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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHI
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1st Endorsement on
4th Mar Div ltr 01971
over 156/nhb dtd
18 May 1945.

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DATE 12/17/2013 BY 60322 SP-7 BJS/STP

From: _____
To: _____

The Commanding General.
Commandant of the Marine Corps.

712 :

- (1) The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
- (2) Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.
- (3) Commander, Fifth Fleet.
- (4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
- (5) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Operations Report - Iwo Jima, 19 February to 16 March, 1945.

1. Forwarded.

2. The 4th Marine Division landed in the assault on Iwo Jima on 19 February on beaches raked by enemy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, and in spite of difficult beach and terrain conditions quickly established a beachhead in its zone of action. Thereafter, until 16 March, this Division pushed the attack against the enemy relentlessly, suffering some 8,000 casualties, including 1,731 dead.

3. The following comments are submitted concerning the comments and recommendations contained in Section V of the basic report:

a. The desirability of operating continuously with the same naval units is obvious, and where at all practicable this should be done even at the expense of minor delays.

b. It is believed that efforts should be made in future operations to neutralize antiaircraft defenses at the earliest practicable time in order to permit precise low-level bombing and the use of rockets against installations capable of interfering with the assault.

c. The necessity for deliberate destruction of blockhouses, pillboxes, weapon emplacements, and other installations interfering with the landing has been emphasized in previous correspondence.

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March 1945.

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d. In connection with the request for "earthquake" bombs, this Headquarters was informed by higher authority that this was not feasible, particularly in view of the late receipt of the request. It is considered, however, that the heaviest available bombs should be used against fortified areas capable of interfering with the landing and repeated requests have been made by this Headquarters for the employment of such bombs during pre-D-day and pre-H-hour attacks.

e. With the present organization of Division Artillery and in order to permit a uniform tactical loading of assault battalions to be landed in LVTs, a minimum of 23 LSTs are required for lifting the Division. An additional LST for employment as an auxiliary command ship would be highly desirable.

f. Numerous LVTs were lost in the operation and in the forward area rehearsal because of inadequate recovery arrangements. LST commanders should not only be impressed with their responsibility for the recovery of tractors in distress but provisions should be made for adequate recovery vessels down-wind from the operation areas to save LVTs and their crews. The LSD appears to be ideal for this purpose.

g. It is considered that control of LSTs and LSMs should be delegated to using agencies as far as practicable consistent with the requirement for general overall control. This can be accomplished much more easily if sufficient LSTs, LSMs, LCTs, and other landing craft are available for the needs of all TRANSDIVs and TRANSRONS. The constant shifting of assignments necessitated by an overall shortage of such vessels resulted in confusion and reduced operating efficiency.

h. The inadequacy of the training of replacement drafts furnished all Divisions of the Corps is appreciated. These units were received too late to permit the necessary integration into the Divisions with the result that when they were committed to combat they were unfamiliar with the leaders of the smaller units to which assigned, were consequently less efficient, and suffered disproportionate casualties.

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i. The inadequacy of aerial photography after the initiation of the attack has been previously pointed out by the Headquarters. It is understood that steps have been taken to provide the proper type planes and qualified personnel to permit the desired photographic coverage. This coverage is particularly important in uncovering targets well forward of the front lines, in order that they may be engaged before the assault troops get so close as to prevent the employment of naval gunfire, artillery, and aircraft bombing.

j. In connection with the need for a heavier and more powerful direct fire weapon than the Bazooka, steps have been taken to procure better weapons for this purpose. The assignment of a mortar battalion to each Division is probably not practicable at this time.

H. SCHMIDT.

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HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

18 May, 1945.

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Via: (1) Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
(3) Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.
(4) Commander, Fifth Fleet.
(5) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and
Pacific Ocean Areas.
(6) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Operations Report - Iwo Jima, 19 February to
16 March, 1945.

References: (a) PacFlt Conf ltr 1CL-45 dtd 1Jan45.
(b) FMF Pac GO 66-44 dtd 27Dec44.
(c) VAC LanFor Spl O 2-45 dtd 26Jan45.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.

1. In accordance with the references, enclosure (A)
is forwarded herewith.

2. In order to preclude the necessity of forwarding
all required copies through the chain of command, an advance
copy has been transmitted directly to each addressee.

C. B. CATES.

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
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CG TraCenFMF Camp Lejeune	(1)	4thPionBn	(1)
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An aerial photograph of Iwo Jima, showing the rugged terrain, craters, and the central mountain. The image is in black and white and serves as the background for the report cover.

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FOURTH
MARINE DIVISION
OPERATIONS REPORT
IWO JIMA
19 FEB TO 16 MAR
1945

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* Pictorial Supplement.	
* Issued Under Separate Cover.	

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B A S I C R E P O R T

TO

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MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

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SECTION I

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

1. PLANNING

(a) The planning phase for the IWO JIMA Operation began with the receipt of the first tentative draft of VAC LANFOR Operation Plan 3-44 on 24 October. Prior to this time the Division had made preliminary studies of probable theaters of operations, which included the VOLCANO Islands, but since no indication of the probable nature of the next operation had been received from higher echelon, this study was superficial only. The VAC LANFOR Chief of Staff and other staff members conducted a beneficial conference with Division and major subordinate unit representatives during the latter part of October where the general plan and scheme of maneuver were presented and discussed.

(b) Based on the VAC LANFOR plan, and using a 1:5,000 map of the landing area, designated Island "X", the Division prepared a map problem which was issued on 27 October to subordinate units as a basis for preparing plans to include scheme of maneuver, boat assignment tables, landing schedules, and embarkation and loading data. This problem was classified SECRET and no connection with a prospective operation was divulged to personnel other than the major unit commanders and those members of the Division staff directly concerned with its preparation.

(c) Upon VAC LANFOR approving the Division's plan for the Island "X" operation, immediate preparation of the first tentative draft of the preferred plan for the IWO JIMA Operation was begun. By 30 November this draft was completed, except for several annexes to be issued later, and distribution was effected. Through the medium of the Island "X" problem and the first tentative draft of the operation plan, subordinate units within the Division were able to initiate early planning for the operation and materially profited thereby.

(d) On 28 October the Division was informed that loading for the operation would begin on 29 November, which required a speeding up of the training schedule and a general intensification of preparations, since 15 December previously had been set as the readiness date. Later, information was received that the target date had been postponed two weeks beyond the original date of 20 January. After an additional two weeks delay in the target date was announced, establishing it then as 19 February, loading dates for major units of the Division were firmed as 27 December and 3 January.

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(e) The final draft of the preferred plan (Div Opn Plan 49-44), based on VAC LANFOR Opn Plan 3-44, dated 23 December, 1944, was prepared and distributed prior to completion of embarkation of major units on 3 January, 1945.

(f) The VAC LANFOR plan envisaged landing the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions abreast, 4th on the right, on the southeastern beaches of IWO JIMA. The 4th Division, landing with two (2) RCT's abreast on a frontage of 2000 yards (4 Battalion beaches), was assigned the mission of seizing objective O-1, which included the major portion of Airfield No. 1, the high ground between Airfields No. 1 and No. 2, and the rugged cliff line on the right flank. The objective varied in distance inland from 2800 yards along the Division boundary on the left to 1000 yards on the extreme right flank, necessitating a turning movement pivoting on the right after establishment of the initial beachhead. The absolute necessity for the early capture of the "Quarry" cliff line during the initial stages of the operation to protect the right flank was foreseen.

The Division was to be embarked in TRANSRON 15 (TRANS-GROUP BAKER), consisting of TRANSDIVS 43, 44, and 45, with 19 LST's, 2 LSD's, and 10 LSM's assigned. LVT's were to be used to land the four (4) assault BLT's, while the reserve BLT's and the Division Reserve (RCT 24) were to utilize LCVP's and LCM's.

(g) The VAC LANFOR plan assigned the Division four (4) battalion beaches, Yellow 1 and 2, Blue 1 and 2. Because of the proximity of Beach Blue 2 to the commanding high ground on the right, and in order to provide a safety factor in maintaining adequate neutralization fires on this high ground during the initial landing, authority was requested and granted to confine the landing of RCT 25 to Beach Blue 1. Accordingly, RCT 25 was directed to land on Beach Blue 1 and rapidly seize Beach Blue 2 in order to permit the early use of this beach for succeeding units and supplies. This decision proved sound in practice.

(h) During the early stages of the planning phase, the usual difficulties, occasioned by the assignment of a new TRANSGROUP with which the Division had never worked, were experienced. Physical separation of the Naval and Marine staffs was an initial handicap. Closer liaison between the TRANSGROUP and 4th Marine Division staffs and particularly between TRANSDIV and RCT staffs would have been preferable during this period when detailed plans were being formulated and orders written. However, in view of the comparatively early embarkation and resultant length of time aboard ship prior to the attack, opportunity was afforded to adjust and perfect coordinated plans.

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(i) The tactical loading of assault elements in LST's was necessarily different for the IWO JIMA Operation than in previous ones in which the Division had participated. For the SAIPAN Operation, at least eight (8) LST's had been provided for each assault RCT, allowing four (4) for each assault BLT in which three (3) rifle companies, BLT support elements, and a proportional part of the LVT(A)'s were embarked. The LVT(A)'s were distributed equally throughout the sixteen (16) LST's assigned assault RCT's. Because of the limited number available to the Division for the IWO JIMA Operation, only seven (7) LST's could be allotted to each assault RCT while five (5) were assigned to the artillery regiment. Each assault RCT in turn assigned three (3) to each assault BLT and embarked the LVT(A)'s of its Armored Amphibian Company in the remaining one (a hospital LST). This plan did not provide equitable distribution of personnel, LST's embarking assault companies being overloaded beyond the capacity limit assigned by higher echelon, particularly those carrying radar and ponton barge personnel. LST's with armored amphibians were loaded to less than one-third capacity in personnel. It is believed that in the future assignment of LST's for an operation, consideration should be given to recommendations submitted by the Division which bases its requirements on the tactical plan, involving the maintenance of tactical unity, rather than upon a mathematical solution arrived at by dividing the number of LVT's and LVT(A)'s to be lifted by the capacity of an LST.

(j) Considerable difficulty was encountered in the allocation of boats to RCT's because higher echelon attempted to assign boats to specific units and tasks within TRANSDIVS. The practice of the RCT and TRANSDIV Commanders making detailed assignment within the TRANSDIV and then submitting to the TRANSGROUP Commander requests for additional boats required has been proven by past experience to be sound.

(k) Early in the planning phase higher echelon required the Division to submit a complete Division landing diagram to include all scheduled and certain call waves. In view of the fact that this data was submitted during the formative stage of the operation plans, changes and improvements in the detailed scheme of landing of subordinate units were inevitable. After the higher echelon diagrams, based on those submitted by Divisions, were prepared and distributed, considerable inertia was experienced in making modifications because approval of higher echelon was required. For instance, if a BLT Commander, basing his decision on last-minute intelligence received, wished to change the number of landing craft in his eighth wave, such change in a call wave was reflected in the plans of at least seven (7) echelons: RCT, TRANSDIV, Division, TRANSGROUP, VAC LANFOR, Naval Attack Force, and the 1st Marine Division.

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While it is recognized that a certain amount of detailed landing data must be distributed by higher command throughout the entire force, it is believed that this data should be limited to only those scheduled waves which will be dispatched by central control, a total of five (5) waves in the IWO JIMA Operation, and the remainder left to the discretion of the RCT and TRANSDIV Commanders to be shown in Division, TRANSGROUP, and subordinate unit orders only.

(1) In providing for the landing of tanks, plans were initially made to utilize LCM's loaded in two (2) LSD's for the two tank companies attached to assault RCT's as had been the standard practice during past operations. After receipt of the M4A3 tanks, replacing the M4A2 with which the 4th Tank Battalion was formerly equipped, tests were conducted in which the new tank, with its added slope plate armor forward and lighter engines in the rear, caused the LCM to be bow-heavy and this means of landing tanks was considered unsafe for actual operations. This fact was transmitted to VAC LANFOR and resulted in additional tests being made with the resultant decision to substitute LSM's for landing all tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion.

(m) Originally, upon orders of the VAC LANFOR Commander, the two tank companies with assault RCT's were scheduled to land at H/30. After discussion and recommendation by the Division that the landing of tanks be left to the discretion of RCT Commanders under whose command they were operating, a change in the landing diagram dated 22 January, which provided that tanks be dispatched as directed by troop commanders, was promulgated by higher echelon. This revised policy proved exceedingly sound in practice.

(n) The final draft of the alternate plan for the IWO JIMA Operation (Div Opn Plan 50-44) was prepared during the MAUI-KAHOOLAWE rehearsal period and distributed during the rehabilitation period in PEARL, a tentative draft having been submitted to VAC LANFOR and distributed to major units during December. This plan was similar in all respects to the preferred plan with the exception that the landing was to be made on the west beaches, preceded by the seizure of KANGOKU ROCK (TA 230) at H-50 minutes, which mission was assigned to one reinforced company of RCT 24, the Division Reserve. The 4th Battalion, 14th Marines, (105mm Howitzer), was to be emplaced on this rock after seizure if conditions permitted.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) The Division was reinforced for the attack on IWO JIMA by attachment of the following units:

2d Armd Amph Bn (less 2 Co's and Hq Det)

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5th Amph Trac Bn
10th Amph Trac Bn
1st JASCO
133d NC Bn (USN)
476th Amph Trk Co (Army)
7th Marine War Dog Plat
1st Prov Rocket Det
Det 8th Field Depot
Det 726th SAW Co (Army)
Det Sig Bn, VAC
442d Port Co (Army)
JICPOA Intelligence Team
24th Repln Draft
30th Repln Draft
VMO-4

(b) The 10th Amph Trac Bn, 1st JASCO, 1st Prov Rocket Det, and VMO-4 had been attached to the Division for previous amphibious operations and, along with the 7th Marine War Dog Plat, 476th Amph Trk Co (Army), 133d NC Bn (USN), and the 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts, participated in the training of the Division. The other units were assigned shortly prior to embarkation but in anticipation of their assignment to the Division for the operation the commanders of these units maintained close liaison with Division Headquarters throughout the planning phase.

3. TRAINING

(a) Upon return from the TINIAN Operation during the latter part of August, 1944, the Division initiated intensive training in accordance with an FMF PAC directive which designated 15 December, 1944, as the readiness date for the next operation. Having suffered 6,658 battle casualties in the SAIPAN and TINIAN operations, the majority being in infantry combat units, the Division initially concentrated on individual and small unit training with the objective of retraining key personnel and readying units for the absorption of large numbers of replacements.

(b) In preparing the training directive, the Division was somewhat handicapped because of a lack of sufficient knowledge as to the nature of the operation for which it was preparing. Based on a prospective operation involving large land masses and jungle-type terrain, the program proved flexible enough to be adapted to small island warfare by making only minor changes and shifting emphasis when the exact nature of the coming operation was revealed. Particular emphasis was then placed on training in the attack of fortified positions, in the detection, marking and neutralization of targets.

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and in the coordination and use of supporting arms. Lessons learned and errors in technique revealed during the MARIANAS campaign were stressed in the Division training directive.

(c) By the first of September, sufficient replacements had been received to bring one infantry regiment and two battalions of another regiment up to strength in enlisted personnel, which permitted these units to reorganize and effect integrated training during the preparation period, the major obstacle then being the lack of officer replacements for these units. Not until 22 November did the remaining regiment and battalion receive assigned quotas of enlisted replacement personnel. The efficiency of the latter units as fighting teams was seriously jeopardized by the late receipt of these replacements. The shortage in junior officers, especially platoon leaders and artillery forward observers, was a distinct handicap in the reorganization and welding together of small units. Two replacement drafts consisting of approximately 2500 total personnel were received on 23 November. Authority was received on 1 December to assign approximately 70 lieutenants from these two recently arrived replacement drafts to infantry units. Thus one regiment and one battalion of another regiment embarked in assigned shipping for the IWO JIMA Operation, during the period 30 December - 3 January, having had 29 days of integrated training with all replacement personnel available. It is obvious that had the original loading date of 29 November been enforced the combat efficiency of the Division would have been seriously impaired. The one-month postponement of the loading date permitted a minimum of reorganization and training of those units which received last-minute replacements.

(d) During November, amphibious exercises consisting of five (5) days for each RCT and 2 three (3) day periods for the artillery regiment were conducted in the MAALAEA BAY area with a training TRANSDIV, composed of vessels from the TRANSGROUP in which the Division was to be embarked. A Division field exercise, based on the scheme of maneuver of the IWO JIMA Operation, was held in the MAALAEA BAY area in conjunction with the landing made at the conclusion of the final RCT amphibious exercise. Two (2) CPX's were held in the camp area using the same scheme of maneuver and designed to perfect technique in the use of supporting arms. Members of the VAC LANFOR staff participated in the second CPX.

(e) Training of the newly-activated 4th Amphibian Truck Company was seriously curtailed because of the late arrival of DUKW's. Some assistance was rendered by the 476th Company (Army) providing materiel for training until arrival of the DUKW's on 4 December. Considerable retraining of tank crews and maintenance personnel of

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the 4th Tank Battalion was occasioned by the substitution of the M4A3 tank for the M4A2, the last of the new tanks being received on 25 October. Because of this fact, infantry-tank training was not as extensive as was desirable. In November, the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment furnished a cadre of approximately half its personnel for the formation of a new unit, and intensive training within a limited time was necessary to bring the detachment up to a satisfactory status of readiness prior to embarkation.

4. REHEARSAL

(a) Plans for rehearsal exercises in the MAUI-KAHOOLAWE Area were formulated and distributed by 21 December, 1944. Embarkation and loading of major units was accomplished during the period 27 December - 3 January, and was as complete in all details for the actual operation as conditions permitted. The rehearsal was designed to simulate, insofar as the beaches and terrain would allow, the preferred plan for the IWO JIMA Operation.

(b) Prior to the scheduled rehearsal, TRANSRON 15 conducted preliminary ship to shore exercises in the MAALAEA BAY Area during the period 6-9 January, primarily to perfect training of landing craft personnel, control personnel, and beach parties. Troops were boated once each day during the exercises, using LCVP's and LCM's exclusively.

(c) Some artificialities were introduced into the rehearsal because of the absence of the 2d Armored and 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalions, and because the 4th Tank Battalion was forced to delay its loading in LSM's until after the rehearsal. While LVT(A)'s of the 2d Armored Battalion were simulated, the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion provided its normal complement of service tractors for RCT 23 and in addition formed a provisional group of fifty (50) training tractors for RCT 25 in lieu of the 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion. This LVT organization permitted RCT 23 to boat and land as scheduled, but only the left BLT of RCT 25 landed in LVT's, the right BLT landing in LCVP's representing LVT's. The six (6) LSM's assigned to lift the two assault tank companies were present during the latter stages of the rehearsal and participated by simulating landings though no tank units were embarked at this time.

(d) Exercises in the formation of boat groups and waves, where troops were embarked and waves dispatched from the line of departure but not landed, were conducted on the first day of rehearsal - 13 January. On 14 January, a landing was made with limited maneuver ashore and reembarkation was completed by 1600. The main tactical landing on MAUI was executed on 15 January with all major units participating, including simulated

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support. The Division remained ashore overnight continuing the tactical problem until reembarkation was begun at daybreak on 16 January. By 1600 all troops had been reembarked and a critique for designated officers was held aboard the AUBURN, flagship of the Naval Attack Force Commander. On 17 January, a simulated landing was made on the north coast of KAHOOLAWA. Fire support ships and support aircraft supported the simulated landing with live ammunition in accordance with the preferred plan. Landing waves were dispatched and approached the beach to within 300 yards, under cover of naval gunfire and air bombardment, at which point landing craft were turned about and no troops were landed. Reembarkation was effected by 1600.

(e) Upon completion of the rehearsal, transfer of troops from LST's to APA's was made in conformity with the embarkation plan for movement from the HAWAIIAN Area, and all units proceeded to PEARL and HONOLULU for rehabilitation.

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SECTION II

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

1. The Division (reinforced) was rehabilitated in PEARL and HONOLULU during the period 18-27 January, 1945. Detailed orders were completed and issued during this period. Shortages of equipment and supplies were filled and all personnel were given liberty. Troops were paid and organized recreational activities were provided from recreational funds.
2. On 22 January the Tractor Flotilla departed for the forward staging area (SAIPAN-TINIAN), followed by the main body (TRANSGROUP BAKER, composed of TRANSDIVS 43, 44, 45), on 27 January. Enroute both convoys stopped at ENIWETOK for fueling and other logistics. Current intelligence information was received and distributed to units concerned, and changes incorporated in Division Operation Plan.
3. Proceeding from ENIWETOK on the 5th and 7th of February, the Tractor Flotilla and TRANSGROUP rendezvoused at the forward staging and rehearsal area (SAIPAN-TINIAN) on 11-15 February. Troops were transferred from APA's to LST's and plans completed for final rehearsal. Because of the distance involved and the limited facilities of LST's during movement to the forward staging and rehearsal area, APA's were loaded to capacity and a minimum number of troops placed aboard LST's (approximately 250 per LST). From the staging area to the objective, LST's were loaded to assigned capacity with assault troops, average load being 380, plus special radar and ponton barrage personnel.
4. Due to inclement weather and high seas the rehearsal exercises scheduled for the 12th of February were cancelled; however, shore fire control parties, which landed on the 11th, conducted communications drills with fire support ships, NGF being simulated.
5. On 13 February, in accordance with plans, the final rehearsal was conducted off the western shore of TINIAN. Troops disembarked in landing craft, boat groups and waves were formed and landings simulated (waves were run to within 300 yards of beach and returned). On this date surf conditions were again unfavorable. After debarking LVT's it was necessary to move the LST area southward to a lee south of GURGUAN POINT in order to obtain more favorable area for reembarking LVT's. This unplanned maneuver resulted in some confusion in that guides of later LCVP and LCM waves, who could not see the beaches and had used certain LST's to guide on, changed course to the southward in direction of the LST's, thereby failing to reach the LD and landing area.

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SECTION II - MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE.

6. On 15 February a conference of the Division Staff and unit commanders was held. Completed plans were discussed and clarified, latest intelligence information distributed, and final instructions issued.

7. On 16 February the Division departed for the objective, arriving and landing on D-Day at H-Hour (0900, 19 February).

8. Enroute to the objective, ship-board training was carried out as practical; tactical employment of weapons was emphasized; staff planning was continuous, and thorough briefing of all personnel, to include the individual rifleman and coxswain, was completed. Physical exercise and drill for officers and enlisted personnel was carried on daily, resulting in minimum loss of combat efficiency though some personnel were embarked approximately 54 days.

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SECTION III

SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS

1. LANDING PLAN

(a) General. As outlined under Section I, the major concept of the landing on IWC JIMA envisaged the landing on contiguous beaches with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions abreast, 4th Division on the right, each to land with two (2) RCTs in assault. The beaches assigned the Division were Yellow One, Yellow Two, Blue One and Blue Two and all averaged 500 yards in width. A careful preliminary study of available intelligence material disclosed conditions which indicated the inadvisability of attempting to force a landing on Beach Blue Two. Upon representation to V Amphibious Corps, permission was obtained to land initially only on three beaches and, once ashore, the scheme of maneuver was to provide for securing the use of Beach Blue Two by the early seizure of the "Quarry" cliff line which directly dominated Blue Beaches, particularly Blue Two, on the right (North) flank. Information available indicated that beach conditions would permit the use of all types of landing craft in landing troops, equipment and supplies, but adverse weather and wind conditions during the landing could be expected to seriously effect the landing of small craft. Further, the loose volcanic sand, which formed the beach and extended inland with a series of steep ledges, would probably be impassable for wheeled vehicles (except light equipment such as "jeeps") without improvement or construction of egress roads, and could even be difficult for the operation of tracked vehicles.

(b) Division Plan of Landing. Based on the above considerations, the Division plan provided for landing two (2) RCTs abreast, RCT 23 on the left (Yellow Beaches) and RCT 25 on the right (Blue Beach One). RCT 23 was to land with two (2) BLTs abreast, 1/23 on Yellow One and 2/23 on Yellow Two, with the RCT Reserve, BLT 3/23, prepared to land on either beach as directed. RCT 25 was also to land with two (2) BLTs in assault but, due to restriction of employing only Blue One initially, the landing formation was necessarily different. BLT 1/25, assigned the left and center of Blue One, was to land with two (2) companies abreast in assault and one in reserve; BLT 3/25, assigned the right of Blue One, was to land in a column of companies, while the RCT Reserve, BLT 2/25, was assigned the use of the entire beach area when ordered to land. The Division Reserve, RCT 24, was to be prepared to land, on order, on any designated beach(es) employing either one of two plans. Plan Number One was designed to land two (2) BLTs abreast, BLT 2/24 on the left and BLT 1/24 on the right, with BLT 3/24, the RCT Reserve, to follow either leading BLT as beaching conditions or the tactical situation indicated. Plan Number Two called for the RCT to land on one beach in a column of BLTs in order - 2/24, 1/24, 3/24.

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SHIP BOARDING OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

(c) Employment of Ships and Landing Craft. To implement the tactical plans, the following ships and landing craft were available:

12 APA
4 AKA
19 LST
16 LSM
34 LVT(A)
200 LVT(2) or (4)
100 DUKW

No serious problem concerning the loading of the APAs or the AKAs presented itself. Ample liaison and conferences between the Division and Transron 15 placed this part of the loading and the tactical use thereof on a sound footing. Allocation of remaining landing ships and craft was as follows:

(1) LSTs. Of the total 19 LSTs available five (5) were assigned the artillery and fourteen (14) to the two (2) assault RCTs. One (1) additional LST (specially fitted) was shared by the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions as an CY-1 carrier for planes that were not embarked on CVEs. The fourteen (14) LSTs for the combat teams were divided equally between the two (2) assault RCTs. There was included in this number, however, several "special" LSTs which were greatly restricted as to their usefulness to the Division. Two (2) of the number were designated as "Hospital Evacuation LSTs", and were fitted for emergency operating, sorting and dispatch of casualties to the transports. They could be used to transport troops to the Target but had to be completely unloaded of all Marine personnel and equipment prior to How-Hour. In order to comply with this restriction these two LSTs were employed to transport the two (2) companies of LVT(A)s that were attached to the assault RCTs. As each of these units went aboard with only four (4) officers and one hundred and fifteen (115) enlisted about one-third of the available troop capacity was gainfully employed. Two of the LSTs in the group assigned to RCT 23 were "Radar" ships. Considerable effort was expended towards having these units split for the assignment of one each to the assault RCTs. This could not be done. Aside from cutting down on the passenger capacity by ten (10) officers and fifty (50) enlisted, these ships had to be either in a completely loaded or a completely unloaded state (and Radars calibrated accordingly). This seriously restricted the value of these two ships to the RCT to which assigned. Nine (9) of the LSTs carried LCTs top-deck loaded. While it is recognized that the LCTs are a necessity at the objective, the loading of these craft on a large number of LSTs seriously curtails troop space aboard for a long voyage, restricts the amount of LVT maintenance equipment that can be carried, and discharge of

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SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

the LCT usually conflicts with the employment of the LST at a time when its use is desired by the Division.

(2) LSMs. The employment of the LSMs provided another problem. Originally scheduled to have ten (10) of these ships, the Division planned to use these as follows:

- 4 - To carry Shore Party equipment of the Pioneer and Naval Construction Battalion, two (2) for each assault RCT Shore Party.
- 5 - To the Division Reserve - Four (4) for tanks, and one (1) for "half-tracks".
- 1 - To the Division Signal Company - To carry heavy radio equipment, trucks pre-loaded with signal equipment and supplies, and radio "jeeps".

After detailed plans for loading had been made, and after loading had started, the Division was informed that LSM 60 (assigned Shore Party) was the Flotilla Flag and that its troop capacity must not exceed one (1) officer and seven (7) enlisted. This restriction was later modified to the extent that the Division was permitted to embark a total of one (1) officer and twenty-eight (28) enlisted from the Staging Area to the Target. Similarly, the "rated" capacity of two (2) officers and fifty-two (52) enlisted for the remainder was reduced to two (2) officers and thirty-nine (39) enlisted. During the Planning Phase, the Division discovered from tests that the LSM(3) could not carry the M4A3 tank with any degree of assurance that it could be beached and the tank landed successfully. Further tests were conducted by higher authority at Pearl and this resulted in the assignment, after the Division was completely loaded, of six (6) additional LSMs to carry the tanks of the two (2) companies assigned to the assault RCTs. This delay caused considerable confusion at the time, and some trouble later at the Target since little opportunity was had for contact with the Commander of the LSM unit with respect to the employment of these vessels, but was a wise decision as conditions at the Target would have prevented the landing of tanks in LCMs on the Division beaches.

(3) Other Craft. The LVT(A)s and LVTs were equally divided between the two (2) assault RCTs except for maintenance LVTs and four (4) LVT(4)s which were assigned to the artillery to assure the early landing of four (4) radio "jeeps". The overall assignment of the craft available was designed to land the maximum number of combatant elements in the shortest possible time and resulted in the following:

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SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Continued)

The leading wave was composed of 34 LVT(A)s, 17 to each assault RCT. Upon beaching these craft (except the right flank platoon on Blue One) were to proceed inland past the first terrace to positions in defilade and there to cover the landing of personnel in succeeding waves. The right flank platoon on Blue One was to echelon to the right rear to furnish protection to that flank, from positions ashore or afloat, as appropriate.

The assault waves of the BLTs were embarked in LVT(2)s and LVT(4)s. The personnel were to be disembarked generally in the lee of the first terrace. Scaling ladders were provided for ascent of this terrace if necessary. When empty, LVTs were to clear the beaches promptly by utilizing as a return route the boundaries between beaches in order not to interfere with following waves. The personnel LVTs were to re-embark on their parent LSTs, except those from the "raider" ships which were assigned for return to certain designated artillery LSTs and other infantry LSTs, and immediately start loading high priority supplies from the preloads for landing on order.

All Support Groups, the Reserve BLTs of the assault RCTs, and the Division Reserve (RCT 24) were boated in LCVPs and LCMs.

The Division Shore Party had its advance elements embarked in LVTs, all of its heavy and most of its light equipment on the four (4) LSMs assigned, and with the bulk of the personnel and the remainder of the light equipment embarked in boats with the various Support Groups.

All combatant vehicles of the Tank Battalion were embarked in LSMs. The companies attached to the assault RCTs were originally scheduled to land as a "timed" wave, the 7th, but the landing schedule was changed to allow this wave to be dispatched as an "on call" wave by the RCT Commanders. The tanks attached to the Division Reserve were to be prepared to land on Division order to reinforce those with the assault RCTs, or if not so employed they were to be landed "on call" by the Division Reserve Commander.

The Artillery Battalions were embarked in four (4) LSTs with their weapons, essential equipment, and about 2/3 of a Unit of Fire of ammunition preloaded in DUKWs. The fifth LST assigned to the artillery carried the bulk of the Regimental H&S Battery plus additional ammunition preloaded in DUKWs. Four (4) radio "jeeps" were carried preloaded in LVT(4)s. Landing was to be effected by battalions in a column of batteries (batteries in column) at ten (10) minute intervals. DUKWs were to be launched and units landed on Division order with the two (2) battalions assigned to direct support of the assault RCTs landing first, 1/14

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SECTION III SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

on Blue One and 2/14 on Yellow One. The remaining battalions were to land on Yellow One on Division order. Battalion reconnaissance parties were to land with the rear elements of the assault BLTs to determine the exact positions in the pre-selected areas. Upon landing all DUKWs, except those fitted with "A" frames, were to return immediately to their parent LSTs to continue landing additional personnel and ammunition.

For details of landing, including special landing instruction and assignment of landing craft, see Annex KING to Division Operation Plan Number 49-44.

2. CONTROL PLAN

(a) General. In general, the control for the operation was carried out as outlined in Chapter 9, Transport Doctrine, Amphibious Force, Pacific. Control was to be effected by a series of Control Vessels carrying both Naval and Troop Control Officers to coordinate and control all movement to and from the beaches.

(b) Brief of Plan. The following craft and personnel were employed to effect control of the landing:

(1) Over-all control was centralized in a "Central Control Vessel". This vessel, a PC(E), carried the Senior Naval Control Officer; the VAC LANFOR tactical, logistical, LVT and Shore Party Officers. This party controlled the dispatching of the first five (5) scheduled assault waves of both Divisions. After the dispatch of these waves this vessel became a "free boat" and exercised such general supervisory control as was necessary.

(2) Each Division had a "Transron Control Vessel" for the coordination of the landing of the various elements of the Division. This vessel, a PC(S), exercised general over-all control of Yellow and Blue Beaches for this Division. It carried the Transron Control Officer (Naval - representative of Commander Transport Squadron 15) and the tactical, logistical, artillery, Shore Party, and LVT Officers representing this Division. Control of the first five (5) scheduled waves was funneled through this vessel and, by plan, passed direct control of all remaining waves directly to the "Beach Control Vessels" operating under it. This vessel, like the "Central Control Vessel" became a "free boat" after the dispatch of the first five (5) waves but in general maintained a position in the center of and seaward of the LD to provide a landmark for elements coming in to land. After the landing of the assault echelons, this vessel dispatched elements for landing to either Yellow or Blue Beach Controls, depending on surf and beach conditions.

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(3) Operating under the Transron Control were two (2) "Beach Control Vessels", one for Yellow and one for Blue Beaches. These vessels, PCs, were to maintain position on the center of their respective sections of the LD and controlled the actual dispatching of all scheduled and "on call" waves. They also controlled the actual dispatching of all other elements as directed by the Transron Control Vessel. This vessel carried the TransDiv Control Officer (Naval) and initially the RCT Commander and his staff. When the RCT Commander landed, he left logistical and LVT officers aboard to act as his representatives.

(4) The Control Plan for this landing was essentially the same as that used for the Marianas Operation with respect to craft employed with the following exceptions:

SCs, designated as "LD Marker Vessels", were employed to mark the division of the colored beaches on the LD. They maintained position on the "Beach Control Vessels" and, although they were without control personnel, were equipped with flags and communication equipment in order to take over control functions in event any control vessel became a casualty.

As in previous landings, LCP(L)s were employed to guide assault waves into the beach. However, in previous landings the initial wave guide was an LCC which, after guiding in the leading wave, took station about 300 yards offshore to serve as traffic control boat for control of the movement of craft to and from the beach as directed by "Beach Control Vessel". In this landing, LCP(L)s were used instead of LCCs for guiding the initial wave and as traffic control boats. The Division protested this change but were overruled by higher authority.

3. THE LANDING

(a) D-Day (19 February, 1945).

(1) The transports entered the Transport Area about 0630. The Division and RCT control personnel were located and dispatched to their respective control vessels. By 0730 all control vessels were in position and the LD had been established. By 0810 all control personnel were reported embarked in their respective control vessels. The Assistant Division Commander and party were embarked in PC(S)-1455 as a roving observer for the Division Commander. A member from the Underwater Demolition Teams, that had surveyed the island's beaches prior to D-Day, was aboard Transron, Yellow and Blue Beach Control Vessels to give the late information on the beaches. An interview with the representative

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SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

aboard the Transron Control Vessel revealed no information not previously received aboard the USS BAYFIELD on D minus 1.

(2) The Division tactical air observer was on station at 0810. Radio reception aboard the Transron Control Vessel, ranging from poor to unreadable, seriously compromised the value of the observers reports.

(3) The weather was favorable for the landing, the sky clear, visibility unlimited, except for the smoke and dust, resulting from NGF bombardment, carried by an 8 to 12 knot northerly wind obscuring the beaches. The sea was calm with slight swells of 2 to 3 feet, and, because of the wind direction, the surf conditions were ideal. During the NGF bombardment no enemy fire fell on the LD or in the Transport and LST Areas.

(4) The LSTs closed the LST Area in good order and immediately began launching LVTs. By 0807 all LSTs had launched their amphibious vehicles for the assault waves and at 0815 the first three waves were formed and waiting in position in rear of the LD. The remaining waves were forming up and it was now apparent that How-Hour could be met.

(5) During the pre-How-Hour air strike the smoke and dust cleared from the beaches and some enemy fire, of small caliber (probably anti-aircraft misses) fell in the vicinity of the LD but with no apparent effect.

(6) Preceded by LCS(L)s (the LCI(G)s were unable to participate in the assault due to heavy damage received in preliminary operations prior to D-Day), and on signal from Central Control, the first assault wave crossed the LD for all beaches at 0830 on time. The next four assault waves followed on schedule and were dispatched as planned by Central Control. Beach Control Vessels then took over and the dispatching progressed without incident through the scheduled waves to and including 6 Able. Only a small amount of gunfire was observed in the boat lanes during the approach to the beaches and no serious damage or casualties were reported.

(7) The first and second waves were approximately one (1) minute late in landing on all beaches. At this time only light small arms fire and moderate mortar fire fell on the beach area. The LVT(A)s were able to cross the first terrace by access routes cut in the ledges by NGF and bombing and take positions to cover the landing of the personnel wave. The right flank platoon on Beach Blue One operated as planned. The personnel LVTs of the initial waves were rapidly unloaded and retracted and this resulted in few casualties to tractor personnel and equipment.

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SECTION III SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

The anticipated flooding of the beach areas did not materialize. Enemy fire was relatively light until the lifting of the NGF. This lifting approximately coincided with the landing of the BLT Reserve elements and as succeeding waves came into the beach, the effect of large caliber mortar and artillery fire began to exact a heavy toll in personnel and equipment.

(8) Having discharged their LVT(A)s, LSTs 930 and 931 (Hospital Evacuation LSTs) launched one (1) pontoon barge each and took station 300 yards in rear of their respective Beach Control Vessels. They were on station, prepared to receive casualties by 0940.

(9) As a result of heavy mortar fire on and adjacent to the beaches it was necessary to delay the "call" waves of the assault battalions somewhat to permit clearing the beaches by the assault troops and tanks. Progress up the steep slope from the waters edge to the edge of the airfield was slow. During this time casualties to reconnaissance, liaison, advance Beach and Shore Parties were high. Boat crews and boats were hard hit. Casualties to LVTs and personnel were surprisingly light. The remaining waves of the assault BLTs were sent in as beaching conditions permitted and by 1200 all elements, except two (2) LCMs of BLT 2/23, (carrying 37mm guns) had been dispatched to the beaches.

(10) The preliminary reconnaissance by tank liaison personnel indicated the feasibility of employing tanks in support of the assault waves and this information was passed back to the RCT Commanders. RCT 23 dispatched its tank LSMs to Yellow Beaches at 0930 and RCT 25 dispatched theirs at 1005 to land on Blue One. The LSMs hit Yellow Beaches about 0940 and were immediately taken under heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire. Those landing on Blue One hit the beach about 1020 and came under the same type of intense enemy fire. Four (4) of the six (6) LSMs were hit, two (2) seriously. All succeeded in discharging their tanks except LSM 216. This ship initially beached on Yellow Two and one (1) tank was discharged, but it bogged down at the mouth of the ramp. After a half hour's efforts failed to move the tank, the LSM retracted and beached again about 1100 on Yellow One but again beach conditions prevented the landing of any tanks. By this time it had been hit repeatedly and again withdrew and proceeded to the Evacuation LST 930 to discharge its casualties. The tanks aboard had not been seriously damaged. At 1245 it again beached on another portion of Yellow One and succeeded in discharging its tanks by 1300. The Division would like to comment on the high degree of courage and tenacity shown by these ships in beaching and accomplishing the landing of this vital equipment in the face of the heaviest enemy mortar and artillery

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SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

fire yet seen in any operation. On the request of assault RCT Commanders, Division authorized the landing of the tanks attached to the Division Reserve to reinforce the Tank Companies attached to the assault RCTs. The first elements of this unit were landed from an LSM on Yellow One at 1155 and consisted of two (2) tank retrievers and an armored dozer. At 1255 another LSM landed a Tank Platoon on Blue One for attachment to the Tank Company operating with RCT 25 and this was followed by two (2) other platoons which also landed on Blue One and were completely ashore by 1330. The remaining Tank Platoon was landed on Yellow One about 1400 and was attached to the Company operating with RCT 23. These LSMs also were subject to enemy artillery and mortar fire but it was neither as accurate or as intense and no serious damage resulted.

(11) The reserve BLTs of the assault RCTs commenced landing at 1233 when the first wave of BLT 2/25 was dispatched to Blue One. The last elements of this unit, except some vehicles in LCMs completed landing by 1327. The first wave of BLT 3/23, RCT 23 Reserve, crossed the LD at 1313 and the last elements of this unit were ashore by 1358.

(12) In addition to the destroyed enemy craft that blocked portions of the Division's landing beaches, partial reports received by 1230 indicated that there were at least five (5) LVTs, one (1) medium tank and an undisclosed number of LCVPs blocking the beaches. Moderate enemy mortar and artillery fire continued on the Division beaches and water areas adjacent thereto. Beached boats with no crews, because of casualties resulting from enemy fire, had broached, filled with sand and water, and, because of the excess weight, could not be retracted by the LCP(R) salvage boats of the Beachmasters. This condition became progressively worse and by late afternoon the beaches were so cluttered with wrecked craft that strict traffic control was necessary to effect any unloading. This condition seriously restricted the landing of the Support Groups of the assault RCTs.

(13) Advance elements of the Shore and Beach Party landed with the reserve units of the assault BLTs on all beaches. The four (4) LSMs carrying heavy Shore Party equipment were on station in rear of the LD by 1000 ready to land on order. Due to the congested condition on the beaches, restricted landing areas for LSMs, and the necessity of favoring the landing of LSMs with tanks, the landing of Shore Party equipment embarked in LSMs was considerably delayed. This resulted in the bulk of the Shore and Beach Party, landing with the BLT Support Group (boated in LCVPs and some equipment boated in LCMs), having little essential equipment to work with on the beaches. Furthermore, some of these units landed on the wrong beaches, the bulk of the Shore Party for

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SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd)

Yellow One landing on the north half of Red Two. Also, casualties to Shore and Beach Parties were extremely heavy, particularly in officers, and this further added to the difficulty of establishing control on the beaches. It was not until 1400 that CPs and communication facilities were firmly established on all beaches. By 1730 Regimental Shore Party CPs were established and sufficient equipment had been landed from Shore Party LSMs to start effective clearance of the beach areas and the construction of access roads.

(14) Beginning about 1300 various elements of the BLT and RCT Support Groups of the assault RCTs were landed as the situation ashore and the beach conditions permitted. Practically all the BLT Support Groups were landed except some vehicular elements which could obviously not be moved off the beach. A larger proportion of the RCT Support Groups was not landed but the bulk of the more essential elements were ashore by darkness. Both RCTs had advance CPs established ashore about 1600 and both CPs completely established by 1700.

(15) The artillery LSTs were in position and ready to launch DUKWs, on order, by How-Hour. At this time, Battalion Reconnaissance Parties embarked in LCVPs and reported to the Division Artillery Officer who was with the Control Party on the Transron Control Vessel. By 1200 information from the assault RCT Commanders indicated that the front lines were still about 200 yards short of Airfield #1 and that in general, conditions ashore were not favorable for the landing of artillery. It was decided however, to land the Reconnaissance Parties and the Party from 1/14 landed on Blue One about 1240. The Party from 2/14 landed on Yellow One about 1340 and this was followed by 3/14 and 4/14, the latter landing about 1430. Division ordered the landing of the two direct support battalions at 1400. These were launched without incident, proceeded to their respective Beach Control Vessels and commenced landing about 1500. 1/14 (75mm Pk How) moved into position off Beach Blue One without too much trouble and was emplaced, registered, and firing direct support missions at 1740. 2/14 (105mm How), landing on Beach Yellow One had an extremely difficult time getting into position. Each piece had to be unloaded from the DUKW just above the water line and then dragged across the beach and into position by an angledozer. This Battalion was in position, registered, and firing direct support missions by 2130. The landing and emplacement of these units was accomplished under heavy artillery and mortar fire and was an extremely difficult operation. Both units were emplaced close to the beach areas, which facilitated ammunition supply but further complicated the already congested condition of this area. 3/14 was launched about 1530 but on the receipt of further information from shore was ordered to re-embark as was the Regimental Reconnaissance Party which had started ashore about 1610.

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SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

No attempt was made to land 4/14 on D-Day. DUKWs which landed the two direct support battalions, returned to their parent LSTs and commenced loading additional personnel and ammunition.

(16) Division ordered two BLTs of the Division Reserve (RCT 24) boated at 1404. BLT 1/24 was ordered to report to Blue Beach Control Vessel and BLT 2/24 to Yellow Beach Control Vessel. At 1500 Division ordered the landing of these two BLTs and, effective upon landing, 1/24 was attached to RCT 25 and 2/24 attached to RCT 23. However, the Division specified that these BLTs were not to be committed without Division authority. Beginning at 1615 the first wave of 1/24 crossed the LD for Beach Blue One and was followed at five (5) minute intervals by the remaining waves and all were ashore by 1700. The first wave of 2/24 was dispatched for landing on Yellow Two at 1620 and was followed by its remaining waves at five (5) minute intervals and this unit was completely ashore by 1650. At 1509 Division ordered the landing of the remainder of the Division Reserve on Blue One. By 1800 BLT 3/24 and the Regimental Support Group, including the Regimental Headquarters, was in position behind the LD off Blue One. The first wave of 3/24 crossed the LD for landing at 1820. The remaining waves followed at five minute intervals and these in turn were followed by the waves of the Support Group. Part of the Regimental Weapons Company and the attached sections of the War Dog Platoon were not landed. By 2030 RCT 24 (less 1/24, 2/24, and the elements noted above) was completely ashore, in Division Reserve, in an assembly area in TA 166 F.

(17) By darkness on D-Day the situation in general was that the Division had three (3) RCTs (less some Support Group elements), two (2) Battalions of artillery, and a fair amount of heavy Shore Party equipment ashore. It held the line which included the eastern edge of Airfield #1 and was of sufficient depth inland from Blue Beaches to guarantee the successful holding of the beachhead. It had firm contact with the 5th Marine Division on the left and sufficient supplies of water, ammunition and rations were ashore to support the continuation of operations in the morning. Although surf and sea conditions had been favorable for the landing of all types of landing craft, beach conditions and the continuous mortar and artillery fire had seriously hampered the actual landing of troops and equipment. This fire had disabled heavy equipment, LVTs, and landing craft on the beach and in the surf to such an extent that only by prompt salvage could the beaches be prepared for the next days operation. It was apparent at this time that the equipment available to the Beachmasters was not sufficiently heavy to either salvage or junk the wrecked craft on the Division beaches. Night retirement of Transports and LSTs was conducted in accordance with plans. Certain APAs, including ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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designated LSTs and all Control Craft remained in the area. The LSMs also remained in the area and certain of these commenced unloading of priority supplies and equipment from the APAs which remained in the area.

(b) D plus 1-Day (20 February, 1945).

(1) During the hours of darkness of D/D plus 1 every effort was made to improve the condition of the beaches, both at the waters edge and inland. Intermittent enemy harassing fire fell in the beach areas all night and interfered with this activity but some progress was made in clearing the beaches by using LVTs, a certain number of which had been retained ashore, to carry supplies and equipment forward to the front line units. No appreciable progress was made in clearing the beaches of wrecked landing craft except for the landing of a few LVTs with emergency supplies, particularly 81mm mortar ammunition, no unloading was accomplished during the night. Information was received that bad weather could be expected in the morning with the wind shifting to the south and east.

(2) At 0800, Transon Control was informed that RCT 21 (3rd Mar Div - VAC LANFCR Reserve) had been ordered to boat and report to it for landing. This RCT was to be landed on Division beaches as directed by Corps order. Since the exact landing area of this unit was not known, it was decided to rendezvous one (1) BLT in the vicinity of Yellow Beach Control Vessel, a second in the vicinity of Blue Beach Control Vessel, and a third BLT plus the Regimental Headquarters Group in the vicinity of the Transon Control Vessel. This was done, in order, as the boat groups arrived. The Regimental Commander with some of his staff and the Naval Officer in charge of the Boat Groups, were brought aboard the Transon Control Vessel. Effective control was maintained in this manner and the RCT could have been landed on any beach or beaches as desired. However, as the situation developed ashore during the day, it became apparent that they could not be utilized successfully ashore and were re-embarked on their parent APAs late in the afternoon.

(3) The expected bad weather developed, and by mid-morning the landing of LCVPs and LCMs became extremely hazardous due to surf conditions on beaches and more of these craft were wrecked. Progress in clearing the beaches of wrecked craft was poor. Higher Naval control finally managed to get some empty LSMs close-in to assist in clearing wrecked craft from the beach and landed UDT personnel to begin blasting wrecks where they could not be towed off. By noon it was decided to confine the landing of additional troops, supplies and equipment to LSMs though some Beach Controls managed to land a

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lee of the larger vessels while they were beached. During the day additional Support Group elements including additional Shore Party equipment were gotten ashore and by late afternoon some progress had been made in clearing the areas inland of the beaches and some egress roads had been started.

(4) The remainder of the Division artillery was landed. 3/14 commenced landing on Yellow One at 1500 and was in position, registered in firing missions by 1730. Considerable difficulty was experienced in landing 4/14. The LST in which it was embarked could not be found for several hours and it was finally located in an outer area endeavoring to recover an LCT launching cradle. It was finally brought in and commenced launching DUKWs about 1600. By this time sea conditions were very rough and, while the launched DUKWs were being assembled for movement to the LD for landing, seven (7) of them swamped and sank, including five (5) carrying artillery pieces. The remainder of 4/14 commenced landing on Yellow One at 1735 and was in position ready to fire by midnight. The Regimental Command Group landed on Yellow One at 1705 and the advance CP was established ashore at 1715.

(5) Throughout the day, other than LSMs, all supplies were landed in LVTs and DUKWs which operated continuously in unloading the pre-loads on the LSTs. The beaches and adjacent water areas continued to receive intermittent enemy artillery and mortar fire which varied in intensity from moderate to heavy. Casualties remained heavy and the facilities of the Evacuation LSTs were stretched to the limit. The rough seas seriously hampered the transfer of casualties from LVTs and DUKWs, which were evacuating them from the beaches, to the pontoon barge rigged alongside each LST. The Division Shore Party Group landed about 1500 on Blue One and the Division Shore Party CP opened just off the left flank of this beach at 1530.

(6) By darkness the situation ashore had cleared considerably and the Division in conjunction with the 5th Marine Division on the left held all of Airfield #1 and some gains had been made on the right. Although the supply of some items, principally mortar ammunition became critical, sufficient supplies had been built up ashore to support all elements during the night and assure the continuation of the attack in the morning. Night retirement of ships with the same exception as for the night of D-Day was again executed.

(c) D plus 2-Day (21 February, 1945).

(1) During the hours of darkness efforts continued in the clearance of the areas inland from the beaches.

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SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

and the few "Weasels" that were available continued to be the only effective means of moving supplies inland. Some progress had been made in establishing beach dumps. Intermittent enemy fire on the beaches continued during the night but had lessened in intensity.

(2) RCT 21 was again boated and reported to Transron Control for landing under the same conditions as prevailed on D plus 1. The Regimental Control Party reported aboard the Transron Control Vessel about 1030. About 1100 orders were received to land this unit on Yellow Beaches. An advance Regimental CP was landed on Yellow One at 1200 and the CP established at 1225 in the vicinity of TA 148 D. The leading BLT commenced landing on Yellow One and Two at 1335 and was followed by the remaining BLTs at half hour intervals. By 1720 all elements were ashore and in an assembly area in TA 148 D, H, I. N. At 1800 RCT 21 was attached to the Division by VAC order.

(3) The landing of the remaining elements of the RCT Support Groups continued throughout the day as beach conditions permitted. Weather conditions remained bad with rough seas and high surf. Enemy fire remained fairly heavy on all beaches. LCS(L)s were employed during the day in an effort to clear wrecked craft from beaches and though some progress was made the effort was only partially successful. Additional Beach Parties were landed and conditions inland from the beaches began to improve. A few LSTs were beached and succeeded unloading badly needed supplies. The landing of other supplies was confined to the use of LSMs, LVTs and DUKWs. In the case of LVTs and DUKWs, refueling began to become a major problem as the supplies on LSTs became exhausted. Priority was given to landing gasoline in LSMs for establishment of dumps ashore. The ADC came aboard the Transron Control Vessel about 1200 and was landed on Blue One at 1255. He established himself initially at the CP of our CT 24, the Division Reserve. It had been planned to land the advance Division CP about 1400 but an LSM could not be obtained to land the necessary communication and other equipment. Evacuation of casualties through the Evacuation LSTs continued adequate but the difficulties increased as the continual battering of the pontoon transfer barge by landing craft resulted in damage to some of the pontoon sections and they filled with water. This caused a bad list and for a time it was thought that one barge might sink. Additional barges were launched but proved unmanageable in the high winds and rough seas. Several of these finally drifted ashore and further blocked the beach area. By darkness the Division had achieved further advances, particularly on the right, and the supply situation ashore remained essentially the same. Additional LSTs and APAs were kept in the area over night to facilitate unloading of

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SECTION III. TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

essential supplies. Remaining ships executed night retirement as usual.

(d) D plus 3-Day to D plus 4-Day (22 - 23 February, 1945).

(1) During this period the remaining elements of the Division, except some Motor Transport and Medical, were landed. Weather conditions remained unfavorable and even LVTs and DUKWs had difficulty. Intermittent enemy artillery and mortar fire continued on all beach areas. Unloading was confined principally to the use of LSMs, LCTs and a few remaining operational LCMs that could be beached in the lee of the larger craft. An increasing number of LSTs were beached and unloading was greatly increased but remained "selective" from APAs and AKAs. Beach conditions began to improve rapidly as additional Shore Party equipment and personnel was landed.

(2) The advance Division CP was landed on Yellow One in an LSM at 1500 D plus 3 and was established and opened at 1600 in TA 164 Y. The Commanding General with the bulk of the Division CP landed on Yellow Two by LSM about 1100 on D plus 4. The Division CP closed on the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) at 0930 and opened ashore at the advance CP location at the same time. The Division Chief of Staff with a small party remained on the BAYFIELD to act as liaison with the Commander of Transron 15 and he and his party landed early in the morning of D plus 7. All elements of the Division were ashore by D plus 7 and general unloading started at that time. With the landing of the Commanding General, the Tactical Control Officer on the Transron Control Vessel also landed but Logistical and LVT Control Officers remained aboard until unloading was completed.

(3) For complete details of the landing of the various elements of the Division during this period, see Section IV and the various reports of the organizations concerned, which are appended as Annexes to this Report.

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SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) The number of LSTs made available to the Division for this operation was insufficient, particularly in view of the restrictions placed on the "special" types (Evacuation Control and Radar). It is considered that a minimum of eight (8) LSTs should be assigned to each assault RCT as anything less than this number will not permit adequate tactical loading and landing of two assault BLTs. The presence of one LST, specially fitted for casualty evacuation control, in such a group would not be a serious interference as their use is deemed essential. However the present practice of embarking numbers of Naval personnel, both officers and men, who are concerned with the launching and operation of pontoon barges and causeways and of LCTs should be stopped. These personnel should be carried to the target in other shipping and transferred to the LSTs after the assault troops have been landed. If any "radar" LSTs are required in future operations they should be in addition to those assigned assault echelons.

(b) Although cooperation and coordination by the LST Flotilla Commander was excellent throughout the operation and the initial operation of the LSTs was highly satisfactory, considerable difficulty was encountered with Group Commanders and, in particular, with individual Ship Commanders in the days following the initial landing. This trouble had to do principally with effecting movement as desired, and required by the difficult unloading conditions on the beaches, and with the old complaint of failure of individual LSTs to retrieve LVTs for necessary fueling and servicing. In connection with moving LSTs, a great deal of the difficulty encountered was caused by the refusal of Commander Transron 15 to delegate the necessary authority to his Transron Control Officer and his insistence on the personal issuance of such orders. In connection with the failure of certain LSTs to retrieve LVTs, particularly at night and under bad sea conditions, the Captains of these ships should have had impressed upon them the responsibility they bear in accomplishing this task when engaged in operation with these vehicles. A number of LVTs were lost during this operation due to the refusal of LSTs to take them aboard.

(c) As with the LSTs, the initial operations of the LSMs were very satisfactory but the same difficulty in obtaining their movement, loading, and beaching prevailed and to even a greater extent than with the LSTs. Some of this difficulty can be attributed to the fact that uncertainty of loading plans had existed

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SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

until the initial Rehearsal in MAALAEA BAY had been completed. Further, these ships sailed in early echelons with the tractor groups and this prevented Division officers holding conferences with the Flotilla and Group Commanders in order to coordinate and explain the plans of the Division for their use. However, as in the case of the LSTs, the major factor with respect to these ships was the refusal of Commander Transron 15 to delegate authority for their control to the Transron Control Officers.

(d) The landing control for this operation, although it accomplished the task, was neither as satisfactory nor as efficient as for the Marianas Operation. In addition to the remarks noted in paragraphs(b) and (c) above, there was a tendency to centralize control in the higher echelons. There is no question that the dispatch of the initial assault waves should be a direct function of "Central Control". However, it is believed that this control should not extend beyond the first three waves and that thereafter the dispatching of all waves and all traffic to and from the beach should be a direct function of the "Beach Control" (TransDiv Control Officer). The function of the "Transron Control", and of the "Central Control" after the dispatch of the initial waves, should be supervisory in character. This system was employed with great success in the SAIPAN and TINIAN Operations. Another change which seriously hampered control of landing operations was the substitution of LCP(L)s for LCCs as traffic control boats off the individual beaches. These craft had inadequate communication and were too small. To the coxswains and drivers of boats and landing vehicles they looked just like another salvage boat cruising around off the beaches. At no time were these craft able to exercise effective control over traffic to and from the beaches. LCP(L)s are excellent as tenders for all Control Ships and their use should be confined to this duty.

(e) Control communications, with the exception of the LCP(L)s used as traffic control boats, were excellent. The greatest improvement was noted in the communication channels set up for control of LVTs which worked better than any previous operation.

(f) Refueling of LVTs developed into a major problem during the first four days of the operation. During the critical unloading period, from D plus 1 to D plus 4, considerable delay resulted from inadequate arrangements for refueling. Although the Division had recommended that each LST carry from 80 to 100 drums of gasoline this was cut to twenty (20) drums by the Navy. This small

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SHIP TO SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

quantity of fuel was quickly consumed and by D plus 1 little if any remained on the LSTs. The use of LCVPs and LCMs as Bowser boats became difficult during the bad weather condition which developed beginning with D plus 1. The plan to use pontoon barges, anchored close in shore, as refueling points failed as these craft proved unmanageable in the high wind and rough sea. The problem was partially solved by transferring large quantities of gasoline from APAs and AKAs to LSTs. This was a slow expedient and could have been obviated by the initial loading of adequate fuel on LSTs at the Staging Area. The problem was not finally solved until, by the use of LSMs, adequate dumps were established ashore.

(f) The use of specially fitted LSTs for Casualty Evacuation Control was highly satisfactory and a great improvement over the methods used in previous operations. From a control standpoint, the only difficulty encountered was with the pontoon barges, which were secured alongside the LST and were used for casualty transfer stations. The continual pounding of these barges in the rough sea by LVTs, DUKWs and landing craft, punctured some of the pontoon sections and caused them to fill with water. This caused the barges to list and made the transfer of casualties very difficult. It is recommended that these barges be well protected by fenders in the future. Some difficulty was experienced in keeping these LSTs on proper station but on the whole their performance was excellent.

(g) One of the most serious, and largest problems encountered during the landing operation was the clearance of wrecked landing craft and equipment from the beaches. The use of LCP(R)s to salvage wrecked craft from beaches proved wholly inadequate and in future operations where similar conditions are anticipated, a heavier type craft, specially fitted and manned by trained personnel will be necessary. Also Beach and Shore Parties will have to receive more training in the clearance of wrecked landing vehicles and equipment from beach areas.

(h) The initial operations of Beach and Shore Parties were badly disorganized. The main contributing factors to this condition were as follows:

Practically all of the Beach Parties and the great majority of the Shore Party were composed of "green" personnel and lacked training and experience. In the case of the Shore Parties, the bulk was composed of Naval Construction Battalion and Marine Replacement Draft personnel who had no previous experience and had been attached to the Division a very short time prior to the operation.

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SHORE OPERATIONS (Cont'd).

Heavy casualties, particularly on D and D plus 1, which in some cases amounted to 80% of the officers and 50% of the men. This resulted in a loss of control and seriously retarded the initial organization of the beaches.

The inability, due to the extremely difficult landing conditions, of getting sufficient heavy Shore Party equipment ashore early.

Conditions began to improve on D plus 2 with the landing of Replacement Beach Parties and additional Shore Party personnel and equipment. Thereafter progress in beach organization was rapid and by the afternoon of D plus 3 was well under control. By D plus 5 the Division beaches were in an excellent state of organization and continued so, though landing conditions remained bad and the beach areas remained under intermittent enemy fire for many days.

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SECTION IV

NARRATIVE OF OPERATION (See Map, Progress of Attack)

1. FROM 0900, 19 FEB 45 TO 1800, 19 FEB 45 (D-DAY)

(a) Elements of TF 54, reinforced by elements of TF 58, opened fire at sunrise in assigned areas of responsibility. Beginning at H-45 all fires were intensified in scheduled series along the beaches and on the Division right flank, concentrating along the beaches from H-15 to H-3, thereupon initiating a rolling barrage forward of the assault forces. Shifting progressively 200 yards inland, fires were 400 yards from the beach when the first wave landed.

(b) B-24's of CTF 94 bombed the objective at 0730. From H-55 to H-35 support aircraft of CTF 58 and CTG 52.2 struck the flanks and the landing beaches. From H-5 to about H-2 these units repeated their attacks on the flanks and beaches, strafing inland 200 yards in advance of the assault troops.

(c) After the above Naval and Air bombardment, the 4th Marine Division (Reinforced) landed at 0902 on Beaches Yellow and Blue with the mission of seizing O-1 in its zone of action, and protecting the right (NE) flank of the Corps, then on Corps order seize O-2, prepared for further operations to seize the remainder of IWO JIMA within its zone, in order to assist in securing that Island and destroying the enemy thereon.

(d) Initial resistance was moderate but increased in intensity as units advanced inland. No obstacles and only a few land mines were encountered on the beaches, but the entire zone of action of the Division was subjected to heavy artillery, rocket, mortar, machine gun and rifle fire throughout the day, causing many casualties, particularly along the beaches. The fire from these weapons was delivered from commanding ground and from well-concealed, well emplaced concrete pillboxes, blockhouses, and caves.

(e) Inland from Yellow Beaches to Airfield No. 1 the advance of troops and movement of vehicles was impeded by loose volcanic sand, abrupt terraces, and a generally steep slope from the water's edge to the rim of Airfield No. 1.

(f) Egress from Blue Beach was similar, and, in addition, on the extreme right of the zone the entire area of both Blue and Yellow beaches was dominated by sheer cliffs rising above quarries, necessitating hazardous envelopments from the

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order to neutralize those heights.

(g) RCT 23 landed on Yellow Beaches at 0902 with two battalions abreast, 1/23 on the left and 2/23 on the right. The attack of this Combat Team was of necessity a direct frontal assault against well-organized positions on commanding ground. At 1655 orders were issued to BLT 2/24 to pass through BLT 2/23 in order to seize the edge of the Airfield. The passage of lines in this instance was postponed until just prior to darkness because of the initiation of an advance by BLT 2/23 to the Airfield. Relief by BLT 2/24 was completed by 1915.

(h) RCT 25 landed on Beach Blue 1 at 0902 with two battalions abreast, 1/25 on the left and 3/25 on the right. Because of the restricted beach area (Beach Blue 2 being untenable for a landing), the right battalion landed in a column of companies. This RCT had the difficult mission not only of landing on a narrow front, but also of delivering a frontal attack with the left battalion, as the right battalion, preparing for the envelopment of the heights, executed a turning movement to the right to secure Beach Blue 2.

Casualties were excessive, necessitating the passage of reserve battalions of both RCT's through assault units. The Commanding General, in order not to allay the momentum of the attack, ordered two BLT's of the Division Reserve, RCT 24, to land and to support the attack. BLT 1/24 landed on Blue Beaches at 1632 and was attached to RCT 25. BLT 2/24 landed at 1650 and was attached to RCT 23 as noted above. RCT 24, less two BLT's, completed landing at 2030 and assembled in TA's 165 O and 166 FG as Division Reserve.

(i) 14th Marines. 1/14 in direct support of RCT 25, landed and was in position at 1700. 2/14 in direct support of RCT 23, landed and was in position at 2130. The Artillery Regiment less these two battalions remained afloat.

(j) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "C", in normal attachment to RCT 23, began landing from LSM's on Yellow Beaches at 0940. Because of difficulties at the beach and inland the company did not complete landing until 1300. Considerable difficulty was experienced in negotiating the loose sand; as a result of that and enemy fire many tanks became inoperative. Because RCT 23 anticipated the need for additional tanks to knock out pillboxes holding up the advance, one platoon of Company "B" was attached to Company "C".

Company "A", attached to RCT 25, began landing from LSM's on Blue Beaches at 1017. Although the terrain inland from these beaches was somewhat more favorable for the use of tanks

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than was that of Yellow Beaches, many mines were encountered causing delay in the commitment of the entire company. Because of initial losses and slightly more favorable terrain, Company "B", less one platoon, was attached to Company "A" during the afternoon.

(k) Call fires were delivered by ships assigned to assault battalions. VOF planes, employed with organic ship spot planes, augmented the search for the location of enemy artillery. Counter-battery fires against both AA and artillery positions predominated.

(l) Although the penetration was not as deep as had been planned, the landing was successful. The combination of a well organized and determined defense and extremely rough terrain retarded the progress of the attack, but by late afternoon the assault elements had reached the edge of Airfield No. 1, and had made considerable progress towards the capture of the high ground on the right flank (See Map, Progress of Attack).

(m) At 1700 all units were ordered to consolidate positions on the most favorable ground, prepared to continue the attack at 0830, 20 February, 1945.

(n) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair, visibility good, except where impaired by smoke drifting across the beaches from the northwest.

2. FROM 1800, 19 FEB 45 TO 1800, 20 FEB 45 (D PLUS 1)

(a) During the night units consolidated positions, established firm contact and made preparations for continuing the attack the following morning. Contact was maintained with the enemy during the night. All units received mortar and artillery fire, but otherwise the night was generally quiet, with no other activity to the front. BLT 2/24, attached to RCT 23, relieved BLT 2/23 in the line at 1915, BLT 2/23 reverting to RCT 23 Reserve.

(b) Because BLT 3/25 had sustained approximately 50% casualties, and because complete relief over such rugged terrain was impracticable, two companies of BLT 1/24, which was attached to RCT 25, were attached to BLT 3/25 in the line at 1845 and 2053 respectively.

(c) Assigned units of TF 54, reinforced by elements of TF 58, provided illumination and harassing fires during the night.

(d) Black Cat night observers were employed but were unable to carry out missions effectively because of low visibility.

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other reasons discussed elsewhere.

(e) Supported by CTF 54 and elements of CTF 58 firing a coordinated naval gunfire preparation from K-15 to K-hour, and by two direct support artillery battalions furnishing local preparation fires for each assault RCT, the Division continued the attack in accordance with VAC LANFOR order, at King-hour, 0830, to seize O-1. There was no change in boundaries or formation; the Line of Departure was the present front lines.

(f) Progress was made initially on the left, but intense machine gun, heavy mortar and artillery fire halted the advance during the afternoon. Little progress was made on the right.

(g) RCT 23, with BLT 3/23 on the left, BLT 2/24 on the right, and BLT's 1/23 and 2/23 in reserve, jumped off at the following hours: 3/23 at 0830, and 2/24, delayed for 15 minutes while waiting for tanks to support the attack, at 0845. The northern and eastern extremities of Airfield No. 1 were secured after a slow and bitterly contested advance. Upon the request of the 4th Division, VAC LANFOR ordered elements of the 2d Bomb Disposal Company to land at 1517 and to report immediately to RCT 23, reporting to the 4th Engineer Battalion when its duty with RCT 23 was completed.

(h) RCT 25, with 1/25, 2/25 and 1/24 in line and 3/25 in reserve, continued the attack on the left at 0855 in conjunction with RCT 23. Little progress was made by this Combat Team, since it was imperative that it conform to the advance of RCT 23. Due to difficulty in distinguishing boundaries on the ground, BLT 1/25 fought most of the day in zone of RCT 23. BLT 2/24, attached to RCT 23, assumed control of this area at 1630. One platoon of Company "B", 4th Engineer Battalion was attached to BLT 1/24 for the period and operated with RCT 25.

(i) RCT 24, less two BLT's, remained in an assembly area in TA's 166 FG and 165 O as Division Reserve.

(j) The 14th Marines, less 4/14, completed landing at 1730. Battalions immediately went into position and registered to support the attack.

(k) 4th Tank Battalion. Companies "A" and "B" (less 1 platoon), attached to RCT 25, remained on call most of the day while Engineers removed land mines obstructing the advance. Company "C" (plus 1 platoon of Company "B") supported the advance of RCT 23, destroying pillboxes, automatic weapons and gun positions.

(l) Naval Gunfire. Units of CTF 54 and elements of CTF 58

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continued to support the action with normal fires. Throughout the day fires were intense, with all ships searching for enemy gun and mortar positions. Fires were restricted about 1500, as the cloud cover after that time hindered float and VOF planes.

(m) Aircraft from the above units executed support missions. Search and attack patrols were instituted by CASCU as requested by the Division. Day and night tactical observers were employed together with NGF and artillery air spotters. VMO-4 did not operate. Air support began securing at 1515.

(n) Although combat efficiency was reduced by heavy casualties, the capture of Airfield No. 1 was completed by 1600, and an advance of 200 to 1000 yards had been made across the Division front.

(o) At 1630, upon VAC LANFOR order, units were ordered to consolidate positions on the most favorable ground, prepared to continue the attack at 0810, 21 February, 1945. Particular attention was directed toward anti-mechanized defense and firm contact between units right and left.

(p) Weather and Visibility. Weather fair and visibility good during the morning. In the afternoon clouds and rain decreased the visibility.

3. FROM 1800, 20 FEB 45 TO 1800, 21 FEB 45 (D PLUS 2)

(a) Because of enemy activity and troop movements along the entire front, RCT 24 (less 2 BLT's), the Division Reserve, was ordered at 2015 to be prepared to be committed on short notice in the zones of action of either RCT 23 or RCT 25.

(b) Rockets or heavy mortars were reported falling in the zones of action of each Combat Team and in rear areas. Since this fire supposedly was coming not only from the front but from the rear in the vicinity of Suribachi, the 5th Marine Division artillery was requested to execute counter-battery fire on positions in the Suribachi area. RCT 23 reported enemy tanks in the vicinity of TA 181 S; artillery fires were requested, and the tanks were either destroyed or dispersed.

(c) At 0443 RCT 25 repulsed an attempted infiltration by approximately 100 Japs; the lines remained intact and all the enemy were killed.

(d) Naval Gunfire. Units of CTF 54 and CTF 58 maintained

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illumination and intensive harassing and defensive fires throughout the night in an attempt to reduce enemy shelling to a minimum.

(e) Night air observers furnished one flight, returning to base on account of bad weather.

(f) 14th Marines. 4/14 completed landing and was in position and registering at 0638. Four guns were operative. Seven had been lost in the sinking of DUKW's, and one was ineffective because of defective sights.

(g) Following a coordinated artillery and naval gunfire preparation from King-hour minus 20 to King-hour plus 20, and a prepared air strike (Plan VICTOR) from King-hour plus 20 to King-hour plus 40, with air on call prior to King-hour, the Division continued the attack at 0810, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 1-45, to seize O-2.

(h) The boundary between the 4th and 5th Divisions was the present boundary extended, inclusive to the 5th Division, and the boundary between Regiments was as shown on the map, Progress of Attack.

(i) Substantial gains were made initially on the right, but further progress was held up by extensive minefields, intense artillery, mortar, automatic weapons, and sniper fire. An advance of approximately 500 yards was made on the extreme left of the Division zone of action.

(j) RCT 23, with BLT 2/23 on the left and BLT 2/24 on the right, BLT's 1/23 and 3/23 following at 600 yards, continued the attack at King-hour. The advance against numerous pillboxes and extensive minefields was extremely costly and very slow. All minefields were expertly covered by mortar, artillery and machine gun fire. Advance was made only on the left of the RCT zone, where slightly defiladed areas permitted local and restricted envelopments. Maximum use was made of all supporting weapons. Because of the difficult and unusual terrain it was necessary for mutual contact to be established on the left between BLT 1/27 and RCT 23.

(k) RCT 25, with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, 1/24 in line, and 3/25 in reserve, continued the attack at King-hour. BLT 1/24 held in its initial position until 0930 in order to straighten lines. The attack of the RCT was held up initially by minefields laid in rough terrain and by sniper, artillery and heavy mortar fire. Under constant pressure, resistance gradually weakened in the center, and gains varied from 50 to 300 yards.

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At 1430 BLT 3/25 was committed between BLT 1/25 and BLT 2/25. This move was necessary because of a gap which had developed between the two BLT's. One (1) company of BLT 3/25 and one (1) company of BLT 1/24 was reconstituted as RCT reserve.

(1) RCT 24, less 2 BLT's, continued in Division Reserve in the same location.

(m) At 0915 the following message was received from VAC LANFOR: "Prepare receive RCT 21 (3d Mar Div) Yellow Beaches, beginning 1130. Assign assembly area your zone. Will be released to you on your request to assist if required in capture of Airfield No. 2. If and when committed designate one integrated RCT as VAC LANFOR Reserve and assign suitable assembly area." The time date group on the message was 210726.

As a result of this message Division requested either the Commanding Officer or the Executive Officer of RCT 21 to report aboard the Division Command Ship for orientation. The RCT Commander so reported.

(n) At 0917 RCT 21 was directed to land as ordered, assemble in TA 165 HIKLMQ, and await orders. Upon Division request, RCT 21 was released to Division control at 1630. The last unit completed landing at 1720, and the entire RCT was in the above assembly areas at the close of the period.

(o) 14th Marines. 1/14 fired 1500 rounds on preparation, counter-battery and continued supporting the attack of RCT 25. 2/14 fired 463 rounds on preparation and continued the support of the attack of RCT 23. This battalion also fired 900 rounds on counter-battery fire across the Division front. 3/14 reinforced 1/14 on preparation and counter-battery fires.

(p) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" and Company "B" (less 1 platoon), attached to RCT 25, supported the advance and were instrumental in driving the enemy from the heights of the quarry and cliff areas on the extreme right of the Division zone.

Company "C" (plus 1 platoon), attached to RCT 23, supported the advance but was held up by the enforced slowness of the engineers in removing minefields under heavy fire.

(q) Aviation. CTF 58 and CTG 52.2 continued to furnish air missions, and CTF 58 voluntarily increased the size and number of air strikes effectively. AA fire damaged two Division Tactical Air Observation planes. Naval Gunfire and Artillery air support.

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conducted normal missions. VMO-4 did not operate.

(r) Naval Gunfire. Units of CTF 54, reinforced by elements of CTF 58, continued to support the attack. Numerous enemy artillery, mortar and rocket positions were reported silenced or neutralized.

Additional elements of CTF 58 arrived in the early morning to reinforce the present naval strength and were assigned sectors of responsibility along with other major units in an "all-out" attempt to search out and neutralize enemy artillery and mortar fire. Organic float planes were again reinforced with VOF planes to provide a maximum of observation facilities for firing ships.

(s) Amphibious Tractors. The 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion was assigned to beach defense and the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion was utilized to supply all units with ammunition and supplies.

(t) Assistant Division Commander. The ADC was ordered to land at 1245 to report on beach conditions and to select a site for the Division CP. He arrived at the CP of RCT 24 at 1255 and reported that although conditions on Beaches Yellow 1 and 2 were still unsatisfactory on account of wreckage of boats and equipment, conditions were improving and beaches were sufficiently open to receive some LCM's and LCVP's. He further reported that Beach Blue 1 was under fire and that an ammunition dump had been hit. Explosions from this dump were endangering both Blue and Yellow Beaches.

At 1502 the ADC reported that after consulting with all RCT Commanders he was of the opinion that the Division CP should remain aboard the USS BAYFIELD until February 22d.

At 1600 the ADC further reported that because of the location of assembly areas of RCT 21 and the general congestion of beaches and inland areas he recommended that RCT 21, instead of relieving RCT 25, as had been previously planned, relieve RCT 23. The Commanding General concurred in the above recommendations.

(u) At 1620 all units were ordered to consolidate present positions for the night at 1700, paying particular attention to contact with adjacent units.

(v) At 1654 the following warning order was issued: "This is a warning order. RCT 21 released to 4th Division. Intend pass 21st through 23d, repeat 23d, tomorrow AM to continue attack present 23d zone. Elements 4th Tank Battalion and 14th Marines, now

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SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

supporting 23d, will be assigned direct support 21st effective upon relief of 23d. Arrange necessary liaison and reconnaissance prior thereto. Upon relief, intend revert 23d to VAC LANFOR Reserve. RCT 23 recommend assembly area."

(w) Combat efficiency, reduced by heavy casualties and battle fatigue, was estimated at the close of the period to be 68%.

(x) An advance of 50 to 500 yards had been made across the Division front. The enemy, employing every type of weapon available, was being slowly driven back yard by yard to strongly prepared positions across the center of the Island.

(y) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair and visibility was good.

4. FROM 1800, 21 FEB 45 TO 1800, 22 FEB 45 (D PLUS 3)

(a) During the night units consolidated their positions on the most favorable ground and established contact with units on the flanks.

(b) RCT's 21 and 23 carried out preparations to effect the relief indicated in the Warning Order of 211654.

(c) RCT 23 reported the following areas in which the Combat Team would assemble upon the relief of RCT 21: TA's 164 E - 165 PQGU. BLT 2/24 was to be assembled in TA's 165 E and 166 A, as requested by RCT 24.

(d) At 2300 RCT 23 reported that 3/23 was receiving a counter-attack in force on its right and that the enemy was converging on RJ 283 in TA 182 P, along the road from NE to E. At 2340 RCT 23 reported that requested Artillery and Naval Gunfire appeared to have dispersed the attack, but that enemy units were still attempting infiltration. At 0020 small groups were observed and fired on in TA 182 G.

(e) In order to be prepared for any eventuality the Division, at 2345, requested permission from VAC LANFOR to use RCT 21, if necessary, to assist in repelling the counter-attack. The request was approved at 0030, with the provision that an equivalent VAC LANFOR Reserve be reconstituted as soon as practicable after the commitment.

(f) At 2325 information was received that the 4th Battalion, 13th Marines, would be available to the 4th Division.

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SECTION 1. AREA OF OPERATION.

1200, 22 February.

(g) At 0300 RCT 25 reported three air bombs were dropped behind its lines.

(h) At 0400 VAC LANFOR confirmed flash red from 0316 to 0346.

(i) Night air observers did not reach the objective because of the air raid. The Division night air observer's base was damaged and inoperative, necessitating his transfer.

(j) Direct and general fire support ships, plus one mortar boat unit, fired extensive harassing missions throughout the night, neutralizing enemy installations and, on several occasions, assisting in turning back enemy counter-attacks.

(k) At 0630 the Second Section, 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, was ordered attached to RCT 21 as of 0700.

(l) At 0741 the Division requested the Division Control Officer, on board PC(S) 1452, to have LVT(4)'s meet the Advance CP Party on Beach Yellow 1 about 1000. The Party was to report to the Control Officer before landing. At 0830, however, a message was received from the Division Control Officer, stating that surf conditions would not permit landing boats and suggesting that the Party remain aboard the USS BAYFIELD until conditions improved.

(m) At 0755 RCT 21, in the process of relieving RCT 23, reported that it was held up by enemy fire and requested that BLT 2/24 remain in its present position and be attached to RCT 21 in order to continue the attack at King-hour. The Commanding General did not approve.

(n) Preceded by a coordinated artillery and Naval Gunfire preparation from King minus 20 to King-hour, and with 8 VF and 8 VT planes on station at 0730, the Division continued the attack, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 2-45, at King-hour, 0835. Objective - O-2; boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(o) RCT 21, with BLT 1/21 on the right, BLT 2/21 on the left, and BLT 3/21 in reserve, was to pass through RCT 23 prior to 0730. Although movement to effect relief was begun at 0500, progress was slow because of heavy mortar and machine gun fire. This RCT was under heavy fire from the first movement towards the

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of departure. Defenses to the front were composed of a succession of mutually supporting pillboxes emplaced on the high ground between Airfields No. 1 and No. 2. These pillboxes were equally well protected on the flanks, and only direct hits by major caliber weapons seemed to have any effect on them. Because of the restricted nature of the area, and because of the excellent defensive system installed, any maneuver, other than a frontal assault, was impossible. As a result, progress during the morning was very slow, but in the afternoon the lines were advanced 200 to 400 yards.

(p) RCT 25 assisted the advance of RCT 21 by fire, but necessarily had to conform to the movement of RCT 21 on its left. The resistance and defenses in this zone were just as determined as those previously described. On the right RCT 25 advanced approximately 50 to 200 yards. On the left a substantial gain was made during the day but at dark the lines had to be pulled back to the original morning position in order to tie in with RCT 21 on the left.

(q) RCT 24, less 2 BLT's, continued in Division Reserve until BLT 2/24 was relieved and reverted to parent control at 1200. BLT 2/24 assembled in TA's 165 E and 166 A. After BLT 2/24 had reverted to RCT control, the RCT, less 1 BLT, was placed in Division Reserve and so disposed as to cover any attempted breakthrough within the Division zone.

(r) RCT 23, less the mortar platoons of BLT's 1/23 and 3/23, was to assemble in TA's 165 PUQLGH, 164 E, with the CP at 164 Y, as VAC LANFOR Reserve. Mortar platoons supporting the advance of RCT 21 were to be released about 1500. Complete relief of this RCT by RCT 21, however, was not effected until approximately 1130, and it was late afternoon before RCT 23 was entirely disengaged. By the end of the period, the RCT was in the designated assembly area and had made reconnaissance of the zones of action of RCT 25 and the 5th Division.

(s) 14th Marines. 1/14 furnished direct support for RCT 25 and 2/14 supported RCT 21. 3/14 was in general support until 1300, when it reinforced the fires of 2/14. 4/14 was in general support. 4/13 was in general support until 1200.

At 1229 the Division, upon VAC LANFOR Order, directed the 14th Marines to prepare to move further inland in order to clear beaches to permit general unloading. The movement was initiated at 1425, after the suggested plan of displacement was approved by VAC LANFOR.

(t) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" and Company "B" (less

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1 platoon) continued support of RCT 25. Company "C" (plus 1 platoon) was attached to RCT 21 and closely supported the attack of that Combat Team in the area northeast of Airfield No. 1. This company operated principally against pillboxes and automatic weapons. Within the battalion, 26 tanks were operational.

(u) Aviation. CTF 52.2 continued furnishing support aviation. No land based aircraft were employed, and requests for air missions exceeded the capabilities of the available planes. No Division Tactical Observers were on station. LST 776, equipped with "Brodie Gear", was requested to advise regarding the feasibility of launching and recovering VMO planes. RCT 23 and the 4th Engineer Battalion were also directed to submit recommendations as to whether or not Airfield No. 1 was suitable for the operation of VMO planes.

(v) Naval Gunfire. CTF 54, reinforced, continued to support the attack with normal fires. The search for enemy gun positions on the objective was continued throughout the day until the air spot was forced down by lack of visibility.

(w) Division Advance CP. At 1139 the Division Advance CP Party started loading into LSM 59, and a message was sent to the Division Tactical Control Officer to have a guide and four (4) LVT(4)'s meet the party on Beach Yellow 1. At 1500, after reporting to the Control Vessel and transferring the Artillery Officer from that Vessel to the LSM, the Advance CP Party landed on Beach Yellow 1. The party contacted the guide and proceeded to TA 164 Y, arriving there at 1600. An Advance Division CP was immediately set up. Because of unfavorable surf and other conditions, it was suggested that the Division Commander wait until the following day to establish the Division CP. The ADC concurred in this recommendation.

(x) Because of weather conditions favorable for an enemy counter-attack, RCT 24, at 1617, was ordered to be prepared to relieve RCT 25 on short notice.

(y) At 1623 the following dispatch was sent to all units: "Consolidate 1630. Weather ideal for enemy concentration and counter-attack tonight. Prepare strong defense in depth. Maintain contact with adjacent units on flanks."

(z) Combat efficiency, reduced by casualties and battle fatigue was estimated to be 65%.

(aa) An advance of from 100 to 400 yards against determined resistance was made across the Division. The Division

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prepared to continue the attack on the following day.

(bb) Weather and Visibility. Strong winds from the south-east, rain during the afternoon, moderate swells, and unfavorable surf conditions prevailed during the day.

5. FROM 1800, 22 FEB 45 TO 1800, 23 FEB 45 (D PLUS 4)

(a) At 2000 the Division Advance CP Party notified the Division that the Advance CP had been set up and that communication with all units had been established. At 0930, 23 February, the 4th Division CP was closed on the USS BAYFIELD and opened at the Advance CP (TA 164 Y) at the same time.

(b) At 2000 it was requested that the Division Reconnaissance Company, the 4th Platoon of the Military Police Company, and the remainder of Headquarters Company be ordered ashore the following morning for assignment to CP security. The Reconnaissance Company was ordered to land at daylight.

(c) At 2140 it was suggested, upon recommendation of the ADC and RCT 23 Commander, that replacements be released to RCT 23 the next day, and to RCT 25 when that unit reverted to Division Reserve.

(d) At 0019, in Division Operation Order No. 4-45, RCT 24 was ordered to relieve RCT 25 in its zone prior to 0600. BLT 1/24, previously attached to RCT 25, passed to the control of RCT 24 at 0600. BLT 2/25, in the line, also passed to control of RCT 24 at 0600. The Division Order further directed that RCT 24 attack in the present RCT 25 zone and seize O-2, and assist RCT 21 in the capture of Airfield No. 2. When relieved, RCT 25, less BLT 2/25, was to assemble in the vicinity of TA's 165 EJ and 166 AF as Division Reserve.

(e) At 0415 the following message was received from enemy sources: "About 50 enemy troops infiltrated 200 meters northeast of TA 201 QR. Use password SAHURA." Artillery was fired on this position with unknown results.

(f) At 0455 a small counter-attack was repulsed by RCT 25 in TA 183 CD.

(g) No Division tactical missions were flown during the night.

(h) Night harassing fires by Naval Units.

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because of the depleted supply of ammunition, but few urgent missions were required.

(i) Other than the above, and enemy mortar fire falling in the Division Advance CP at 0645, the night was comparatively quiet.

(j) At 0725 a dispatch received from VAC LANFOR stated that in order to facilitate the advance of the 5th Division and to assist in the advance of RCT 21, the 5th Division was authorized to move into the 4th Division zone over the boundary as necessary. Close liaison was to be maintained between adjacent Regiments on the boundary. All units concerned were to be kept advised of the plan and actual movements. VAC LANFOR was to be advised if a change in boundaries would facilitate the general advance.

(k) Following an intense coordinated artillery and naval gunfire preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, and a prepared air strike, plan VICTOR, from King plus 15 to King plus 30, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0730, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 3-45 Objective and boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(l) RCT 21, on the left, was unable to make any advance except on the extreme right because of difficult terrain and extremely stubborn enemy resistance from pillboxes, emplaced tanks, 47mm guns sighted so as to cover both airstrips of Airfield No. 2, high velocity flat trajectory weapons, heavy artillery, mortar and automatic weapons fire. Continuous artillery, naval gunfire and air support failed to break the determined and fanatical resistance in this critical area.

(m) RCT 24, on the right, with BLT's 2/24, 3/24, 1/24 in line and 2/25 in reserve, advanced an average of 300 yards along the entire front against moderate to heavy resistance. BLT's 2/24 and 3/24 moved out in time to effect the relief of RCT 25, but because of broken and rugged terrain and enemy fire were not able to completely effect this relief until about 0830. At 0850 all units of this Combat Team, supported by tanks, were moving forward all along the line.

(n) RCT 25, less BLT 2/25, when relieved, reverted to Division Reserve in TA's 165 EJ and 166 AF.

(o) RCT 23 continued in Corps Reserve.

(p) 14th Marines. 3/14 furnished support for RCT 24, 2/14 for RCT 21. 1/14 and 4/14 were in support of RCT 23.

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5th Division, was attached to the 14th Marines in general support from 0730 until the end of the period. All battalions fired extensive counter-battery, preparation and close support fires. A flash ranging team was established at 1430 on SURIBACHI Volcano and began operations. At 1900 sound ranging was established and located six (6) targets.

(q) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" and Company "B" (less 1 platoon) were attached to RCT 24. Company "C" (plus 1 platoon) was attached to RCT 21. Neither company was employed to any great extent because of the unusually rough terrain. At the end of the period 27 tanks were operational.

(r) Aviation. CTF 52.2 furnished normal support missions. No land-based aircraft were available, and no tactical day missions were flown. VMO-4 did not operate. The Division Radar Station, capable of reporting bogies at ranges exceeding 90 miles, was established. Work was started on the northeast-southwest airstrip of Airfield No. 1 for the use of VMO-4 planes.

(s) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack. Normal support missions were fired throughout the day with emphasis remaining on counter-battery fire.

(t) Since RCT 21 had been unable to advance during the day, and because RCT 24 was restricted to conform to the movements of RCT 21, and in order to prepare for a concentrated and intensive bombardment, warning orders to consolidate for the night were issued to RCT 24 at 1500, and to RCT 21 at 1630. RCT 21 was in contact with RCT 26 on its left, but a gap of about 200 yards, which was filled by RCT 24 before night, existed on the right.

(u) Combat Efficiency, reduced by casualties and battle fatigue, was estimated to be 63%.

(v) Moderate advance was made on the right of the Division front, but no appreciable gain was made on the left. The Division was prepared to continue the attack on the following day.

(w) Weather and Visibility. Winds gusty 15 to 25 MPH from the northwest, overcast most of period, visibility from 4 miles to unlimited, sea and surf moderated during period permitting landing of small boats.

(x) At 1605 VAC LANFOR offered the Division the use of 7.2 rockets if they could be unloaded. The Division replied affirmatively and requested that the landing of 14 rockets be completed by 1700.

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be expedited.

(y) At 1639 the Division requested that 4/13 remain attached during the night because of the extended front. VAC LANFOR concurred. 4/13 was available to reinforce the 14th until time for preparation fires on 24 February.

6. FROM 1800, 23 FEB 45 TO 1800, 24 FEB 45 (D PLUS 5)

(a) The enemy attempted small patrol infiltration during the night in front of both RCT's, but only seven enemy were reported to have been able to get through the lines. Contact with the enemy was maintained throughout the night. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire fell in all areas during the hours of darkness.

(b) There were no night air observers on station.

(c) The 726th SAW Radar functioned efficiently during air raids but sustained damage during the night.

(d) Direct support ships, reinforced by gunboat units and VAC LANFOR controlled general support ships, fired harassing and illuminating fires throughout the night.

(e) Following a deliberate destructive bombardment by Naval Units with 8" or heavier caliber, from King minus 75 to King minus 15, against targets in areas 199 GHLMJO and 200 FKP, with a maximum VT and VF air strike on TA 199 O and 200 KP from King minus 15 to King-hour, and a coordinated Corps-Division Artillery concentration and preparation from King minus 30 to King-hour, the Division, making the main effort on the left, continued the attack, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 4-45, at King-hour, 0915, to seize a limited objective, O-1A. Boundary between Divisions - present boundary from front lines to TA 199 V, northwest to TA 216 W, 216 M; Line of Departure - present front lines.

(f) RCT 21, with BLT 3/21 on the right, BLT 2/21 on the left, and BLT 1/21 in reserve, and with Companies "A" and "C", 4th Tank Battalion attached but under tactical control of Commanding Officer 5th Tank Battalion, was supposed to coordinate its attack with that of the tanks. The attack, delayed by the late arrival of the tanks, was not initiated until 0930; thus a great deal of the effectiveness of the preparation was lost. During the morning a slow advance closed out the reentrant in the zone of BLT 3/21, and by 1130 the RCT had reached a general line along the southeastern edge of Airfield No. 2. Stiff resistance from the opposite side of the airstrip and from mortar and artillery positions to the north

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necessitated another preparation and coordinated tank-infantry attack, which was launched at 1330. In bitter action throughout the afternoon, the RCT advanced a considerable distance on the right, with practically no gain on the left, as shown on the map, Progress of Attack. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, difficulty was experienced in establishing firm contact between the 5th Division on the left and RCT 24 on the right. Gaps existed in the line across the east-west airstrip of Airfield No. 2 but were covered by fire.

(g) RCT 24, with BLT 2/25 attached, and with BLT's (from left to right) 2/24, 3/24 and 1/24 in the line, attacked at 0915 on schedule, and, with a steady, slow, and determined advance reached positions as shown on the map, Progress of Attack. In TA 183 CD, which was called "Charlie-Dog Ridge", bloody fighting occurred until this ridge was finally neutralized at 1520. Numerous emplacements in this area and in the draw immediately north were holding up the advance of RCT 21. At 1700 this RCT was ordered to consolidate for the night. Contact was maintained with RCT 21 on the left, and the shore line on the right.

(h) RCT 25, less 2/25, was in Division Reserve in TA 165 EJ and 166 AF. At 1600 BLT 1/25 was attached to RCT 24 for use as RCT Reserve during the night.

(i) RCT 23 continued in VAC LANFOR Reserve. BLT 2/23 was employed to mop up Airfield No. 1 and revetments adjacent thereto, but encountered no enemy. Because of the location of the Division Reserve, the extended front of RCT 24, and the casualties of RCT 21, the Division requested at 1035 that one BLT of VAC LANFOR be released to the 4th Division. At 1100 VAC LANFOR approved the request but stipulated that the BLT, in view of the contemplated employment of the 3d Division, be moved to the zone of action of RCT 24, and that it was not to be committed without further authority. At 1650 VAC LANFOR released one (1) BLT to Division; at the same time the Division assigned BLT 3/23 to RCT 21 as RCT Reserve. RCT 21 assigned BLT 3/23 to an assembly area in TA 182 UP.

(j) 14th Marines. 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 21 and 3/14 was in direct support of RCT 24. 1/14 and 4/14 were in general support. 1/14 fired supporting fires for the 5th Tank Battalion. 4/13 reinforced the fires of 2/14 from 1800 23 February to 1200 24 February.

(k) 4th Tank Battalion. Companies "A" and "C", after a delayed start, attacked in conjunction with RCT 21 along the NE-SW runway of Airfield No. 2, destroying pillboxes, AT guns, and machine gun positions. Company "B", attached to RCT 24, assisted BLT 1/24

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in advancing up the shore line. At the end of the period, 26 tanks were operational.

(l) Aviation. CTG 52.2 and CTF 94 continued normal air support. Air support and artillery air spot planes were considered insufficient, particularly in the zone of RCT 21. Antiaircraft was very active, and one tactical air observer of 5th Marine Division was shot down. No day air observers were provided as the 5th Division tactical observers were functioning for this Division. No land based aircraft were made available, although planes from the MAR- IANAS appeared over the objective. VMO-4 did not operate, as personnel were not landed from LST 776. The Division had 8 planes operational during this period.

(m) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack by firing normal missions. Major units of CTF 54 fired main batteries on deep support targets from King minus 75 to King minus 15 as part of the coordinated preparation for the attack. Fire support ships worked with VOF planes throughout the day.

(n) VAC LANFOR assumed command ashore at 0955 and established its CP at TA 147 R.

(o) The 4th Reconnaissance Company landed at 1115.

(p) The 3d Marine Division assumed control of the south one-half of Beach Yellow 2 and the north one-half of Red 2 at 1600 and the Division commenced landing at 1315. The Beaches were redesignated as **Black Beaches**.

(q) 4th Engineer Battalion. H & S Company was landed during the afternoon and established the Battalion CP at 165 R at 1500.

(r) Support Group. The Commanding Officer, Support Group, landed at 1743. The CP was established at TA 164 Y.

(s) Combat Efficiency was reduced by casualties and battle fatigue to an estimated 60%.

(t) Better progress was made during this period than during the succeeding one. The resistance encountered was determined, but advances of up to 1000 yards were made by some units. At the close of the period, the Division prepared to continue the attack the following day.

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SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

(u) Weather and Visibility. Fair and warmer, wind WNW, 5 to 15 MPH, visibility and ceiling unlimited.

7. FROM 1800, 24 FEB 45 TO 1800, 25 FEB 45 (D PLUS 6)

(a) During the night all units consolidated positions, established contact with adjacent units, and maintained contact with the enemy. Activity during the night was particularly vigorous, especially on the front of RCT 21. Enemy patrols in this area consisted of small parties of about platoon strength which attempted local counter-attacks at 1925 and 2345. Heavy grenade and small arms fire was directed against this RCT during the night. The entire front and rear areas were subjected to mortar, artillery, and rocket fire. RCT 23, which had been in VAC LANFOR Reserve, was released to the Division at 0630. BLT 3/23, attached to RCT 21, was released to RCT 23 at 0530. At 0700 RCT 21 passed to the control of the 3d Marine Division.

(b) There were no night air observers on station.

(c) The 726th SAW Radar installation was again operational, tied in with AA Artillery, the 14th Marines, and with the Division Air Section for coordination and the exchange of information.

(d) Direct support ships fired harassing and illuminating fires throughout the night.

(e) Following a coordinated naval gunfire preparation from King minus 50 to King-hour, with general support ships employing major caliber batteries, and a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division Artillery preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, the Division, making its main effort on the left, continued the attack in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 5-45, at King-hour, 0930, to capture O-2. The 4th Division maintained contact with 3d Division. Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour; Boundaries - see map, Progress of Attack.

(f) RCT 23, with Company "C", 4th Tank Battalion (plus 2 platoons Company "B") attached, on the left, executed a passage of lines of the left battalion of RCT 24 during the preparation fire and attacked in column of battalions in the following order: 3/23, 1/23, 2/23. The advance was met with heavy mortar and machine gun fire from pillboxes, bunkers, and caves and progress was slow. In order to expedite the advance, the 3d Division was requested to permit the tanks attached to RCT 21 to use an approach route through the 3d Division's zone to Airfield No. 2. Permission was granted at 1253, and from this approach the tanks were able to attack.

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pillboxes, bunkers, and AT guns holding up the advance. RCT 23 maintained contact with 3d Division.

(g) RCT 24, with BLT 2/25 attached, continued the attack at King-hour and made slow progress throughout the day. The difficult terrain, coupled with mortar fire and with interlocking bands of fire from automatic weapons in pillboxes, bunkers and caves, delayed the advance of this RCT. BLT 2/24 relieved by RCT 23 at King-hour, when reorganized, was placed in RCT reserve until 1600, at which time it relieved BLT 1/24 on the right of the zone of action. BLT 1/25 was released to RCT 25 at 0930.

(h) RCT 25, less BLT's 2/25 and 1/25 until 0930, remained in Division Reserve.

(i) All units were ordered to consolidate at 1700, and to be prepared to continue the attack at 0800 with no change in boundaries, objectives or attachments.

(j) 14th Marines. 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support of RCT 24, and 4/14 was in general support. At 0500 VAC LANFOR directed the attachment of one (1) battalion of artillery to support the attack of RCT 9, 3d Division. 1/14 was assigned this mission. Rapid adjustment was made and the battalion ably supported RCT 9 with preparation and close supporting fires for the remainder of the period.

At 1726 VAC LANFOR directed that one (1) battalion of the 14th Marines continue to support the 3d Division until 0700, 26 February. All units fired call and counter-battery fire throughout the period.

(k) 4th Tank Battalion. The majority of the available tank strength was assigned to RCT 23. The terrain in front of RCT 24 was not negotiable for tanks except along the coast line, where they supported the advance of the right BLT. At the end of the period, 30 tanks were operational.

(l) Aviation. CTG 52.2 and CTF 94 continued normal air support missions. At 1425 a strike by 9 B-24's, each armed with nine (9) 500 pound bombs, was accurately placed as directed in TA 216 NOSTXY.

(m) VMO-4 personnel (less pilots and planes) landed and were tentatively located northeast of Airfield No. 1. Enemy AA was active but inaccurate.

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SECTION IV. TACTICAL ASPECTS OF OPERATION.

The North-South airstrip of Airfield No. 1 was considered ready for emergency landings. VMO-4 and two planes were ordered to be flown in from the USS MAKIN ISLAND on 25 February. For the period, the 5th Marine Division tactical observers continued to furnish information to the 4th Division.

At 1245 a message was received from EXTROPAC that there would be no more coordinated pre-King-hour air strikes until further notice.

(n) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to maintain fires in support of the attack. In movements along the east coast, one destroyer was able to take under fire and to destroy major enemy installations.

(o) 4th Engineer Battalion. During the period construction was begun on a road in the beach area. At the end of the period the road was 25% completed.

(p) Nine (9) distillation units were ashore, with six (6) units operating in TA 149 C. The search for and demolition of land mines, booby traps, and duds was carried out.

(q) Combat efficiency was reduced by casualties and battle fatigue to an estimated 55%.

(r) The combination of terrain skillfully employed to the best advantage by the enemy, terrain unsuited for tank employment, the locations of installations in areas which were defiladed from our artillery, and the stubborn to-the-death attitude of the defenders had temporarily limited the advance of this Division; but the Division prepared to continue the attack.

(s) Weather and Visibility. Fair and warmer, visibility and ceiling unlimited, 2/10 to 4/10 high cloud cover.

8. FROM 1800, 25 FEB 45 TO 1800, 26 FEB 45 (D PLUS 7)

(a) At 2158 a dispatch was received that the 4th Division Rear CP was closing on the USS BAYFIELD at 2200. Personnel and equipment landed in LSM 238.

(b) Activity during the night was relatively quiet. A small enemy patrol in front of BLT 3/24 attempted infiltration, but all were either killed or dispersed. The Division zone was shelled sporadically during the night by rockets, mortars, and artillery.

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(c) Normal night missions were fired by CTF 54 with large area neutralization effected by mortar boat units.

(d) Information was received at 0530 that a B-24 strike had been ordered to hit TA 218 BCDHI at about 1500.

(e) No night air observers were on station.

(f) After a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division-Naval Gunfire preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0800, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 6-45. Objective - O-2; boundaries - see map, Progress of Attack; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(g) RCT 23, with BLT 1/23 on the left and BLT 3/23 on the right, continued the attack at 0800 as scheduled. The advance was slow and difficult. Enemy resistance consisted of heavy small arms, and mortar fire from well emplaced, well dug-in pillboxes and block-houses. A general advance of about 300 yards was made along the front, which placed the RCT in position on the southwest slopes of the vital Hill 382 (TA 200 Y), thus partially neutralizing the effect of this point to the enemy. Orders were issued to the RCT to consolidate at 1700, but at 1800 it was still actively engaged with the enemy. The RCT reserve was employed in mopping up the RCT rear area. Sniper fire hit in the CP and in TA 183 U, indicating that there was still some of the enemy in that area.

(h) RCT 25, with BLT 3/24 attached, started relieving RCT 24 at 0530. At 0830 the RCT attacked with three battalions abreast, from left to right, 1/25, 2/25, 3/25, with 3/24 in RCT reserve. The delay in launching the attack was occasioned by the time involved in effecting the return of BLT 2/25 to RCT control, reorganization, and movement to the line of departure. Progress was slow and difficult along the entire front because of the extremely difficult terrain and stiff enemy resistance employing small arms, machine guns, and mortars fired from well-prepared and camouflaged positions. The RCT considered that it was not feasible to by-pass positions and cleaned them up as units advanced. An advance was made on the right, of about 75 yards. The RCT reserve was employed in mopping up the RCT rear area. Company "A", 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, was assigned to direct support of this RCT for possible employment along the coast line.

Orders were issued to the RCT to consolidate at 1700, paying particular attention to the left flank, and to be prepared to continue the attack the next day.

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SECTION I. SUMMARY OF OPERATION.

(i) RCT 24, less BLT 3/24, upon being relieved by RCT 25, assembled in Division Reserve in the vicinity of TA's 165 EJO and 166 A. The RCT located a cave in TA 183 W which extended underground for over 400 yards and contained about 200 Japanese dead. Investigation of this cave continued.

(j) 14th Marines. At 0700 1/14 reverted to Division control. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 in direct support of RCT 23, 3/14 reinforced 1/14, and 4/14 was in general support of the attack for the period. In addition to the preparation fire at King-hour, another fifteen minute preparation was fired for RCT 23 at 1430. The regiment continued counter-battery and call fires. Flash teams on SURIBACHI and sound ranging teams in Regimental Area continued to furnish valuable intelligence for counter-battery fires.

(k) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" was attached to RCT 25 and Company "C" to RCT 23. Tank activity in the vicinity of the Radio Weather Station in TA 200 resulted in the destruction of two tanks and the damaging of one tank by land mines on the taxiway of Airfield No. 2. At the end of the period, 32 tanks were operational.

(l) 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion. All elements reverted to parent control at 0600. Company "A" was assigned direct support of RCT 25.

(m) Aviation. CTF 52.2 continued to furnish support aviation but the number of aircraft on station was insufficient to carry out requests for missions. Planes on call were available for pre-King-hour strikes. Land based aircraft missions were cancelled because weather conditions were unfavorable. Artillery and Naval Gunfire Air Spot missions by VO and VS continued throughout the day when weather permitted. Two planes of VMO-4 landed at 1025 and furnished artillery air spot during the afternoon. VMO-4 was out of gasoline before the end of the period. Division day air observers did not operate.

At 0800, 1500 x 100 feet of runway on Airfield No. 1 was operational and available for use.

(n) Naval Gunfire. CTF 54 continued to support the attack with normal and on call missions.

(o) 4th Engineer Battalion. During the period construction was expedited on roads in the beach area. On level stretches roads were operative for all traffic, but on grades they were still difficult. The matting of grades progressed satisfactorily, however, and by the end of the period the project was 90% completed. (5)

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SECTION II. RATE OF OPERATION.

distillation units were operating in TA 149 C and turned out 3500 gallons of water for the period. Fifteen (15) units were ashore by 1800. Units deactivated and removed five (5) JLXVC single-horn and two (2) JLXIII two-horn Japanese land mines from TA 149 C, and neutralized two (2) depth charges armed with improvised fuzes in TA 166 E. Excavation for a Division Hospital was started in TA 165 KL.

(p) Combat Efficiency was reduced by casualties and battle fatigue to an estimated 53%.

(q) The area of the operations for the period was still in the enemy defensive organization encountered during the preceding day. Gains were secured by a methodical pillbox-to-pillbox advance. The Division prepared to continue the attack at the end of the period.

(r) Weather and Visibility. Weather fair, visibility good until 1300, when it was reduced by rain. Ceiling low and overcast 6/10 to 10/10.

9. FROM 1800, 26 FEB 45 TO 1800, 27 FEB 45 (D PLUS 8)

(a) Although ordered to consolidate at 261700, RCT's 23 and 25 encountered considerable enemy opposition before effecting security for the night. Mortar and machine gun fire harassed the entire front until about 2100. Firm contact was eventually established between the RCT's and with the 3d Division. Activity during the night consisted of enemy mortar and artillery fire on the front and rear areas, particularly on Division artillery positions. Small arms firing continued throughout the night. Attempted infiltrations by small parties all along the front were repulsed. At 0535 RCT 23 reported a probable counter-attack forming in TA 201 QV. The distinct sound of tanks was heard and a resulting smoke screen indicated that it was laid by the tanks. Artillery fired in this area, dispersing the possible counter-attack.

(b) Normal night missions fired by fire support ships included harassing fires and illumination.

(c) Following a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division-Naval Gunfire preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0800, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 7-45, to capture O-2. Formation and boundaries - no change. Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(d) RCT 23, with BLT's 1/23 on the left, 3/23 on the right, and 2/23 in reserve, continued the attack on schedule but was unable

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to advance. Smoke was employed by this RCT from King minus 30 to King minus 10 to cover reorganization and movement of front line companies. Resumption of the attack, following a short preparation from 1200 to 1230, resulted in only a short advance of about 100 yards on the left of the sector. Two (2) enemy tanks, emplaced as pillboxes in the recesses of Hill 382, greatly retarded the advance but were finally destroyed with bazookas. Although troops reached the top of Hill 382, they were forced to withdraw to consolidate on more favorable ground at 1700. Hill 382, one of the most vital terrain features in this area, was made up of a series of deep fissures or crevices which blended well into the scheme of the Japanese defense. It was envisaged that the capture of this terrain freak would be costly and a time-consuming job.

(e) RCT 25, with no change in formation since the last period, continued the attack at King-hour. In order to bypass and isolate a pocket of resistance in TA 184 F, BLT 1/25, on the left, withheld its advance until BLT 3/23 had advanced sufficiently to permit BLT 1/25 to enter the zone of RCT 23. Since BLT 3/23 was unable to advance until quite late in the day, no appreciable gain was made. Company "B", 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, was attached to this RCT for the period; Company "A" reverted to Battalion control.

(f) RCT 24, less 3/24, continued in Division Reserve. On Division order one (1) company of this RCT was alerted in its assembly area to be on call to RCT 23, and was attached to RCT 23 at 1530.

(g) 14th Marines. There was no change in the assignment of artillery since the last period. Preparation, call, and counter-battery fires were delivered as requested. Ten (10) rounds of propaganda leaflets were fired in TA 201 E. Sound ranging operated with VAC LANFOR and Division Artillery and Flash Ranging with Division Artillery.

(h) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" was attached to RCT 25 and Company "B" to RCT 23. Company "C", which was attached to RCT 23, reverted to Battalion control. At the end of the period 32 tanks were operational, 11 destroyed, and 13 damaged.

(i) Aviation. CTG 52.2 and CTF 94 provided air support of King-hour call strikes and a nine (9) plane B-24 (9-500 pound bombs per plane) strike at 1500. One (1) Division observer flew tactical missions for the 5th Division.

(j) The 726th SAW Squadron covered the approach of VMO-4 from the Carriers. VMO-4 planes flew in from the EAST PACIFIC BAY.

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and the USS MAKIN ISLAND and arrived at Airfield No. 1 at 1630. One (1) VMO-4 plane was lost while being launched from LST 776. At the end of the period VMO-4 had eleven (11) pilots ashore, and seven (7) planes were operational.

(k) Naval Gunfire. CTF 54 continued normal day and night missions.

(l) 4th Engineer Battalion. The construction of roads was continued. The construction of revetments for VMO-4 planes was interrupted by the presence of enemy mines. Six (6) water distillation plants were operating on Yellow Beaches.

(m) Combat Efficiency was reduced to 50%.

(n) Weather was fair and visibility was good.

10. FROM 1800, 27 FEB 45 TO 1800, 28 FEB 45 (D PLUS 9)

(a) Activity during the night consisted of heavy mortar fire falling along the Division front and in CP locations. Fifteen (15) heavy shells hit the Division CP area before 2200. Fire of either 20mm or 40mm enemy automatic weapons fell on the beach area. At 0043 RCT 23 reported parachutes dropping in enemy-held territory about 400 to 600 yards in front of the Division's zone. Although reported from three sources, the plane (or planes) were not picked up on the radar.

(b) CTF 54 continued to provide normal harassing and illumination fires during the night.

(c) After a coordinated VAC LANFOR-4th Division-3d Division-Naval Gunfire preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0815, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 8-45, to capture O-2, prepared to continue the attack on order. Formation - no change; Boundaries and Objectives - see map, Progress of Attack. Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(d) RCT 23, (plus one (1) company from RCT 24) with BLT's 1/23 on the left, 2/23 on the right, and 3/23 in reserve, continued the attack at King-hour. BLT 2/23 relieved BLT 3/23 prior to King-hour. Initial advances on the left moved favorably for about 300 yards; however, increasing artillery fire, mortar fire, and cross fire from machine guns in bunkers and pillboxes halted the advance on the right. On the left resistance from heavy weapons of all types directed from the vicinity of Hill 382 temporarily held up the

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advance. At 1300 a coordinated attack, following a short preparation, permitted the extreme left of BLT 2/23 to advance approximately 300 yards. The operation of Company "B", 4th Tank Battalion, was restricted because of the terrain and the heavy AT fire which could not be located. RCT 23 maintained contact with 3d Marine Division.

(e) RCT 25, with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, 3/25 in line, and 3/24 in reserve, continued the attack at King-hour. The center of this RCT was unable to advance during the period, but a gain of 250 yards was made on the right flank. Upon request of RCT 25, one 75mm pack howitzer was assigned to BLT 2/25 as an accompanying gun in order to neutralize opposition to the front. The howitzer was transported to the rear of the front lines via DUKW; from there it was packed to the vicinity of BLT 2/25, where it was assembled and dug in preparatory to firing. It succeeded in destroying the opposition to the front of the BLT. The howitzer returned to parent control at 2100. Company "B", 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion was attached for the period.

(f) On the Regimental boundary, approximately in TA 201 U, the flanks of both RCT's received a murderous concentration of heavy mortar fire which was extremely accurate and which must have been observed fire. Although all agencies of the Division were employed in an attempt to locate the source of this fire, no definite conclusion regarding its location could be reached.

(g) RCT 24, less BLT 3/24 and one (1) company, remained in Division Reserve.

(h) 14th Marines. There was no change since the last period.

(i) 4th Tank Battalion. There was no change since the last period. A new battalion CP was set up in TA 165 O. Thirty-five (35) tanks were operational, twelve (12) destroyed, and nine (9) damaged.

(j) Aviation. CTG 52.2 continued to provide air support. The B-24 mission was cancelled for the afternoon strike. VAC LANFOR Air Delivery Section planes from SAIPAN dropped ammunition and medical supplies. VMO-4 had five (5) planes on Airfield No. 1, and two (2) on LST 776. VMO-4 furnished air spot for ten (10) artillery missions, conducted thirty-five (35) fire missions and flew tactical observers. Two (2) VOF air spot planes were maintained on station during the day. The Air Liaison Officer with RCT 25 reported that less than 50% of the Napalm dropped in the morning strike detonated.

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The strike requested by RCT 23 was delayed and was not dropped in the TA requested.

(k) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack. Naval gunfire support was on call throughout the day. Mortar and gunboat units operated along the coast on the right flank. In the afternoon one (1) destroyer closed on the east coast and successfully engaged enemy guns in direct fire up draws and ravines which opened seaward.

(l) Combat Efficiency of the Division was increased to an estimated 60% by the assignment of replacements to the RCT's.

(m) Weather and Visibility. Weather was fair, visibility good with ceiling overcast 6/10 to 9/10.

(n) All units were ordered to consolidate for the night at 1700, and to be prepared to continue the attack at King-hour, 0830, March 1st.

(o) At 1715 VAC LANFOR directed that one (1) battalion of this Division be assigned to VAC LANFOR Reserve by 1200, 1 March, 1945 and that it be assembled in 4th Division zone south of grid 73.

11. FROM 1800, 28 FEB 45 TO 1800, 1 MAR 45 (D PLUS 10)

(a) At 1930 RCT 24 was alerted to relieve RCT 23 prior to King-hour.

(b) At 2230 RCT 25 reported observing and firing on an estimated 150 enemy forming up in front of BLT 3/25. Naval Gunfire and artillery were requested and succeeded in dispersing the concentration. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire fell in the Division area during the night.

(c) After a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Naval Gunfire preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, and an intense Division artillery preparation beginning at King minus 10 and moving forward in successive concentrations after King-hour, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0830, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 9-45, to capture O-2, prepared to continue the attack to O-3 on order. Boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(d) RCT 23, when ordered to consolidate for the night at 281700, was not in contact with the unit on its left. Two (2) platoons from the Reserve Battalion were sent into the zone of the

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3d Marine Division to close the gap and establish contact. To accomplish this it was necessary for these platoons to fight their way through by-passed enemy defenses in the 3d Division zone. During the night these platoons suffered casualties from enemy positions located to their rear. When RCT 23 was relieved by RCT 24, BLT 3/23 was then attached to RCT 24 until BLT 3/24, which was attached to RCT 25, could be relieved by BLT 3/23. When this relief was effected at 0930, BLT 3/23 was then attached to and became the reserve of RCT 25. At 1200 BLT 2/23 assembled in TA 165 BC as VAC LANFOR Reserve. RCT 23, less BLT's 2/23 and 3/23, assembled in TA 182 YRS as Division Reserve.

(e) RCT 24 relieved RCT 23 in line at 0630. The relief was initiated at 0330 and was accomplished by placing BLT 2/24 in line with BLT 1/23 and BLT 1/24 with 2/23. The relief was completed at 0630. The company attached to RCT 23 reverted to RCT 24 control at 0630. The fighting around the base of Hill 382 was intense and continuous until consolidation for the night was ordered at 1700. Slight gains were made on the left and right of the RCT zone. Upon consolidation at 1700 firm contact with RCT 25 on the right was established. After 1400 RCT 21, on the left, was able to advance quite rapidly in its zone, resulting in a gap of about 450 yards along the Division boundary. BLT 3/24 was ordered into the zone of RCT 21 to fill this gap. Although the ground over which this BLT moved into position had been crossed by RCT 21, it was necessary for the companies of BLT 3/24 to fight their way over this same area to take up a position on the Division boundary in order to establish contact with units on its right and left. By 1800 consolidation had been effected and firm contact had been established. The RCT CP moved to TA 182 S at 0930.

(f) RCT 25, with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, and 3/25 in line from left to right, continued the attack at King-hour but limited its advance in order to conform to the movement of RCT 24 on its left. BLT 1/25, assisted by one (1) company of the RCT Reserve (BLT 3/23), spent the remainder of the period in an attempt to reduce the reentrant and pocket of resistance in TA 183 J.

At 0850 the Division Reconnaissance Company was directed to report to RCT 25 to assist in mopping up operations in the rear areas of that RCT. It was further directed that the Reconnaissance Company was not to be committed in the front lines and that it would be released not later than 1700. The RCT CP was shelled at 1605 and all agencies were employed to search for probable sources of fire. Contact was established with RCT 24 when that unit was ordered to consolidate at 1700. Company "B", 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, was attached for the period.

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(g) 14th Marines. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 3/14 in direct support of RCT 24, 2/14 reinforced 3/14, and 4/14 was in general support. VAC LANFOR artillery reinforced the 14th Marines on call. VMO-4 fired a total of thirty-three (33) fire missions. Three (3) guns were spotted by air observation and destroyed by VAC LANFOR artillery fire. Sound ranging picked up fifteen (15) enemy guns, which were immediately shelled.

(h) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" remained attached to RCT 25; Company "B" was attached to RCT 24; Company "C" was under Battalion control.

(i) Aviation. Air support was furnished by CTG 52.2. VMO-4 flew two (2) photographic and five (5) day observation missions. One (1) experimental night mission was flown and proved to be very successful. Two (2) OY-1's arrived on the field from LST 776; VMO-4 then had seven (7) planes based on Airfield No. 1. One (1) FM-2, the first carrier-based plane to land on Airfield No. 1, made an emergency landing during the morning hours.

(j) Naval Gunfire. Preparation fires in TA's 185 BCG, 201 HIMNRS, 202 CHLMPQVX and 219 UV by direct support ships were controlled by individual battalions. Gunboats controlled by BLT 3/25, fired 40mm in TA's 168 A, 185 V. Between King-hour and King-hour plus 70 two (2) CA's and one (1) BB fired in TA 202 NO. Following this preparation, one (1) CA and one (1) DD closed on the coast, taking observed installations under direct fire. These ships reported three (3) guns destroyed in TA 219 A and a direct hit in a cave at TA 203 U. Four (4) DD's and two (2) gunboats were employed by the Division throughout the day.

(k) 4th Engineer Battalion. Company "A" was attached to RCT 25. Headquarters Platoon continued construction of the supply road paralleling the coast.

(l) Combat Efficiency was estimated to be 55%.

(m) Weather and Visibility. Weather was fair, visibility was good, with ceiling overcast average 3/10.

12. FROM 1800, 1 MAR 45 TO 1800, 2 MAR 45 (D PLUS 11)

(a) The period of darkness passed with little incident other than the normal infiltration attempts by the enemy in small numbers. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire was laid down by the enemy during the night, but at each salvo either VAC LANFOR or Division Artillery immediately commenced counterbattery fire.

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(b) Direct support ships fired illumination fires during the night.

(c) Following VAC LANFOR Artillery preparation from King-hour minus 30 to King-hour minus 15 and King-hour minus 10 to King-hour, and an intense Division preparation beginning at King-hour minus 10 and moving forward in successive concentrations after King-hour, the Division continued the attack at 0800, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 10-45, to capture O-2, prepared to continue the attack to O-3 on order. Boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(d) RCT 24, with BLT's 3/24, 2/24, and 1/24 abreast from left to right, continued the attack at King-hour and made slight advances on the right and left and proceeded with the mopping up of pillboxes and caves on the reverse slope of Hill 382. It appeared that there were underground passageways leading into the defenses on Hill 382, and when one occupant of a pillbox was killed another one came up to take his place. This mopping-up proved to be a lengthy process. This RCT maintained contact with the 3d Division on the left, and upon consolidation at 1700 also established firm contact with the units on the right.

(e) RCT 25, with BLT 3/23 attached, and with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, and 3/25 in line from left to right, continued the attack at King-hour, and made its main effort on the left flank. In extremely bitter fighting against the reentrant on the left, BLT 1/23 and other elements spent the day in reducing pillboxes and caves which lined the face of the cliff in TA 184 B. Flame thrower and combat tanks were employed against a concrete blockhouse at the top of the cliff. Although the blockhouse appeared to be unoccupied after the tank attack, it was reasonable to assume that it too was connected by a subterranean passage and that it would be reoccupied. The BLT's in the center and on the right maintained their positions during the day. Upon consolidation for the night contact was maintained with RCT 24.

(f) RCT 23, less BLT's 2/23 and 3/23, remained in Division Reserve. BLT 2/23 was in VAC LANFOR Reserve and BLT 3/23 was attached to RCT 25. The Division Reserve was employed in mopping up the rear area and re-equipping in preparation for further action.

(g) 14th Marines. There was no change in the assignments of this unit. Air observers fired a total of forty-two (42) missions. Sound ranging located six (6) enemy guns firing in the zone of the Division and adjusted fire on them. A total of 306 missions were fired.

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SECTION II. NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

(h) 4th Tank Battalion. No change in assignments.

(i) Aviation. Air support was furnished by CTG 52.2. VMO-4 flew four (4) day, one (1) photographic, and one (1) night observation missions. Two (2) planes were damaged on the field by enemy artillery fire and one (1) in flight by AA fire. Planes dropped propaganda leaflets over the Division zone of action. At the end of the period five (5) planes were operational.

(j) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack. Because of the extreme irregularity of the front lines, direct support ships did not fire harassing fire during the night. During the day two (2) BB's and one (1) CA fired general support missions in eastern sectors of TA's 185, 202, 219 and all of 236, and mortar units covered TA's 250 and 251. RCT 24's ships were unable to fire a preparation for the King-hour attack because of safety limits; RCT 25's ships fired in TA 185 BCGHI. Four (4) DD's and two (2) gunboats were assigned to the Division for the day.

(k) 4th Engineer Battalion. Company "A" was attached to RCT 25; Company "B" was attached to RCT 24, and Company "C" to RCT 23, in Division Reserve.

(l) Combat Efficiency was reduced by excessive casualties, particularly to key personnel, and battle fatigue to an estimated 50%.

(m) Weather and Visibility. Weather was fair, visibility good, with ceiling overcast 3/10 to 5/10.

13. FROM 1800, 2 MAR 45 TO 1800, 3 MAR 45 (D PLUS 12)

(a) During the night all units consolidated positions, established contact with adjacent units, and maintained contact with the enemy. Activity along the Division front was limited to one (1) attempted counter-attack in front of BLT 2/24. In the ensuing action four (4) Marines and twenty (20) enemy were killed, and the remainder of the enemy was dispersed. Mortar and artillery fire was at a minimum during the night. This was attributed to the fact that the artillery counter-battery fire was immediate and accurate and the possibility that the enemy was making a withdrawal of his artillery and mortars to new positions. Direct support ships furnished illumination and fired harassing fires during the night in TA's 185 CDG, 202 GHLMQRVWX.

(b) The Division continued the attack at King-hour minus 75 (0630), King-hour being 0745, in accordance with the plan.

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SECTION IV. SUMMARY OF OPERATION.

No. 11-45, without artillery or naval gunfire preparation. VAC LANFOR, Division artillery, and 3/12 fired counter-battery fires on located and suspected mortar, rocket, and artillery positions from King-hour minus 75 to King-hour plus 30. Boundaries and Objectives - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(c) RCT 24, on the left, with BLT's 3/24, 2/24, and 1/24 in line, attacked at King-hour minus 75 with orders to disengage at least three (3) companies from the front lines during the day. By 1525 two (2) companies were in rear of the front lines as RCT Reserve. The RCT made a slow advance against the enemy positions to its front. The right and center battalions were able to advance to the top of a ridge line to positions indicated on the map, Progress of Attack. During the period the RCT maintained contact with the 3d Division on the left. In the late afternoon Hill 382 was completely secured.

(d) RCT 23, less BLT 2/23, and with BLT's 2/25, 3/25 attached, passed through RCT 25, within its present zone, at King-hour minus 75. RCT 23, then with BLT's 1/23, 2/25, 3/25 in line from left to right and with 3/23 in reserve, continued the attack, holding with the battalions on its right and center. In savage fighting against well-entrenched enemy and subjected to intense mortar fire, the BLT on the left was able to make a slight gain to the positions shown at the end of the period. The reentrant, or pocket of enemy resistance, was isolated and, at the close of the period, was being contained and mopped up by two infantry companies, tanks, and halftracks. Company "B", 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, was attached to RCT 23.

(e) RCT 25, less BLT's 2/25 and 3/25, when relieved by RCT 23 reverted to Division Reserve.

(f) 14th Marines. 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 23; 1/14 reinforced the fires of 2/14; 3/14 was in direct support of RCT 24, and 4/14 was in general support. Neutralization and destruction fires were fired in support of assault units. VAC LANFOR artillery reinforced the fires of the 14th Marines on call.

The air observers fired a total of nineteen (19) missions during the period, and when heavy artillery was required they fired VAC LANFOR artillery in the zone of the Division. No sound ranging targets were reported during the period. The total number of missions fired was 231.

(g) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "C" was attached to RCT 23; Company "B" was attached to RCT 24, and

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battalion control. At the end of the period thirty-six (36) tanks were operational, twelve (12) were destroyed, and eight (8) were damaged.

(h) Aviation. CTG 52.2 continued to furnish air support. Seven (7) missions were requested and six (6) were completed. VMO-4 flew seven (7) day observation missions. Three (3) planes were operational at the end of the period.

(i) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack. The use of Naval Gunfire was limited because of the safety factors dictated by the location of the front lines. In order to cover the difficult terrain in the Division zone, three (3) VOF spot planes were employed and one (1) DD with an NLO aboard closed the coast and successfully delivered direct fire into TA's 185, 219, 201, and 202. Gunboats fired 40mm fire in TA 185. Four (4) DD's and two (2) gunboats worked with units of the Division.

(j) 4th Engineer Battalion. Company "A" was attached to RCT 25, with the 2d and 3d platoons attached to BLT's 2/25 and 3/25 respectively. These platoons continued mopping up operations in TA 184. Company Headquarters and the 3d platoon removed twelve (12) horn mines and one (1) terracotta mine from the roadway in TA 184 XW.

(k) All units were ordered to consolidate at 1700 and to be prepared to continue the attack on 4 March, 1945.

(l) Combat Efficiency was estimated to be 50%.

(m) There was a slight change in the area of operations and it was believed that the Division was now fighting in the rear of the highly prepared defensive area in which the operations for the past three (3) days had been conducted.

(n) Weather and Visibility. Weather was fair and visibility was good, with ceiling overcast 4/10, wind SE 15 knots.

14. FROM 1800, 3 MAR 45 TO 1800, 4 MAR 45 (D PLUS 13)

(a) The hours of darkness for this period were relatively quiet. Some medium mortar fire fell on the front lines and occasional sniper fire harassed the troops in the front lines. Rear areas were quiet. At 0355 there was an attempted infiltration in front of BLT 3/24, but it was repulsed with no casualties. Four (4) DD's provided illumination during the night, but no harassing fires were fired because of limitations imposed by the location of the front lines.

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(b) Following a VAC LANFOR artillery preparation from King-hour minus 35 to King-hour, joined by a Division preparation from King-hour minus 15 to King-hour plus 15, and Naval Gunfire from King-hour minus 10 to King-hour, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0730, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 12-45, to capture O-2, prepared to continue the attack. Formation and Boundaries - no change. Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour. The main effort of the attack was made on the left, resulting in slight gains during the morning. A second coordinated attack was launched at 1500, but this also resulted in the gain of only a few yards.

(c) RCT 24, on the left, with BLT's 3/24, 2/24, and 1/24 in line, from left to right attacking generally in a south-easterly direction in order that the direction of attack would be parallel to the corridors, made only slight progress during the day. This RCT was able to employ the tanks during the day against pillboxes and caves, and the results obtained, particularly from the flame thrower tank, were satisfactory. The RCT used 2200 pounds of demolition in blowing cave entrances and exits. At the close of the period, and when consolidation was ordered at 1700, this RCT had established contact with units on its right and left.

(d) RCT 23, on the right, with BLT's 1/23, 2/25, 3/25 in line from left to right, and with BLT 3/23 in reserve, made short gains in the zone of BLT 1/23 and held on the remainder of the front. BLT's 2/25 and 3/25 could have advanced within their zones, but such an advance was not deemed advisable because it would have over-extended the lines. The terrain in front of this RCT was the most difficult yet encountered; observation was limited to only a few feet, and it was impossible to support the attack with anything heavier than normal infantry weapons. Detachments of BLT 3/23 were employed throughout the period in reducing the area of resistance in TA 184 F. Upon consolidation at 1700, contact was established with RCT 24. BLT 2/23 remained in VAC LANFOR Reserve.

(e) RCT 25, less BLT's 2/25 and 3/25, remained in Division Reserve.

(f) 14th Marines. There was no change in the assignment of the 14th Marines. Air observation was hindered during the period because of a very low ceiling. Twenty-one (21) fire missions were conducted for Division Artillery, and VAC LANFOR Artillery was fired when targets required heavy weapons. No targets were reported by sound ranging during the period. The total number of missions fired was 480.

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SECTION IV. TACTICAL OPERATION.

(g) 4th Tank Battalion. There were no changes in assignments. At the end of the period thirty-two (32) tanks were operational, thirteen (13) damaged, and eleven (11) were destroyed.

(h) Aviation. Air support was cancelled because of inclement weather. VMO-4 flew six (6) tactical observation missions at the request of front line units.

(i) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack. Throughout the day call fires were placed in TA's 185, 186, 219 and 202. Spotters generally employed ships on direct fire missions because of poor visibility. One (1) DD and one (1) gunboat worked up the coast covering TA's 185 and 202 with 40mm and 5" fire. A special mission was fired in TA 185 G with an OY-1 plane spotting. Five (5) direct hits were reported and the target destroyed. Two (2) DD's, one (1) CA, and one (1) gunboat fired for the Division throughout the day.

(j) 4th Engineer Battalion. Company "A" was attached to RCT 25. The 1st platoon reverted to company control in the Division Reserve area. The 2d platoon continued working on caves in TA 184 S. The 3d platoon blew caves and removed booby traps in TA 184 X. Company "B" was attached to RCT 24 and Company "C" to RCT 23.

(k) Combat Efficiency was estimated to be 45%.

(l) Weather and Visibility. Rain and misty throughout the day, low overcast with visibility limited to 800 yards in rain squalls.

15. FROM 1800, 4 MAR 45 TO 1800, 5 MAR 45 (D PLUS 14)

(a) During the night the zone of the Division was fairly quiet except in the area of RCT 24, where heavy mortar and artillery fire was received constantly during the hours of darkness. The resulting casualties were moderate.

(b) The Division acted in accordance with VAC LANFOR dispatch 041624, which stated that except for limited adjustment of positions the plan was to reorganize preparatory to attacking on a limited front on 6 March, and that the Division would effect necessary reorganization by noon 5 March to have one (1) RCT, less one (1) battalion, available for employment on 6 March, exclusive of Regimental Reserve, by units in the line. The general direction of the proposed attack was to be eastward in the present zones of action.

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(c) RCT 24, on the left, remained in position and, by thinning out the front lines, effected the necessary reorganization to establish a strong Regimental Reserve line of three (3) companies. Mopping up of the rear areas was continued during the period.

(d) RCT 25, on the right, with the Division Reconnaissance Company attached as of 0700, 5 March, relieved RCT 23 in its zone at 0600, 5 March. This RCT also effected the necessary reorganization to establish a Regimental Reserve of one (1) company, and continued mopping up the rear areas. A Provisional Battalion composed of the Division Reconnaissance Company and Company "L", BLT 3/25, was organized and relieved BLT 3/23 in TA's 183 IO and 184 K.

(e) RCT 23, less BLT 2/23, assembled in Division Reserve in the vicinity of TA's 182 O and 183 KL. The remainder of period was devoted to reorganizing, reequipping, and rehabilitating in preparation for the attack on 6 March. BLT 2/23 was in VAC LANFOR Reserve until 1500, at which time it was relieved by BLT 1/23.

(f) The 14th Marines continued to fire on targets of opportunity and executed harassing fires throughout the period. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 direct support of RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support of RCT 24, and 4/14 in general support. Air observation fired a total of seventeen (17) missions during the period. One (1) target was reported by sound ranging, and VAC LANFOR Artillery was adjusted on the target. The total number of missions fired was 302.

(g) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "C" was attached to RCT 23, Company "B" to RCT 24, and Company "A" to RCT 25. At the end of the period 30 tanks were operational. Company "A" tanks were employed extensively in TA's 183 JO and 184 FK.

(h) Aviation. CTG 52.2 continued to support the attack. Units of the Division requested fire missions, of which four (4) were completed in TA's 185 KGD and 202 DEGLQ. VMO-4 flew ten (10) tactical observation missions; one (1) pilot was wounded and evacuated, and four (4) planes were operational at the end of the period.

(i) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 fired call fire missions throughout the day. Two (2) DD's, one (1) CA and, one (1) LCS were employed by the Division.

(j) 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Company "B" was attached to RCT 25. This company patrolled the beach areas north of the location of BLT 3/25 and fired on targets on the beach.

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(k) 4th Engineer Battalion. Company "A", attached to RCT 25, continued road work in the RCT rear area. The 2d and 3d platoons, attached to BLT's 2/25 and 3/25 respectively, took up defensive positions and supervised the laying of an anti-personnel mine field in front of these positions. Company "A", attached to RCT 24, was inactive during the day. Company "C", attached to RCT 23, was in the rest area with that RCT.

(l) Combat Efficiency was estimated to be 45%. The reorganization directed by VAC LANFOR was completed by 1200 and the Division was prepared to continue the attack on 6 March.

(m) Weather and Visibility. Occasional showers during the night. Daylight period was fair with visibility good, ceiling overcast 2/10 to 5/10.

16. FROM 1800, 5 MAR 45 TO 1800, 6 MAR 45 (D PLUS 15)

(a) The night was relatively quiet except for mortar and small arms fire along the front of RCT 24 and an attempted infiltration in this area.

(b) One (1) LCS fired harassing fires along the coast in TA 185 throughout the night. Illumination was provided by elements of CTF 54.

(c) Following a coordinated artillery preparation by twelve (12) artillery battalions (three (3) from the 3d Marine Division, three (3) from the 5th Marine Division, four (4) from the 4th Marine Division, and two (2) from VAC LANFOR) reinforced by Naval Gunfire, from King-hour plus 45 to King-hour plus 81, the Division continued the attack at King-hour plus 60, King-hour being 0800, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 13-45, to capture the high ground in the left of the zone of action and that portion of O-3 within zone. For boundaries, zone of action, line of departure, and objectives, see map - Progress of Attack.

(d) RCT 23, less BLT 1/23, moved into position prior to 0600, relieved BLT 3/24 in its zone with BLT 2/23 and attacked in column of battalions at King-hour plus 60, to seize the high ground in its zone. See the map, Progress of Attack. In extremely bitter fighting against caves, pillboxes, and emplacements in rugged terrain, this RCT advanced approximately 100 yards except on the extreme left where no gain was made. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, a gap existed between the left and the 3d Division, but firm contact was made and maintained by RCT 23 before dark. At 0700 BLT 1/23 moved into TA 182 VW as VAC LANFOR Reserve.

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(e) RCT 24, less BLT 3/24, and with BLT 2/24 on the left and BLT 1/24 on the right, attacked at King-hour plus 60 in conjunction with RCT 23. Against opposition similar to that of RCT 23, RCT 24 moved forward to conform to the advance of RCT 23. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, contact with RCT 23 was made and maintained. BLT 3/24 reverted to Division Reserve at 0630 in TA's 182 O and 183 KL when it was relieved by BLT 2/23. See the map - Progress of Attack.

(f) RCT 25, on the right, with the Division Reconnaissance Company attached and with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, and 3/25 in line from left to right, held in position on the right and center and assisted the attack of RCT's 23 and 24 by fire, prepared to conform to the advance of RCT 24. This RCT employed the Division Reconnaissance Company and elements of the Combat Team to mop up in TA 184 FK. RCT consolidated for the night and maintained contact with RCT 24.

(g) 14th Marines. All battalions fired a coordinated preparation for VAC LANFOR from King-hour minus 10 to King-hour plus 21 in the zones of the 3d and 5th Divisions and from King-hour plus 45 to King-hour plus 81 in the 4th Division zone. VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 with RCT 23, 3/14 with RCT 24, and 4/14 was in general support. Air observation fired a total of twenty (20) fire missions during the period. Sound ranging reported and adjusted fire on two (2) missions. The total number of missions fired was 472.

(h) 4th Tank Battalion. Four (4) tanks were employed in the zone of RCT 23 and a flame thrower tank assisted in the mopping up operations in the rear areas of RCT 25. At the end of the period thirty-five (35) tanks were operational, eleven (11) were destroyed, and eight (8) were damaged.

(i) Aviation. CTG 52.2 continued to furnish air support. Three (3) missions were requested by the Division in TA 185 and all were executed. VMO-4 flew one (1) night and seven (7) day observation missions. Five (5) planes were operational at the end of the period. Enemy AA was active throughout the day.

(j) Naval Gunfire. Three (3) DD's, one (1) CA, and one (1) LCS provided naval gunfire support for the attack. Preparation fires were fired from King-hour minus 10 to King-hour plus 45 at a reduced rate, and from King-hour plus 45 to King-hour plus 81, with fires increased. One (1) Naval Gunfire Spotter was placed aboard a DD and controlled direct fires against located targets along the east coast.

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(k) 4th Engineer Battalion had no change in its assignment.

(l) Combat Efficiency, reduced by excessive casualties among experienced leaders, was estimated to be 45%.

(m) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair and visibility was good. There was a slight haze with ceiling overcast 2/10 to 4/10.

17. FROM 1800, 6 MAR 45 TO 1800, 7 MAR 45 (D PLUS 16)

(a) Activity during the night was sporadic but costly. At 2130 several enemy mortar shells fell in the lines of BLT 2/23, wounding approximately thirty (30) men. At 2210 enemy were reported moving in front of BLT 3/25; artillery fire was requested and the formation or gathering was dispersed. At 2250 BLT 1/24 reported that up to that time it had had its quietest night on the line. During the night forty (40) to fifty (50) of the enemy came into the foxholes occupied by elements of BLT 1/25 and in the ensuing melee one (1) officer, twelve (12) enlisted Marines, and an estimated fifty (50) Japanese were killed. At 0515 a rocket fell into the CP of BLT 2/23 killing one (1) and wounding five (5) men. The BLT commander was badly shaken up and was relieved by the Executive Officer of RCT 23. This interruption necessitated a thirty (30) minute delay in meeting King-hour. The Division rear areas were quiet. Illumination only was fired during the night.

(b) The Division continued the attack at King-hour plus 30, King-hour being 0730, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 14-45, without a preliminary artillery or naval gunfire preparation, to complete missions assigned on the previous day. Formation and boundaries - no change; line of departure - front lines at King-hour.

(c) RCT 23, less BLT 1/23, making the main effort for the Division, attacked within its zone, advancing slowly during the morning. At 1230, following a five (5) minute preparation, the attack was continued and resulted in substantial gains, particularly on the extreme left. BLT 1/23 continued in VAC LANFOR Reserve. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, contact was established and maintained with the 3d Division.

(d) RCT 24, less BLT 3/24, in the center, with 2/24 and 1/24 in line left to right, continued the attack against heavy opposition, particularly on the right where intense machine gun and mortar fire stopped all advance. At 1245, following a five (5) minute preparation, the attack was continued. At 1700, when consolidation was ordered, this RCT had advanced left to

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positions shown on the map - Progress of Attack and had made firm contact with RCT 23. During the morning when Company "C" was relieving Company "B", a heavy mortar shell landed in the CP, killing the Company Commander and six (6) men of Company "C". BLT 3/24 continued in Division Reserve.

(e) RCT 25, plus Division Reconnaissance Company, with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, and 3/25 in line from left to right, maintained contact with BLT 1/24 but was unable to advance because of the murderous fire coming from the front of BLT 1/24; as a result of this fire no gains were made by the RCT during the period. Mopping up operations in the rear areas continued.

(f) 14th Marines. From 0800 to 0830 the Regiment fired neutralization fires on all known enemy mortar and artillery positions. At 1225 VAC LANFOR and the 14th Marines fired a five (5) minute coordinated preparation on the front to RCT 23; at 1240 the same preparation was fired for RCT 24. There were no changes in the assignment of support battalions. Air observation fired a total of sixteen (16) missions, VAC LANFOR artillery being fired when targets required heavy artillery. Sound ranging adjusted three (3) VAC LANFOR artillery missions. The total number of missions fired was 159.

(g) 4th Tank Battalion. There were no changes in assignments. Tanks assisted and supported the attack of RCT 23, especially in the center of the RCT zone; however, the terrain prevented the operation of the tanks except in restricted localities. RCT 25 continued to operate flame thrower and other tanks against concrete blockhouses and caves in the vicinity of TA 184 FK. At the end of the period thirty-four (34) tanks were operational, eight (8) damaged, and twelve (12) were destroyed.

(h) Aviation. CTG 52.2 continued to furnish air support. Five (5) missions were requested by the Division; three (3) were completed and two (2) were cancelled. All air support was cancelled at 1510 because of bad weather. VMO-4 flew one (1) weather and five (5) tactical observation missions. At the end of the period five (5) planes were operational.

(i) Naval Gunfire. The Division was supported by four (4) DD's and one (1) LCS. A concentration was fired on known targets from King-hour to King plus 30. All units were available for call fires during the day. Two (2) VOF spot planes were employed with the fire support ships; one (1) DD working with air spot reported eight (8) artillery or mortar positions were destroyed in TA 185 KL and six (6) guns were knocked out in TA's 185 A and 202 U. A naval

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gunfire spotter aboard a DD spotted fires along the coast.

(j) 4th Engineer Battalion. There were no changes in assignments. All units supported their respective RCT's by executing demolitions work, mine removal, and road repair.

(k) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 45%.

(l) Weather and Visibility. The weather was warm, but visibility was poor. There were occasional showers with overcast ceiling limited at times to 300 feet.

18. FROM 1800, 7 MAR 45 TO 1800, 8 MAR 45 (D PLUS 17)

(a) Activity along the front lines for the night consisted mainly of small and large mortar fire and small arms fire. Generally the night was quiet, compared to previous nights. Some enemy mortar shells fell in the lines of BLT 1/24 and on the front of RCT 25. At 0300 BLT 3/24 was released to RCT 24, relieving BLT 2/24 in the line at 0530. RCT 24 reported that the enemy attempted a withdrawal during the night and that a considerable number of them were killed. BLT 2/24 reverted to Division Reserve in TA's 182 O and 183 KL. Only illumination fires were fired during the night:

(b) Following a coordinated preparation in successive concentrations reinforced by VAC LANFOR Artillery and naval gunfire from King-hour minus 90 to King-hour minus 60, the Division resumed the attack at King-hour minus 90, King-hour being 0750, making the main effort in the center, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 15-45, to assist in the capture of the remainder of the Island. Formation and boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(c) RCT 23, less BLT 1/23, on the right, attacking in column of battalions, BLT 2/23 in the line, jumped off on time. Advancing initially against light resistance, which soon stiffened to normal, considerable gain was made in the center of the zone. The enemy was apparently confused by the early morning attack. Resistance by the enemy in this area was relatively less than that experienced on the remainder of the front. When this RCT consolidated for the night at 1640, contact was established on the right and left. BLT 1/23 continued in VAC LANFOR Reserve.

(d) RCT 24, less BLT 2/24, in the center, with BLT's 3/24 on the left and 1/24 on the right, continued the attack at King-hour minus 90. Making its main effort on the left, this RCT was able to make only slight gains, generally in the center, against an enemy

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who was concealed in perfectly fortified positions. Resistance was characterized by extremely heavy small arms, knee mortar, and large mortar fire. The right of this RCT was unable to move forward regardless of repeated efforts to envelop and to even by-pass the resistance holding up its advance. At 1120 BLT 2/24 was directed to reconnoiter the area of BLT 3/25 with the probability of relieving that BLT that night. Upon consolidation at 1640 contact was made with RCT 23 and maintained with RCT 25. BLT 2/24 continued in Division Reserve.

(e) RCT 25, on the right, with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, and 3/25 in line from left to right, held its position and maintained contact with RCT 24 on its left. Elements of the RCT and the Division Reconnaissance Company continued mopping up operations in the rear areas and in the vicinity of TA 184 KL.

(f) 14th Marines. Other than the preparation fires for the attack, fires were executed on call from the RCT's. Eighteen (18) rounds of yellow smoke were fired to pin-point targets for support aircraft. There were no changes in assignments. VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. Air observation fired a total of nine (9) missions. No targets were reported by sound ranging during the period. The total number of missions fired was 303.

(g) 4th Tank Battalion. Tanks were able to render some support to the attack of RCT 23, even though their approach was restricted more or less to roads. A mine field was encountered in TA 201 NOT and three (3) tanks were destroyed. Further tank activity in this area was delayed until the minefield was cleared by the engineers. During a requested air strike in TA 185 KL, an auxiliary gas tank of Napalm, through error, was dropped in TA 201 N and fell directly to the rear of a friendly tank. The Napalm was splashed all over the tank. The outer surfaces of the tank caught fire but the crew successfully evacuated the tank and with a portable CO2 extinguisher put out the fire. The crew sustained no casualties and the tank was not put out of action. At the end of the period, thirty-two (32) tanks were operational.

(h) Aviation. CTF 52.2 continued to furnish air support. The Division requested two (2) strikes, one (1) of which was completed in TA 185 KL and the other of which was cancelled by the originator. The 7th Fighter Command, with eight (8) P-51's strafed the coastal area in the Division zone. VMO-4 flew seven (7) tactical observation missions and five (5) planes were operational at the end of the period. The 726th SAW Squadron reverted to VAC LANFOR control.

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(i) Naval Gunfire. Four (4) DD's from CTF 54 supported the attack.. Call fires for the period were executed in TA's 185 and 202. A large amount of 40mm ammunition was employed in lieu of 5" as a safety precaution. One (1) naval gunfire spotter aboard a DD adjusted fires along the coastal area.

(j) 4th Engineer Battalion. There were no changes in assignments. This battalion continued to support the RCT's by executing demolitions on pillboxes, blockhouses, and the entrances and exits to caves and by mine removal and road work in the forward and rear areas.

(k) Combat Efficiency. The combat efficiency had been reduced by excessive casualties, particularly to key personnel, and battle fatigue, to an estimated 45%.

(l) Weather and Visibility. The weather was cloudy and cold, visibility was fair, and ceiling was overcast 10/10.

19. FROM 1800, 8 MAR 45 TO 1800, 9 MAR 45 (D PLUS 18)

(a) By 1800 enemy fires, consisting of rockets, mortars, grenades, rifle, and machine gun fire, were increasing in intensity, building up to a peak about 2000. Casualties were suffered in units all along the Division front and particularly in the area of TA 184 ABFG. Enemy movements indicated that either a counter-attack or a large scale infiltration would be attempted. Enemy units infiltrated in the zones of all RCT's but were most successful in the zone of RCT 23 where some elements reached the CP of BLT 2/23. At 1920 ten (10) to fifteen (15) Japanese were observed on a ridge in TA 202 QR. Artillery fire was requested on this area, and the enemy were either killed or dispersed. At 2300 there was considerable enemy activity along the front of BLT 3/24 and extending to the left in the zone of BLT 2/23 where infiltration attempts were reported. At 2330 the enemy attacked BLT 2/23 in force, and some elements succeeded in penetrating as far as the BLT CP where they were either killed or dispersed. It was apparent that this skirmish was not an all out "Banzai" attack but a well-planned and predetermined counter-attack in force. Captured information revealed that an assembly area had been designated at the crossroads in TA 201 N, from which the enemy moved up to CR 331 and south along the road to the CP of BLT 2/23, and that the forward elements were to be followed by a much larger force. The attack failed because of intense artillery fire and the disruption of the Japanese communications. A total of over 400 of the enemy were killed in the zone of BLT 2/23 during this counter-attack.

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(b) Throughout the night there was constant pressure along the front of RCT 24; numerous small units attempted to infiltrate, but all were repulsed and enemy dead in this zone totaled 150 for the night. Some infiltration was attempted through RCT 25 but no enemy were successful. Illumination fires were employed throughout the night. Contact throughout the night was maintained with a support ship of the 3d Marine Division which fired on possible rocket positions in TA's 185 and 202 and kept the east coast under observation. At 0415 Flash Red was reported; at 0505 Flash Blue, control Green, was received, and at 0512 Flash White was reported.

(c) Following a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division Artillery preparation from King-hour to King-hour plus 10, with a limitation on ammunition expenditure to 1000 rounds 75mm, and 1000 rounds 105mm, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0700, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 16-45, to complete the mission assigned in the previous Operation Order. Formation and boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(d) RCT 23, less BLT 1/23, resumed the attack in a column of battalions with BLT 2/23 in the assault. Considerable advance was made on the right and the right center against fairly light opposition, but the entire left was held up by intense enemy fire from the ridge in TA 202 BG. BLT 1/23 was released to RCT 23 at 1500, and BLT 3/23 reverted to VAC LANFOR Reserve at 1700 in TA 165 BC. Although ordered to consolidate at 1700, this RCT continued the attack to improve its positions and did not halt the attack until 1730. RCT 23 maintained contact with the 3d Division on the left and with RCT 24 on the right.

(e) RCT 24, less BLT 2/24, began the attack at King-hour with the main effort on the left in order to overrun a center of resistance along the boundary. This attack was not successful, and after a rapid reorganization the RCT launched a second attack at 0900, resulting in a breakthrough for a gain of about 300 yards on the left and left center. BLT 1/24, having suffered numerous casualties began a reorganization of its units into a consolidated BLT of two (2) companies under the command of the RCT Executive Officer. The BLT Commander was relieved just prior to this reorganization. By 1200 BLT 1/24 was able to advance its line on the left to a position opposite BLT 3/24. Extremely heavy resistance on the right held up the advance and little gain was made in that sector. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, this RCT was in contact with elements on its right and left. BLT 2/24 was released to RCT 25 at 0500 to relieve BLT 3/25 on the extreme right of the Division zone. When released, BLT 3/25 was directed to assemble in TA's 182 O and 183 KL as Division Reserve. BLT 3/25 closed in the assembly

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area at 0730.

(f) RCT 25, less BLT 3/25, and plus BLT 2/24, maintained its positions and was unable to advance on the left because of the resistance holding up the right of BLT 1/24. A prominent reentrant resulted from the inability of these two BLT's to advance; however, plans were made to drive through this area on the morning of 10 March.

(g) 4th Provisional Battalion. A temporary Provisional Battalion, consisting of thirty-eight (38) officers and four hundred eighty-eight (488) enlisted was organized from the Support Group and assembled in TA 182 Y as Division Reserve for emergency use in the rear areas.

(h) 14th Marines. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 in direct support RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support RCT 24, 4/14 in general support, and VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. Air observers fired a total of seventeen (17) missions during the period. VAC LANFOR Artillery was fired on three (3) targets which required heavy artillery. Six (6) targets were reported and were fired upon during the period from information secured by sound ranging. The total number of missions fired was 343.

(i) 4th Tank Battalion. There were no changes in assignments. At the end of the period thirty-three (33) tanks were operational, eight (8) were damaged and thirteen (13) were destroyed. Company "B" towed a 7.2 rocket launcher in the zone of BLT 1/24 and fired twenty (20) rockets. Results were not successful.

(j) Aviation. CTG 52.2 and the 7th AAF continued to furnish air support. Of the eight (8) support missions requested, four (4) were completed. The remainder were cancelled because the front lines were too close to the target areas by the time these missions came in. RCT 23 reported that the P-51 mission with 500-pound delayed-action bombs was very effective. VMO-4 flew six (6) tactical observation missions. Successful tests were completed of smoke rockets fired from VMO-4 wing-mounted bazookas for target designation. One (1) VMO-4 plane, armed with six (6) smoke rockets, was available on call to designate targets for support aircraft.

(k) Naval Gunfire. Because of the increasing limitations upon fire possibilities, the Division Naval Gunfire Support was reduced to two (2) DD's. In supporting the Division attack, fires were placed in TA's 185, 186 and 202, with two (2) VOF planes furnishing air spot.

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(l) 4th Engineer Battalion. There were no changes in assignments or tasks of this battalion.

(m) 4th Pioneer Battalion. At 0800 the Division Shore Party was relieved by the Garrison Force. For the remainder of the period this battalion was disposed tactically for beach defense. It was directed to be prepared to assemble in Division Reserve on one (1) hour's notice.

(n) Combat Efficiency remained at an estimated 45%.

(o) Weather and Visibility. The weather was cool; visibility was unlimited. The ceiling was unlimited in the morning, decreasing to 1500 feet by the end of the period.

20. FROM 1800, 9 MAR 45 TO 1800, 10 MAR 45 (D PLUS 19)

(a) Enemy activity during the night was relatively quiet. The front lines received a small amount of light and medium mortar fire at infrequent intervals during the night. There were several unsuccessful attempts at infiltration. In order to insure the closing of the reentrant in TA 184 CH, and to shorten the lines across the Division front, Division decided to have RCT 25 relieve BLT 1/24, the right BLT of RCT 24, with BLT 3/25, which was in Division Reserve prior to 0630. BLT 3/25 was released to RCT 25 at 0300. RCT 23, on the left, was then ordered to assume control of BLT 3/24 in its present zone at 0630. When relieved by RCT's 23 and 25, RCT 24, less BLT's 2/24 and 3/24, was ordered to assemble in TA's 182 O and 183 KL as Division Reserve. Two (2) DD's provided illumination in the Division zone during the night.

(b) After a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division Artillery preparation from King-hour minus 25 to King-hour minus 15, and from King-hour minus 10 to King-hour, and moving forward in successive concentrations of 100 yards every five (5) minutes from King-hour to King-hour plus 15, the Division resumed the attack with two (2) RCT's in assault at King-hour, 0800, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 17-45, to destroy the enemy and capture the remainder of the island within its zone of action. For formation and boundaries, see the map, Progress of Attack. Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(c) RCT 23, on the left, less BLT 3/23, and with BLT 3/24 attached, continued the attack at King-hour with two (2) BLT's in assault, 2/23 on the left and 3/24 on the right, and with 1/23 in RCT Reserve, making its main effort on the right. Progress on the left was steady against light mortar and small arms fire coming from caves along the cliff line marking the Division zone.

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the right the advance was slow against strong enemy resistance throughout the zone. After a steady advance resulting in considerable gains, the RCT took up a favorable defensive position along a line about 400 to 600 yards from the beach. Consolidation for the night was begun at 1700. Contact was maintained from right to left within the Division. At about 1500 patrols reached the coast line within the zone without encountering the enemy. At 1115 BLT 3/23, which was in VAC LANFOR Reserve, was released to RCT control. The RCT Reserve was employed in mopping up the rear areas throughout the day.

(d) RCT 25, on the right, with BLT 2/24 and the Reconnaissance Company attached, completed the relief of BLT 1/24 by BLT 3/25 at 0600 and assumed control of the zone as assigned in the attack order. See the map, Progress of Attack. At King-hour BLT's 3/25 and 1/25 jumped off in a coordinated attack supported by the fire of BLT's 2/25 and 2/24. Pivoting on the right of BLT 1/25, these two BLT's turned towards the southeast and were able to break through the reentrant and make a considerable gain during the day. During the day advance elements of BLT 1/25 were pinched out and were employed, together with units of BLT 2/25, to liquidate an area of resistance which developed in TA 184 N. At 1700, when consolidation was ordered, RCT 25 had reached the line shown on the map, Progress of Attack, and was occupying favorable ground for defense. The Division Reconnaissance Company was assigned the task of containing and destroying the enemy in TA 183 J in order to protect the rear areas from possible infiltration from caves in this vicinity. The advance of RCT 25 overran and annihilated the strong positions of the enemy and secured the commanding ground in the zone. The rear areas were mopped up as the advance was continued.

(e) RCT 24, less BLT's 2/24 and 3/24, reverted to Division Reserve in TA's 182 O and 183 KL at 0630. At 1115, VAC LANFOR directed that BLT 1/24 be assigned to VAC LANFOR Reserve and remain in position in above TA's.

(f) 4th Provisional Battalion, in Division Reserve, established defensive positions on the left of the Division zone in the rear areas. There was no activity reported during the night. During the daylight hours patrols from this battalion began mopping up operations in the Division rear areas.

(g) 14th Marines. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 in direct support of RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support of RCT 24 prior to 0630, after which time it reinforced the fires of 2/14; 4/14 was in general support, and VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. Air observers fired on a fire mission during the

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period. The total number of missions fired was 329.

(h) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "C" was attached to RCT 23, Company "A" to RCT 25, and Company "B" was under Battalion control. At the end of the period thirty-five (35) tanks were operational, six (6) damaged, and thirteen (13) destroyed. One (1) platoon of Company "C" operated with RCT 9 during the day.

(i) Aviation. Two (2) missions were requested by the Division from the 7th Fighter Command, but both were cancelled because the front lines moved forward so rapidly that the strikes could not be employed. VMO-4 flew seven (7) tactical observation missions. Beginning at 0700 this period, and daily thereafter until they were secured, close air support groups were to be composed of eight (8) P-51 aircraft, each armed with two (2) 500 pound bombs and full ammunition. Flights were to be relieved on station at two (2) hour intervals, the first flight 0700, the last flight 1700.

(j) Naval Gunfire. One (1) DD with VOF air spot supported the Division during the day. Before all fire was lifted, because of the rapid advance of the Division front, one (1) mission was fired in caves in TA 185 J. The ship was held for emergency missions, and VOF air spot was employed in keeping the Division's front under observation throughout the day.

(k) 4th Engineer Battalion. No change in assignments or duties.

(l) 4th Pioneer Battalion, was prepared to assemble in TA 166 F on one (1) hour's notice as Division Reserve.

(m) Combat Efficiency of this Division was reduced by excessive casualties, particularly to key personnel, and battle fatigue to an estimated 40%.

(n) Weather and Visibility. The weather was cool and fair; visibility was unlimited; ceiling was overcast 1/10 to 2/10.

21. FROM 1800, 10 MAR 45 TO 1800, 11 MAR 45 (D PLUS 20)

(a) Enemy activity was relatively quiet along the entire front. Some infiltration attempts were made on the front of RCT 25. The area of resistance by-passed in 184 N was contained by elements of this RCT. It was quite apparent that the main enemy resistance had been broken but that the Japanese were continuing their passive defense from an intricate system of well concealed caves. These caves were hard to locate and were generally disclosed only when

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the enemy opened fire. Two (2) DD's provided illumination for the Division throughout the night.

(b) The Division continued the attack at King-hour minus 60, King-hour being 0830, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 18-45, without a preliminary artillery or naval gunfire preparation, to assist in the completion of the capture of IWO JIMA. Formation and boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(8) RCT 23, with BLT's 2/23 and 3/24 abreast, continued the attack at King-hour minus 60 and rapidly overran the weak enemy resistance to its front by employing combat patrols to cover all of the beach areas. On the left of the RCT zone, the mopping up could not be completed because RCT 9 of the 3d Division was operating along the boundary and in the zone of action of RCT 23. On the right, BLT 3/24 encountered strong enemy resistance in the vicinity of TA 185 K. This resistance was reduced by the end of the period, and combat patrols had cleared out the remainder of this zone. BLT's 1/23 and 3/23, in RCT Reserve, were employed in mopping up the rear area. At 1530 BLT 1/23 relieved BLT 2/23 in its zone, completing the relief by 1700.

(d) RCT 25, with BLT's 3/25, 2/25, and 2/24 in line from left to right, continued the attack at 0745, fifteen (15) minutes late, to execute the mission assigned. BLT 1/25 neutralized the enemy resistance in TA 184 N by 1100. Shortly after the assault was initiated, the left of the line received intense fire from rockets, mortars, and small arms. The center of this fire area was located as being in the vicinity of TA 185 PQV, and it was at once apparent that this area was the final defensive position of the enemy in this zone. The terrain in this area was not normal in any respect; it could be classified only as a terrain freak of nature. However, it was well suited for the construction of cave positions, and the Japanese had utilized this advantage to the fullest extent. Their scheme of maneuver was to hold up the advance as long as it was possible, and to inflict as many casualties as they could before they were forced to adopt their usual suicidal tactics. By the end of the period this resistance in the above TA had not been liquidated. The Division Reconnaissance Company continued mopping up operations in the rear area.

(e) RCT 24, less three (3) BLT's, had no change. BLT 1/24 was in VAC LANFOR Reserve.

(f) 4th Provisional Battalion - One (1) platoon was attached to the Pioneer Battalion for the defense of Beach 1

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during the hours of darkness. The Battalion continued mopping up operations in the rear areas of the Division zone.

(g) 14th Marines. In accordance with VAC LANFOR Order, 2/14, 3/14 and 4/14 fired a thirty (30) minute preparation from King-hour minus 10 to King-hour plus 20 in the zone of the 5th Marine Division. 1/14 was in direct support of the Division until 1430, when it was directed to reinforce the 13th Marines. VMO-4 fired one (1) mission during the period and executed surveillance of fires in the Division zone. Artillery spot missions were secured at 1145. No targets were reported by sound ranging. The total number of missions fired in the 4th Division zone was eleven (11); the total in support of 5th Division was twenty-six (26).

(h) 4th Tank Battalion. At the end of the period, thirty-nine (39) tanks were operational, four (4) were damaged, and eleven (11) were destroyed. During the afternoon one (1) flame thrower tank with crew was loaned to the 3d Marine Division.

(i) Aviation. VMO-4 flew nine (9) tactical observation missions. One (1) plane was hit by enemy machine gun fire, and at the end of the period one (1) plane was operational.

(j) Naval Gunfire. No fires were placed in the Division zone during the day. One (1) DD was on call for possible emergency missions.

(k) 4th Engineer Battalion. Company "A" was attached to RCT 25, Company "B" to RCT 24, and Company "C" to RCT 23. All units continued the execution of demolitions and road work in the areas of these respective RCT's.

(l) 4th Pioneer Battalion. No change in assignment.

(m) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 38%.

(n) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair, visibility unlimited, and ceiling overcast 2/10 to 8/10.

22. FROM 1800, 11 MAR 45 TO 1800, 12 MAR 45 (D PLUS 21)

(a) Activity for the night consisted of sporadic mortar and small arms fire coming from the center of resistance in the zone of RCT 25. The majority of this fire was aimless and apparently fired with no other purpose than to bolster the courage of the enemy. Some infiltration was attempted from this area, but all attempts were unsuccessful. One (1) DD illuminated the zone of

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action for the Division.

(b) Division Administrative Order No. 1-45, Warning Order for reembarkation, was issued at 0800. Reembarkation was to begin on or about 14 March.

(c) The Division continued the attack at King-hour plus 60, King-hour being 0700, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 19-45, to eliminate the pocket of resistance in TA 185 PQUV and to mop up thoroughly the zone, beginning at the coastline and working progressively back through the zone in order to destroy the remaining Japanese within the area. Boundaries and zones of action - no change.

(d) RCT 23, on the left, employed BLT 3/24 to assist RCT 25 in containing the enemy in the center of resistance in TA 185 PQUV. At King-hour this RCT, less BLT 3/24, began a systematic mopping up of its area from the beach toward the RCT rear area line. The evacuation of Marine dead and the burial of enemy dead as well as a general policing of the area occupied the remainder of the period.

(e) RCT 25, with BLT's 3/25, 2/25 and 2/24 in line, at 0900 began mopping up operations to destroy the organized resistance in its area. Because the area of this resistance was relatively small and was contained on three (3) sides (see the map, Progress of Attack), it was necessary to limit the weapons employed to small arms, mortars, and flame throwers. The character of the terrain prohibited the employment of tanks. The enemy were entrenched in ravines, caves and man-made pillboxes, and were extremely tenacious. In order to annihilate this resistance it was necessary to flush the enemy out of these emplacements one or two at a time. The Division Reconnaissance Company was employed in mopping up the rear areas. Detachments from RCT Headquarters were employed to evacuate Marine dead and to bury enemy dead.

(f) RCT 24, less three (3) BLT's, had no change. BLT 1/24 continued in VAC LANFOR Reserve.

(g) 4th Provisional Battalion. One (1) platoon was assigned to the Pioneer Battalion for the defense of Beach Blue 1 during the hours of darkness. At 1400 the battalion was disbanded and the elements thereof reverted to parent control.

(h) 14th Marines. Four (4) battalions fired preparation fires in the 5th Marine Division zone from 0903 to 0913. 3/14 fired harassing fires in the zone from 1900 to 0630 and from 0913 to 1045.

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The total number of missions fired was 84.

(i) 4th Tank Battalion. Two (2) flame thrower tanks, without crews, were loaned to the 5th Marine Division. At the end of the period, forty-one (41) tanks were operational, two (2) were damaged, and eleven (11) were destroyed.

(j) Aviation. VMO-4 flew four (4) tactical observation missions, and at the end of the period two (2) planes were operational.

(k) Naval Gunfire. One (1) DD maintained contact with the Division in case emergency fires were required.

(l) The 4th Engineer Battalion continued operations in support of the RCT's.

(m) 4th Pioneer Battalion. No change.

(n) Combat Efficiency was estimated to be 36%.

(o) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair and cool, visibility was fair, overcast 8/10 to 10/10.

23. FROM 1800, 12 MAR 45 TO 1800, 13 MAR 45 (D PLUS 22)

(a) During the night sporadic and generally aimless mortar and machine gun fire was directed towards the Division rear areas. Attempted infiltration from the enemy compressed within the center of resistance was continuous throughout the night but was unsuccessful. One (1) DD furnished illumination during the night.

(b) The Division continued the attack at King-hour minus 30, King-hour being 0730, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 20-45, to complete the missions previously assigned. There was no change in boundaries or formations.

(c) RCT 23 continued mopping up operations, evacuation of own dead, and the burial of the enemy dead. BLT 1/23 operated in the forward part of the area, BLT 3/23 in the center part, and BLT 2/23 was in RCT Reserve.

(d) RCT 25 continued the attack at King-hour to eliminate the enemy resistance in its zone. The Division Reconnaissance Company and elements of RCT Headquarters continued mopping up operations, evacuation of own dead, and burial of the enemy dead. The center of resistance was contained by BLT 3/23 attached to RCT 23.

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BLT's 3/25, 2/25, 1/25 and 2/24. Slow progress was made in the elimination of this area.

(e) RCT 24, less two (2) BLT's, continued in Division Reserve. At 0745 BLT 1/24 was released from VAC LANFOR Reserve to parent control. RCT 24 was employed in policing and mopping up the Division rear area.

(f) Division Administrative Order No. 2-45, directed that elements of the Division would begin reembarkation on 14 March.

(g) At 1350 a warning order was issued to RCT's 23, 24, and 25 to the effect that upon orders to withdraw all units, the assembly areas would be as follows: RCT 23 - TA's 165 BCD, 182 TWXY, 183 U; RCT 24 - TA's 182 JNOS, 183 AFKL; RCT 25 - TA's 183 MNRST, 184 UV, 167 B.

(h) 14th Marines. 2/14 and 3/14 fired harassing fires in the zone of the 5th Marine Division. All battalions were available to reinforce the 13th Marines on call until 1000. By 1130 all battalions had closed station and the forward observers and liaison officers of 3/14 returned to the battalion area at 1155. The total number of missions fired was 118.

(i) 4th Tank Battalion. Eight (8) tanks, including two (2) flame throwers, were loaned to the 5th Marine Division. Two (2) flame thrower tanks and two (2) combat tanks were employed along the road in TA 185 P. There was no change in the status of operational tanks.

(j) Aviation. VMO-4 flew four (4) tactical observation and three (3) photo missions. At the end of the period two (2) planes were operational.

(k) 4th Engineer Battalion. No change in assignments or duties.

(l) 4th Pioneer Battalion. No change.

(m) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 36%.

(n) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair, visibility was good, and the ceiling was overcast 3/10 to 6/10.

(o) The operations for the period partially completed the mopping up of the Division zone and the continuance of the fighting to neutralize the enemy in the center of resistance then confined

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to TA 185 K.

24. FROM 1800, 13 MAR 45 TO 1800, 14 MAR 45 (D PLUS 23)

(a) The period of darkness covered by this report was relatively quiet except in the front of BLT 3/25. Continuous fighting in this area went on all during the night. One (1) DD illuminated the Division zone throughout the night.

(b) In accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 21-45, the Division continued its assigned mission at King-hour, 0630.

(c) RCT 23 continued mopping up operations and the burial of enemy dead. At 0810 elements of BLT 1/23 encountered a small group of Japanese in TA 185 B. This group had apparently been hiding in caves and had been by-passed unintentionally. Patrols from BLT's 1/23 and 3/24 surrounded the area and killed all the enemy. By the end of the period 95% of area had been policed and mopped up.

(d) RCT 25 continued the attack at King-hour to reduce the center of resistance in its zone. A slow, gradual advance, against desperate resistance was made throughout the period, and it was believed that the enemy remaining in this pocket had been considerably reduced. Mortars, hand grenades, demolitions, small arms, and flame throwers were employed against this area. Because BLT 2/25 had become so depleted in strength, BLT 2/24 was directed to relieve BLT 2/25 in time to continue the attack at King-hour on 15 March. A Provisional Company composed of personnel from the RCT Weapons Company, RCT H & S Company, and the 81mm Mortar Platoon of BLT 1/25 was organized and relieved BLT 2/24 on the right. The Reconnaissance Company continued mopping up operations.

(e) RCT 24, less two (2) BLT's, was in Division Reserve, and continued the police of the rear areas and made preparations for reembarkation.

(f) The 14th Marines began reembarkation at 0700. By 1600, 1/14 and 4/14 had completed reembarkation; 2/14, 3/14, and H&S Battery were continuing preparations for loading.

(g) 4th Tank Battalion. Eight (8) tanks (including two (2) flame throwers) were on loan to the 5th Marine Division. At the end of the period forty-three (43) tanks were operational and eleven (11) were destroyed.

(h) Aviation. VMO-4 flew one (1) tactical observation

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SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

mission and at the end of the period two (2) planes were operational.

(i) Naval Gunfire. No naval gunfire was available nor could it be employed within the Division zone.

(j) 4th Engineer Battalion continued assigned duties blowing caves and executing general demolitions.

(k) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 35%.

(l) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair, visibility was unlimited, and ceiling overcast 1/10 to 3/10.

25. FROM 1800, 14 MAR 45 TO 1800, 15 MAR 45 (D PLUS 24)

(a) Night activity in the Division zone was confined to the center of resistance in TA 185, where several unsuccessful infiltrations were attempted. There was considerable grenade activity, particularly on the front of BLT 3/24. BLT 2/24 relieved BLT 2/25 at 2200.

(b) The Division continued operations at King-hour minus 60, King-hour being 0730, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 22-45, to mop up thoroughly its zone of action.

(c) RCT 23 continued mopping up operations, burial of enemy dead, and the general police of its area. This RCT continued preparations for reembarkation and for the relief by RCT 24 at 0800, 16 March.

(d) RCT 25 resumed its operations to reduce the center of resistance in TA 185, to mop up the rear areas, to bury the enemy dead, and generally police its area. The order of units from left to right was BLT's 3/24, 2/24, 2/25, and 3/25. On the right of the center of resistance considerable advance was made, which reduced the size of the pocket approximately one-third.

The enemy continued to oppose the advance stubbornly. Numerous caves were demolished in this area after unsuccessful attempts to induce the occupants to surrender.

(e) RCT 24, less two (2) BLT's, was in Division Reserve. This RCT continued mopping up and policing of rear areas, and prepared to relieve RCT 23 in its present zone at 0800, 16 March.

(f) The 14th Marines continued reembarkation. The Regimental CP opened in the USS BOLLINGER at 1400.

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(g) 4th Tank Battalion. Eight (8) tanks (including two (2) flame throwers) were still on loan to the 5th Marine Division. At the end of the period thirty-two (32) tanks were reembarked, three (3) remained attached to RCT 25, and eleven (11) were destroyed.

(h) Aviation. VMO-4 flew three (3) tactical observation missions, and at the end of the period two (2) planes were operational.

(i) 4th Engineer Battalion. No change.

(j) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 35%.

(k) Weather and Visibility. Weather was fair and visibility was good.

26. FROM 1800, 15 MAR 45 TO 1800, 16 MAR 45 (D PLUS 25)

(a) Activity for the night was confined to the area in front of the troops containing the center of resistance in TA 185. Accurate rifle fire, hand grenades, and small mortar fire were delivered by the enemy. An attempt by a party of from fifty (50) to sixty (60) of the enemy to break out of the center of resistance was stopped when the advance party of the enemy was fired upon. Six (6) of the enemy were killed, and the remainder were driven back into the caves from which they had emerged.

(b) At 2250 1/14 had completed reembarkation in APA 172; 3/14 and 4/14 had completed reembarkation in APA 234.

(c) The Division continued operations at King-hour minus 105, King-hour being 0815, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 23-45, to eliminate the pocket of resistance in TA 185 and to mop up its zone of action thoroughly.

(d) RCT 23 was relieved at 0800 by RCT 24, less two (2) BLT's, and immediately began reembarkation. At 1700 the CP of this RCT was opened in the USS ROCKBRIDGE.

(e) RCT 24, less BLT 2/24, relieved RCT 23 and continued mopping up and the general police of the area assigned it. This RCT assumed control of BLT 3/24 at 0800. In a cave in TA 185 B, a patrol killed fourteen (14) Japanese and entombed eleven (11) additional when this cave was closed. At 1800 positions were taken for the defense of the area as shown on the map, Progress of Attack.

(f) RCT 25, with BLT 2/24 attached, continued the attack.

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at King-hour minus 105, and at 1030 all organized resistance in this area had ceased. For the remainder of the period this RCT continued mopping up in its zone, the evacuation of own dead, the burial of the enemy dead, the removal of friendly mine field in TA's 167 D and 184 SX, and general police of the area. At 1700 dispositions for defense were as shown on the map, Progress of Attack. At 1600 the Division Reconnaissance Company reverted to Division control.

(g) At 1100 the entire Division Sector was reported secured.

(h) At 1800 the Commanding General VAC LANFOR announced that all organized resistance on IWO JIMA had ceased.

(i) 4th Tank Battalion continued reembarkation. Eight (8) tanks were still on loan to the 5th Division, and one (1) flame thrower tank to the 3d Division.

(j) Aviation. VMO-4 flew one (1) photographic mission and one (1) tactical observation mission, and at the end of the period one (1) airplane was operational.

(k) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 35%.

(l) Weather and Visibility. Weather fair, visibility good, and ceiling overcast 1/10 to 4/10.

27. FROM 1800, 16 MAR 45 TO 1800, 17 MAR 45 (D PLUS 26)

(a) RCT 23 completed reembarkation at 2300.

(b) During the hours of darkness eleven (11) Japanese, attempting to move about in the Division zone, were killed. Other than this, quiet prevailed over the entire Division front during the night.

(c) RCT 24 relieved RCT 25 in its zone at 0800. BLT 2/24 reverted to parent control at that time. RCT 24, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 24-45, continued thorough policing and mopping up the remaining enemy in the zones of action of RCT's 23 and 25. Throughout the day, active patrolling was conducted in both areas, in addition to the evacuation of own dead, the burial of enemy dead, the blowing of caves, and the general policing of the areas.

(d) RCT 25, when relieved, assembled in designated areas and commenced reembarkation. At 1345 troops of RCT 25 were embarked on APA's 178 and 172.

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(e) As a result of the mopping up operations for this period, fifteen (15) of the enemy were killed, one hundred thirty-two (132) enemy dead were buried, fifty-eight (58) caves were closed, and thirteen (13) Marine dead were evacuated. General police improved the area in preparation for turning it over to the 3d Marine Division.

28. FROM 1800, 17 MAR 45 TO 1800, 18 MAR 45 (D PLUS 27)

(a) At 1900 RCT 25 CP opened in APA 172, reembarkation having been completed at that time.

(b) No enemy activity was reported during the night.

(c) In accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 25-45, the 3d Marine Division relieved RCT 24 with RCT 9 at 0808.

(d) When relieved by RCT 9, RCT 24 assembled in designated areas and prepared to commence reembarkation on order.

(e) At 1650 units of RCT 24 were embarking and proceeding to APA 222.

(f) At 1730 the Division Advance CP opened in APA 103.

(g) The remaining units continued reembarkation.

29. FROM 1800, 18 MAR 45 TO 1800, 19 MAR 45 (D PLUS 28)

(a) RCT 24 completed reembarkation at 2000 and opened its CP at 2100 in APA 222.

(b) The 4th Pioneer Battalion CP opened in APA 233 at 2300.

(c) The 4th Engineer Battalion CP opened in APA 222 at 0030.

(d) The Division CP was closed ashore at 0900 and opened at the same time in APA 103.

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Appendix 1

to

SECTION IV

P R O G R E S S O F A T T A C K

1:20,000 Target Area Map of Objective overprinted to show objectives assigned and daily front line positions.

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SECTION V

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. General.

(a) In view of the varied and numerous suggestions pertaining to changes in current Tables of Organization and Basic Allowances, and in view of the possible adoption of an FMF PAC proposed Table of Organization, a coordinated study of the subject has been instituted by the Division and the results therefrom will be forwarded to FMF IAC in the form of specific recommendations.

(b) Without attempting to comment on all detailed recommendations outlined in staff section and subordinate unit reports, the comments and recommendations included herein and considered of immediate importance and general interest, are submitted.

2. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) Comment. The immense value of cooperation and understanding which results from constant association in a joint endeavor is reflected in smoother, more efficient teamwork which is the essence of success in the most complicated of battles - an amphibious operation. This Division has gained considerable experience in amphibious technique as the result of having participated in four (4) major engagements in the past fourteen (14) months, and it is felt that, if the Division had been working with the same TRANSDIVS, the same TRANSGROUP Staff, and the same control organization throughout this period, the resultant would have been an amphibious fighting team of unparalleled efficiency. Certainly the inevitable process of relearning the capabilities of personnel and retraining in basic principles and practices prior to each operation would be minimized.

The immediate reaction to this proposal will be to state that widespread Pacific operations make such a scheme impractical. The fact remains that maximum efficiency and unity of action between the agency responsible for placing troops ashore and the troops themselves will result only from the establishment of such a policy and, in view of more difficult operations in prospect where cooperation and understanding will be vital during the critical stages of landings, it is maintained that every effort should be directed toward achieving the desired end.

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SECTION V - COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

Recommendation. That the Navy establish a policy of maintaining TRANSDIV, TRANSGROUP staffs, and control organizations as permanent integral units, assigning them to work with the same troop units in each operation.

(b) Comment. Results indicate that high horizontal bombing by land based aircraft had little effect on the enemy's defensive system. In fact, one POW estimated that 40% of the bombs dropped by these aircraft prior to D-day missed the island entirely and this is considered a conservative figure. In order to permit more effective air strikes from low altitudes, which are essential if destruction of emplacements is to be accomplished, early destruction of enemy AA defenses must be effected. The efficiency of NGF spotting by VOS aircraft would also be enhanced by the reduction of the enemy's AA.

Recommendations. That in future assaults on heavily fortified objectives, initial effort be concentrated on destruction of AA defenses by carrier aircraft and that precise low-level bombing and use of rockets against located positions be initiated two (2) weeks prior to the target date.

(c) Comment. The Division's concept of NGF requirements for the IWO JIMA operation, which was submitted to VAC LANFOR early in the planning phase, emphasized the necessity for adequate preliminary bombardment of the objective and requested that a minimum of ten (10) days destructive fire be conducted prior to the landing. It was apparent that in order to insure success of the landing, weapon emplacements, pillboxes, and blockhouses, particularly those located on the right flank of the Division zone of action would have to be reduced prior to D-day by slow, deliberate, destructive fire from ships firing at close ranges. It is considered that the three (3) days allowed for the preliminary bombardment was insufficient.

Recommendation. That in future operations against highly fortified objectives a minimum of ten days preliminary bombardment to be scheduled, rotating BB or CA divisions if necessary.

(d) Comment. During the forward area rehearsal, the Division requested the use of "earthquake" bombs on the ridge in TA 183 CD, the "amphi-theater", and the high cliffs on the right flank of the Division zone of action, the objective being to cause a crumbling effect which would seal numerous weapons emplacements and caves contained in the cliff and ridge faces. This procedure had been found effective in the European Theater of Operations and

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SECTION V - COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

it is believed that similar results could have been obtained on IWO JIMA, particularly in view of the soft sand stone composition of the cliffs. The request was denied.

Recommendation. That provisions be made to employ "earthquake" bombs on future operations in an effort to crumble cliffs and seal caves, and also to use in large ravines for their concussive effect.

(e) Comment. The 19 LST's assigned the Division for the IWO JIMA operation were insufficient to properly embark four (4) assault BLT's and Division Artillery. In some cases tactical unity could not be completely preserved and the presence of additional radar, ponton barge and causeway personnel on seven (7) LST's further restricted troop space. LST requirements for the tactical loading of four (4) assault BLT's consist of sixteen (16) LST's, four (4) being assigned to each BLT. Division Artillery requires five (5) LST's, one (1) for each battalion and one (1) for regimental headquarters and additional ammunition, making a total of twenty-one (21) LST's needed to embark assault elements of the Division.

Recommendation. That a minimum of twenty-one (21) LST's, the entire troop capacity of which would be available for troop units, be assigned the Division in future operations of a similar character.

(f) Comment. On several occasions LST commanders refused to take aboard LVT's, causing the loss of LVT's from swamping when fuel was exhausted. (See par. 8(e), Annex NAN).

Recommendation. That all LST commanders be impressed with the responsibility they bear and the problems involved in operating with LVT units, and that new LST's be given training with LVT's sufficient to foster a spirit of cooperation and teamwork.

(g) Comment. Movement and operations of LST's and LSM's were handicapped because of the insistence of the TRANSRON Commander in personally controlling these craft. Consequently, the chain of command was considerably more involved and delays greater than if such authority had been vested in the TRANSRON Control Officer who was working in conjunction with the representative of the Commanding General.

Recommendation. That TRANSRON commanders establish a general policy relative to movement and operations of LST's and LSM's and delegate authority for the detailed control to their TRANSRON control officers.

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SECTION V - COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(h) Comment. The two replacement drafts were not received in sufficient time to thoroughly train them along with the Division units for which they would provide replacements. The status of training of the replacement drafts when received was such as to require intensive and realistic combat training prior to their reaching a satisfactory state of readiness for combat, and it is highly desirable that these drafts be available to the Division throughout the preparatory training period.

Recommendation. That battle replacement drafts be assigned the Division at least three (3) months prior to embarkation for an operation in order that integrated training with the Division may be accomplished.

(i) Comment. The need for timely oblique and vertical photographs of the battle area was keenly felt throughout the operation. The quality of most of the photographs furnished by higher authority after D-day was poor and the photographs were worthless for use by small unit commanders. During the latter stages of the operation, vitally needed photographic coverage of the enemy area under attack was finally obtained through the use of a VMO-4 plane and a Division photographer, a woefully inadequate system in comparison with the modern equipment available to higher echelon for this purpose.

Recommendation. That higher echelon automatically furnish the Division adequate photographic coverage of its zone of action throughout the operation, that more emphasis be placed on thorough briefing of pilots for photographic missions, and that higher standards in the technique of processing film be achieved.

(j) Comment. Experience gained in the IWO JIMA operation emphasized the need for a heavier and more powerful direct fire weapon than the Bazooka for use of assault teams against concrete emplacements and caves, employing a shell with concrete-piercing capabilities against the former and a fragmentation shell for attack of the latter.

Recommendation. That a short range rocket of 4.5" caliber, capable of being crew served by two (2) men of the assault team and firing concrete piercing and fragmentation ammunition, be adopted.

(k) Comment. The need for additional mortars in the Division, particularly a heavier type mortar than the 81mm, was

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SECTION V - COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

apparent in the operation. Heavier mortars should be employed to supplement the organic 81mm mortar platoons and provide the infantry commander with vitally needed additional fire support to bridge the gap between the 81mm and artillery.

Recommendation. That the 4.2 mortar be adopted by the Marine Corps and a mortar battalion of two (2) 4.2 companies and one (1) 155mm mortar company be assigned to each Division.

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A N N E X A B L E

TO

FOURTH

MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

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SECTION I - PLANNING AND PREPARATION

(a) Administrative.

Planning for the conduct of administration began on September 1, 1944, immediately after return from the Marianas Operation. Based on the experience gained in handling casualty reports on that operation, the casualty card inaugurated and used by this Division was revised, 100,000 copies being printed and distributed to subordinate units. These units filled out and kept up-to-date a set of these cards for each officer and man. Organizations ordered to duty with the Division during the operation were furnished copies of orders pertaining to administration and furnished blank casualty cards. Officers who were to handle casualty reporting attended a conference held at Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for the purpose of clarifying that Headquarters' desires in connection with such reporting.

Orders governing submission of embarkation rosters and submission of recommendation for award of medals and decorations were revamped and reissued.

Previous efforts to obtain an identification tag stamping machine for the use of this Division were continued with the result that such machines have now been authorized for all divisions. However, the machine was not delivered prior to the operation and identification tags had to be obtained by the Division Surgeon through the cooperation of nearby units having such machines. In addition a supply of 3,000 tin bound cardboard tags were obtained by the D-1 Section for use by the division medical units aboard each ship as emergency identification tags to replace those lost by officers and men enroute to the target.

The 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts of approximately 126 officers and 2600 enlisted were assigned to this Division during November, 1944. These drafts were assigned and ordered held intact, to be used as ships platoons and shore parties and later released to regiments. Due to the shortage of junior officers throughout the Division, replacement officers were released to the Division for assignment to combat teams, together with some medical personnel assigned to other units by higher authority. This reduced the officer personnel of the drafts to 63 Marine Corps and 3 Navy.

Each combat team was assigned a portion of the Replacement Drafts for training as a separate unit and for use as ships platoons during the operation.

Upon leaving the combat area following the Marianas Operation this Division had no information on the whereabouts of 555 officers and enlisted men. Some few of these were missing in action

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but the vast majority had been wounded and evacuated by ship and plane to hospitals located throughout the Pacific. By means of unremitting effort and utilizing the record resources of all hospitals, casual centers and Fleet Post Offices in the Pacific, all of the officers and men still alive were located at such widely separated points as Guadalcanal and Seattle. To avoid this state of affairs following the current operation, this Division decided to leave on each transport at the target a clerical noncommissioned officer whose sole duty would be to record data on all casualties brought aboard that ship for treatment. Once a casualty's presence aboard a particular ship is known, it is a comparatively easy task to trace his disposition thereafter. In order to obtain information on 4th Marine Division personnel who might be evacuated as casualties to vessels on which the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions arrived at Iwo Jima, this Division requested that the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, issue orders that all units participating in the operation likewise leave a casualty reporting noncommissioned officer aboard each ship. Reports were submitted daily by these noncommissioned officers to Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps which disseminated the information to the various divisions. This information has already proven of great assistance.

An additional aid in locating wounded officers and men was developed where by means of a personal message from the Commanding General, and a cartoon bringing out the main points of that message, all officers and men were urged in case they were evacuated to write or have someone write for them, first to their next of kin and next to the Commanding General, or any other officer of the Division, by title, advising of their current address.

(b) Provost Marshal.

Planning and preparation of the Military Police Company consisted of final training for their duties in combat.

(c) Religious Activities.

Chaplains were so assigned to the various ships as to provide a Catholic and Protestant Chaplain for each vessel as far as practicable. Two additional chaplains were assigned, one of whom was assigned to the Rear Echelon and the other assigned to the Division Burial Section.

(d) Morale.

(1) Recreation - Prior to leaving the Division Base Camp, the commanding officer of troops aboard each ship assigned to the Division was allocated recreation funds approximating fifty cents per man for expenditure during organized recreation at Pearl Harbor

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after rehearsal and prior to sailing for the staging area. In addition, unit recreation officers were directed to take a supply of small games, cards and books to be used aboard ship.

(2) American Red Cross - Of the five American Red Cross representatives in this Division, four accompanied the Division. They procured and furnished commanding officers of troops on Division ships recreational supplies and comfort articles ranging from playing cards to razors, and including 6,000 ditty bags for use for the personal effects of our dead. In addition the ladies of the Red Cross Chapter on Maui made up and delivered through the Division American Red Cross Field Director a large contribution of battle dressings and wrappings.

(3) Other steps - Division Recreation and Morale funds were appropriated for the purchase from the Division Post Exchange of 20,000 folders of air mail stationery for distribution to troops at the target by the various unit mail orderlies. Magazines purchased by the Recreation Fund were intercepted at Pearl Harbor and distributed to commanding officers of troops aboard the various ships assigned to the Division. Books and magazines were assembled by the chaplains beginning two months prior to the operation and together with an additional supply obtained at Pearl Harbor, distributed to the ships on which the Division was embarked.

(c) Postal.

By November, plans for the operation had crystalized sufficiently to begin postal planning. At a conference of the Postal officers concerned, arrangements were made to secure plane priority for the mail of the combat troops involved, for working space at Pearl Harbor, Eniwetok and Saipan enroute to the target, for the establishment of an LST borne Fleet Post Office at the target and for the loading aboard that LST of supplies, equipment, V-Mail forms and other reserve postal supplies. The Division Postal Officer evolved a plan of sending fifteen postal clerks to Pearl Harbor to intercept all mail for the Division at that point and to break down this mail into 107 components comprising the Rear Echelon and troops aboard the 51 ships on which the Division was to be embarked. Postal supplies assembled and packed for the operation included a complete V-Mail sending station; \$15,000 in stamp stock including 55,000 air mail envelopes, in addition to a \$4,000 stock provided each of the four regiments.

(f) Civil Affairs.

The Corps Civil Affairs Unit, consisting of two Navy officers, Civil Affairs specialists; one Marine officer, a Japanese linguist and five enlisted men, reported to the Division immediately prior to the operation. The unit was outfitted with two trucks which

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were preloaded with the prescribed equipment of the unit.

SECTION II - MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

(a) Administrative.

Embarkation rosters were secured from the various ships, verified and despatched to the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; the Division Rear Echelon and the various Division Postal Echelons immediately prior to departure from Pearl Harbor.

During the movement to the objective normal administrative work and final preparations for the tasks ashore were conducted.

(b) Provost Marshal.

The Provost Marshal utilized the military police under his control to augment Navy Shore Patrols during the weeks liberty granted members of the Division in Honolulu after rehearsal and prior to departure for the target.

(c) Religious Activities.

During the period spent aboard ship, chaplains conducted religious services, arranged for movies, organized amateur shows and assisted whenever possible in the conduct of ship's libraries and recreational facilities. During stop-overs, chaplains conducted services on ships having no chaplain of their denomination.

(d) Morale.

(1) Recreation - Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor, the recreation funds previously allocated to commanding officers of troops were pooled under the V Amphibious Corps, as were all available recreational facilities in the Pearl Harbor area. Each ship was allotted a quota and assigned a daily recreational area. Areas were rotated so that the preferred recreational facilities could be shared by the greatest possible number of men. Iced beer and Coca-Cola was purchased through the Navy and provided free to the men with sandwiches the men had brought from their respective ships.

(2) American Red Cross - Enroute to the target additional Red Cross recreational gear was supplied to the ships at Pearl Harbor.

(e) Postal.

This Division effected a completely successful delivery of mail to the Division scattered over 51 ships, and components of which were transferred from one ship to another over a period of 43 days

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consisting of 37 separate deliveries at Lahaina Roads, Maui; Pearl Harbor, T. H.; Eniwetok and Saipan. This delivery to ships was possible through the work of the fifteen man detail at Pearl Harbor which sorted all the mail of this Division and, employing rosters, sent to the Division's base camp the mail of the Rear Echelon and to each ship the mail for the troops embarked on it. Result was that all current mail (except 12 pouches) was delivered to the officers and men of the Division before leaving Saipan for the target. As a censorship matter from the time the Division left Pearl Harbor until D-Day, all outgoing mail was impounded and released when directed by the Commanding Officer, Expeditionary Troops.

SECTION III - NARRATIVE

(a) Administrative.

Periodic reports were prepared throughout the operation and beginning on D-Day casualty information in the form of cumulative figures on killed in action; wounded and evacuated (from the reporting organization); missing; wounded but not evacuated; sick and evacuated and total casualties, each divided between officers and enlisted men were furnished D-3 for inclusion in the Division daily despatch report. On D plus 3 a representative of the D-1 Section landed with the Division Advance Message Center to obtain and provide these figures and to compile the periodic report. After Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps came ashore C-1 of that organization was furnished by telephone each day the same casualty figures as were included in the daily despatch report to that Headquarters.

The main body of the D-1 Section landed on D plus 5. The first administrative casualty report by name was prepared on 28 February, 1945, and before leaving Iwo Jima, 14 administrative casualty reports, containing a total of 6527 names of officers and men had been prepared and despatched. An additional administrative casualty report containing 124 names of officers killed in action and died of wounds was radioed from Guam. Casualty reports were submitted in mailbrief form although during the last few days of its stay ashore this Division was permitted to report daily the names of twelve killed in action by radio.

The 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts accompanied this Division on the Iwo Jima operation. During the first phase of the operation these drafts functioned as ship platoons and shore parties until ships were unloaded when they were assigned to combat teams, they having been released to the Division early in the operation to be used as replacements.

The 24th Replacement Draft consisted of 30 Marine officers, 1267 Marine enlisted, and 7 Navy corpsmen. The 30th Replacement Draft consisted of 29 Marine officers, 3 Navy medical officers, 1214 Marine enlisted and 36 Navy corpsmen, the total draft containing 62

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officers and 2524 enlisted. At the completion of the operation all of these replacements had been assigned to other units except 4 Marine officers, 57 Marine enlisted, 3 Navy medical officers and 15 Navy enlisted (corpsmen), of which 11 enlisted Marines were missing in action.

A rear echelon at base camp from these two drafts consists of 4 Marine officers and 38 Marine enlisted.

The assignment of personnel of these Replacement Drafts was by specification number as far as possible, in accordance with existing instructions.

On 9 March, 1945 by Division Special Order #12-45, a temporary Provisional Battalion consisting of 38 officers and 488 enlisted was organized from the Support Group and assembled as a Division Reserve for emergency use in rear areas. These troops were used in rear area patrolling for two days, at which time forward elements had been returned to that area and the temporary battalion was no longer necessary. Officers and men rejoined their units.

Following are cumulative casualty totals as of 1800 on each date shown:

1945	KILLED			WOUNDED EVACUATED			SICK EVACUATED			MISSING IN ACTION			TOTAL KIA EVAC & MIA		
			To-			To-			To-			To-			To-
	Off	Enl	tal	Off	Enl	tal	Off	Enl	tal	Off	Enl	tal	Off	Enl	tal
2/19															
2/20															
2/21	33	347	380	96	1655	1751	1	51	52	2	332	334	132	2385	2517
2/22	36	391	427	92	1720	1812	1	99	100	1	354	355	140	2564	2704
2/23	39	417	456	101	1959	2060	4	168	172	-	300	300	144	2844	2988
2/24	46	520	566	122	2318	2440	6	339	345	1	340	341	175	3517	3692
2/25	45	543	588	120	2379	2499	7	347	354	2	304	306	174	3573	3747
2/26	48	620	668	144	2557	2701	11	432	443	2	316	318	205	3925	4130
2/27	56	705	761	161	3063	3224	14	572	586	2	338	340	233	4678	4911
2/28	57	728	785	159	3149	3308	12	633	645	1	347	348	229	4857	5086
3/1	58	769	827	176	3365	3541	13	712	725	1	352	353	248	5108	5446
3/2	64	816	880	183	3573	3756	14	761	775	1	286	287	262	5433	5698
3/3	65	927	992	187	3799	3986	14	847	861	1	276	277	267	5849	6116
3/4	66	1025	1091	193	3993	4186	15	909	924	1	228	229	275	6155	6430
3/5	67	1102	1169	201	4171	4372	15	955	970	1	191	192	284	6419	6703
3/6	69	1148	1217	205	4293	4498	14	967	984	1	174	175	289	6582	6871
3/7	73	1224	1297	210	4461	4671	19	1008	1027	2	162	164	304	6855	7159
3/8	77	1265	1342	215	4663	4878	15	1043	1058	2	136	138	309	7107	7416
3/9	77	1271	1348	214	4751	4965	16	1059	1075	2	132	134	309	7213	7522
3/10	79	1315	1394	217	4793	5010	17	1115	1132	1	111	112	315	7557	7872

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1945	KILLED			WOUNDED EVACUATED			SICK EVACUATED			MISSING IN ACTION			TOTAL KIA, EVAC & MIA		
	Off	Enl	To- tal	Off	Enl	To- tal	Off	Enl	To- tal	Off	Enl	To- tal	Off	Enl	To- tal
3/11	82	1366	1448	222	4913	5135	16	1122	1138	1	112	113	321	7513	7834
3/12	83	1429	1512	223	5006	5229	17	1143	1160	1	89	90	324	7667	7991
3/13	84	1481	1565	223	5087	5310	18	1167	1185	1	95	96	326	7850	8156
3/14	84	1513	1597	222	5158	5380	18	1180	1198	1	88	89	325	7937	8264
3/15	88	1606	1694	221	5155	5376	21	1200	1221	1	78	79	331	8039	8370
3/16	90	1622	1712	220	5196	5416	22	1211	1233	1	74	75	333	8103	8436
3/17	91	1640	1731	219	5209	5428	22	1213	1235	1	74	75	333	8136	8469

WOUNDED BUT GRAND
1945 NOT EVACUATED TOTAL CASUALTIES

	Off	Enl	To- tal	Off	Enl	To- tal
2/19						491 #
2/20				93	1918	2011
2/21	None Reported			132	2385	2517
2/22	14	144	158	144	2708	2852
2/23	17	158	175	161	3002	3163
2/24	18	220	238	193	3737	3930
2/25	24	238	262	198	3811	4009
2/26	27	310	337	232	4235	4467
2/27	33	335	368	246	5013	5259
2/28	35	377	410	262	5234	5496
3/1	37	397	434	285	5595	5880
3/2	36	435	471	298	5871	6169
3/3	39	436	475	306	6285	6591
3/4	41	462	503	316	6617	6933
3/5	41	471	512	325	6890	7215
3/6	41	485	526	330	7067	7397
3/7	38	498	536	342	7343	7685
3/8	43	520	563	349	7627	7976
3/9	45	527	572	354	7740	8094
3/10	44	532	576	359	7869	8228
3/11	47	543	590	368	8056	8424
3/12	48	556	604	372	8223	8595
3/13	49	560	609	375	8390	8765
3/14	50	565	615	375	8504	8879
3/15	50	572	622	381	8611	8992
3/16	50	575	625	383	8678	9061
3/17	51	578	629	384	8706	9090

Includes estimate of 470 from RCT 23. No reports received from RCT 24 and RCT 25.

(b) Provost Marshal.

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The Military Police Company strength of 7 officers and 133 men was sub-divided into 5 platoons and company headquarters on this operation. Three platoons, each consisting of 1 officer and 23 men, were attached to the regimental combat teams with whom they performed military police duties for the duration of the operation. The two remaining platoons provided Division Command Post security as well as traffic control and straggler patrol initially on the beach and later along established straggler lines. 219 stragglers were apprehended and returned to parent organizations. A prisoner of war stockade was established and maintained for 22 days.

(c) Religious Activities.

On arrival at Iwo Jima, all chaplains landed with the organizations to which detailed. Later it was necessary to assign them for alternating tasks of a divisional nature such as the continual presence of one chaplain at the beach casualty evacuation station, and the nightly vigil at the Division Hospital of one Protestant and one Catholic chaplain. In addition unit chaplains visited the wounded of their units at the hospital. The chaplain on continuous duty at the Division Cemetery conducted a committal service when each officer and man was interred. On 15 March, 1945, the 4th Marine Division Cemetery was dedicated, after which the chaplains conducted Jewish, Catholic and Protestant memorial services.

(d) Morale.

(2) American Red Cross - Red Cross personnel assisted in caring for the wounded, both aboard ship and after landing ashore. After establishment of the Division Hospital ashore they furnished most of the health and comfort items to the patients.

(3) Other Steps - The air mail stationery provided by the Division Morale and Recreation Fund was distributed to the Division in the same postal pouches in which incoming mail was sent to the units. Because in combat men cannot be expected to have preserved air mail stamps and may be prevented either by lack of funds or other circumstances from obtaining such stamps, initially \$115.00, an amount later increased by \$100.00, of morale funds was turned over to the Postal Officer so that every letter leaving the Division Post Office would have an air mail stamp affixed to it. Men were encouraged to write home to allay their next of kin's fears for their safety. By appropriating to the Division Morale and Recreation Fund money realized from the sale of Division Post Exchange supplies placed aboard such vessels as did not have ship's service stores, sufficient funds were realized to give each commanding officer of troops 22.6¢ per man to be expended for the health

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and comfort of the enlisted men on the trip from Iwo Jima to the Division's base camp.

(e) Postal.

Division Post Office personnel landed on Iwo Jima on D plus 6 and the Division Post Office was in operation the following day. No conclusive arrangements to receive incoming or to despatch outgoing mail by air having been made, this Division recommended to higher authority that mail be dropped with the result that mail was dropped by parachute on 1 and 2 March. On 3 March an airfield was in operation, after which all division mail was received and despatched by air. A portable V-Mail station of this Division was put into operation by the Division Postal Officer in a shell pocked water reservoir on D plus 7 and the first outgoing V-Mail despatched via press plane the following day. This V-Mail station was the only such station operating on Iwo Jima and served all Marine, Navy, Army and Coast Guard personnel on the island as well as on ships anchored there.

Following is a tabulation of mail handled by the 4th Marine Division Post Office during the 22 days it was in operation on Iwo Jima:

OFFICIAL V-MAIL-OUTGOING

Rolls - Documents - Division		
17	105	3rd
14	89	4th

REGULAR V-MAIL OUTGOING

Rolls	Letters
117	161,777

INCOMING AIR MAIL

MAR 1 - MAR 19TH INCLUSIVE

4th MarDiv:	For Other Organizations:
364 pouches	420 pouches

OUTGOING AIR MAIL

FEB 28 - MAR 19 INCLUSIVE

264 pouches

(f) Civil Affairs.

No civil population was encountered in the 4th Marine Division zone of action on Iwo Jima.

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SECTION IV - RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Administrative.

It is recommended:

(1) That in the future, as on this operation, casualty noncommissioned officers be left on board each vessel during the operation. The sole duty of these men would be to record and report casualties brought on board their ship. This system worked very well and it is highly desirable that it be continued.

(2) That higher echelons of command make a definite study, determine and announce at least two months prior to embarkation for an operation, the exact information relative to personnel, which will be required during the operation from divisions and positive time these reports are to be made. Further, that once this is done no changes be made during the operation. The information desired should only be of such vital nature and such that front line troops will be able to furnish it with the least amount of diversion from the job at hand.

(3) That Division Commanders be given a quota of meritorious field promotions for noncommissioned officers, allotted by pay grades, for use on the field of battle. This will enable a Division Commander to make just awards for outstanding work in the face of the enemy and at the same time fill vacancies resulting from the battle.

(4) That personnel replacements be furnished as excess per regiment and be assigned for training and use of the regiment. If this is done the personnel will become acquainted with the leaders in their units and feel they are a part of the regiment. This excess will provide sufficient personnel for ships platoons and Regimental Shore Parties. When these men are put into combat they will be a reserve being sent forward to their own unit. When held out as separate replacement drafts as done in the last operation, men were committed with units utterly strange to them, which did not lend to the utmost efficiency.

(b) Provost Marshal.

It is recommended:

That the present strength of the Military Police Company in this Division, 7 officers and 133 enlisted, which provides 5 platoons and a headquarters section be included in the Table of Organization. Recent reduction in Table of Organization strength to three platoons, one platoon being assigned to each of the three

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regimental combat teams, makes no provision for Division Command Post security; for Division prisoner of war compound; for traffic control on the beaches or for rear straggler lines, tasks which could not very well be delegated to Military Police of another unit such as Corps Military Police.

(d) Morale.

(3) Other Steps

It is recommended that:

(a) Money allotted to troops for recreational purposes at Pearl Harbor or any other intermediate stop between the base and target be delivered to each man by the commanding officer of troops on his ship to be spent by the man at the recreation center assigned as he sees fit. That beer, Coca-Cola, cigarettes, and such other articles as may be furnished, be provided by the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at those recreation centers for sale to the liberty parties. This insures each man receiving his apportioned share and he alone is responsible that he obtains the articles. This requires coordinated effort between Divisions and higher echelons.

(e) Postal.

It is recommended that:

(1) A postal detail be left at each intermediate mail stop between the base and the target for the purpose of expediting mail and for the purpose of holding out and delivering where possible mail of men evacuated. This was done at Pearl Harbor on this operation with the result that men evacuated to that area received immediate mail service, as their mail did not go beyond that station.

(2) That members of this Division when enroute to an operation be permitted to write letters under the same censorship rules which obtain during rehearsals, i.e. no mention being made of the rehearsal or an impending operation and no mention being made that the writer is aboard ship, and that such letters be placed in the postal system immediately upon the arrival of the Division at each way-point enroute to the target. It is believed this would do much to relieve the anxiety of the next of kin, improve the morale of officers and men, and let thousands less civilians know that an operation impends than does the present system of suddenly stopping all despatch of personal mail to the mainland of the United States.

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A N N E X B A K E R

TO

FOURTH

MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

I N T E L L I G E N C E

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ANNEX BAKER

INTELLIGENCE

1. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Maps.

Prior to embarkation the following maps were furnished this Division:

- (1) Special Air and Gunnery Target Maps, scales 1:5,000, 1:10,000 and 1:20,000, with Target Area grid.
- (2) Special Terrain Maps, scales 1:5,000, 1:20,000, without Target Area grid.
- (3) Special Air and Gunnery Target Maps, scale 2 inches equal 1 nautical mile.
- (4) G-2 Situation Maps, Nos. 1 and 2, scale 1:10,000 gridded.
- (5) Special Aerial Mosaics, scale 1:10,000, with Target Area grid, and 1:20,000 without Target Area grid.
- (6) H.C. Chart No. 6101.

In addition, Division prepared an East Beach Assault Map, scale 1:5,000.

The Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, scale 1:10,000, with Target Area grid was designated the "Official Map" upon which all reports were to be based.

Division was given the opportunity to request the quantity of maps desired. Quantities supplied were ample and permitted wide and thorough distribution.

Considering the fact that these maps were made from aerial photographs, without ground control, they were in general reasonably accurate. It would have required the most meticulous ground survey to have portrayed accurately the areas of rough terrain. In these areas, such as Target Areas 184, 185 and portions of 200, 201 and 202, the 20-foot contour interval in no way depicted the deep crevices running generally seaward on the rocky volcanic serrations and outcroppings which were so effectively hidden by vegetation in the preliminary aerial photographic coverage.

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ANNEX BAKER TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

All units reported that overprinting enemy positions on the Special Air and Gunnery Target Map proved detrimental rather than helpful.

The quantity of enemy positions shown obscured contours and made reading lettered squares most difficult and as these positions were plotted from early photographic coverage they were out-dated by the final Situation Map printed and issued at GUAM.

The improved type and quality of paper employed for map reproduction was noteworthy. The effects of handling and rain were minimized.

Maps of scale 1:5,000 and those ungridded were occasionally used and proved helpful in isolated instances.

The half tone aerial mosaic map, due to its cloud cover, was of little use. There was also little use for the Eastern Beach Assault Map printed by Division.

While the Enemy Situation Map prepared by VACLIF was the basic situation map, others were received in lesser quantity prepared by JICPOA, FMF PAC, and PHIBSPAC. As each situation map reflected the interpretation of the issuing unit, they were at variance. Inasmuch as preliminary naval gun fire and air attacks are largely prepared from these maps this variance is confusing. A single situation map depicting the combined photographic interpretation is strongly recommended. The Joint Situation Map, scale 1:10,000, made at GUAM from last minute aerial coverage and issued at SAIPAN, was excellent and of considerable value.

The Enemy Place Name Map, issued at IWO JIMA, proved of material assistance. The captured contoured map which was reproduced by VACLIF and issued at IWO was of considerable value, but the limited quantity printed restricted its use.

Relief Maps received from VACLIF and augmented by those made by the Division Relief Mapping Section were of sufficient quantity to place one on every APA, and most of the LST's, LSM's and LSD's.

(b) Photographs.

Preliminary aerial photographic coverage was excellent and the quantity received of each sortie permitted suitable distribution.

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ANNEX EARLY TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT TWO JIMA

The plan to send an advance API officer from the Division Intelligence Section to Interpron 2 at GUAM to assist in the preparation of the final situation map and to select and arrange the distribution details of the D-minus-15 aerial photographs, met with outstanding success. The wholehearted cooperation of Interpron 2, VD5 and Photographic Squadron 28 was all that could be desired.

Commencing with the assault on Hill 382 and continuing throughout the operation, good oblique and vertical aerial photographs were vitaly needed. Preliminary coverage of this area depicted little ground detail due to heavy vegetation and gave no idea of the innate ruggedness of the terrain. By the time this area was under our direct assault, the whole surface of the area was altered by bombardment. Green vegetation was a tangled mass of dead and torn trees. Buildings were destroyed and even the trace of some roads was obscured.

As the map and preliminary photographs were virtually useless, except for general area orientation, repeated requests were initiated for aerial photographs. The few photographs furnished were hopeless. Considering the height at which they were taken and the focal length the resultant scale was unsuitable for Division use. Oblique photographs were taken at odd angles and generally not in the direction of our attack and apparently taken by pilots unfamiliar with our zone of action or plan or direction of attack. Processing was equally poor. Few of the aerial photographs taken after D-day were ever used. The title strip giving all the needed data, long adopted and in use by both Navy and Army in combat areas all over the world, was completely omitted.

The only aerial photographs of real use to the Division were those taken from Division VMO-4 observation planes by Public Relations personnel. The pilot and photographer were thoroughly briefed and understood their mission. Employing a K-20 camera, excellent obliques were taken at altitudes as low as 500 feet. The photographs were processed, enlarged and annotated by G-2 and turned out to be the only true terrain guide available.

During combat, the ideal situation envisions a few selected obliques and vertical aerial photographs complete with title data, annotated for orientation, obliques to be taken in the direction of our attack, verticals in strips parallel to our front and both furnished in sufficient quantity for distribution to companies and observers, and in time for use; likewise a few annotated photographic mosaics with grid for regimental and Division use.

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ANNEX BAKER TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT TWO JIMA

While front line panels are SOP, the suggestion has been offered to use some similar type of panel immediately behind the front line to identify boundaries. This scheme would be a great aid to pilots and observers and would materially assist API personnel in annotating aerial photographs for general use.

The enlarged beach photographs, in some cases annotated, were excellent. The quantity received permitted distribution down to companies.

(c) Hydrographic Information.

In general, preliminary hydrographic information furnished Division proved accurate.

The carefully laid plans for the attachment of personnel from the 4th Reconnaissance Company to accompany the Underwater Demolition Teams on their reconnaissance preliminary to D-day, and their consequent assignments to report to assault battalions, regiments and Division, were partially upset in the final phase, due to damage suffered by the ships on which these personnel were embarked.

Dispatch reports, while brief, were of considerable value. In the instances where Underwater Demolition Team and Division Reconnaissance personnel succeeded in reporting in person, they proved of great assistance. The personnel reporting aboard the Division Command Ship gave an excellent report and many points of interest were developed in a round table interrogation.

Information of particular importance obtained from the UDT's included the following: (1) the lack of underwater obstacles, permitting landing craft up to LST's to use the beaches; (2) the nature of the beaches and location of terraces inland from the beaches; (3) routes inland from the beaches; (4) the extremely high gradient of the slope up to Airfield No. 1; (5) the presence of unidentified positions in the base of the embankment of the Airfield; and (6) the presence of heavy defensive concentrations in the vicinity of MT. SURIBACHI and the wooded area north of the Quarry.

The only misleading item of information was the statement that the beach sand or volcanic ash would support the movement of jeeps and other small trucks. Until roads were bulldozed, passage of wheeled vehicles proved impossible.

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(d) Other Intelligence.

On the whole, the intelligence furnished by higher echelon for the IWO JIMA Operation prior to D-day was more timely, complete and usable than on any previous operation.

Early preliminary information, while not complete, was adequate for initial planning phases.

The preparation of a single comprehensive JICPOA bulletin to treat every aspect of the target and the use of this bulletin as the basis for all other intelligence proved highly satisfactory. With maps, charts and photographs, the printed bulletin was in a form to be readily digested and was furnished in sufficient quantities to be distributed to all echelons. It rendered unnecessary the preparation of the usual mimeographed study of the theater of operations.

The G-2 Study prepared by VAC, containing a situation map, lists of defensive installations by target area squares, and studies, diagrams and drawings of each of the beaches, was extensively used to good purpose, particularly in the briefing stage.

The voluminous C-2 Study of the Enemy Situation proved an excellent vehicle for collecting and issuing all undissemated enemy information acquired prior to leaving the HAWAIIAN Area. Sufficient quantities were provided for wide distribution, though some of the enclosures - e.g. the lists of enemy officers - did not need such wide distribution. Order of Battle information, as it turned out, was not complete, but all possible methods of making it complete must have been used.

Various beach diagrams and profiles and water level profiles supplemented the principal studies and proved of some assistance.

Use was made of the G-2 Tactical Study of the Terrain, especially in planning phases. The report of the submarine reconnaissance provided important verifications of early estimates.

Aerial photographic interpretations made by VACLF, JICPOA and Interpron 2 differed considerably. As emphasized in section 1 (a) of this Annex (Maps), it is strongly recommended that the interpretations not be duplicated but be prepared and issued by one agency.

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After D-day close contact was maintained with VACLF by telephone, teletype, dispatch and liaison. VACLF made every effort to keep Division well informed. G-2 Periodic Reports were received in sufficient quantities to be distributed to regiments, which gave them a better over-all picture than had been heretofore provided.

The preliminary order of battle analysis, issued on D-plus-10, was useful and accurate, but it is believed that the production of similar studies at an earlier stage of the operation, even though they could not be so comprehensive or accurate in detail, would have given better direction to Division.

The coordination with higher echelons on intelligence matters reached an all-time high. Every request by Division was approved at once with the single exception of requests for aerial photographic coverage in the later phase of the operation.

2. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING.

(a) Collection of Information.

Collection of information from lower echelons followed standard practice and procedure. Reports and single items of information from one echelon were correlated by the next echelon and forwarded until they reached Division. Division was in constant communication with regiments by phone and by liaison.

Establishment of Division OP's from which the Division zone of action could be scrutinized was most difficult due to the terrain. Initially, the Division OP team, using 20-power captured Jap glasses, operated on the top of MT SURIBACHI. In the later phase, after the capture of Hill 382 and its environs, it was necessary to displace for closer observation. Due to the fact that no single point permitted observation of even one whole battalion sector in its entirety, it was necessary to establish several roving two-man OP's, which moved as frequently as required to keep their zone under observation. As distances involved were short, reports were collected by runner and brought to a central collection point, where they were correlated and transmitted to G-2. As the OP runners were in constant contact with company and battalion CP's, a valuable flow of additional intelligence was possible.

The difficulties of observation, lack of late aerial photographs and the failure of the map to portray the whole picture accurately, constituted a serious problem. As a result the G-2 made

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almost daily tours to all battalion CP's and as many battalion and company OP's as were necessary to complete the full picture. Likewise, enemy-held terrain was studied from the air and from close-in reconnaissance on an LCI(G). This constant study of all angles of the terrain not under our control, coupled with an intimate contact with operations and all intelligence echelons, assisted in making the Division Intelligence effort more valuable than it had ever been while in combat.

Due to the closer contact maintained with the enemy throughout the operation there was little opportunity or occasion for patrols to the front of our lines. Listening posts were maintained at night and anti-sniper patrols covered rear areas. In both of these tasks the war dogs proved to be invaluable. It was reported that the German shepherds appeared to be the superior breed for scouting of fortified positions and caves.

Collection of documents and material is discussed in Section 4 of this Annex. Systematically organized search patrols covered rear areas attempting to find documents, and front line units either turned in documents or reported location of observed caches as found.

Division Language personnel received valuable experience in monitoring Japanese radio transmission. It is believed from this experiment with a minimum of equipment that the effort is thoroughly worth while and should be highly developed for any future operation.

A Ground Study Team was organized from G-2 and JICPOA personnel. Its composition included photographers, draftsman and language personnel and was augmented when necessary by specialists such as experts on bombs, weapons, planes, etc. The team was commanded by the Officer-in-Charge of JICPOA Team No. 23, whose past experience enabled this group: (1) to make accurate daily reports; (2) to compile a complete record of the enemy's organization of the ground; (3) to obtain photographs, drawings and sketches of installations and terrain; and finally (4) to arrange for the collection of all weapons of particular intelligence value.

Intelligence collected by artillery was notably improved. The S-2 made full and proper use of the wealth of sources at his disposal including artillery forward observers, air observers, observation posts and flash ranging. Resultant reports were extremely valuable to Division.

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(b) Evaluation and Dissemination of Information.

Subsequent to the issuance of the Division Intelligence Annex and while enroute to the target, the Division Intelligence Section prepared and distributed a study of the Western Beaches and two appendices to the Intelligence Annex to the Division Operation Order in which an effort was made to analyze and present the latest intelligence garnered from aerial photographs and other sources in a clear and concise form.

Benefiting by past experience, the initial dissemination of intelligence material for the operation was effected direct to all major units in sealed packages for further distribution after departure from the HAWAIIAN Area. Intelligence received after embarkation at PEARL HARBOR and at SAIPAN was distributed direct to all ships for further distribution aboard. The plan was the most successful one used to date.

At the target, even though there was less intelligence material with which to work than on SAIPAN, the Division Intelligence Section did a far sounder job of evaluation than before. Information was received from battalions and regiments in more accurate form than heretofore. Regimental intelligence reports were also better organized and gave a clearer picture than formerly.

At Division CP, prior to dissemination, all intelligence received was carefully but rapidly evaluated. Compilation and evaluation of Order of Battle information was made a Language Section function. On D-plus-6, three days after Division CP was established ashore, a detailed Order of Battle was published and given wide distribution. On D-plus-9, a special report entitled "Analysis of Original Enemy Dispositions and Subsequent Movements", was given similar dissemination. This report was an attempt to present a graphic picture of enemy units defending in this Division's zone of action on D-day, and to give a running story of how enemy units disintegrated or retreated, and what enemy units were believed remaining to oppose us. It was felt that only through such a summary could troops and commanders alike visualize the nature of the enemy in contact. A special collection of captured orders and overlays in connection with the enemy counterattack on the night of D-plus-18 (9 March), was also prepared, together with an analysis of enemy operations during the attack.

Division intelligence and periodic reports were sound and accurate and remain as tangible evidence of their worth.

Continuous telephonic contact with all units and daily liaison with higher, lower and adjacent units made dissemination rapid and efficient.

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(c) Communications.

Initially each regimental S-2 was provided with an SCR 300 radio, for contact with Division using the Division OP channel. Heavy initial losses of radio equipment necessitated the appropriation of the regimental sets allocated for intelligence sections. These radios could not be replaced during the operation. The speed and value of the information obtained from this temporary net while it was in operation confirmed opinions of its extreme value.

Messages from the regiments reaching G-2 through regular radio channels were supplemented by the radio dispatch summaries called for in Division Intelligence Memorandum No 5-44 and presented an adequate and clear picture, even though delivery of regimental periodic reports was delayed. Radio communication with VACLF was satisfactory and G-2 periodic reports were delivered each morning by officer messenger.

When telephonic connections were established, the field telephone became the standard means of communication with regiments and VACLF. A separate phone for the Language Section permitted both it and the Operations Section of G-2 to function more efficiently. Proximity of regimental CP's to Division permitted prompt delivery of all written reports and generally facilitated rapid communication.

Communication with the Division OP throughout the operation was by SCR 300 radio over the Division OP channel.

(d) Liaison.

On the day that Division CP was set up ashore, G-2 instituted the practice of sending an experienced officer daily to make a round of the regimental CP's, G-2, VACLF, and the G-2's of the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions. By employment of this system the G-2 liaison officer could collect as well as disseminate intelligence. Experience with the procedure confirmed the belief that it is a sounder plan than to attach an officer from the G-2 Section to each regimental intelligence section for an operation, where he becomes merely an assistant to the S-2, taking over the task of dissemination which the section is capable of performing.

Daily liaison with the other Divisions and VACLF permitted observation and comparison of procedure and methods of function of their various departments such as API, language, etc, resulting in a reciprocal exchange of good ideas.

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In addition to the regular liaison with regiments, JICPOA and language personnel either belonging to or attached to the G-2 Section, made daily round-ups of regimental CP's to pick up documents and materiel items of intelligence value and to confer with regimental intelligence officers.

Corps liaison with Division was excellent. Frequent visits from officers in the G-2 Section adequately supplemented communication by phone. Liaison was also maintained by G-2, Expeditionary Troops.

(e) Training and Use of Personnel.

(1) General.

It is worthy of note that Division Intelligence Sections entered this operation in a particularly strong position. A large portion of the original intelligence personnel was intact. Three of the four Regimental S-2's, a large number of Battalion S-2's and virtually the entire G-2 Section had the background of intelligence experience of ROI-MANUR, SAIPAN and TINIAN. As a result training prior to the operation was sound.

Throughout the operation it was evident that the intelligence function was being performed with professional speed and accuracy. Little direction was required, as personnel knew what to do and did it.

The G-2 Section operated on proved plans, making minor adjustments to meet current contingencies. The plan of maintaining a strong, central reserve of intelligence personnel, assigning them where and when needed, was continued.

(2) Photographic.

Coordinating with the Navy photographic plan to cover this operation and benefiting by tried and experienced photographers, a particularly detailed plan was made and followed to assure the best possible still and motion picture coverage.

Enthusiastic appraisal received of the motion picture film flown out is indication of the high standard of the film coverage taken.

Regimental photographers trained in the G-2 Photographic School were augmented by G-2 photographers to assure coverage from the early assault stage throughout the entire operation.

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Specific scenes were shot to fit into an educational picture Division is making on prisoners of war, including their capture, treatment and interrogation.

Quantities of reconnaissance stills were taken by Division personnel from OY-1 planes and from OP's to assist in terrain appreciation.

A few statistics tell the story:

Motion picture film exposed

16mm color.....	19300 feet
35mm black & white....	2100 feet
TOTAL.....	21400 feet

Still film/exposures

4 x 5.....	139 Packs.....	1668 total exposures
35mm.....	73 Rolls.....	2190 total exposures
TOTAL.....		3858

Aerial film exposed

100 feet or 500 exposures.

Contact prints and enlargements made during operation

4 x 5.....	47
8 x 10 (enlargements)....	919
TOTAL PRINTS.....	966

In previous operations all film was forwarded undeveloped and a very small percentage of prints ever returned to the Division. Frequently, when copies were seen, they were incorrectly titled. During this operation all motion picture, Public Relations and action exposed film was flown out. All intelligence stills were retained for proper screening and titling, and when forwarded, should prove of considerable intelligence value. They will also be of immeasurable value within the Division, in accompanying special reports and Division education in general.

(3) Language Personnel (permanent and attached)

The officers permanently attached to Division operated successfully and smoothly within their limits. The personnel

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originally selected for training in the Japanese language were unquestionably excellent. The courses of study were good, particularly that at Camp SAVAGE, MINNESOTA. The results obtained by the instruction were remarkable. It must be remembered, however, that at the completion of the course personnel had necessarily received only certain base elements of the Japanese language, a framework upon which to build.

Since graduation further advancement has been dependent on: (1) actual contact during comparatively short action periods; (2) a brief period of practice at JICPOA; and (3) study during training periods within the section. The latter phase has been of minimum value because of lack of instructors and suitable space and the inability to obtain text books.

Consequently, there has been an admittedly alarming decrease in efficiency and fluency. There are a few cases where the individual has lost all but the most fragmentary knowledge of written and spoken Japanese.

These comments are relatively applicable to the enlisted language personnel. Their basic instruction was only for six months.

The attached JICPOA officer language personnel, with one exception, were occupied during the operation in the sorting, evaluating and classification of captured documents. Their work was efficiently and expeditiously done and of great help in keeping a smooth flow of documents passing through the G-2 Section. The other officer contributed outstanding work in interrogation, due to his full knowledge and fluency in the Japanese language.

The great value of NISEI was demonstrated to all in contact with them during this operation. Their industry, initiative and ability to rapidly comprehend the situation made them invaluable. Their command of the Japanese language was even more conspicuous in view of the deterioration of the skill of the permanent personnel. They were invaluable in making rapid translations, reading place names and personnel names (a study in itself), and in the interrogation of POW's. They won the respect and friendship of all the Marines with whom they were associated.

(4) JICPOA

The excellent organization and function of JICPOA Team No. 23 was displayed throughout the operation. This well selected, ably trained, cooperative team completely rounded out the veteran intelligence organization and is considered to be a tower of strength for a G-2 during an operation.

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3. PRISONERS

POW's captured by the 4th Marine Division:

Army, including one 1stLt.....	32
Navy.....	8
Koreans (Labor Bn Personnel).....	4
TOTAL.....	44

Continuous indoctrination of troops in the need of taking prisoners paid dividends. Active measures were taken to capture prisoners. Front line units assisted fully, insofar as compatible with the military situation, in all attempts to induce other enemy troops to surrender.

Short lines of communication facilitated the expediting of POW's to regiments and then to Division. Length of time required for passing through regiments was governed by the tactical value to the regiments of the information possessed by the POW on hand. There were no undue delays.

Processing at Division followed standard practice, medical treatment, delousing, clothes, food and water. Detailed records were kept at the Division stockade.

Prior to the operation a system of interrogating POW's and writing reports was formulated, based on the experience of three previous operations.

Because of the well established belief that all Japanese are regimented throughout their lives, an experimental form was devised for the questioning of POW's. The form was printed entirely in Japanese and adhered chiefly to personal and military questions, the answers to which could be easily and concisely filled out by the POW. At the beginning of the stockade questioning, one of the forms was handed to the POW with instructions to fill out the required information. Having been handed a form in his native tongue, which was typical of other forms he had been accustomed to, each POW without exception willingly cooperated. This initial cooperation carried on naturally into his subsequent relations with the interrogating officers and proved of great value.

Most interrogations were done by a team consisting of one officer interpreter and one NISEI interpreter. For each interrogation each team had as equipment the experimental form, an "Outline for In-

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terrogation" (which delineated all possible topics for questioning and provided a structure for the final report), a Target Area map, and a captured Japanese map with Japanese place names. This team system was found to be the most effective in obtaining the greatest amount of information in the shortest time. In this system the NISEI does the greater part of the questioning while the officer guides the lines of the interrogation and takes notes. The officer can follow the information and remain clearheaded to detect contradictions or to spot a "lead" for desired information.

POW's not only showed no surprise or resentment when questioned by NISEI interrogators but seemed particularly pleased to find some one of their own race in whom they could confide.

In one instance a POW was found who was extremely reluctant to talk. An interesting experiment was conducted to make him more communicative. One of the NISEI interpreters was placed with the POW and represented himself as a Jap POW captured at SAIPAN. He told a glowing story of his treatment and the treatment of other POW's and how he himself had risen to a position of trust and usefulness in our organization. The POW reacted favorably and became one of our most valuable sources of information.

Two of the first POW's captured were kept at the Division stockade until the end of the operation because of their willingness to assist. These two prisoners were a fountain of information and an immeasurable help in indoctrinating POW's. After a day or so in the stockade all POW's, without exception, volunteered to help us in getting their comrades to surrender. Several were willing to re-enter the enemy lines to accomplish this end.

Valuable information was obtained from the prisoners. The first ones provided information concerning the number of enemy troops, the enemy supply situation and enemy tactics. Later POW's substantiated information given by the first prisoners and were extremely helpful in giving information on order of battle, locations of various units, lines of defense and strong points of resistance, casualties, locations of CP's and OP's and the location and description of rocket, mortar and artillery positions. General information not of immediate tactical value was also obtained during the course of the interrogation.

With the personal help and information of one POW, a ravine in the final pocket of resistance was taken in two hours. Another POW, familiar with the second ravine of the pocket, drew a sketch showing location of caves in the ravine and number of troops in each. The pocket was overrun the next day.

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POW interrogation reports were distributed to higher echelons, other Divisions and regiments. In cases where reports contained information of especial interest or importance, larger dissemination was given.

4. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.

As on past operations, indoctrination of all Division personnel as to the value of captured enemy documents proved its merit. Officers and men showed a keen interest in the collection of documents and often took extra measures to expedite maps and papers to intelligence sections.

Two factors, however, operated against a wealth of material being collected. First, the Division zone of action did not contain the huge bulk of documents found in previous operations, and second, those caches which presumably did exist in underground CP's were blown shut and buried during the assault or mop-up. Where possible, intelligence patrols searched caves and underground establishments, but it will take weeks, and possibly months, of patient work to unearth documents in by-passed positions.

The original scarcity of documents can be attributed almost wholly to the enemy's security consciousness. Several POW's told us that all classified material was burned and destroyed during the naval bombardment phase. Documents and diaries confirmed this story. This was the first concrete evidence this Division has encountered that the enemy is making strides in this direction.

Although constantly hampered by these two factors of scarcity of material and increasing enemy security, translators were able to piece together much worthwhile information. Document files, letters and diaries helped assemble the Order of Battle, maps provided lucrative targets for artillery, and captured orders gave some idea of the enemy's strength and capabilities. One set of maps and messages removed from enemy dead by BLT 2/23 following the largescale counterattack on the night of D-plus-18 permitted translators to reconstruct the attack and enabled G-2 accurately to evaluate the results.

Captured enemy documents, despite their scarcity, again proved a valuable source of intelligence. In addition, 17 seabags of culled material were sent to JICPOA for further evaluation.

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Material. The only materiel actually handled and collected by intelligence personnel was that which had definite intelligence value, such as new weapons. After such finds had been inspected they were turned over to JICPOA. All other materiel located by intelligence was reported to JICPOA for inspection and collection.

5. PROPAGANDA.

Results of our propaganda on IWO JIMA were disappointing. Of the 44 prisoners taken by this Division, one had actually seen our leaflets; seven others said they were influenced to surrender by oral propaganda.

Unless we are to make the assumption that the Japanese possess a psychology utterly different from that of other peoples and are therefore impervious to the power of suggestion, these facts indicate the need for a reappraisal of our propaganda methods. The fact that only one of the total number of POW's saw our leaflets is a measure of the feebleness of our efforts and suggests the desirability of improving the technique of dissemination. One of the basic facts of effective propaganda is reiteration. If a person hears an idea as new and startling as surrender is to the Japanese a single time, it is certain to be dismissed without further thought. But if it is pounded into his consciousness like a rivet, it is likely to become disturbing and may influence his behaviour at a critical moment. It must be remembered that the force of our propaganda will become greater as the operation progresses and the enemy situation becomes increasingly desperate, and our efforts should take advantage of this fact and be brought to a crescendo at the psychological moment. How great the possibilities of propaganda are is suggested by the fact that the idea that they could surrender had not occurred to four POW's until they heard our broadcasts.

Our propaganda has been given only a nominal trial. Under the circumstances it is impossible to make a judgment on its content.

Amplification equipment was repeatedly used by Division to induce surrender. The effort usually drew fire and was frequently minimized by the difficulties of the terrain. Broadcasts from LCI(G)'s were admittedly heard by some POW's.

Unfortunately, 40 of the 50 rounds of artillery shells loaded with propaganda were lost by enemy action. The 10 rounds left were employed at a critical time with unknown results. Had more shells been so loaded they would certainly have been employed.

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6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(a) Own.

Counterintelligence on this operation was not as effective as it might have been. Captured documents and POW interrogation disclosed that the enemy knew IWO JIMA was to be attacked and had an accurate estimate as to the time and place the attack would be delivered and generally the forces involved. The POW's and documents did not indicate the source of this intelligence. It may have been the result of a sound estimate of the situation. However, it is reiterated that counterintelligence was not complete.

Division exercised scrupulous care to insure that there be no leaks of the operation. Dissemination of target information was limited strictly to a designated list of officers to whom knowledge was absolutely essential in order to conduct the proper planning; and this group was specifically ordered to insure that all material relative to the target be given security consistent with its Top Secret classification.

When the preliminary plan was drawn up for "Island X", Division believed that the Air and Gunnery Target Map issued for the purpose, though unnamed and showing only the southern portion of IWO JIMA, was too obvious for general use, due to the peculiar shape of the SURIBACHI knob. Of the 1000 copies received, only approximately 25 were issued to major unit commanders.

During this time knowledge of details of the operation, seeping into the Division through unofficial channels from outside sources, complicated the problems of security and rendered them much more difficult.

Target intelligence materials being received at this time, including large quantities of maps, photographs and other material, were closely guarded. Very limited distribution was made to the approved and authorized list only. Materials for subsequent distribution were delivered in sealed packages to CO's of regiments and independent battalions. Detailed instructions were given to each recipient unit to insure proper security in repackaging for the unit's own distribution to its elements which would be separately embarked. All such material was packaged and sealed and covered by strict orders that the seals would not be broken until final departure from the HAWAIIAN Area.

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During the rehabilitation period at PEARL HARBOR after the rehearsal, it was apparent that the target and details of the operation were openly discussed ashore. Though open discussions were forbidden in the Division it was impossible to keep the information from Division personnel while on liberty ashore.

A counterintelligence plan ordered by VACLF was effectively executed. By this plan an immediate study was ordered of another objective. While it succeeded in causing considerable consternation within the Division it is questionable whether its late release was sufficient to counter the prevalent rumor ashore.

Counterintelligence function enroute and at the target was generally satisfactory.

Front line units were carefully indoctrinated in the absolute necessity of preventing compromise of our maps, orders and other documents, and it is believed that no maps or documents were lost to the enemy within this Division's zone of action. On two occasions, when BLUE observation planes were shot down close to our front lines patrols were sent out to the planes at considerable risk of life to bring back or destroy any compromising documents.

The employment or effect of extensive camouflage in areas behind the front line was largely minimized due to fact that most of the CP's and all rear areas were totally exposed and in the open. The enemy enjoyed commanding ground for CP's overlooking at short range the entire Division zone of action until after the capture of Hill 382.

During the operation a careful check was kept on our radio transmission; and although much material was sent in modified clear, discrimination was used, and it is believed that the enemy obtained no compromising information by monitoring our transmissions.

One report from the 14th Marines suggested that a telephone line might have been tapped and a captured enemy document further suggests this possibility. The document did not indicate that information gained was of any importance. Generally, translations indicated that the enemy's combat information was as inaccurate as usual.

Unlike the MARIANAS Operation, there were no cases reported of the enemy attempting to use our passwords. On one occasion groups did try to infiltrate our line by crying "Corpsman!", and approaching our lines carrying a stretcher.

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Instances were reported of the enemy's using our front line markers to sight in on, and one case was reported of observing a Jap soldier making off with one of our panels.

Censorship. Censorship rules and regulations for the operation issued by VACLIF were timely and complete.

(b) Enemy counterintelligence.

The enemy on this operation was markedly more security conscious than on any previous operation. This is shown not only by the failure of the Division to make the rich hauls of intelligence materials which had been previously made, but also by the enemy's own testimony.

Numerous captured documents directed the destruction of all classified documents and valuable materiel, even going so far as to set out priority of destruction and means to be used. POW's declare also that they were instructed to this effect and that instructions were carried out.

Evidence was also received that most of the enemy's radio transmission was in code and that he frequently avoided the use of radios for important messages.

This new attitude on security, however, has apparently not caused instructions to be issued to troops concerning information to be divulged by prisoners. POW's on this operations talked as freely as those on previous operations.

After D-day the enemy's principal camouflage was cover and concealment. He made full and excellent use of rough terrain, rocks, tree roots and debris. Enemy targets were difficult to observe.

7. PUBLIC RELATIONS.

Distribution of Public Relations personnel through the Division followed the plan for previous operations, with minor changes to cover tank and amphibian tractor units. The Radio Recording Team, a new unit of the section, was assigned to the Tank Battalion to take advantage of the ease of ship-to-shore movement from an LSM and to secure recordings from the tank radio net.

A new system for collecting and forwarding copy, as established by higher echelon, was used on the rehearsal for the operation and worked successfully. At the critique of the rehearsal, however, the suggestion was made by Division and Corps PRO's that the

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plan was adapted to a landing against light opposition and that an alternate plan should provide for the use of control vessels as collecting stations. This suggestion was not accepted and no alternate plan was adopted.

Some nine civilian War Correspondents were embarked with the Division either at the rehearsal area or at the final staging area, and insofar as permitted by the exigencies of the situation and orders from higher echelon, arrangements were made for their landing in accordance with their wishes.

All Division Public Relations personnel landed generally as scheduled. One combat correspondent became a casualty immediately after landing and another on the fourth day. The planned channels of forwarding copy broke down immediately with the failure of the press boat from the Flagship to arrive at the beach and the evacuation of the VACLF collection station after a direct hit on its shelter.

On the first day three stories and one film pack were forwarded to the Flagship, using control vessels as forwarding stations. Two of the stories were picked up immediately by the wire services and were among the first eyewitness accounts to reach the UNITED STATES by radio.

On D-plus-1 a Press Headquarters was established at Beach YELLOW One. Intra-division collection arrangements were utilized to get copy to this Press Headquarters, and couriers carried press material twice daily from the beach to the Flagship using press boats when available and "hitch-hiking" otherwise. The two assault Divisions alternated in sending men for this function. After the establishment of VACLF CP ashore, the higher echelons collected material twice daily from all three Divisions, picking all material up at the 4th Division CP.

The Section's Radio Recording Team landed on the evening of D-plus-1. Recordings had been made from the Tank Battalion radio net and during several runs to the beach. Much material of the highest value was secured from these sources. The film-type recorder was destroyed by enemy fire during the night of D-plus-2 and thereafter the wire-type recorder was used exclusively.

Civilian War Correspondents landed as planned and used the copy collection channels for their material. Most of them divided their time between gathering material ashore and writing it up aboard ship. After the establishment of the Division CP ashore, at least three Civilian Correspondents stayed ashore continuously, and lived at

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the Public Relations office and dugout in Division CP. (Because the Division CP did not displace, there was opportunity to build a workable blackout shelter.)

During the assault phase of the operation, the following totals were produced and forwarded:

Stories.....	541
Film packs.....	81
Records (film).....	6
Records (wire).....	21

All material was made available to civilian correspondents.

The following comments and recommendations are drawn from the experience gained during the operation:

(a) Copy Collection. Copy collection plans were well laid and might have worked in an operation involving lighter opposition. They did not work well at IWO JIMA, and complicated arrangements had to be devised at short notice on the beach. It is recommended that in future operations plans for copy collection include the use of a control vessel offshore as a collection station and as a place for correspondents to write and that an alternate plan be included in the copy collection arrangements.

(b) Equipment. The Public Relations Section has the assigned mission of covering, by stories, pictures, and recordings, the activities of the entire Division from the time of landing until the securing of the operation, and the additional duty of providing working facilities and transportation for civilian correspondents assigned to the Division. The equipment deemed necessary by higher echelons for the fulfillment of this assigned mission includes two jeeps and a blackout tent. Had the distances been longer, a second jeep would have been an urgent necessity; and had the Division CP ever been displaced, the lack of a blackout tent would have caused serious difficulties and much deserved newspaper space might have been lost.

(c) Radio Recording. The operation of the radio recording team was entirely satisfactory, and plans followed in this operation will be followed again. In an operation over a greater area, present transportation assigned to the Section will not be adequate. The Radio Recording Section will require practically the full time use of one vehicle. It is recommended that the portable recording equipment be standardized, that the use of either the wire or the film-type recorder be discontinued, and that an additional recorder be issued to each Division to provide a spare.

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8. THE ENEMY

(a) Organization for Defense

The defensive organization of IWO JIMA reflects considerable credit on the Japanese Island Commander, Lieutenant General KURIBAYASHI.

From observation of the enemy's defenses and from captured documents it was evident that he had profited by the experience of his previous defeats and that he had made a sound estimate of the situation. He had anticipated our heavy preliminary air and naval bombardments and his eventual loss of air control, and had prepared his defensive plans accordingly. Documents captured on SAIPAN showed that the enemy gave IWO JIMA a priority on cement, steel and reinforcements.

The perimeter defense doctrine previously employed by the enemy, with its objectives (1) of preventing a Blue landing and (2) in case a Blue landing was effected, of destroying it by a combined counterattack, was discarded as obsolete. In its place, it would appear that the enemy had adopted as his mission (1) to prevent a Blue landing on any beach and (2) in case a landing was effected, to deny Blue use of airbase facilities for as long as possible and to make the Blue conquest as costly as possible.

The new type of plan included the following fundamentals:

(1) Construction throughout the Island of massive defensive positions artfully concealed and capable of withstanding everything but a direct hit from a heavy caliber weapon.

(2) Construction of sufficient underground caves and tunnels to be able to house all personnel underground during an attack.

(3) Maintaining heavy and accurate anti-aircraft fire during the preliminary phase in order to compel Blue air attacks to be made from high levels so that damage would be minimized and principal installations would be intact for employment when our actual landing was made.

(4) Distributing personnel, ammunition, food and water so that no movement above ground would be necessary after our attack commenced.

(5) Strongly augmenting coast defense guns and artillery by many mortars and rockets so that heavy concentrations could be maintained from varied and unseen positions. (This would eliminate the task of displacing artillery to the rear which the enemy had found impossible to perform on SAIPAN).

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In actuality, the enemy prepared an elaborate defense in depth, making maximum use of the terrain. Within the Division's zone of action several hundred pillboxes were spotted. There were many massive reinforced concrete blockhouses and covered artillery positions, all with deadly fields of fire, all mutually supporting and generally covered with many feet of sand. Sea approaches were covered by many dual purpose, coast defense and anti-boat guns, many of which were installed in well camouflaged massive reinforced concrete blockhouses.

Artillery, large mortars and rockets were so emplaced as to cover all the beaches and the entire Division's zone of action. Many of the rocket and mortar positions constructed below ground had a firing aperture of less than two feet, making it a virtual impossibility to observe them and requiring a direct hit to neutralize them. Observation posts covering the entire Division's zone of action were located on high ground, where the enemy had hollowed out and lined with concrete the tops of hills. Gun positions were provided with complete pre-registration data.

Defenses were prepared for attacks from varied directions. The deep emplacements which protected the guns confined their fields of fire but supporting installations were always so constructed that the attacker was exposed to multiple fires when he attempted to capture a position. Gun ports were generally sited to have defilade from the direct fire from Blue ships.

Communications were maintained by trenched wire, radios, pigeons, and dogs, and a labyrinth of underground tunnels was constructed connecting all areas. One of these tunnels was explored for 800 yards, and 14 entrances were found; it housed two battalion command posts and was equipped with lights and telephones.

Mine fields were employed at well selected locations and were invariably covered by fire.

The following installations directly covering BLUE and YELLOW Beaches, upon which Division landed, were captured and identified by the Division in an area approximately 2500 yards long by 1000 yards deep:

- 10 reinforced concrete blockhouses
- 7 covered artillery positions
- 80 pillboxes

These positions included the following direct fire weapons:

- 7 120mm coastal defense guns
- 2 120mm short coastal defense guns

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- 4 120mm Dual Purpose guns
- 1 80mm Dual Purpose gun
- 1 70mm Battalion Howitzer
- 6 47mm Anti-Tank - Anti-Boat guns
- 3 37mm Anti-Tank - Anti-Boat guns
- 19 25mm Twin Mount Machine guns
- 1 13mm Machine gun

Unquestionably there were many more positions and weapons which could not be identified because of the destructive effect of the bombardments.

Strong underground defensive positions were constructed to cover by direct fire both east and west beaches and the terraces inland from them. Numerous well emplaced positions were also constructed at Mt. SURIBACHI and overlooking the East Boat Basin to enfilade the boat lanes and the entire eastern beach.

The high ground between Airfields No. 1 and No. 2 was highly organized with minefields and mutually supporting pillboxes which had fields of fire covering the east beaches and approaches inland. A deep cross-island defense was built from HIRAINA Bay to the East Boat Basin. This sector was generally organized on high ground overlooking the beaches and approaches therefrom and was strewn with all types of mines. It was organized to cover a Blue landing from either the east or west beaches and while held, denied our forces access to the major portion of the Island and the use of either airfield and retained for the enemy virtually all of the high ground for observation and the rough terrain for cover and concealment.

North of this cross-island defensive sector, the extremely rough terrain found in the eastern bulge of the Island and in its north and northwestern tip was well organized, with much underground construction. Defensive organization for final resistance centered around headquarters of higher echelon units found in each of the two sectors. Artillery, rocket, mortar and anti-aircraft positions were also scattered throughout the sectors. The center of the Island north of the cross-island defense was flat and open. This soft spot, however, was protected by a highly organized piece of high ground just north of the center of Airfield No. 2.

The cross-island defense was anchored on Hill 382, just west of Airfield No. 2. The surface of this hill was deeply cut by a labyrinth of winding, erosion-made crevices. Here the enemy prepared a defense to withstand against assault or bombardment by air, land, or sea. Observation posts, radar and anti-aircraft positions were placed on top of the hill. Deep tunnels cut into the sides of the crevices afforded perfect shelter for personnel and material. Concrete faced caves were dug into the crevice walls to cover the approaches to the Hill and its interior network.

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Tanks and 47mm anti-tank guns were dug-in on the perimeter of the Hill and installed inside the Hill in craftily selected positions in the crevices where they would have long fire lanes covering vital exterior approaches. The defense was prepared for an attack from the west, south or east. From the west, the attacker was forced to approach down 1500 yards of a flat airfield, which in turn had to be approached across 700 yards of gradually sloping bare volcanic ash. The approach from the south was dominated by a steep rocky ridge line later known as "Charle-Dog Ridge" and a natural amphitheater some seventy feet high. Southeast and east of Hill 382 was a weird mass of wild, rocky volcanic outcroppings, deeply furrowed with narrow gullies running to the coast in a southeasterly direction. This area in the original aerial photographic coverage was so densely covered with vegetation that its surface was an unknown quantity. In it, the enemy prepared his most elaborate underground works.

There were no "lines" as such in the enemy's defense. Instead, he prepared strongpoints or fortified areas which would require the attacker to fight bitterly for every foot of advance and where the attacker would be under prepared fires through the entire advance.

(b) Conduct of Defense

From translation of captured documents it was revealed that the enemy knew of the size of our forces and when they left the HAWAIIAN Area. Prior to the preliminary bombardment he was underground and ready. Preliminary reconnaissance missions by underwater demolition teams were met with severe enemy fire.

The initial ship-to-shore movement was met with well directed fires, although most of the 120mm coastal defense guns had been knocked out by our preliminary bombardment. With the entire barren and steeply sloping beach area under observation, the enemy placed well directed and pre-registered artillery, rocket and mortar fire over our entire beachhead. The enemy was almost never seen in person and only his larger positions could be observed. A multitude of varied positions and weapons firing direct fire missions between the beach and the airfield continued firing until individually captured, taking full advantage of our slow and difficult progress through the beach mine fields and the heavy volcanic ash.

Phase two of the enemy's defense covered our advance beyond the beach areas over the ground between Airfields No. 1 and No. 2 and the north and easterly advance from the Quarry north of the East Boat Basin. Roads and routes of advance were obstructed by mine fields. Flat sandy areas were swept by "flush-deck" pillboxes which often protruded only a foot above the ground. A machine gun battalion, with large numbers of infantry troops, occupying these pillboxes; defended until the last pillbox was destroyed and all the personnel slain.

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Utilizing the rougher ground to the northeast, 37 and 47mm anti-tank guns fired from reinforced concrete covered positions with deadly effect. Each of these positions was in turn covered by as many as ten pillboxes, and the entire area was still subject to observed and directed fires from the inland concealed mortar, rocket and artillery positions.

Phase three of the defense was centered around Hill 382 and the "Amphitheater". According to a prisoner of war these positions were prepared by the 2nd Mixed Brigade Engineering Unit, and were regarded as the strongest and most elaborate ones on the Island. Commanding hill faces were hollowed out and lined with reinforced concrete for observation posts and for anti-tank guns and machine guns. Three tiers of such positions were constructed across the entire face of the "Amphitheater". Thousands of feet of tunnels and caves were provided, as well as reinforced concrete command posts and hospitals, all deeply imbedded below ground.

Up to this point there had been no "line;" the entire area was mine-strewn, booby-trapped and covered by fire from innumerable mutually supporting direct fire positions and subjected to observed artillery, rocket and mortar fire. There had been no retirement or surrender of enemy personnel. Each enemy position fought till it was individually destroyed and all personnel killed.

As the pivotal point of the Island's defensive system, Hill 382 and the "Amphitheater" were defended even more fiercely and effectively than the preceding areas. Several times the enemy lost Hill 382 to our troops, but he pushed them off its peaks or out of its crevices by a flare-up of intensive rifle, machine-gun and grenade fire from the fortified caves or by a tremendous barrage from the heavy mortars or rockets, which all had pre-registration data on this key terrain feature. At night, fantastic hand-to-hand fighting raged, with grenades and satchel charges being tossed up and down through the crevices. It was only after the cave and tunnel entrances had been sealed shut by demolitions that the last enemy resistance on the Hill died out. Resistance at the "Amphitheater" continued for even a longer period of time. Enemy riflemen and machine gunners were extremely accurate, and the difficulties of the open approach to the tiers of the "Amphitheater" complicated the problem. Even after the "Amphitheater" itself was taken, the "Pocket", a small strip of terrain running in Target Area 184F from MINAMI to "Turkey Knob", just east of the "Amphitheater", continued to hold out. This strip was completely covered by our fire, but its defenses were not destroyed for several days after our front lines had progressed beyond it. It has been the experience of this Division that engineer troops, when they are occupying positions which they have prepared for themselves, create by far the hardest strongpoints for an assault to take. The fight for Hill 382 and the "Amphitheater" definitely confirms this opinion.

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There had been no real counterattacks. Captured documents and prisoners of war secured at the close of this phase disclosed that the command had forbidden counterattacks, retirement or surrender, and that the defense had been rehearsed in detail in January, 1945, exactly as it was being fought.

Phase four of the defense included the fight around TAMANA YAMA (directly east of Hill 382, in the vicinity of 201PORV) and MINAMI Village (southeast of the "Amphitheater" in 184FGKL). Both of these areas had constituted headquarters locations for both army and navy troops and were well dug-in. The defense can be best described by quoting an extract from G-2 Periodic Report Number 63, dated 6 March, 1945.

"As a result of a close study of the enemy's recent defensive action, aided by observation from OP's and air reconnaissance, the following explanation is suggested of the enemy's defense in this Div's ZofA. The enemy remains below ground in his maze of communicating tunnels throughout our preliminary arty fires. When the fire ceases he pushes OP's out of entrances not demolished by our fires. Then choosing a suitable exit he moves as many men and weapons to the surface as he can, depending on the cover and concealment of that area, often as close as 75 yards from our front. As our troops advance toward this point he delivers all the fire at his disposal, rifle, MG and mortar. When he has inflicted sufficient casualties to pin down our advance he then withdraws through his underground tunnels most of his forces, possibly leaving a few machine gunners and mortars. Meanwhile our Bn CO has coordinated his direct support weapons and delivers a concentration of rockets, mortars and arty. Our tanks then push in, supported by infantry. When the hot spot is overrun we find a handful of dead Japs and few if any enemy weapons. While this is happening, the enemy has repeated the process and another sector of our advance is engaged in a vicious fire fight, and the cycle continues. Supporting indications to these deductions are:

"(1) When the hot spot is overrun we find far too few dead enemy to have delivered the fire encountered in overrunning the position;

"(2) We find few if any enemy weapons in the position overrun but plenty of empty shell cases;

"(3) We find many tunnel entrances, some caved in, all appearing deep and well prepared, some with electric light wires;

"(4) During the cycle, close air and OP observation detects no enemy surface movement."

This proved to be an accurate estimate of the enemy's actual practice.

A prisoner of war captured at this time gave the following

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statement:

"After the present defensive positions have been breached, night counterattacks can be expected from large numbers of reserves still in the northern end of the Island. General counterattacks are discouraged by command as long as gun or mortar positions are intact. After permanent positions have been overrun by our troops (Marines) counterattacks are to be made at the discretion of unit commanders."

The highly organized defensive positions around TAMANA YAMA and MINAMI were being breached and nearly overrun by 9 March and the enemy was being compressed in a manner beyond his endurance. Preceded by a heavy concentration of mortars and rockets he made a desperate counterattack on the night of 9 March in the left and center sectors of the Division zone of action. From identifications established and from captured documents it was evident that elements of the 310th and 314th Independent Infantry Battalions, 3rd Battalion, 145th Infantry and personnel of the Naval Land Forces had planned a coordinated counterattack across the entire front in the Division zone of action. Communication breakdowns and lack of contact, however, caused some of the units on the left to fail to jump off. The attack was completely repulsed, with over 800 enemy troops killed, and the backbone of the enemy's coordinated defense was broken.

Phase five of the defense constituted the final fight, in the area between the last position and the sea. In this area the enemy had previously taken advantage of the concealment afforded by the once luxurious foliage to dig large numbers of deep personnel caves and tunnels. He had also made wide distribution of heavy rocket and mortar ammunition. Taking advantage of this unbelievably rocky terrain and the debris caused by combined bombardment the enemy fought to the death. The area was infested with snipers, machine guns, mortars and rockets. The rockets were launched from rough board troughs from caves in the sides of deep volcanic crevices. While their fires could neither be directed nor observed for more than a hundred yards, their volume always made them a casualty producing agency. From their many totally concealed positions, enemy troops held their fire until our troops were very close by. Their accuracy throughout was deadly, particularly at the close range.

Throughout three-fourths of the operation enemy anti-aircraft fire from hidden positions was accurate and brought several Blue planes down in the Division's zone of action.

(c) Units in Contact

According to the captured map of enemy units and positions prepared by Fifth Amphibious Corps Landing Force on 5 March, 1945, this Division's zone of action included the Japanese "southern" sector and the bulk of the "eastern" sector, of the five main sectors into which the Island was divided.

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Opposition on the beaches consisted principally of approximately two companies of the 309th Independent Infantry Battalion, some elements of the 1st Battalion, 145th Infantry Regiment, and assorted Naval Anti-Aircraft, Construction and Guard Force personnel, who were defending fixed emplacements on the terraces. As our forces moved into the north section of Target Area 165 and into Target Areas 166, 183, the full strength of the 309th Battalion was encountered and destroyed. Emplacements of the supporting 8th Independent Anti-Tank Battalion, in target area 183, were overrun and personnel destroyed. Elements of the 12th Independent Anti-Tank Battalion were met between Airfields No. 1 and No. 2. The 2d Independent Machine Gun Battalion, defending an area roughly centered at the junction of Target Areas 165, 166, 182, and 183, in support of the 309th Independent Infantry Battalion, was annihilated.

As we advanced into Target Area 183, moving northeast, units of the 310th Independent Infantry Battalion were encountered, plus 2d Mixed Brigade Engineer and Signal personnel. Contact with Naval units was infrequent except that a Naval Guard Force Intendence Headquarters in Target Area 183 was overrun. The heart of the enemy resistance was met at NIDAN IWA, (Hill 382), and TANANA YAMA, (201 PQVR). Well entrenched here were the bulk of the 310th Battalion, plus the supporting 11th Independent Anti-Tank Battalion; the 3d Battalion of the 145th Infantry Regiment; 2d Mixed Brigade Headquarters and Engineer unit; and a strong naval reserve force consisting of Guard and Land Force troops, plus some construction personnel.

After elements of these units abandoned their positions to counterattack on the night of D-plus-18 (9 March), units of the 314th Independent Infantry Battalion, which had been in reserve, pocketed artillery personnel, and remnants of the other forces were destroyed in Target Area 185.

Artillery firing into the 4th Division's zone of action consisted of the 1st, 3d, and 4th Batteries, 2d Mixed Brigade Artillery (plus one 120mm howitzer platoon); the 3d Medium Mortar Battalion; 1st, 2d, and 3d Batteries, 145th Regiment Artillery; 1st Battery, 20th Independent Mortar Battalion; and the 2d Rocket Unit. Of these, probably the 1st Battery, 20th Independent Mortar Battalion, two batteries of the 3d Medium Mortar Battalion, two batteries of the 2d Mixed Brigade Artillery, one battery of the 145th Artillery, and the 2d Rocket Unit were actually emplaced in the Division's zone of action.

While originally the battalions of the 145th Infantry Regiment were under direct control of the 109th Division Headquarters, it is likely that when committed, the 3d Battalion was directed by the 2d Mixed Brigade Headquarters, which was the command echelon for all other infantry units in the Division's zone of action.

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Guard Force Headquarters was adjacent to the Headquarters of the 2d Mixed Brigade and close liaison was evidently maintained. The Land Forces, Southern Air Command, and Antiaircraft and Construction personnel were under Guard Force Command.

Artillery was apportioned into sector commands of which the Central Group and the Southern Group were in the Fourth Division's area, and the West-Central Group undoubtedly contributed to fire received by this Division. There was an overall artillery command which was responsible to the 109th Division Headquarters.

The following is a tabulation of enemy units encountered in the Fourth Division's zone of action, together with an estimate of strength, showing the number of enemy troops believed to have been overcome by this Division:

2nd Mixed Brigade Headquarters and Signal Unit	350
2nd Mixed Brigade Engineers	450
2nd Mixed Brigade Artillery (two batteries)	300
1st Battalion, 145th Infantry Regiment (elements)	200
3rd Battalion, 145th Infantry Regiment (4 Infantry Companies, 1 Machine Gun Company, 1 Infantry Gun Company)	700
309th Independent Infantry Battalion (4 Infantry Companies, 1 Machine Gun Company, 1 Infantry Gun Company)	800
310th Independent Infantry Battalion	800
314th Independent Infantry Battalion (approximately 50%)	400
8th Independent Anti-Tank Battalion (3 companies)	250
11th Independent Anti-Tank Battalion	250
12th Independent Anti-Tank Battalion (part)	100
2nd Independent Machine Gun Battalion (3 companies)	300
3rd Medium Mortar Battalion (Main force)	350
1st Battery, 20th Independent Mortar Battalion	150
145th Regiment Artillery (1 battery)	100
2nd Rocket Unit	100
26th Tank Regiment (one company)	100
Naval Forces	
Guard Force	2000
Land Force (Southern Air Command)	1500
Construction	500
TOTAL	<u>4000</u> 9700

The actual count of enemy dead reported by the Fourth Division is 8982. This count is of observed dead and does not include enemy dead disposed of by the enemy or troops sealed in caves or tunnels and not seen.

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(d) Special Intelligence

(1) Artillery

Enemy artillery was ably employed during this operation. From the start it was evident that there was an unusual degree of infantry-artillery coordination. With the exception of some coastal defense guns and the anti-aircraft batteries, guns were emplaced in reinforced concrete shelters. Their well chosen, usually defiladed, positions were capably sited for deadly fields of fire. Generally, their limited fields of fire and dispersal prevented massing of fires. Many reports indicated, however, that the fires of two guns were massed on one target. The positions were frequently established with observation, fire control and with communications to adjust and deliver accurate fires on our troops.

The establishment of prior registration on critical terrain features and check points and the maintenance of detailed firing charts made enemy fires effective even after the best observation posts had been captured. The unification of command of artillery and mortar units under an artillery officer and the employment of a gridded fire control map are further evidence of the careful preparation of the artillery defense.

Some time-fire (airbursts) was noted and was believed to have been delivered by depressed anti-aircraft batteries. Shrapnel was used to some extent, but was largely ineffective, due to the fact that it was impact-fused and the soft volcanic ash had a blanket-ing effect on the burst.

All of the 34 captured 37, 47 and 57mm guns had ample supplies of armor-piercing solid shot, which readily penetrated our medium tanks. On two specific observed instances the fragmentation of a 75mm shell was directly to the rear. Fragments appeared to be a light weight alloy.

On several occasions the enemy employed smoke.

The list of captured artillery is recorded in Appendix No. 1 to this Annex.

(2) Rockets

The largest weapon of this type recovered was the 250 kilogram bomb rocket. It consisted of a 250 kilogram aerial bomb from which the tail cone had been removed and a motor assembly attached. The motor was a cylinder 12 inches in diameter and 45 inches long, which contained the rocket propellant, with a 24-inch tail section which carried the venturi tube and the four tail fins.

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A nose fuse on the explosive head detonated the rocket on impact. Its reported range was 5,000 yards.

Rocket motors launching 63 or 100-kilogram aerial bombs were found in two different lengths. One was 42 inches long and seven and one-half inches in diameter, while the other was 30 inches long and 10 inches in diameter. The motors were frequently fired without the bomb attached.

The eight-inch rocket was extensively employed by the enemy. The projectile is known as the converted eight-inch naval-shell, spin-stabilized, rocket. Initially, it was fired in batteries of four from light tube launchers which were open at both ends, and mounted on light two-wheel rubber-tired carriages. It was breech-loaded over a small attached loading tray, eight inches by four and one-half inches in size. The barrel could be elevated to 80 degrees by a lever arm. Setting in place was secured by a rotating clamping handle. A plunger, cammed down when the rocket shell was loaded, held the rocket in place. Firing was by percussion hammer. Traverse was accomplished by rotating the entire launcher. Each position included an open revetted fire pit, provided with a wire camouflage net to cover it completely and an underground covered shelter into which the launcher could be rolled by a ramp when not firing. From prisoner-of-war interrogation it was learned that the enemy did not contemplate the displacement of these launchers but planned to rely on countless simple wooden trough launchers if forced to abandon these positions. From the same source, confirmed by observation of captured positions, it was learned that the eight-inch rocket projectiles were stored in innumerable small caches in caves throughout the entire area, each cache being provided with the trough launchers.

Rockets were extensively employed by the enemy. Their well chosen launching sites were very difficult to locate and required a direct hit to neutralize. Their concussion effect was terrific. Rocket positions invariably had range and pre-registration data posted on boards.

(3) Mortars

Mortars were employed in great numbers. All of the conventional types were found, including the 150mm mortar. Positions were captured constructed to fire four 150mm mortars in a battery.

Six 320mm "Spigot" mortars were captured in the Division zone of action. The positions were uniform in construction, consisting of reinforced covered shelters constructed below the ground level containing the mortar base and ammunition. A small tunnel adjoined for personnel shelter during firing. The front of the position was open for firing. The opening was provided with a removable wire camouflage net. All walls and faces were revetted with

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quarried blocks of volcanic stone. The mortar was mounted on a three-tier wood base bolted at a 45 degree angle upon which were bolted the steel base plate and spigot barrel section. The projectile was four feet, eleven inches in length and 320mm in diameter. It was constructed in three sections which were packed separately but joined together for use by a threaded joint. The parts consisted of an explosive head, an explosive body and a tail assembly. The total weight was 680 pounds. The same fuse was used to ignite the first and second sections. The propulsion charge was ignited by an electric squib. Each position had a detailed firing chart, including azimuth rays and range with elevation and propellant required. These charts listed BLUE and YELLOW Beaches as the primary target, with Airfield No. 1 as the alternate target.

Several interesting developments in enemy mortar tactics were observed. Light 81mm to 90mm mortars were used extremely close to our front lines. Frequently, they were so close that they could fire only on our observation posts and command posts. These close-up mortars were covered by mortars further to the rear which could fire on our front lines. In many instances it was noted that when a medium mortar position drew our artillery fire it became silent sometimes for a period of two or three days. From an observation post on an LCI(G) it was noted that the enemy would get off several quick mortar rounds simultaneously with the falling of rounds from our artillery in his immediate area, thus taking full advantage of the smoke and noise to hide his firing position. In several instances it was noted that the enemy placed and operated mortars in concrete artillery positions which had been previously knocked out. Light and medium mortars were coordinated for massed fires. Enemy 81mm mortars would fire a concentration of airbursts on our front lines and just prior to lifting the barrage would fire one or two high airbursts over the target, presumably as a signal and aiming point for the medium mortars, which would then commence firing on the same area.

(4) Mines, Grenades and Booby Traps

As this subject is covered in detail in Annex King to the Operation Report only brief reference will be included here.

Mines. No new mines were encountered. Mines were employed, however, in much greater numbers than heretofore encountered, and while their employment still does not compare with American or European standards they were used both in fields and individually. (See Appendix No. 1 for areas of minefields). They were judiciously placed on the beaches, on routes of advance to defensive positions, on the airfields and on the shoulders of roads, and were generally covered by fire. There was evidence of considerable last-minute hasty surface emplacement of individual mines.

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Types discovered included:

- (a) Two horn hemispherical
- (b) One horn conical
- (c) 50, 63 and 250 kilogram aerial bombs buried as mines and generally activated by an attached yardstick mine.
- (d) Yardstick
- (e) Terracotta
- (f) Box type
- (g) Tape measure.

Grenades. Grenades as usual were plentiful. Captured types included:

- (a) Magnetic anti-tank
- (b) Shaped charge anti-tank
- (c) Terracotta. This offensive grenade was found in quantity. It was made of terracotta filled with type 88 explosive (ammonium perchlorate) and has a friction type scratch igniter. Grenades varied in color from white to black. Some were glazed and all were encased in a rubber protective cover with a separate small rubber cover for the igniter and cap to seal it from moisture.

- (d) Frangible (smoke)
- (e) Molotov cocktail. A new variation of Molotov cocktail was found. A detonator made of explosives which ignited on being crushed was encased in a celluloid box and attached to the bottom of the bottle with rubber bands. When the bottle was thrown against a tank the detonator was crushed, igniting the oil from the broken bottle. This detonator replaced the detonator and fuse in the neck of the bottle.

Booby traps. Booby traps were found in greater quantities than heretofore. They were employed on enemy and Marine dead, souvenirs, food and ammunition, and at entrances of Japanese installations.

(5) Tanks.

The following enemy tanks were captured:

- 2 Model 95 light tanks, with 37mm guns
- 2 Model 97 medium tanks, with 47mm guns
- 3 Model 97 medium tanks, with 57mm guns.

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None of the tanks were employed or observed in mobile defense. Two fired from revetted positions, while five were fired from defiladed or artfully concealed and camouflaged positions.

(6) Small Boats.

While small boats were reported in operation to transport enemy troops on the western side of the Island, none were employed off the shores of this Division's zone of action. Several were found destroyed in the area of the East Boat Basin.

(7) Communications.

In aerial photographs furnished just prior to our departure from the HAWAIIAN Area it was noted that there was a lace-work of narrow communication trenches throughout the Division's contemplated zone of action. Occupation of this area disclosed a new departure worth noting. Narrow and shallow trenches were frequently found in which stakes had been driven supporting communication wires. This practice obviously protected the wire from being cut by fragmentation but still left it in sight for wiremen to locate and repair breaks.

Radios were in use in greater numbers than on SAIPAN or TINIAN but were meticulously destroyed before capture. Captured communication diagrams disclosed a thorough, well organized net of both wire and radio to all units and areas.

War dogs with message collars were observed in use. Pigeons were found with quantities of message bands but were not observed in use.

(8) Construction.

Concrete work was of far better type than that encountered on ROI-NAIUR, SAIPAN and TINIAN. This was probably due to the fact that the hard volcanic rock when crushed made a better aggregate; and the volcanic ash, resembling coarse sand, made a better mix than the coral product used on the coral islands.

Reinforcing bars up to three-fourths inch in size were freely employed. Concrete works, depending on their vulnerability and size, had walls and roofs ranging up to nine feet in thickness. Vents were baffle-plated to prevent the passage of grenades. Fire apertures were very small and frequently were faced in a direction to prevent penetration by direct fire from seaward sides. The exterior of fire apertures were generally heavily re-

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vetted for further protection. Sand, sand-filled oil drums and timbers were used to cover positions often to a depth of 10 to 15 feet and occasionally to a depth of 20-25 feet.

Small water tanks are described under section (9) herein. Large concrete tanks with wooden roofs flush with the ground were constructed to hold water drained from the airfields.

Two massive concrete communication centers, both built above ground, remained intact at the completion of the operation. The larger, built with four-foot-thick reinforced concrete walls, withstood several hundred rounds fired from our tanks and half-tracks.

Blockhouses and casemates were massive and of the German casemate type. Two concrete buildings adjacent to Airfield No. 2 remained intact. The more recently constructed one, reported to be a weather station, was modern and employed steel sash for doors and windows. All concrete structures were provided with percussion vents.

Virtually all above-surface wooden buildings had been destroyed prior to the operation, and the debris was either burned or reemployed for underground structures.

Construction of the elaborate underground cave and tunnel system was simplified due to the fact that the volcanic rock resembling soft limestone was easily cut by hand and required no shoring. The soft stone had an additional advantageous feature in that it cushioned shock and concussion. Lights, telephones and countless entrances were a part of each major system.

In the rough terrain, tunnel entrances were put in defilade and were difficult to observe from the air or to hit by even high trajectory weapons. Entrances to underground systems from flat terrain were made by placing end on end short sections of concrete pipe with an inside diameter of approximately three feet, the bottom section having a side cut out to allow passage to a ramp or steps which led further underground. All entrances had several abrupt turns.

Many so called "flush-deck" pillboxes, constructed below ground with a slightly mounded sand-covered top, blended perfectly into the terrain and had their sole entrance many yards away, connected by an underground tunnel.

Trenches and most anti-tank ditches were constructed in the volcanic ash and none were observed revetted. Consequently, the sand rapidly drifted in and they constituted neither effective shelters or barriers.

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ANNEX B. I. TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

(9) Supplies.

Captured documents, prisoner-of-war interrogation and observation all indicated that the enemy had ample supplies of food, ammunition and general supplies. There were no shortages.

Command policy called for the immediate distribution of all types of supplies upon their arrival at IWO JIMA to individual units. There were no large centralized dumps. Each small unit had complete and adequate supplies distributed in prepared underground shelters throughout its zone of responsibility.

Rice was stored in heavy rubber bags. Water storage was established throughout the entire area in underground tanks approximately six feet wide, 10 feet long and 12 feet deep. The tanks consisted merely of a hole dug in the volcanic stone (resembling limestone), faced with approximately one-half inch of cement with a six-inch to eight-inch peaked concrete slab roof. The plan and distribution of this water storage might have been excellent except for the fact, as indicated by prisoners of war and confirmed by observation, that the thin veneer face of cement cracked by concussion and drained the precious water supply.

The apparent lack of surplus of lumber, cement and reinforcing steel indicated that all stocks of such material had all been used up.

(10) Equipment.

Trucks were chiefly of the open-body, two-wheel-drive variety of Japanese manufacture and comparable to Chevrolet or Ford type. While they were in some quantity most of them were old. Two multiple-wheel pneumatic-tire dirt-moving scoops were captured - the first modern pieces of dirt-moving equipment observed by this Division. They were crudely welded and made in JAPAN. Two diesel narrow-gauge locomotives of conventional design were also captured. Three obsolete steam rollers and one small gasoline roller and several stone crushers, all of conventional design, were also captured.

As usual, the enemy appeared to have an amazing lack of modern equipment.

(11) Miscellaneous Intelligence Items and Observations.

(a) The first gridded Japanese map encountered on any operation by this Division was found on IWO JIMA. It was divided into 550-yard numbered squares, which were in turn divided into sixteen lettered squares, and the lettered squares were further divided into

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MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

four squares numbered from one to four in each case. The scale was 1:5,000. It was contoured at five-meter intervals.

(b) The enemy's discipline in remaining out of sight at all times was perfect.

(c) In many cases where enemy personnel had an assigned mission to hold a blockhouse or casemate it was noted that although they were well equipped with machine guns and grenades there were no rifles present.

(d) Infiltration groups attempted passage of our lines by impersonating Marines and by boldly carrying stretchers.

(e) Many Japanese were killed wearing Marine uniforms.

(f) A "Battle Vow," presumably issued by the Island Commander, was frequently found posted in captured positions and on dead. It said, "Above all else we shall dedicate ourselves and our entire strength to the defense of this entire Island. Until we are destroyed to the last man we shall harass the enemy by guerilla tactics."

(g) A 105mm fuse and assembly, with the fuse made of wood, was found.

(h) The enemy continued his practice of burning and burying his dead.

(i) On two instances the enemy preceded a counter-attack by firing three white streamers.

(j) The enemy generally held his rifle and machine-gun fire until very close range made sure hits.

(k) The enemy constantly attempted to keep contact during the hours of darkness by strong reconnaissance patrols.

(l) Rifle grenades were frequently fired as airbursts and were often massed.

(m) Rifles captured were nearly all Model 99 7.7mm. There were a few Model 44, 6.5mm cavalry carbines.

(n) Examination of approximately 100 wrecked Japanese planes disclosed that most were of conventional types. One new type Army bomber was found. It was a twin-engined medium plane identified as a "Peggy."

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ANNEX BAKER TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a compilation of the more important recommendations contained in this Annex:

(a) That the official map for the operation not carry an overprint of enemy installations. Enemy installations should be shown in the intelligence maps.

(b) That intelligence maps, or enemy situation maps, not be issued separately by each echelon but as a joint product on which the various units have agreed.

(c) That aerial photograph interpretation reports regarding the prospective target also be issued by a single agency.

(d) That during an operation complete and adequate arrangements be made and carried out for providing satisfactory aerial coverage after D-day in accordance with the needs and requests of lower echelons.

(e) That a system of displaying panels be adopted to designate boundaries between units, to be displayed near enough to the front line to be a guide to air observers.

(f) That arrangements be made to send Division language personnel to school between operations for additional instruction in the Japanese language.

(g) That the methods for disseminating propaganda be completely reappraised in order to insure more effective results.

(h) That a Radio Intelligence Platoon be attached to Marine Divisions.

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A N N E X C H A R L I E

TO

FOURTH

MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

O P E R A T I O N S

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OPERATIONS

1. INFANTRY

(a) General.

(1) The amphibious assault on the island fortress of IWO JIMA presented a tactical problem different from any previously encountered by the Marine Corps, (except possibly to a limited extent at PELILEU) in that, after establishment of the initial beachhead, the attack inland continued to be opposed by heavily fortified positions organized in depth throughout the island. The initial landing was made on beaches composed of loose volcanic sand and backed by formidable terraces of varying heights which restricted the movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles inland. The defense-studded high ground on the right flank effectively covered the landing area and afforded the enemy excellent observation of the landing and the subsequent attack inland.

(2) Tactics displayed by the enemy in defending IWO JIMA were different from those employed in the defense of other island bases captured by this Division, in that, units were instructed to hold their positions until death and to conserve their forces with the mission of inflicting maximum casualties on our attacking forces. The enemy made skillful use of the rocky, rugged, jumbled terrain and from concealed, mutually supporting positions was able to deliver intense and accurate automatic weapons and mortar fire combined with sporadic and intermittent artillery and rocket fire throughout the operation.

(3) Within the Division zone of action, two phases of defense were encountered. The first phase consisted of a highly organized defense in depth of the landing beaches and airfields, utilizing, for the most part, concrete and steel pillboxes, blockhouses, and weapon emplacements. The enemy's defense during the latter stages was conducted from natural terrain irregularities, utilizing previously prepared caves and tunnels, rather than from concrete works.

(4) Nature of terrain and type of defenses encountered prevented maximum benefit being obtained from the fire power of supporting arms. The majority of the fortifications were of such strength that numerous direct hits of heavy caliber shells in the same place were required to breach the structure.

(5) Indirect artillery fire had little or no destructive effect on concrete blockhouses and pillboxes nor was it entirely effective against enemy personnel and weapons located in the labyrinth of caves and underground tunnels. Even under intense artillery

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

fire, the enemy was still able to continue his mortar barrages and small arms fire. Naval gunfire achieved some destructive effect when employing AP ammunition and direct fire, but few targets could be so engaged from seaward. Air bombing, strafing, and use of rockets had little destructive effect on such well constructed and artfully concealed positions. Extremely tortuous terrain and skillfully designed anti-tank measures precluded effective use of tanks and 75mm half-tracks for direct fire missions against these emplacements, while the Bazooka and 37mm AT gun proved, in most cases, too light for the job.

(6) Thus, the infantryman, attacking in the open without full benefit of his usual supporting fire power, was pitted against imposing walls of concrete and steel and an intricate system of underground works.

(b) Tactics Employed.

(1) From the outset, the Division was committed to a continuous frontal assault against a series of strongly fortified positions. While constant attempts were made to flank or envelop enemy positions throughout the operation, the system of defense, employing mutually supporting fire from fortified positions, and the restricted area in which the Division was operating, prevented successful flanking action on a large scale. Thus, no recourse but frontal assault was open.

(2) The eastern portion of the Division's zone of action beyond the O-1 line consisted of a series of cross compartments running perpendicular to the direction of attack. These deep, fortified ravines extending from the high central plateau to the sea presented a formidable obstacle to movement toward the O-2 line and early in the operation requests were made to move the Division boundary southward to permit an attack down these corridors "with the terrain". Not until the latter stages, when the left RCT had advanced to a favorable position on the flank, was it possible for the right RCT to move down the ravines to the sea.

(3) In the assault of fortified positions, the following factors increased the difficulties of the problem and contributed to excessive casualties:

a. Unsuitability of terrain for the employment of heavy direct fire weapons, such as, the tank-mounted 75mm gun and the 75mm half track.

b. Relative ineffectiveness of artillery, air, and NGF against heavy installations.

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

c. Lack of a suitable, portable, direct fire weapon capable of breaching concrete installations.

d. Mutually supporting nature of the majority of the fortifications, making attack by assault teams alone more costly than if heavy direct fire weapons could have been employed.

(4) The IWO JIMA operation emphasized the fact that the assault of a fortified position is a time consuming process that requires meticulous reconnaissance, planning, and preparation prior to initiation of the actual attack. The most important single factor in the success of the attack is the proper employment of heavy direct fire weapons executing slow, deliberate destruction of each enemy position. Artillery cannot be expected to destroy a great number of concrete pillboxes, blockhouses, and weapons emplacements, even though it be large caliber employing precision methods. Once a position has been neutralized by direct fire weapons, then, and only then, can assault teams attack the position with minimum casualties. Experience indicates that all infantry commanders from the battalion level upward must give more consideration to the planning and preparation phase before pitting flesh and blood against concrete and steel.

(5) Again the enemy practice of "crowding" our lines in order to get out of our artillery and mortar fire was prevalent and, on many occasions, rifle and hand grenades were the only weapons that could be used effectively against such tactics. Accordingly, great emphasis was placed on the use of the rifle grenade, but more intensive training in the employment of this valuable weapon is indicated. A system of mass fires, four (4) men in each squad firing in battery, will be stressed in future training of the division.

(6) Because of the reduced size of units after the initial stages (many rifle companies were down to 50 men from a T/O strength of 240) and because of the rugged terrain which restricted visibility and limited fields of fire to a few yards, it was necessary to utilize more units in the line than would have been required on the same frontage in more open terrain. Physical contact was necessary, particularly at night, since gaps in the lines could rarely be covered by fire and this fact necessitated the employment of what may have seemed an excessive number of troops in the line, leaving very small reserves for all units. Against constant, heavy opposition in the type terrain encountered on IWO JIMA, it is considered that the commitment of fewer troops in the line to allow more rest for reserve units would have resulted in excessive infiltration, disruption of rear area activities, and additional casualties.

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ANNEX C MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

(7) The by-passing of strong points in an operation of this type is considered undesirable. On only two (2) occasions were such tactics used on a large scale in the Division zone of action and it was found that both positions were difficult to reduce because of inability of the containing and mopping up force to employ heavy supporting arms. In more open terrain where defenses are not so concentrated, such by-passing tactics could be employed advantageously.

(8) During the early stages of the operation the enemy took advantage of our set pattern of beginning an attack by remaining in caves and emplacements during the preparatory fires, then appearing suddenly as soon as the attack jumped off. On the several occasions when pre-dawn attacks without preparatory fires were made, surprise was gained and good advances made, indicating that the decision to attack with or without a preparation must be carefully weighed in view of the factors involved. A standard routine of attacking at a certain hour must not be allowed to develop, but the procedure should be so varied that the enemy will be habitually caught off guard. The possibility of employing limited objective night attacks should be considered.

(9) The early loss of leaders and other experienced key personnel seriously affected the efficiency of small unit tactics. Assignment of untrained replacements did little to improve the situation and toward the end of the operation most small units were under command of personnel who had been placed in a position beyond their capabilities. Thus, the fact that leaders and key men must be adequately trained at least "three deep" was forcefully emphasized in the IWO JIMA operation.

(10) While retaining advantage of observation, the enemy consistently concentrated mortar, rocket, and artillery fires on CP's of all units, indicating the need for additional emphasis being placed on CP discipline and camouflage, particularly traffic control. When under constant enemy observation and conditions do not permit concealment of CP locations, it is believed the practice of small units occupying one CP location during daylight and then moving to an alternate location during the night should be considered.

(c) Infantry Weapons.

(1) No unusual employment of small arms was encountered during the operation. The BAR retains its place as a most dependable and popular weapon with the infantry. The carbine is valuable as a defensive weapon, but should be replaced in many instances by the .45 caliber pistol. The short bayonet was used by

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

many units to replace both the long bayonet and the utility fighting knife. TSMG's are needed in the infantry battalion for mopping up work.

(2) The 60mm and 81mm mortar were employed effectively for close-in targets of opportunity, illumination, smoke missions, and counter-mortar fires. While these weapons were invaluable in their role, the need for a more effective mortar organization within the Division was indicated. The Japanese have many times the mortar fire power of a Marine Division, both in number of weapons and larger calibers, and on IWO JIMA it is estimated that a larger percentage of casualties to our own forces were caused by enemy mortars than any other weapon. Repeated recommendations have been made by the Division that the 4.2 chemical mortar, which has been tested and proven in combat, be adopted by the Marine Corps. A mortar battalion, consisting of two (2) 4.2 companies and one (1) 155mm mortar company, has been recommended as the ideal organization which would permit the assignment of one (1) 4.2 company to support each assault regiment while the 155mm company was held in general support under Division control.

(3) The 37mm gun and the 75mm half track, with which the Regimental Weapons Companies were equipped for the operation, were used infrequently because of the difficult terrain and the vulnerability of these weapons to enemy fire. The 37mm gun should be replaced by the 57mm gun in order to provide more adequate anti-tank protection. The M7B1, now replacing the 75mm half track, could have been used in the IWO JIMA operation as an indirect fire weapon when it was not possible to employ it in a direct fire role.

(4) The Bazooka was designed primarily as an anti-tank weapon and as such it has proven invaluable. For lack of a more suitable weapon, it has been used more frequently by assault teams as a direct fire weapon against fortified positions and caves. The need for a heavier direct fire weapon that could be carried by the assault team as a substitute for the Bazooka was keenly felt throughout the operation. It is believed that a rocket, embodying Bazooka-like characteristics but equipped with both a concrete-piercing and fragmentation shell, should be developed.

(5) Portable flame throwers were used extensively in assault work and in cleaning out caves. Their vulnerability to enemy fire and the difficulties of servicing make it mandatory that at least one (1) flame thrower be retained in reserve for each one (1) in use.

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, TWO JIMA.

2. AVIATION

(a) Support Aviation.

(1) Defensive air cover including antisubmarine patrol, was adequate and efficient from time of mounting until completion of assault phase. Preliminary air strikes were not sufficiently effective and the desired degree of neutralization was not obtained.

(2) On DOG-day, air attacks were delivered on the beaches and flanks prior to HOW-hour, and during the period H-55 to H-35 caused an apparent lull in naval gunfire, which was scheduled to continue uninterrupted with a limited maximum ordinate.

(3) Air liaison parties operated under the supervision of unit air officers and commanders. Close liaison with naval gunfire and artillery teams was initially obtained by direct contact with their liaison officers in the landing teams. Requests for air support were forwarded over voice radio on the single channel available and later over land wires. Direction of air attacks was retained exclusively by CASCU, with whom radio communications were satisfactorily maintained throughout the operation.

(4) Communication between AGL teams and ASC was adequate; between ASC, support aircraft, and air coordinators apparently satisfactory; and between support aircraft and air support parties non-existent, although equipment was available.

(5) Targets were marked by white phosphorous and yellow smoke. Yellow fluorescent front line panels were used to mark front lines and appeared satisfactory to support aircraft.

(6) Air support missions were particularly effective when the heavier bombs with four-second-delay fuzes were used. In general, a lack of coordinated training of pilots with troops seemed to be responsible for inordinately lengthy dummy runs being made, adversely affecting effective timing and resulting in excessive intervals between origination of request and execution.

(7) Dummy attacks were the rule rather than the exception, preceding all close support missions; they were only rarely employed to cover an advance.

(8) Air liaison parties were not permitted to employ their VHF radios to control aircraft from the ground. This arbitrary limitation abrogated the tentative joint Navy-approved

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

procedure which stated that air liaison parties would not be deprived of this privilege. Air liaison parties suffered heavy casualties working forward into positions from which to coach aircraft. Many air liaison officers available were former aviators, and six naval aviators were with the combat teams and Division Headquarters. Any objection to turning over coaching control to "inexperienced" air liaison parties is therefore not valid.

(9) The following comments and recommendations are tendered on their merits:

a. The planned air support did not provide adequately for exigencies such as might be reasonably expected from enemy action, nor did it provide the minimum number of aircraft for support missions stipulated in our previous battle operation reports.

b. Garrison fighter aircraft might have been employed earlier and more effectively for troop support missions if the pilots had trained with the Division.

c. Night air observers, repeatedly in demand by combat teams, should have been provided for in the Air Plan as recommended, and the subject given the widest dissemination; at least one air raid condition was caused partially by this omission.

d. Armament did not provide 2000-pound and heavier bombs despite prior requests and recommendations contained in previous battle operation reports.

e. Since no dive bombers were part of the support carrier group none were available to hit peculiarly defiladed enemy targets which artillery reported they could not reach.

f. Air liaison parties should not be deprived of the privilege of coaching aircraft onto the targets, if air support is to be close and effective.

g. Pilots of troop support aircraft should train with the Division.

h. White phosphorous was used by friend and foe, often with confusing and dangerous results. Yellow smoke shell at present has a poor ballistic design but with improvement, could more accurately be employed.

i. More data as to the allocation, number, armament, and type of aircraft, and times available for support.

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

H-hour strikes should be made available by higher authority and the Division permitted to plan coverage of targets in the Division zone of action.

j. Strategic priority to water installations was advocated in our prior air recommendations, and apparently ignored. POW's stressed the fact that lack of water was losing the war for them on IWO.

k. The ordnance arming of carrier planes again proved too inflexible. Requests originated the night before for Napalm or specific bomb and fuzes were repeatedly ignored; or the present system is inadequate to effect the desired arming on reasonable advance notice.

l. Rehearsal air exercises were of little value to the Division. A minimum requirement should have provided for the air liaison parties being landed on KAHOO LAWE with sufficient troops to form front lines and display panels, while live ammunition was employed.

(b) Air Observation

(1) Plans and Preparations.

a. Training of Air Observers - Prior to the SAIPAN-TINIAN operation, twenty-three officers had received air observation training and over half flew in combat during that operation. Upon returning to Maui, training was continued and seventeen officers, ten of whom had had no previous training, attended a two-week course at Naval Air Station Kahului; a one-week course at Hickam Field; and a four-week course at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe. Two tactical observers received training at JICPOA, CINCPAC, and four artillery observers attended a two-week course at SOSU, Naval Air Station, Ford Island. Upon return to Maui, observers trained with VMO-4 and naval air units up to the time of the Division's embarkation. During the rehearsal period off Maui, fifteen observers continued training at Naval Air Station, Kahului. The Division Air Observer Group comprised: nine officers from the Artillery Regiment; one officer from each infantry regiment, the Fourth Tank Battalion, and the Division Reconnaissance Company; two officers from the First JASCo, and four officers from Division Headquarters.

b. Plans for Employment - Plans for employment of observers were designed to furnish tactical observation commencing immediately prior to H-hour on Dog-day; air spot for naval gunfire commencing on Dog-minus-three day; air spot for shore-based artillery to commence as soon as artillery was ashore and prepared

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

to fire; night tactical observation, and special missions. Since the situation precluded use of OY-1 aircraft during early phases, it was necessary for the plan to be sufficiently flexible to take full advantage of observers based on carriers and other combat ships, and yet provide for the OY-1 aircraft to be shore-based with observers as soon as practicable. The plan was covered by Annex MIKE to Operation Plan No. 49-44, and provided for embarkation as set forth in the following table:

EMBARKATION TABLE

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Plane</u>	<u>Pilot</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Observer</u>
USS CHESTER	VOS	Navy	NGF	1 Arty Obsr
USS SALT LAKE CITY	VOS	Navy	NGF	1 Arty Obsr
USS TENNESSEE	VOS	Navy	NGF	1 Arty Obsr
USS BILOXI	VOS	Navy	NGF	1 Arty Obsr
	<u>OY-1's</u>			
USS WAKE ISLAND	2	2 VMO-4	Arty Spot	3 Arty Obsrs
USS SAGINAW BAY	2	2 VMO-4		
USS MAKIN ISLAND	1	1 VMO-4		
USS BISMARCK SEA	2	2 VMO-4	Tactical	5 Tact Obsrs
LST #776	5	5 VMO-4	Arty Spot	2 Arty Obsrs
USS SARATOGA	TBM	Navy	Night Obsn	1 Tact Obsr

The five remaining officers who had received observation training were embarked with their respective units, prepared to fly on order.

c. Movement to Theater of Operations - During the rehearsal period at Maui from 3 January to 18 January, 1945, the fifteen observers assigned to combatant ships were temporarily attached to Naval Air Station, Kahului. The four observers assigned for naval gunfire spot departed from Maui 8 January, 1945, and embarked at Pearl shortly thereafter, while the remaining eleven observers departed Maui for Pearl 18 January, 1945. The one observer for night tactical observation, and the two observers assigned to LST #776 embarked at Pearl. The eight observers assigned to carriers departed Pearl by air on 21-22 January, 1945, arriving at Ulithi and embarking aboard assigned carriers on 25 January, 1945. On all combatant ships where observers were embarked, satisfactory liaison was established with the Air Department, Intelligence, Gunnery, Operations, and Communications. Aboard the USS BISMARCK SEA, arrangements were made for a receiver to monitor the SAO net and to make a transcription of all transmissions on that net. All observers made a detailed study of the operation plan and an intensive intelligence analysis of the theater of operations. The senior observer aboard the various combatant ships lectured separately to the air squadron aboard, all ship's officers, and to all ship's personnel on the landing force phase of the operation and the mission of air observation.

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ANNEX C MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

Prior to the departure from Ulithi, four pilots and radiomen on the USS BISMARCK SEA had been specifically assigned to fly observation missions. They were specially briefed in all phases of the operation, and worked closely with observers while en-route to IWO JIMA. This trained pilot-observer team was of great value, and the observations of pilot and radiomen contributed materially to the observer's reports. No flights were provided for observers of this Division during the rehearsal at TINIAN.

(2) Activities During Combat

a. Naval Gunfire Spot - Air observers embarked on the four combatant ships commenced air spot for naval gunfire on 16 February, 1945, (Dog-minus-three day), and continued through 28 February, 1945, flying in OS2U's. Approximately 132 hours were flown in the execution of naval gunfire spot missions from OS2U aircraft, with highly satisfactory results. During subsequent phases of the operation, on several occasions, the tactical observers were employed to spot for naval gunfire.

b. Artillery Air Spot - From 20 February to 12 March, 1945, air spot for shore-based artillery was provided continuously by observers embarked aboard the USS WAKE ISLAND, flying in TBM aircraft. On 26 February, 1945, two OY-1's which had been embarked aboard the USS WAKE ISLAND, landed ashore at MOTOYAMA Airfield No. 1. Three OY-1's landed ashore from USS MAKIN ISLAND and USS SAGINAW BAY on 27 February; the remaining two of seven operational OY-1's landed ashore from LST #776 with two artillery observers on 28 February. Between 26 February and 4 March, four OY-1's were rendered unserviceable through enemy action in the shelling of the airfield; however, by 4 March, four OY-1's were again in operation. Artillery spot was continued with one TBM and generally with one OY-1 on station until the artillery was secured; however, two OY-1's were on station for two or three days from about 6 March, 1945. A total of about 470 hours were flown by artillery spotters on artillery missions which, combined with naval gunfire missions, totaled 602 hours.

From the observer's viewpoint, air spot was satisfactory. Base points and targets were easily located and registrations quickly made. Artillery observers airborne in TBM aircraft were greatly handicapped by the limited observation and difficulty of maneuvering.

c. Tactical Observation - Tactical observation commenced prior to How-hour on 19 February, 1945. Missions were flown in TBM aircraft from the USS BISMARCK SEA. Planes were armed only with defensive small-arms ammunition, no rockets being available.

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ANNEX C-10 TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

Two tactical air observers were to fly ashore from the USS BISMARCK SEA in OY-1 aircraft on Division order, leaving three tactical air observers aboard to continue observation in TBM's when carrier-based aircraft could operate ashore. The three tactical air observers aboard were to be shore-based, to continue observation in both OY-1's and TBM's. The night tactical air observer was to continue to operate from a carrier until ordered ashore. Supplementing the primary tactical air observers were the five officers who had received observation training and could be ordered to fly on order.

On the evening of Dog-plus-two, 21 February, 1945, the USS BISMARCK SEA was sunk by enemy action. The five tactical air observers aboard, and one OY-1 pilot were rescued later that evening, having been in the water up to three hours.

From 22-26 February, the Division was without its own tactical observation but immediately upon arrival of OY-1's ashore, tactical observation was commenced with secondary observers and one volunteer officer flying missions. Upon return of the regular tactical air observers, a definite schedule was maintained with tactical observation being furnished continually until the Division was secured. At that time, one OY-1 was operational and able to maintain observation flights. Only one tactical observation flight was flown in carrier-based aircraft from MOTOYAMA Airfield No. 1, a special mission for VAC.

One observer from Fourth Marine Division, one from Fifth Marine Division, and two from Third Marine Division were embarked aboard the USS SARATOGA for night tactical observation missions to commence D-day evening. It was hoped that day and night observation would be continuous. Five missions, totalling twenty-five hours, were flown by the night tactical observers through D- and D-plus-one evening; weather conditions and an air raid caused partially by faulty IFF, and an inadequate dissemination of the flight plan were factors hampering the success of this very much needed and new type of observation. On the early evening of D-plus-two, 21 February, the USS SARATOGA was subjected to an air attack and after sustaining heavy damage, was forced to retire from the theater of operations.

Several successive night, pre-dawn, and dusk-to-darkness flights were performed by tactical air observers in OY-1 aircraft. Ground troops report that enemy mortar and artillery fire was held to a minimum during darkness, when observation planes were kept on station. The presence of a plane overhead resulted in enemy forces being less willing to reveal their positions by firing.

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Heavy and accurate anti-aircraft and small-arms fire was received throughout the operation. Observation planes with Fourth Marine Division Observers were hit many times; one pilot being wounded and evacuated. The observer effectively piloted the aircraft from the rear seat after the pilot was hit, until just prior to the landing.

Although the enemy anti-aircraft fire was intense, all observers agree that our artillery, mortars, and naval gunfire constituted the chief hazard. To stay above the trajectory and get results was impossible, and there was no reliable way of tabulating when or where fire would be laid. With complete knowledge of trajectories at various ranges with various charges, angle of fall, and maximum ordinates for artillery, mortars, rockets, and naval gunfire, it was still usually impossible to judge which batteries were firing, and from what direction. It was therefore necessary most of the time to "feel one's way in", judging by nearby bursts, or by flying, when practicable, along the coastline of the island.

A total of about 260 hours was flown by tactical observers, of which 100 hours were in TBM aircraft and 160 hours in OY-1 aircraft.

d. Liaison on the Ground - Observers bivouaced with VMO-4 near the airfield, thus facilitating liaison. Continuous contact was maintained with Division Headquarters and the artillery regiment, and frequent visits were made to front line units. Communication with Division Headquarters was by radio and telephone.

e. Communications - The SAO net was used only for communications between SAC, Division Headquarters, RCT's, BLT's, and tactical air observers in TBM's. No difficulty was encountered on this net during the three days' operation by Division observers. To limit the traffic on the Fifth Division SAO net only Fourth Division Headquarters was permitted to transmit. The Reconnaissance Net, used with the OY-1's, included Division Headquarters, RCT's and BLT's. For a period of about two days, 4 and 5 March, sporadic enemy jamming was experienced and a frequency shift was made for one day only.

(3) Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. Consideration should be given to the advisability of organizing all tactical and gunnery air observers into a special section of Division Headquarters.

Observers with additional duties are not generally available for flying. At present, air observers are not

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included in the Tables of Organization for a Marine Division. All tactical and gunnery air observers authorized in Letter of Instruction #929, should be included in the Tables of Organization for a Marine Division.

b. Operation and Employment of OY-1's - It is recommended that all OY-1's be equipped and armed with six bazookas (rocket launcher 2.36" - M9A1) for purposes of accurately pin-pointing targets for support fires.

c. Operations in Carrier-Based Aircraft - It is strongly recommended that carrier-based observers fly in SNJ, SBD, or SB2C aircraft. The TBM is unsatisfactory for use as an observation plane. Its design restricts vision in the turret, to the port side; in the belly, to two small ports (approximately 18" x 12"); and in the greenhouse, by the wings, to directly ahead or astern. The TBM is not sufficiently maneuverable to keep a definite area under observation continuously, or for adequate evasive action. It is not suitable to fly at low altitudes over enemy installations for extended periods of time.

All observation planes should have dual controls to enable the observer to maintain the plane in flight and to land the plane in the event the pilot is hit.

Minimum allocation should provide eight tactical air observers with primary duties as follows: three night observers on night-operating carriers; three on one carrier for day tactical observation, and two observers as standbys aboard a third carrier in a separate carrier division.

A pilot-observer team for tactical observation should fly together in training and throughout the operation, moving ashore together.

During the operation, targets of opportunity discovered required immediate action and included active enemy artillery, rocket or mortar positions, and enemy troops concentrations. Inherent delays in the present system more frequently than not allowed the enemy to escape. The armament of observation planes, carrier-based, in the IWO operation did not permit taking these targets under fire even with permission of the Support Air Commander. On several occasions, air strikes went into targets located by air observers and were observed to miss completely. Had the observer led in the strike, better results might have been expected. It is recommended that observation planes be armed with half-explosive and half-colored smoke rockets to permit them to strike or mark targets. During the initial phase of the operation,

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direct-support attack aircraft guarding the SAO net should operate with tactical observers to hit such targets of opportunity as are located, reported, and marked by observers.

(c) VMO-4 Operations

(1) Preparations.

a. In preparation for the IWO JIMA operation one officer, one enlisted man, and seven aircraft were sent to Guam in December, 1944. At Guam the planes had wings attached to the fuselages, engines checked, and were put aboard carriers for the coming operation.

b. On 31 December, 1944, twenty enlisted men embarked aboard the APA 207 at Kahului Harbor, Maui. On 4 January, 1945, seventeen enlisted men and one officer embarked aboard the APA 33. Fifteen men and one officer transferred from this ship to the LST #776 at Pearl Harbor. On 8 January, 1945, one Warrant Officer and two enlisted men, plus Squadron gear, embarked aboard the AKA 60 at Kahului Harbor, Maui, and sailed for Pearl Harbor. On 22 January, 1945, LST #776 sailed from Pearl Harbor; AKA 60 and APA 33 sailed from Pearl Harbor 28 January, 1945 - - all enroute to the objective.

c. On 22 January, 1945, six officers flew to Guam; here they were assigned aircraft. On 9 February, they flew their aircraft to Saipan and embarked aboard carriers on 11 February. Two officers and two planes went aboard the USS BISMARCK SEA; two officers and two planes went aboard the USS SAGINAW BAY; two officers and two planes went aboard the USS WAKE ISLAND; and one officer and one plane went aboard the USS MAKIN ISLAND.

(2) Flight Operations

a. In the evening of D-plus-2, the USS BISMARCK SEA (CVE 95) was sunk by enemy action. Of the two pilots VMO-4 had aboard this ship only one was rescued. Both of the Squadron's aircraft were lost.

b. On the morning of 25 February (D-plus-6), two officers and fifteen enlisted men came ashore and proceeded to MOTOYAMA Airfield No. 1. Signal equipment was immediately set up and radio contact was established with units of the Fourth Marine Division. The ground crew prepared to receive the first planes and to begin flight operations.

c. The following morning, 26 February (D-plus-7), two planes flew in from a carrier; the first American planes to

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land on IWO JIMA. Flight operations commenced on the same day. On 27 February (D-plus-8), the three remaining planes aboard the carriers flew ashore. This same day an attempt was made to fly one OY-1 from the Brodie Gear on LST #776. The hook failed and the plane went into the water; both pilot and passenger were recovered uninjured.

d. On the evening of 28 February (D-plus-9), a night mission was requested in order to locate, or hold down, enemy fire. Since it was experimental, only the pilot went on the mission. This was one of the first times that OY-1's had been used for night flying in combat. The flight proved to be of value to the division, and, therefore, more missions of this type were flown on following nights. The airstrip was not illuminated at night since the enemy still had observation of the field. A bad crosswind plus lack of proper instruments in the planes made night flying hazardous.

e. On 1 March, (D-plus-10), using an improvised releasing gear, the two remaining planes were flown off LST #776. The Squadron now had seven operating planes ashore.

f. Enemy artillery and mortar fire continued to fall on the airstrip while the Squadron was operating. Besides wounding one enlisted man, considerable damage was done to the aircraft. Two planes were damaged beyond repair and the remaining planes received damage necessitating immediate repair. On 2 March, (D-plus-11), one plane met with a mishap while landing. This accident put another plane out of operation, leaving only four operational planes in the Squadron.

g. On 5 March (D-plus-14), while flying a tactical mission, a plane was hit by enemy machine-gun fire and the pilot received wounds in the leg and arm. He was able to fly his plane back to the airstrip and made a safe landing. His wounds were such as to warrant evacuation and he was flown to Guam that day.

h. Bazookas, having been installed on one aircraft, were tested against KANGOKU Rock on 9 March (D-plus-18), using both antitank and white phosphorous rockets. Though performing satisfactorily, their use was never scheduled on IWO JIMA.

i. On 11 March (D-plus-20), the Fourth Marine Division Artillery was officially secured. Thereafter, the Squadron had no scheduled flights, but remained on call for tactical missions only. Flight operations were secured entirely on 17 March (D-plus-26).

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1. During the nineteen days of Squadron operations against the enemy on IWO JIMA, this unit flew a total of one hundred and ninety-four (194) missions, accumulating three hundred and sixty-six and four tenths (366.4) hours. All missions were flown over enemy territory at altitudes ranging from ground level to one thousand (1,000) feet. The scheduled length of a mission was two hours; the average, one and nine tenths (1.9) hours, the discrepancy being frequently due to engine trouble while in the air, necessitating the return of the craft prior to the completion of the mission. Flights where no difficulty was encountered averaged a duration of two and three tenths (2.3) hours, the longest mission being three and two tenths (3.2) hours. During fourteen of the nineteen operational days, two planes were on station at all times from dawn to dusk; one plane flying an artillery spotting mission, the other flying for tactical observation. This rotation of aircraft presented a definite hindrance to proper engine upkeep, and was a contributing factor, along with enemy action, to the early depletion of operative aircraft. Enemy fire was encountered frequently while in the air. Some of the planes that were hit needed major repairs while others needed only minor repairs. No airplane from this unit was lost to enemy fire while on a flight.

k. Combat experience in the IWO JIMA operation demonstrated that the mere presence of a plane over enemy territory helped considerably in holding down mortar and artillery fire. Flights for this purpose were most valuable at dawn and dusk; that is, before support aviation was on station, and after it had been secured. Also, enemy mortar and artillery flashes could be seen better during these periods.

(3) Brodie Gear

a. The Brodie System, as used by this Squadron, might well be termed a failure. The initial trial in December, 1944, was unsuccessful, and resulted in the loss of one aircraft from VMO-4 and one from VMO-5.

b. One aircraft was lost at Saipan, on 14 February, 1945. This plane was attempting to take off. Investigation revealed the cause to be a faulty hook of the launching gear which was unable to hold the suspended weight of the loaded OY-1.

c. On 1 March (D-plus-10), two aircraft were successfully launched from LST #776. This was made possible by suspending the plane on the launching gear by the main hook used in landing, thereby rendering the pilot-controlled release ineffective. Release from the cable was effected by an emergency trip which released the five-foot suspension cable as well as the plane. In one instance this cable crashed into the canopy of the plane.

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ripping out the plexi-glass. This was a radical method of launching and is not recommended, except under emergency conditions.

3. NAVAL GUNFIRE

(a) Training and Planning for Operation.

(1) NGF personnel of the Division functioned together on numerous occasions prior to the operation. CPX's were held, both in camp and in the field, for battalions, regiments and Division. In addition all teams performed normal functions on maneuvers in the MAALAEA BAY area and on TINIAN ISLAND. This training is felt to have been fully adequate with the one exception that the late assignment of several of the NLO's prevented them from personally taking part in the majority of these exercises and becoming familiar with their teams and supported units. Teams conducted simulated problems with fire support ships assigned in direct support for the operation from positions ashore on TINIAN ISLAND. Some of the DD's to be employed on the operation took part in simulated missions with teams in the MAALAEA BAY area and actually fired missions for spotters on KAHOO LAWE ISLAND. No opportunity was provided for conferences aboard fire support ships.

(2) This Division was the instigator of a series of conferences among unit commanders and staff officers as to the proper employment, problems and potentialities of all supporting arms. NGF was well represented and particularly stressed at each of these gatherings. Following several Division conferences which thoroughly covered all general aspects of the problem, individual units called on their own liaison officers to carry the principles along to individual members of their commands. All unit commanders appeared to be vitally interested in these conferences and it is felt that constructive steps were taken in bringing about a more thorough understanding of the proper employment of NGF throughout the chain of command. All NLO's kept their commanding officers and staffs well informed and abreast of the situation relative to NGF, day to day.

(3) The method of coordinating Artillery, NGF and Air support was accomplished in lower echelons of this command through the medium of conferences involving all three liaison officers and the operations officer or commander of the unit involved. On the Division level particularly close contact was maintained between the NGF officer and the operations officer of the 14th Marines. Through personal contact and telephonic communications NGF and Artillery kept well aware of each others activities. This usually took care of coordination with Corps Artillery also. The Coordination and cooperation of the 14th Marines with NGF was particularly

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helpful and gratifying throughout the operation. Personal contact was always present between Division NGF and Air officers. Each kept the other informed of his activities and coordination in the Division was good. However on several occasions NGF was not notified in sufficient time of air activities planned by higher echelons. This brought about several instances where ships were still firing when planes came in, simply because warnings had not had time to be sufficiently distributed.

(4) Division NGF was kept fully abreast of the situation throughout the operation by the D-3 section. Particularly close liaison was maintained between NGF and D-3 as they occupied adjacent sectors of the same dugout. All lower echelons reported that unit commanders kept them fully advised of all operation plans.

(5) It is felt that too much cannot be done in the furtherance of the coordination conferences between units and liaison officers of supporting arms. Excellent steps were taken prior to this operation but it is impossible to have too close an understanding between infantry units and supporting arms. This must go down as far as the individual riflemen. In the final phase of training for any operation SFCP teams must work closely with units which they will support. It is recommended that on future operations radio exercises with fire support ships at the advanced staging area be conducted with SFCP teams aboard their respective ships, thus incorporating the excellence of the exercise and precluding any chance of loss or damage to equipment at such a late date. If possible all fire support ships to be employed on an operation should take part in all preliminary operations and maneuvers. It is also highly recommended that in future operations conferences aboard direct support ships be arranged for all SFCP teams involved.

(b) Observations on Effect of Scheduled NGF.

(1) It is estimated that approximately ten percent (10%) of the beach defenses were knocked out and all enemy troops neutralized by scheduled bombardment in RCT 23 zone of action. Destruction was principally accomplished by heavy caliber shells. High velocity guns were not knocked out on the flanks and automatic weapons from emplacements along abutments of the airfield to the front were active. Mortars from the flanks and reverse slopes exacted heavy casualties on the beaches. Construction of emplacements, in conjunction with terrain, rendered area fires largely ineffective, although observation revealed it possible to close small caves with 5" projectiles. Directed fire from 5" batteries proved to have little effect upon the area surrounding the 11382. In RCT 25 zone of action large pillboxes on beach were knocked out

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by heavy caliber fire prior to the landings. Effect of 5", rocket and mortar fires on beaches was not visible due to the sandy nature of the beach. The rolling barrage screened initial waves sufficiently to enable them to organize on the beach but enemy riflemen had held their positions and were able to fire through the barrage from the right flank. Most emplacements observable from seaward were destroyed and the fire received came from reverse slopes and emplacements further inland.

(2) With the terrain and type defense employed by the enemy on this island, area coverage loses almost all value. All fire must be pin-pointed on targets if destruction is to be obtained. The pre-Dog day bombardment was far too brief to enable any ships to definitely locate many targets, let alone destroy them. Bad weather, coupled with brief time allotted, permitted ships to fire through areas only. In the operation two facts were obvious: (1) far more and heavier fires were needed on the flanks in depth, and (2) the rolling barrage was an excellent instrument in neutralizing areas but did little destruction. The reduction of enemy strong points and the total destruction of the bulwarks of defense must be accomplished in a carefully planned and more carefully executed pre-Dog day bombardment.

(c) Call Fire Phase.

(1) The present organization and doctrine for call fires is considered satisfactory.

(2) Every attempt was made throughout the operation to maintain coordination between adjacent units. Units communicated with one another and discussed their respective situations. No unit fired into another unit's zone of action without the specific permission of the commander of the unit involved. A close check was maintained at all times of front line positions of all units and the line of fire of each ship was kept under constant surveillance. Effectiveness of coordination in illumination was particularly stressed in the latter stages of the operation due to limitations on number of star shells available. Here one ship illuminated for as many as three units. Higher echelon coordination proved particularly effective. The 5th Marine Division proved themselves especially cooperative at all times in assisting our advance by promptly taking under fire any areas in their zone which were holding up our advance. Similar cooperation was obtained from the 3d Marine Division. All involved reacted promptly on all reports of starshell cases or short rounds and the number of instances of both were at a minimum.

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(3) Approximately 750 call fire missions were fired by units of the Division on the operation. Roughly 20-25% were fired by spotters, 50-60% by air spot, 5% direct fire and the remaining unobserved fires. Results obtained were generally good. In most instances neutralization only was obtained. Due to the nature of terrain over which the Division operated air spot was invaluable.

(4) Deep harassing fires were employed at night, mainly as counter-battery measures. Little destruction was obtained but almost invariably these fires would force enemy guns to cease firing. Some interdiction fire was also employed.

(5) On one occasion call fires were brought within 100 yards of friendly troops. In this instance a spotter was aboard the firing ship and communications with front line units were excellent. Fires were walked to within 200 yards of friendly troops on several occasions and as a rule NGF was employed as close as 400 yards. The 1200 fs ammunition was mainly responsible for these close supporting fires. Ships capable of efficiently employing this type ammunition proved excellent supporting units and it cannot be too strongly urged that 1200 fs ammunition be used during the major portion of all future shore fire bombardment exercises.

(6) Air burst was not extensively used due to the fact that the enemy was seldom caught in the open. When employed it was very effective. WP was used principally for marker salvos. Some units mixed it with HE and recommended its further use in such a manner. Rockets and mortars were especially adaptable for large area coverage in night harassing and interdiction fires. Forty and twenty millimeter fires were used mainly along the coast firing up draws and into caves. They were very satisfactory in this assignment. On several occasions spotters went aboard destroyers and fired forty millimeter along the coast.

(7) When air spot was employed the SFCP was on the same frequency with the plane but usually was unable to contact the plane by radio necessitating relaying of all messages through the firing ship. It was the consensus of opinion in the Division that due to the nature of the terrain air spot was indispensable. The continued employment of VOF spot planes is most strongly recommended with even larger numbers available for each operation if possible.

(d) Fire Support Ships.

(1) The relief and assignment of ships worked out excellently on the operation. The one difficulty encountered was the

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fact that on occasion ships were assigned later than desirable in the day. The principle of all reliefs being made prior to 1600 each day should be adhered to as much as possible. When additional ships were required higher echelons proved particularly cooperative in securing them if they were available. During the closing phases of the operation there were not enough ships made available to provide proper illumination.

(2) All ships proved cooperative and delivered prompt, effective fires. Some were rated as excellent and others as less so, but all were generally satisfactory. All appeared eager to do every thing possible for SFCP's. In several instances spotters were able to coach ships onto targets in order that they might employ direct fire methods.

(3) This Division continually employed one or more gunboats along the coast on the right flank. Their use proved very effective, particularly in the early stages of the campaign when a spotter from the right flank battalion spotted fires from the flag gunboat. It is believed that in future operations it would be well worth while for units operating along a coast line to so employ a spotter. This Division used a replacement spotter for this mission until casualties ashore forced his recall. The work of all types of gunboats was especially commendable throughout the operation.

(4) In the early stages of the operation a Division general support ship was assigned the Division and excellent use was made thereof. The ship was instructed to come up on the Division NGF Common net and was employed in deep support, emergency missions and with air spot on observed targets in the Division zone of action. Assigned to the Division for two days the USS SANTA FE proved extremely cooperative and continually functioned in a highly efficient and effective manner at the most trying stage of the operation. At one time this ship was in communication with a battalion spotter, a battalion liaison officer and the Division NGF officer and was simultaneously illuminating, firing call missions and maintaining a harassing schedule in a most capable manner. It is recommended that plans for all future operations include a general support ship, preferably a cruiser, assigned to Division both day and night. The lack of such a ship was severely felt later in the operation.

(e) Scheduled Fires During Continuation of the Attack.

(1) The extreme difficulties of the terrain which were continually encountered in the Division zone of action rendered preparation fires less effective than is normally expected. However

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neutralization was obtained in almost every instance.

(2) Harassing and interdiction fires with NGF were held to a minimum whenever the areas could be covered by artillery. As fired they were reported as very effective. Mortar barrages were particularly adaptable for these fires.

(3) Due to the fact that the enemy took every possible advantage of the abundance of natural cover and concealment, and reinforced his positions with the strongest type of fortifications, counter-battery fires in our zone of action did not prove effective to the goal of destruction. Batteries were silenced through neutralization but it was impossible to knock many of them out since no direct line of fire could be obtained.

(4) In terrain of this type, fires must be placed on pin-point targets rather than in areas. Air spot is virtually the only successful means of observation. Destruction of targets, while still sought after, is not to be expected in too many instances unless a line of fire is available to allow the ship to employ direct fire.

(5) Star shell illumination was the only type employed by this Division. In the late stages of the campaign arrangements were made for searchlight illumination along coastal areas to the front, but such steps were never taken as the situation changed shortly thereafter. Coordination of illumination between Divisions consisted of passing on to Corps, and to each other, positions of ships and line of fire to be employed. On occasion when lack of illumination or point of illumination was detrimental to an adjacent unit, adjustments were quickly made. The Division attempted to hold the rate of fire for star shell illumination to one round every ten minutes except in cases of emergency. This rate is believed to be adequate, even though it was often exceeded due to the night infiltration tactics of the enemy. All units place star shell illumination above all other methods available and no casualties were reported in the Division from star shell cases.

(f) Effectiveness of SFCE Personnel.

(1) The number of personnel supplied to Division and regimental teams is the minimum number for manning necessary nets and radio sets. At least two more radio operators per team could be gainfully employed. These teams were enabled to function efficiently on this operation through two expedencies; the use of radar beacon men as watchstanders on radio nets and the early cessation of the Division NGF Common net due to heavy losses in

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radio materiel suffered by regimental and battalion teams. The number of personnel furnished battalion teams is believed to be sufficient, particularly when it is borne in mind that these teams must be extremely mobile. It is felt, however, that a number of trained personnel should be held in reserve for these teams as replacements, since casualties must be expected to run high in assault battalion teams.

(2) Due to the fact that the majority of SFCP personnel of this command have operated together on several operations, the status of training could be called very adequate. Among some of the newer personnel there was a lack of sufficient training in radio materiel and infantry tactics. This can be mainly attributed to the late assignment of many of these men and officers to this unit prior to the operation and can be adequately dealt with before again moving into combat. It is felt that a communications officer of warrant or commissioned rank would prove extremely valuable as officer in charge of technical communications training of NGF personnel. During operations he would act as officer in charge of communications with the Division team.

(g) Equipment.

(1) Communication equipment furnished for the operation was sufficient and adequate. Facilities for replacement of equipment, parts, repairs, etc. were adequate, largely through the cooperation and efforts of the communications officers of the units to which SFCP teams were attached.

(2) It is recommended that the SCR 694 replace TBX and SCR 284 sets. If this is impossible arrangements should be made to provide a quieter generator for the foregoing sets. Each assault battalion should be provided with an SCR 300 channel. This is essential to early communications. All battalion teams should have crystals installed in SCR 536 sets on the same frequencies as fire support ships. These little sets, so equipped, proved life savers in the initial confusion and disorganization on the beach.

(3) The Radar Beacon was not used by SFCP units of this Division. Four beacons were taken ashore. One was lost on the beach from enemy action; another was being put in operation when it was knocked out by enemy fire; the other two were not used at all. The terrain did not lend itself to the use of this line-of-sight beacon, and when finally high ground was gained, firing was in limited areas. In exercises conducted prior to the operation the beacons were successfully employed, however, and their use is recommended in any terrain permitting proper line of sight.

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(4) Equipment other than communication proved adequate.

(h) Operational Features.

(1) The practice of SFCP-officers going aboard destroyers and actually spotting fires into enemy installations proved very valuable on this operation since in many instances the deep ravines in which installations were located opened to the sea and could be observed by the experienced eye from seaward.

(2) The time allotted for pre-Dog day fires was much too brief to allow sufficient accurate, destructive fires to be placed in vital areas. NGF on and after Dog day is rated as excellent, bearing in mind that the extreme difficulty of the terrain rendered destructive fires impossible in the majority of instances.

(i) General Recommendations.

(1) It is believed that the presence of at least one NGF spotter aboard a free gunboat is the solution to the problem of control during the unstable ship-to-shore period. Spotters so situated can control fires even more capably than personnel in free LVT's, as heretofore attempted, and in addition can furnish invaluable assistance from the seaward along the flanks after the SFCP has established itself ashore.

(2) The numerous changes in firing ships necessitated by changing situations between the time of conception of an operation plan and the time of landing lends to the general confusion of last minute corrections. It is therefor felt that the assignment of fire support ships by type rather than by name, would lend itself more readily to the planning of NGF. (Example: DD-1, DD-2 instead of LEUTZE, McCALL). An up-to-date list of ship assignments would have to be furnished units at regular intervals.

(3) In order to obtain the accurate, destructive fires necessary in the pre-Dog day bombardment it is felt that the presence of experienced SFCP officers aboard ships assigned to sectors in the Division zone of action is desirable. The Division recommends that Naval liaison officers and spotters of the initial Division reserve be placed aboard cruisers and battleships assigned to the Division zone of action in the pre-Dog Day bombardment. Arrangements could be made for the transfer of these officers to the Division control vessel the morning of Dog-day. It is further recommended that these officers be empowered to direct the fires of ships against enemy installations and areas which they are able to observe, or have spotted on maps and photos. A close coordination between these officers and ships' spotters is deemed very

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advisable, and complete cooperation with Landing Force gunnery plans necessary.

4. ARTILLERY

(a) Standard artillery tactics and doctrine were employed in the IWO JIMA operation and proved adequate and sound. Experience gained in this operation indicates that improvement in execution of existing doctrines and the adoption of new techniques must be a continuous process.

(b) According to the standard operating procedure for the Division, Division artillery landed as a unit and no attachment to infantry units was made. This scheme of landing again proved to be sound, particularly in view of the difficult beach conditions during the initial stages. Normal direct support assignments were followed throughout the operation.

(c) The reinforcement of Division artillery by the 155mm Howitzer Battalions of Corps Artillery was satisfactory, except that during critical periods additional corps artillery would have been highly desirable. It is considered that the minimum corps artillery in support of three Marine Divisions should consist of four 155mm Howitzer Battalions in order to provide one reinforcing battalion per division, permitting the remaining howitzer battalion to be used in general support. The nature of the terrain encountered on IWO JIMA made the high-angle features of the 155mm Howitzer Battalion highly desirable in reaching defiladed positions, and it is believed that 155mm guns, now constituting the corps artillery organization, would have been unsuitable for the mission of reinforcing division artillery. Attention is invited to the fact that the primary mission of corps artillery is to reinforce the fires of Division artillery, which, even in its present organization of three 105mm Howitzer Battalions and one 155mm Howitzer Battalion, represents minimum artillery requirements to support a marine division in an attack against light or average resistance. Normal concepts dictate that division artillery must be reinforced by several battalions of corps artillery howitzers in order for the division to accomplish its mission in operations against heavier than average resistance.

(d) High-angle fire was executed several times during the operation but experience proved that in terrain with limited visibility this type fire is harder to control and cannot be brought in as close to front line troops as normal low-angle fire.

(e) For detailed operations of 4th Marine Division artillery, see Annex Item, Division Artillery Report.

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

5. TANKS

(a) Tank companies were attached to RCT's in the normal manner for landing, each company being embarked in three LSM's. This method of landing in LSM's, in view of the beach conditions, proved exceedingly satisfactory. Some difficulty was experienced in getting the information from tank reconnaissance parties back to RCT commanders and tank units prior to tanks landing. Additional training, reorganization of tank reconnaissance personnel, and the establishment of a standard procedure for tank reconnaissance is indicated.

(b) The rugged, jumbled terrain encountered in the Division zone of action precluded maximum use of tanks in support of infantry. Under similar conditions in the future and after intensive training in field artillery methods, tank units will be able to support the attack with indirect fire, augmenting the fire power of infantry weapons and artillery.

(c) Flame throwing tanks and bulldozer tanks were invaluable and additional tanks of these types should be included in the organization of a tank battalion.

(d) For detailed operations of the 4th Tank Battalion, see Annex Jig, 4th Tank Battalion Report.

6. ROCKETS

(a) Again the massed fire power of the 4.5 barrage rocket exerted a marked influence on the successful outcome of the IWO JIMA operation. This short-range weapon was repeatedly used by the infantry to neutralize centers of resistance and to thicken preparatory fires prior to an attack.

(b) Training of the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment prior to the operation was seriously handicapped by the late receipt of ammunition and material and by the transfer of one-half of experienced personnel of the detachment to the 5th Marine Division late in the training period. Intensive rocket training was conducted for approximately one month prior to embarkation for IWO JIMA.

(c) The first section was attached to RCT 25 and the second section to RCT 23 for the operation. The Provisional Rocket Detachment headquarters was assigned to the support group. The sections landed generally as planned, although, in view of the congested beach conditions and the lack of access roads inland, it is considered that they were landed too early. Because of these

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

conditions the first use of rockets did not occur until D plus 3.

(d) The rocket trucks drew enemy mortar, rocket, or artillery fire practically every time a rocket was fired, and many times while the trucks were being moved into position. Therefore, it was important that the vehicles maneuver rapidly into a position, fire the barrage, and move back to a rear area assembly point. When an intensive barrage was desired in a certain area, a section, consisting of six trucks, would fire one barrage, reload from ammunition carried in the trucks, and fire again. This double barrage took less than five minutes and consisted of 432 rounds.

(e) Much greater and closer support was fired by the rocket detachment on this operation than on the Saipan or Tinian operation. The sections were used frequently to fire preparatory barrages prior to an attack, then increase the range and fire barrages in support of the attack as the troops advanced. As a safety factor rocket barrages were normally fired at least 300 yards forward of the front lines. However, on this operation the infantry demanded closer support during critical stages and it is estimated that 12 to 15 barrages were fired less than 200 yards forward of the front lines.

(f) Effective conduct of fire was greatly impaired by the lack of a forward observer team with each section and by the inadequacy of communications. It was frequently necessary for infantry company commanders or personnel at Battalion OP's to adjust fire into the desired target area since the section leader, the only officer in the section, was required at the firing section position. As on Saipan and Tinian, it was found that a forward observer section of one officer and four enlisted for each firing section is absolutely essential for efficient conduct of fire.

(g) While the 4.5 barrage rocket has been used successfully by the Division in the past three operations, it is considered that the 5" spin stabilized rocket should be substituted therefor in order to obtain more flexibility in range, greater fire power, and considerably more accuracy.

7. WAR DOGS.

(a) The 7th Marine War Dog Platoon, consisting of three sections, was attached to the Division for the operation. In the task organization one section was attached to each RCT. The first section was landed by RCT 25 on D-day, while the second and third sections, attached to RCT 23 and RCT 24 respectively, were landed on D plus 2 day.

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

(b) Throughout the operation the dogs were used primarily for security at night in the front lines, rear area security, and in mopping-up operations. The value of the dogs in front line security was attested to by the fact that on frequent occasions they alerted at approaching enemy infiltration parties, and gave front line troops an added sense of security due to their presence. Failure of the majority of the dogs to enter caves limited their value during mopping-up operations. On patrol the failure of the dogs to distinguish between hidden Japanese riflemen and Japanese dead limited their usefulness in this type of operation. Messenger dogs, when used, carried out their assignments in a highly satisfactory manner.

8. CHEMICAL

(a) Personnel of the Division were equipped and fully indoctrinated in the use of all individual chemical protective equipment authorized in the Table of Basic Allowances, as well as in field identification of toxic agents, and first aid. Battalion decontamination squads were trained in the technique and procedure of decontamination. Chemical warfare officers and key non-commissioned officers were thoroughly conversant with the Division Chemical Warfare Standing Operating Procedure, and were prepared to carry out the procedure set forth therein had chemical warfare been initiated.

(b) Chemical warfare equipment was held loaded on ships in such a way as to render it immediately available for emergency use.

(c) Gas masks were carried ashore by all personnel. Some unit commanders had the gas masks turned in to easily accessible dumps when it was definitely ascertained that there were no enemy chemical agents on the island. This procedure, however, was only localized.

(d) Chemical warfare supplies and decontamination equipment were deposited in regimental dumps as soon as possible after they were landed.

(e) The enemy did not use toxic agents against our troops at any time. No previously unreported enemy materiel was captured. Enemy troops were equipped with gas masks, inferior to ours, which they carried with them at all times. Both the Division and enemy troops were prepared had chemical warfare been initiated.

(f) Gas masks collected during the operation were turned in to the Division salvage dump. 5,988 gas masks were turned in

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

for salvage. Of that number, 2,140 were serviceable and 3,848 were unserviceable. Those which were unserviceable were turned over to the Island Command, this Division having no facilities for repairing gas masks. 420 gas masks were re-issued from salvage during the operation.

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A N N E X D O G

TO

FOURTH

MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

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HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 April, 1945.

Annex DCG to Operation Report - IWC JIMA

LOGISTICS

- A. Planning and Preparation
- B. Loading and Movement
- C. Rehearsal, Rehabilitation and Movement to Target
- D. Unloading
- E. Shore Party
- F. Supply Ashore
- G. Motor Transport
- H. Road Construction and Repair
- I. Traffic Circulation
- J. Salvage
- K. Medical Services and Evacuation
- L. Burial
- M. Reembarkation
- N. Recommendations

APPENDICES

- 1. Division Shore Party Report
- 2. Medical Report
- 3. Division Quartermaster Report
- 4. Ordnance Report
- 5. Motor Transport Report
- 6. Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, 4th Marine Division, Reinforced.

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Annex to Operation Report - IWC JIMA

A. Planning and Preparation:

Upon return of this Division to MAUI from the SAIPAN-TINIAN Operation, showdown inspections and inventories in all units revealed that considerable shortages in individual and organizational equipment existed within the Division. Prior to return from that operation, plans were formulated and, it was believed, arrangements made for the stocking at the Division's immediate supply source, the Second Service and Supply Battalion, of sufficient items of equipment and supply to meet the immediate needs of the Division upon its return to the Base Camp. However, the Second Service and Supply Battalion was unable to stock these items, and early replenishment of supplies and equipment within the Division was impossible.

Approximately one month following the Division's arrival at the Base Camp, requisitions covering all existing shortages were submitted. Here again, as after the RCI-NAMUR Operation, the delivery of supply shortages was excessively slow. Some of these shortages which continued to exist had an adverse effect upon the training schedule of the Division, and others seriously impaired the "readiness" of the Division.

While there is no desire on the part of this Division to be unduly critical of the Supply Service, it is believed worthy of comment that difficulties of initial supply for this operation were in all respects similar to the difficulties encountered in previous operations. The problems of the Division follow a clear-cut pattern in this respect. Upon return from an operation, the Division's immediate supply source is unable to provide in adequate quantities even the most essential items of supply and equipment; this is particularly objectionable with regard to clothing and individual equipment. Following this, supplies are delivered in an aggravatingly slow manner during the "middle days" of the Division's rehabilitation. Then, beginning sometime during the final four weeks immediately prior to commencement of loading, there is a sudden frenzy of activity on the part of supply services, and the Division and its immediate supply source are deluged with tons of "last-minute" deliveries. Undoubtedly some of these items of supply are not available at an earlier date, but obviously many of them are. These "last-minute" deliveries to the Division have a decidedly adverse effect on preparations for embarkation. The receiving, processing and servicing of these supplies and equipment places an additional burden on service personnel of the Division at a time when they should be employed largely in the marking and assembling of supplies for loading.

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

In anticipation of the commencement of loading on 29 November, 1944, the clearing and preparation of stock piling areas in the vicinity of the docks, and the assembly in other areas of supplies for embarkation began in October. Segregation of the Division's ammunition supplies was begun at the ammunition dump of Second Service and Supply Battalion, but due to the proximity of this dump to the docks, and in order to avoid the assembly of this material in the exposed dock area, all Class V items remained in this dump and were moved therefrom directly to ships when loading commenced. Commissary and general supply items were segregated in warehouses and stock piles in the area of the Second Service and Supply Battalion located three quarters of a mile from the docks. These materials were so arranged that they could be moved in proper sequence by boxcar, flatcar and trucks from this area directly to the piers as loading progressed.

On 1 November, the cleaning of all water containers commenced. The method employed was that of steaming cans and rinsing them thoroughly, and in the case of 15 and 55-gallon drums, this procedure was entirely satisfactory. However, in the case of 5-gallon expeditionary cans, this method had little effect in removing the strong oily taste that persisted in these cans. The sterilization and filling of water cans was under the supervision of a Medical Officer, and was completed in early December.

In late November and early December, experiments were conducted by the Fourth Tank Battalion on the loading of the M4A3 tank in LCMs. It was found that LCMs so loaded had very little free-board generally and were dangerously low in the water at the bow. The results of these experiments were reported to V Amphibious Corps with the recommendation that LCTs be substituted.

Further tests were conducted by higher echelons confirming the Division's recommendation that LCMs should be replaced, and six LSMs were allocated to this Division for the loading of tanks. This decision was entirely satisfactory. However, the indecision which prevailed for some time as to the type craft to be used for tanks caused considerable concern and adversely affected the preparation of final loading plans.

In December a number of conferences were held with the TransRon and TransDiv Commanders and with loading representatives from the majority of ships upon which this Division was to embark. The Transport Squadron Commander came to the Base Camp at MAUI on 17 December, to examine preliminary loading plans. At his suggestion, several changes were made in these plans. The loading

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

representatives of the various ships were in camp for short periods of time, and conferred not only with Division representatives but also with the Regimental Combat Team and Battalion Landing Team Commanders concerned. All of these conferences were found to be extremely helpful to the Division in the preparation of its plans.

The final loading plan of the Division was submitted by the Division Transport Quartermaster to Commander Task Force 53 and the Transport Squadron Commander at PEARL HARBOR on 24 December, and, after certain minor changes were made, the plan was approved.

Throughout the period in which this Division was preparing for the IWC JIMA Operation, numerous conferences were held by Division representatives with representatives of V Amphibious Corps, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and Supply Service, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, with the view to expediting the delivery of supplies to the Division. In every instance the cooperative spirit of these agencies and their representatives was clearly evident, but despite this, the delivery of supplies continued too slow to meet the urgent need of this Division.

Periodic conferences and informal discussions pertaining to method of supply and related subjects for the IWC JIMA Operation were held with Commanding Officers and "Fours" of Regimental Combat Teams and the Shore Party and other unit Commanders. A tentative Loading and Movement Order was issued 2 December, 1944, and a tentative draft of the Administrative Order to accompany the Operation Order was issued on 4 December, 1944. Following this, further conferences were held and certain suggestions and recommendations by unit commanders were incorporated in the final draft of these orders issued 20 December, 1944 and 24 December, 1944, respectively.

The Loading and Movement Order provided for the embarkation of items of supply and equipment considered essential to carry out the assigned mission. In general, supplies were loaded as follows:

Class I.

Rations	- 30 days.
Water	- 5 days (2gal/man/day).

Class II. - 30 days.

Class III. - 15-18 days.

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

Class IV. - 30 days.

Class V.

Artillery and mortar - 7 U/F
All other weapons - 5 U/F

In anticipation of a possible change of target involving an operation on a large land mass, an additional eighteen (18) 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo trucks were carried by this Division. Otherwise it was considered that the supplies and equipment embarked were adequate to support initial operations on a large land mass.

On the basis of experience gained on the SAIPAN-TINIAN Operation, where the ½-ton, 4x4 trucks, and ½-ton, trailers were insufficient to meet the needs of the Regimental Combat Teams, a reassignment of these vehicles was made. This reassignment involved temporary allocation of organic transportation from other units of the Division to the Regimental Combat Teams. As an example of this, fifty (50) ½-ton trailers which were to be left in the rear echelon (thirty-seven (37) by Fourteenth Marines, five (5) by Crinace Company and eight (8) in replacement stocks) were reallocated to the Regimental Combat Teams and other units for use on the operation.

Initially the Division was scheduled to commence loading on the 29th of November, but on 23 November, 1944, an order was received from Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, delaying this until 13 December, 1944. On 10 December, 1944, a further delay of fourteen (14) days was announced, and the final date for commencement of loading of the Division was set for 27 December, 1944. These delays were a distinct advantage to the Division in that they allowed additional time for receiving, processing, distributing and servicing, prior to commencement of loading, the vast quantities of supplies and equipment received during the month of December.

During the latter part of December and early days of January, urgently needed tractors, cranes, DUKWs and distillation plants were delivered to the Division, and units were afforded only the minimum time required for inspection and servicing of this equipment prior to loading. It is understood that this material was not available in the area in time for earlier deliveries.

However, the delivery of 50% of the Division's ration requirements and the arrival of a shipment of gasoline and lubricants approximately 70% in excess of Division requirements during

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

the month of December, at a time when dock and storage facilities were already taxed, is inexplicable. This is especially true in view of the fact that 60% of the Division's Class III requirements were already available at the Second Service and Supply Battalion, and the Supply Service had been so notified. The handling of these surplus supplies caused unnecessary work and confusion at a time when storage space and personnel were at a premium.

Considerable ammunition was delivered to MAUI during December, and one (1) ammunition ship discharged cargo for this Division during the time that actual loading was being accomplished. Other items of ammunition were flown in to MAUI after some units had completed loading and cleared the port, and it was necessary to load these items during the Rehearsal at MAALAEA BAY.

Undoubtedly some of the delay in receiving supplies was unavoidable, but it is believed that much of this material could have been provided earlier. It is feared that the Supply Service does not fully appreciate the problem presented to a Division by "last minute" deliveries. The fact that equipment is finally loaded in assault shipping and reaches the target is no criterion for believing that the situation is satisfactory; "issues at the gangway" are possible, but they are in no measure desirable.

If the two delays in loading dates had not been made, those critical items which were secured in December would, in large part, have been embarked at PEARL HARBOR during the rehabilitation period there following the Rehearsal. This would have been an unsatisfactory solution as it would have involved top-loading these items on cargo already in the ships, thus violating the principles of combat loading.

However, as a result of the delays, coupled with the splendid cooperation of Second Service and Supply Battalion and the untiring efforts of the service personnel of this Division, supplies and equipment were received and processed to such an extent during December that when loading of the Division began on 27 December the status of supply within this organization was generally satisfactory.

A further factor which interfered with preparations for embarkation, and for a time, even threatened to delay the actual loading of the Division, was the docking at Pier #1 on 22 December of the SS MANULANI and the SS MAHMAHI, both of which carried non-critical stores and supplies for civilian concerns on MAUI. The MANULANI was completely unloaded onto the pier, and departed at 0810, 23 December. As the MAHMAHI, a very large ship which was

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ANNEX 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

loaded to capacity, continued to discharge cargo, the dock became increasingly congested as these stores and supplies were not removed from the dock as fast as they were unloaded.

Despite frequent assurances of the local Director of Cargo and Passenger Control that docks would be cleared by the morning of the 26th, the date when the movement to the docks of organizational gear was scheduled to begin, it became apparent early on 24 December that this deadline could not be met. At that time Pier #1, representing more than half of the available dock space at KAHULUI, was completely blocked by stores packed to the overhead and spread in a solid mass throughout the pier. Higher echelons were notified of this situation, and were advised that, if the dock could not be cleared, loading of the Division would necessarily be delayed.

Despite frequent requests from Division to local port authorities that the unloading of this ship be discontinued and that she be dispatched from the port, the discharging of cargo was suspended only when there was no further space available on the dock.

Civilian employees of the Kahului Railroad (the stevedoring agency in the harbor) failed to report for work on 24 and 25 December, and the Director of Cargo and Passenger Control, in a memorandum written at Division's request and delivered at 0900 on the morning of the 25th, admitted the situation was beyond his capabilities to correct, and requested the Division to clear the docks, using such Marine Corps personnel and equipment as required. In anticipation of this, working parties totaling four hundred fifty (450) men plus twenty (20) 2½-ton trucks and sixty (60) drivers and supervisory personnel were alerted to work on a "round-the-clock" basis until the docks were cleared. At 0900, Christmas Day, the first working party of one hundred fifty (150) Marines, which was assembled at the docks awaiting receipt of orders, commenced clearing the pier and moving cargo to the warehouse.

As cargo was removed and space became available on the docks, the MAHMAHI continued discharging stores and supplies until in the late afternoon of the 25th she was finally ordered out of the port with five hundred (500) tons of cargo still aboard.

It is believed that the Office of Cargo and Passenger Control at HONOLULU made a serious error in judgment in dispatching such a heavily laden ship to KAHULUI immediately prior to the scheduled departure of this Division. It is further believed that the Director of Cargo and Passenger Control at KAHULUI, being familiar with the local situation, lacked foresight in allowing

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

this undesirable condition to develop and grow progressively worse on the docks. Furthermore, during the time the Division was making strenuous efforts to remedy a situation which had arisen due in considerable part to his apparent indifference, this individual's cooperation left much to be desired.

Realizing the gravity of the situation, all Marine Corps personnel employed in relieving the congestion at the dock, worked willingly, diligently and with great speed. Due entirely to their untiring efforts, the docks were cleared by early morning of 26 December, thus enabling this Division to commence loading operations as scheduled.

B. Loading and Movement:

1. General.

Loading of the Division began 27 December, 1944, at KAHULUI HARBOR and MAALAEA BAY, in ships of Transport Squadron 15, plus LSTs and LSMs attached. Shipping was allocated as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>BASIC ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>LOADING DATES</u>
<u>Transdiv 44 RCT 25</u>		
APA 120 HINSDALE (F)	Support Group	Dec 27-28
APA 190 PICKENS	BLT 2	Dec 27-28
APA 193 SANBORN	BLT 3	Dec 27-28
APA 157 NAPA	BLT 1	Dec 27-28
AKA 66 SOUTHAMPTON	Cargo	Jan 5-8
7 - LSTs	(Amphibian Tractors, (Assault Infantry Companies	*Jan 10-Feb 10
3 - LSMs	Co "A" Tanks	Jan 18
2 - LSMs	Shore Party	Jan 1-3

* Assault troops embarked at MAUI beginning 10 January and amphibian tractors embarked at SAIPAN beginning 9 February.

Transdiv 45 RCT 23

APA 196 LOGAN (F)	Support Group	Dec 30-31
APA 158 NEWBERRY	BLT 1	Dec 30-31
APA 207 MIFFLIN	BLT 2	Dec 30-31
APA 154 LOWNDES	BLT 3	Dec 30-31
AKA 60 LEO	Cargo	Jan 5-8

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REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

Transdiv 45 RCT 23 (Cont'd).

7 LSTs	(Amphibian Tractors,	Jan 8-10
	(Assault Infantry Companies	
3 LSMs	Co "C" Tanks	Jan 18
2 LSMs	Shore Party	Jan 1-3

Transdiv 43 RCT 24

APA 33 BAYFIELD (SF)	Support Group	Jan 2-3
APA 156 MELLETTE	BLT 2	Jan 2-3
APA 118 HENDRY	BLT 1	Jan 2-3
APA 206 SIBLEY	BLT 3	Jan 2-3
AKA 65 SHC SHONE	Cargo	Jan 5-8
AKA 21 ARTEMIS	Cargo	Jan 5-8
5 LSTs	14th Marines	Jan 7-10
4 LSMs	Co "B" Tanks	Jan 4-6
1 LSM	Reg Weapons Company	Jan 4-6
1 LSM	4thSigCo	Jan 1-3

Elements of the Division Support Group were distributed throughout the Transport Squadron for transportation. Division Headquarters, less Assistant Division Commander's Group, was embarked aboard BAYFIELD, APA-33. The Assistant Division Commander's group was embarked aboard MELLETTE, APA-156.

2. Transports.

Heavy rains on 26-27 December made initial movement of ammunition from the dump to the dock area difficult; however the time schedule for the first group of four ships was met. Thereafter good weather prevailed, and the loading of transports progressed smoothly and on schedule. No deviation was made from approved loading plans except in the case of SHC SHONE, AKA-65. Upon arrival, it was discovered that three platforms, which had been shown in ship's characteristics to be available for troop cargo, were actually used for crew and troop berthing. This necessitated the complete revision of loading plans of this ship prior to commencement of loading, and resulted in several undesirable changes in vehicle debarkation priority.

Movement of cargo to the dock area began one (1) day prior to arrival of each group of four (4) ships. All Division supplies, except ammunition, were moved by rail, while ammunition and organizational equipment were moved by truck. Advanced parties boarded ships immediately upon arrival, and loading began as soon as hatches were opened and booms topped. The average time

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

of loading of APAs was twenty-four (24) hours and of AKAs, seventy-two (72) hours. The average tonnage of APAs and AKAs (except ARTEMIS, nine hundred (900) tons) was five hundred and nine (509) tons and twenty two hundred (2200) tons, respectively (see Appendix 6). Personnel, moving by motor serial to lock area, were embarked following completion of loading of cargo.

3. LSTs and LSMs.

Six (6) LSTs assigned to RCT 23 were loaded with LVTs and infantry personnel at MAALAEA BAY 8-10 January, and three (3) LSTs assigned to RCT 25 were loaded with infantry personnel only on the same dates. As the Fifth Marine Division was to use, during Rehearsal, three (3) LSTs assigned to RCT 25, these could not be loaded until 19 January, at which time they embarked personnel only at KAHULUI HARBOR. Upon arrival at SAIPAN on 10 February, one (1) LST assigned to RCT 25 and one (1) assigned to RCT 23 embarked LVT(A)4s, and the remaining LSTs assigned to RCT 25 embarked LVTs.

Each of twelve (12) Infantry LSTs loaded three (3) days rations, two (2) U/F (Infantry Company) and two (2) gallons of water per man at the time personnel embarked. These supplies were to be used as initial landing supplies. In addition to the above, V Amphibious Corps preloaded in each of ten (10) of these LSTs, prior to their arrival at MAUI, the following: approximately two (2) U/F (Infantry Battalion), two thousand (2,000) "C" and "K" rations, twelve hundred (1,200) "D" rations, four thousand (4,000) gallons of water, fifty (50) rolls of concertina, and twenty-two hundred (2,200) gallons of gasoline plus corresponding lubricants. Five (5) LSTs assigned to the Fourteenth Marines, embarked artillery pieces (preloaded in DUKWs), personnel, and three (3) U/F 75mm PH, plus landing ammunition (small arms), water and rations at KAHULUI HARBOR 7-10 January.

All LSMs were loaded in KAHULUI HARBOR during the period 1-18 January. The LST pier could not be used because of its deteriorated condition and the prevailing heavy swells, and some difficulty was experienced in loading Shore Party equipment (cranes, beach matting and beach sleds, in particular) from the beach in the outer harbor. One mishap occurred during beaching which necessitated the substitution of one LSM following Rehearsal. A quay with a concrete cap was hastily constructed by the 39th Naval Construction Battalion at the shore end of Pier #2, which could accommodate three (3) LSMs or two (2) LSTs providing there was no ship alongside the pier. All LSTs were loaded at KAHULUI, and several LSMs were loaded at this point. LSM 238, assigned to Regimental Weapons Company, RCT 24, was given a one layer understow of ninety (90) pallets of "K" ration. This was lunnaged and secured.

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REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

and vehicles mounted thereon. Similarly, LSM 260, assigned to the Fourth Signal Company, was given an understow of ninety-eight (98) pallets of fruit juices. This cargo arrived at the target in excellent condition, not so much as a can of fruit juice having been breached by the weight of the vehicles. This understow had no effect on the stability of the vessels or of the vehicles resting upon it.

4. Miscellaneous.

Due to the two successive postponements in target date, this Division had ample time for proper preparation and approval of loading plans prior to commencement of loading. However, had these delays not occurred, an almost impossible situation would have resulted due to delay in arrival of vital supplies and equipment. Even with these delays, it was found necessary to load such items as clothing (2000 cuft), three (3) portable operating rooms, etc., during the rehabilitation period at PEARL HARBOR following Rehearsal, thereby nullifying to some extent the combat load of ships on which these items were placed.

C. Rehearsal, Rehabilitation and Movement to Target:

As TransDivs, less AKAs, completed loading they moved to PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU to await arrival of remaining ships of the TransRon. In view of the fact that the great majority of the ships assigned had been recently commissioned and had had only a minimum amount of training, on 6 January all ships present of the TransRon sortied from PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU, and conducted exercises in preparation for the Rehearsal scheduled during the period 12-18 January. Troops embarked did not participate in these preliminary exercises. On 9 January TransRon 15 returned to ports at CAHU where it remained until 12 January when it sortied to conduct scheduled Rehearsal operations of the Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions (Reinforced) and V Amphibious Corps Troops in the MAUI - KAHOLAWE area.

Initially, Rehearsal operations consisted of boating troops without equipment in order to conduct exercises in the formation of boat groups and waves. No landings were made.

On 14 January, troops landed with nothing heavier than hand carts and portable equipment. Skeleton Shore Party installations were established. Troops conducted limited maneuvers ashore and completed reembarkation by 1400 on 14 January.

On 15 January, troops landed with nothing heavier than

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ANNEX DUG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

1-ton, 4x4, trucks and 37mm guns with prime movers. Artillery was landed in DUKWs. Only such signal equipment as was required to establish communications was landed. Complete Shore Party installations were established, and the beach was organized to accept rations and water to be used by troops ashore. Landing of other supplies was simulated.

Upon completion of exercises ashore, reembarkation of all units commenced at daybreak on 16 January.

The Fourth Marine Division was charged with the responsibility of refueling LVTs and DUKWs of the V Amphibious Corps ashore during these Rehearsal exercises. Accordingly, gasoline dumps were established by the Tenth Amphibian Tractor Battalion prior to the Rehearsal, and refueling of all vehicles proceeded satisfactorily and was accomplished without untoward incident.

The remainder of the Rehearsal period was devoted to Naval Gunfire exercises off KAHUCLAVE, and TransRon 15 reentered CAHU ports on 18 January.

No equipment of the Fourth Marine Division (Reinforced) was lost or destroyed during the Rehearsal. The few LVTs which became inoperative during the exercises were training vehicles which were used in lieu of LVTs of the Fifth Amphibian Tractor Battalion which did not participate in the Rehearsal. These inoperative LVTs were not scheduled to be used in the IWO JIMA Operation, and their loss had no effect upon the status of the equipment to be used in combat.

During the rehabilitation period in HAWAIIAN ports certain small items of equipment were delivered to Division and some exchanges were effected on ordnance items, the serviceability of which was questionable. In addition to the above, three (3) portable operating rooms and two thousand (2,000) cubic feet of clothing, which was not previously available, were loaded by this Division.

As a result of engine trouble sustained by LST 1031 and a damaged bottom suffered by LSM 202 when she ran aground in KAHULUI HARBOR, LST 648 was substituted for LST 1031 and LSM 201 was substituted for LSM 202. Transfer of cargo and personnel of these vessels was accomplished in CAHU ports.

During the rehabilitation period at CAHU and during the Navy logistical stop-overs at ENIWETCK and SAIPAN, conferences were held with Naval Commanders, Regimental Combat Team Commanders

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and their "Fours", the Division Quartermaster and Shore Party Commanders. As a result of these conferences, a complete understanding of plans for unloading and for supply ashore was reached.

While at SAIPAN, personnel and equipment of the Fifth Amphibian Tractor Battalion were embarked in LSTs assigned. On 15 and 16 February, Tractor Group Baker and TransRon 15, respectively, departed for IWC JIMA.

D. Unloading:

1. Narrative of Events.

(a) D-Day (19 February).

Two (2) LCVPs from each APA and AKA were designated to receive balanced loads of ammunition, water, rations and medical supplies. Upon arrival of ships in the transport area, these boats were lowered and loaded, and were dispatched to their respective beach control vessels immediately following the dispatch of assault waves. They were then held as a floating dump at the control vessel until calls for supplies were received from the beach.

Upon landing of assault waves, LVTs returned to the LSTs from which originally discharged, and immediately began to take aboard #1 preloads. Initial LVT loads were balanced loads of ammunition, water, rations and medical supplies. LVTs were on call and did not report directly to control vessels, but were controlled by radio teams of LVT representatives on beach control vessels and on the beach.

Bowser boats for the refueling of LVTs and DUKWs were available at the Line of Departure from about noon of D-Day. In addition, a small, and it developed, inadequate amount of gasoline was included in the #1 preload aboard each of ten (10) LSTs.

LSMs carrying tanks of assault Regimental Combat Teams were landed on Yellow and Blue beaches at 0945 and 1020 respectively. Because of the loose volcanic ash of which the beach was composed, the steepness of the beach and lack of exits, tanks had difficulty in moving off the beach. All beaches were under heavy mortar and artillery fire by this time. At 1155, an LSM carrying shore party equipment was beached on Yellow, and unloaded an armored bulldozer to clear a beach exit for tanks of Regimental Combat Team 23. Two (2) tank retrievers were landed on Yellow Beach at 1230 to assist in movement of tanks from beach. Tanks of the reserve Regimental Combat Team (RCT 24) were landed at 1400, and

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

were divided and attached to each assault Regimental Combat Team. The First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, completed landing on Blue and the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, on Yellow at approximately 1700 and 2000 respectively. By 1800, an LSM load of shore party equipment consisting of five (5) dozers, three (3) cranes, one (1) utility tractor and five (5) trucks had been landed on Yellow. Due to constant interdiction of beaches by mortar and artillery fire, little could be accomplished in the organization of beaches by the shore party. Due to the heavy surf, only a limited number of LCVPs could be beached. However, supplies were being landed by LVTs from LSTs. Transports and LSTs withdrew during the hours of darkness, leaving only Hospital, Maintenance and two (2) Artillery LSTs, and a small number of previously designated transports in the area. Throughout the night, LVTs continued to unload preloaded #1 from Maintenance LSTs, while DUKWs unloaded artillery ammunition from Artillery LSTs. The shortage of ammunition on both beaches was reported as critical.

(b) D plus 1 (20 February)

During the night, many items of shore party equipment were rendered inoperative by artillery, mortar fire and mines. All preloaded supplies on two (2) Maintenance LSTs had been unloaded by morning. As other LSTs came into the area, unloading of the remaining eight (8) carrying preloaded #1 was immediately begun. Beach-matting and an additional dozer were landed during the morning to be employed in preparation of beach exits. As a result of continuous artillery and mortar fire, coupled with heavy surf conditions, all beaches were virtually blocked by damaged and beached landing craft, and this situation was termed critical. Immediately after beaching, these landing craft quickly filled with sand and water, and settled somewhat in the loose volcanic ash, with sandbars building up around them. As a result of this, the small salvage boats available were inadequate to pull the beached boats and hulks from the beaches. Some improvement was made in preparation of beach exits, however the only means of supplying troops inland was by LVTs and DUKWs. As on D-Day, LCVPs and LCMs were used to a limited extent in the landing of supplies due to heavy surf conditions. An ammunition dump of Regimental Combat Team 25 on Blue Beach was almost completely destroyed by enemy fire at approximately 0400. By 1500, one hundred sixty (160) LVT and thirty (30) LCVP loads of supplies had been landed. Unloading of artillery ammunition from LSTs by DUKWs continued. The Third and Fourth Battalions, Fourteenth Marines, were landed on Yellow Beaches and went into position. LSMs, which had discharged cargo on D-Day, were utilized for the unloading of transports. The first of these (loaded with rations and ammunition) landed on Yellow Beaches during the afternoon.

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CONFIDENTIAL REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd)

(c) D plus 2 (21 February).

The landing of RCT 21 of the Third Marine Division on Yellow Beaches during the morning, interfered somewhat with the unloading of supplies. Amphibian trailers were towed to the beach by LVTs, but broached and bogged down in the volcanic ash on the beach. In the majority of cases, the supplies carried therein were salvaged. These broached trailers further congested the beaches on which broached boats and hulks of LVTs already had created a serious problem. Services of the Underwater Demolitions Teams were utilized during the day to clear some of these hulks with explosives. LCVPs were unable to land because of heavy surf. Another hit on an ammunition dump on Blue Beach completely destroyed all remaining 81mm mortar ammunition of Regimental Combat Team 25.. As all 81mm mortar ammunition from ships of this Regimental Combat Team had been landed, this loss was extremely serious. Supplies continued to be unloaded on call only, except that certain designated snips were being completely discharged into LSMs in order that they might clear the area. Mortar and artillery fire on the beaches continued heavy. Work was begun on beach lateral roads but was not completed because of artillery positions in close proximity to beach. Three (3) passable roads to Airfield #1 were completed. By nightfall, all preloaded supplies from five (5) Infantry LSTs and approximately 50% from remaining five (5) had been landed. Transports were 20% unloaded, overall, although some items, such as 81mm mortar ammunition, were 75% unloaded. At approximately 2200, a direct hit on a napalm dump on Blue Beach started another fire which was not brought under control for several hours. Shore Party reverted to Division Control at 2045.

(1) D plus 3 (22 February)

Constant calls for 81mm mortar ammunition were being received from both beaches. At 0945, a request for additional ammunition of this type was sent to V Amphibious Corps. Situation on the beaches was improved by clearance of wrecked landing craft, and LCTs and LSMs were unloaded during the day. A lateral beach road was completed during the period. A number of vehicles were landed and were employed in moving supplies to front line units from dumps. Sporadic enemy fire on the beaches continued, but unloading progressed to the point that critical items were reduced to 81mm mortar ammunition only. At 1945, ComTransDiv 32, which carried RCT 21, was directed to land two thousand five hundred (2,500) rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition on Blue and Yellow Beaches. By using all available LCMs within that TransDiv, this ammunition was landed prior to daybreak.

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ANNEX D TO OPERATION REPORT TWO JIMA (Cont'd)

(e) D plus 4 (23 February)

Unloading proceeded steadily, although LCVPs still could not be handled on the beaches. 81mm mortar ammunition continued critical, as no further supply was available. All artillery ammunition had been unloaded from LSTs, and calls began to come in for that remaining on AKAs. The Division Command Post was established ashore at 0930. Exit roads were completed; three (3) from Yellow Beaches to airfield #1 and two (2) from Blue Beaches into main road net. Sporadic artillery and mortar fire continued to impede unloading on beaches.

(f) D plus 5 (24 February)

Priority of unloading was given to 105mm howitzer ammunition, which had become critical. Water distillation units were landed on both beaches. Division dumps began operation during period. Corps Shore Party Commander assumed control of beaches at 1700. Shore Party was able to handle supplies as rapidly as they could be unloaded from ships. Surf conditions still precluded the use of LCVPs for unloading of cargo. Four (4) APAs of TransRon 15 had been completely unloaded into LSTs and LSMs, and had departed from the area. Because of shortage of suitable landing craft, AKAs began unloading 105mm howitzer and 75mm pack howitzer ammunition directly into DUKVs. Enemy fire on beaches had slackened, and only two (2) interruptions in unloading from this cause occurred during the day.

(g) D plus 6 (25 February)

An ammunition resupply ship (COLUMBIA VICTORY) arrived, and unloading thereof began at daybreak, using DUKVs and LCTs. Unloading progressed favorably during the day, although 105mm howitzer ammunition was being fired as fast as it could be landed, and the supply remaining aboard AKAs was running dangerously low. The south portion of Yellow Beach One plus the northern portion of Red Beach Two were redesignated as Black Beach and assigned to the Third Marine Division at 1400. Two (2) enemy shells landed on Blue Beach, and Yellow Beach was sprayed with 20mm and 40mm fire with no resultant damage. Improvement of beach exits and laterals continued.

(h) D plus 7 (26 February)

Surf conditions still would not allow the use of LCVPs for unloading. Shore Parties were able to handle cargo as rapidly as it arrived on the beach. Intense mortar fire was laid on the beach at 1000 and again at 2200, causing casualties to personnel and material. This, however, did not cause a serious

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REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

disruption in unloading. At 1500, ComTransRon 15 gave directions that general unloading was to begin immediately, and that remaining cargo to be discharged was to be landed at maximum rate. At the end of the period, nine (9) APAs had been completely discharged of all cargo, the remaining three (3) APAs were approximately 60% unloaded, and the three (3) large AKAs approximately 45% unloaded. Unloading of the ammunition resupply ship continued, with priority of unloading being given to 81mm mortar, 105mm howitzer and 60mm mortar illuminating ammunition.

(i) D plus 8 (27 February)

Unloading proceeded at a rapid rate despite sporadic fire on beaches. Garrison elements began landing equipment and supplies over Blue Beaches. Unloading of ammunition resupply ships continued. One (1) large AKA completed unloading during period.

(j) D plus 9 (28 February)

Two (2) APAs completed the discharge of cargo during period, leaving only one (1) APA and two (2) large AKAs to complete unloading. At 1200, GroPac assumed control aboard control vessels in preparation for landing garrison forces, and Control Officers of TransRon 15 were relieved.

(k) D plus 10 (1 March)

Unloading of all ships of TransRon 15 was completed this date. As the cargo remaining aboard the ARTEMIS (AKA-21), consisting of "B" rations, fuel and clothing, was not needed ashore, this ship was dispatched to SAIPAN for unloading. As sufficient transportation was ashore to support this Division, eighteen (18) 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo trucks were not unloaded but were returned to SAIPAN. At 1600, the beaches were again brought under fire causing some casualties. Unloading of the ammunition resupply ship continued.

2. Comments.

There were many factors which contributed to the length of time required to unload the equipment and supplies of this Division at the target. The intense enemy artillery and mortar fire on the beaches caused heavy casualties to Beach and Shore Party personnel and equipment in the early phases and restricted the amounts of material which could be landed. Furthermore, as long as the beachhead was small and heavy fire was more or less continuous, it was considered unprofitable and undesirable to subject additional equipment and supplies to the hazards of the beach.

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OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd)

Accordingly, only such materials as were immediately required were landed and general unloading was not considered practicable until D plus 7. A further factor which impeded initial unloading operations was the badly congested condition of the beaches. Scores of boats which had beached as a result of the heavy surf or of enemy fire, and numerous LVTs, DUKVs, Amphibian trailers, vehicles and items of heavy equipment which had been destroyed by mines, artillery or mortar fire, littered the beaches to the extent that unloading was restricted to a few small areas.

Due to the loose volcanic ash on the beach, beached boats quickly became deeply imbedded in the beach, and the light salvage boats available were able to clear the beaches only with considerable difficulty and after extended delays.

The initial congestion on the beaches was further complicated by the fact that artillery batteries were, of necessity, emplaced along the beach. The space occupied by artillery installations, plus that occupied by supporting elements of the Regimental Combat Teams, left little area available for the establishment of beach dumps.

The unfavorable surf conditions and heavy seas which set in D plus 1 and continued throughout the unloading period, precluded the use of LCVPs and, to a large extent, the use of LCIs, and lengthened the time required to complete unloading.

Considerable delay in unloading resulted from inadequate arrangements for the refueling of LVTs. Although the Division expressed the desire to carry from eighty (80) to one hundred (100) 55-gallon drums of 100 octane gasoline aboard each LST for use of LVTs embarked thereon, a maximum load limit of twenty (20) 55-gallon drums was established by the Navy. This small quantity of fuel was quickly consumed, and by the night of D-Day, little, if any, fuel remained on LSTs. This was a highly unsatisfactory situation as the LST is the natural refueling point for LVTs which must go aboard her both for maintenance and for receiving cargo to be ferried ashore, and in this particular operation, it was anticipated that beach conditions would preclude the early establishment of LVT units ashore. Refueling on LSTs could have been accomplished by the LVT crew during the time the ship's platoon was loading cargo into the tractor.

In view of the lack of gasoline aboard LSTs, recourse was made to the bowser boats (two (2) per beach) which were on station primarily for emergency refueling. These boats were insufficient in number and inadequate in capacity to effect refueling

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of all the LVTs, and in consequence, many amphibious tractors exhausted their gasoline and swamped or drifted helplessly to sea.

Considerable dependence had been placed in the plan to establish refueling points at gasoline-laden pontoon barges to be located close off shore. However, these barges which it had been planned to have on station by D plus 1 were not launched until D plus 2 and did not arrive on station until D plus 3. Due to the high winds and rough seas, these barges were unable to maintain their station, and refueling from them was impracticable. Meanwhile large quantities of gasoline were transferred from APAs and AKAs to LSTs in order to effect refueling of LVTs at that point. This was a slow expedient which worked fairly satisfactorily, but it would have been obviated by the loading of adequate amounts of gasoline on LSTs at the staging area.

Considerable confusion and delay in the process of unloading resulted from the TransRon Commander's reluctance to delegate to the TransRon Control Officer the control of the employment of LSMs and LCTs and from his insistence that he alone should dispatch these craft to ships and to the beach. In view of the fact that the TransRon Control Vessel and each of the TransDiv Control Vessels were manned by Division Logistical Officers who were well informed as to the requirements for supplies on the beach and as to the status of unloading of the ships of the TransDivs, and in view of the fact that the TransRon Commander had assigned Control Officers who are presumed to be competent to carry out their assignment, it is considered unreasonable that they should be denied the opportunity to carry out this portion of their assigned mission. Both the TransRon Commander and the Division representatives remaining aboard his ship lacked much of the information which, in accordance with plans, had been made available to the officers aboard the Control Vessels. It is believed that LSMs and LCTs could have been dispatched more expeditiously and in closer accord with requirements of units ashore had direct control of these craft remained with the duly appointed Control Officers and had not been assumed by the TransRon Commander who should confine his efforts to over-all supervisory control.

E. Shore Party:

Although numerous factors beyond the control of the Landing Force combined to curtail shore party activities, beach operations were able to support the tactical plan. Sustained enemy fire with resultant heavy casualties among Beach and Shore Party personnel, the steep slope of the beach, and limited routes of

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

gress therefrom prevented stock-piling in the beach areas in the initial phases of the operation. Consequently, supply was on a day-to-day basis from ship to shore until D plus 4 at which time limited general unloading was instituted.

Subject to the comments and recommendations set out in Appendix 1 hereto, the personnel and equipment allocated to Shore Party use were adequate.

For detailed discussion of Shore Party organizations and operations see Shore Party Report, Appendix 1.

F. Supply Ashore:

Some of the general aspects of supply ashore are discussed in this sub-section, but for a well-rounded picture of this subject, reference should be made to sub-section G, H, I and J below and to Appendices 3 and 4 hereto.

Initially, supply was on call from floating dumps established off each beach. During the first two (2) days of the operation, enemy fire on the beaches was so intense that it was impossible to organize well regulated dumps, and it was impractical to assemble any quantities of supply in the small area available. LVTs were used in the landing of critical items of supply, and in most cases were dispatched directly to front line units without re-handling of cargo on the beach.

Upon completion of the unloading of Infantry LSTs, LVTs were used in the moving of supplies from the beaches to dumps inland and to front line units. It had been hoped that motor transport could be employed in this respect, but in the early stages of the operation the nature of the terrain was such that only tracked vehicles could be utilized extensively. Here again, the adaptability of the LVT to use on varied types of terrain proved invaluable. A limited number of "Weasels" were also available and proved excellent.

DUKWs were employed principally in the landing of artillery pieces and artillery ammunition. These DUKWs were sent from the LSTs directly to the gun positions and battalion dumps. The DUKWs were so efficiently employed that by D plus 4, the five (5) Artillery LSTs were completely unloaded. Thereafter, the DUKWs were employed in the unloading of artillery ammunition from AKAs. Upon the arrival of the ammunition resupply ships, DUKWs were used in the unloading of all types of ammunition from these ships, moving the cargo directly to ammunition dumps.

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

As the operation progressed and the situation permitted, beach dumps were established and Regimental Combat Teams obtained supplies directly from these dumps utilizing LVTs and organic transportation ashore in transporting these supplies to front line elements.

Due to lack of space and the congestion in rear areas, the Division Quartermaster was unable to assume control of supply until D plus 6. The Division Ordnance Officer established ammunition supply on the same day. The Division Quartermaster controlled issues of supplies by use of a "chit system". When Service and Supply personnel attached to RCTs were reverted on D plus 8, they were immediately employed in segregating and stock-piling of supplies and in expanding and consolidating of Division dumps in preparation for the assumption of delivery of supplies by Division. With the expansion of the road net and the landing of additional elements of motor transport, Division was able to commence delivery of ammunition on D plus 7 and of all other supplies on D plus 10. Bulldozers were used extensively in the revetting of Division dumps, and there was sufficient special equipment in the dumps to handle supplies expeditiously with a minimum of manual labor.

Personnel of the Ordnance Company were not attached to the Regimental Combat Teams for this operation and, upon landing, were therefore immediately available to Division for employment. However, ammunition technicians were attached to the Shore Party and were employed in the supervision and control of all beach ammunition dumps. The fact that no ordnance personnel were attached to Regimental Combat Teams enabled the Division Ordnance Officer to quickly assume control of ammunition dumps and commence early delivery of ammunition to Regimental Combat Team dumps.

The landing of water distillation units was not begun until D plus 4. Initially, only a few units were landed each day as the early and unnecessary exposure of this equipment to enemy fire was deemed inadvisable. Due to the cold damp weather, troops required little water, and sufficient quantities of the mounting out water remained on hand until D plus 7. With the installation of water distillation units, the Engineer Battalion delivered filled water cans to the Division water dump in exchange for empty cans. Deliveries of water were then made by Division to subordinate units on a pro-rata basis by exchange of filled for empty cans. The water produced by the distillation units was uniformly good. It was noted that while the mounting out water in 15-gallon and 55-gallon drums was potable, much of the water contained in 5-gallon expeditionary cans had a very unpleasant, salty taste which was imparted to the water by the lining of this type of can.

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Although field baking equipment was not embarked, a "doughnut" bakery was established on D plus 13. Issues were made on the basis of two (2) doughnuts per man per day to front line units and in many instances when front line quotas were exceeded, issues of one (1) doughnut per man per day to rear area units were made. The issue of doughnuts to front line units was a definite morale factor, and was greatly appreciated by the men.

With several striking exceptions, mounting out supplies and resupply were adequate for the operation.

By classes, adequacy was as follows:

Mounting out

Class I - Adequate

Rations were carried in sufficient quantities, but the ratio of types should be revised. "B" rations were difficult to handle and serve in a sanitary manner, and should not have been embarked in assault shipping. However, certain components of the "B" ration, such as fruits, juices, coffee, sugar and milk, were needed by the troops and the issue of these components to Division for inclusion in mounting out ration allowances was highly desirable. The old type "C" ration which was carried by this Division was not as popular as the new type "C" brought on to the target by Army Garrison Troops. More "K" rations were carried than were required. The "10-in-one" ration was excellent, and was very much relished by all hands.

Water was adequate, though that in 5-gallon expeditionary cans had an extremely unpleasant taste.

Class II - Generally adequate though more clothing should have been embarked.

Class III - Adequate

Class IV - Adequate, except for sand bags which were not carried in sufficient quantities.

Class V - Generally adequate except for critical shortages of 81mm mortar, HE, 60mm mortar, illuminating and artillery ammunition. The Division mounted out using CinCPOA U/F dated 11 March 1944. It is believed that the CinCPOA dated 11 March 1944 incorporates the changes needed.

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

in the earlier one and will, in large measure, correct the shortages noted above.

Resupply

Class I - Adequate

There was no natural fresh water source on IWC JIMA, but the thirty (30) distillation units (ten (10) of which were an additional allowance) were able to provide all water required by this Division.

Class II - Generally adequate.

Class III - Generally adequate.

Class IV - Generally adequate. Sand bags were not available in sufficient quantities.

Class V - Generally inadequate with respect to mortar and artillery ammunition. Resupply of this type ammunition was unsatisfactory for several reasons. The first ammunition ship arrived after the initial supply of Class V items had become seriously depleted, and unloading was never rapid enough to permit accumulation of any reserve in Division dumps. Unloading operations of resupply ships were restricted by rough seas and the fact that ships were not properly loaded for selective discharge. In many instances, much valuable time was lost in the unloading of non-critical items in order to gain access to types of ammunition vitally needed to support the operation.

Furthermore, the fact that only one ammunition resupply ship was available at the target at a time when immediate resupply was so necessary, created a considerable bottleneck. Resupply of artillery ammunition was so slow that it restricted the artillery in carrying out preparation fires and other assigned missions.

It is believed that a more satisfactory system of ammunition resupply would be achieved if the initial resupply were brought to the target selectively loaded on LSTs.

For further details as to the adequacy of supply and

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ANNEX 10 - IWC OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

resupply, see Appendices 3 and 4 hereto.

G. Motor Transport:

Because of the loose volcanic ash, steep grades from the beaches inland and the absence of roads in the beach areas, the Division had to rely on LVTs, DUKWs and M29C cargo carriers (weasels) for its transportation in the initial phase of the IWC JIMA operation. These vehicles were able to surmount terrain obstacles confronted, and successfully maintained a steady flow of supplies to front line units and artillery battalions until D plus 4 when roads were established to the point where wheeled motor vehicles could satisfactorily be employed.

As was anticipated, 2½-ton cargo trucks could not be used in the initial phase of the operation and ¼-ton 4x4 trucks with ½-ton trailers were used extensively by the Regimental Combat Teams once these vehicles were towed across the beach and over the steep terraces to high ground inland.

Upon establishment of the Fourth Motor Transport Battalion ashore, a daily assignment of 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo trucks was made generally as follows: five (5) to each assault Regimental Combat Team and three (3) to the reserve Regimental Combat Team to augment organic transport for movement of supplies within these units; ten (10) to the Division Quartermaster and Division Ordnance Officer for use in delivery of supplies to subordinate units and hauling of supplies from beaches to the Division dumps; two (2) to the Division Salvage Officer; three (3) to the Division Burial Officer; and one (1) to the Division Bomb Disposal Officer. The remaining trucks were employed in augmenting the above daily assignment and to care for the transportation needs of other units within the Division.

The Fourth Marine Amphibian Truck Company and the 476th Amphibian Truck Company (Army) were attached to the Fourteenth Marines (Artillery) and were initially employed in the unloading and transporting of artillery pieces, ammunition, supplies, equipment and personnel to selected artillery areas. Upon the arrival of ammunition resupply ships on the target, the DUKWs of these two units were pooled under VAC control and were employed in the unloading of all types of ammunition from these ships.

The twenty (20) M29C cargo carriers (weasels) carried by this Division were extensively used for wire laying, communications, and hauling of supplies. These vehicles were ideally

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adapted to the terrain encountered on IWO JIMA and proved invaluable. Had additional "weasels" been made available to the Division, the difficult transportation problems confronted in the early stages of the operation would have been greatly reduced.

Because extremely rugged terrain and absence of roads in some forward areas precluded the extensive use of heavy transportation, six (6) additional $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4, trucks with $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trailers were transferred from rear area units to Regimental Combat Teams on the basis of two (2) per Regimental Combat Team. These vehicles facilitated the delivery of supplies from Regimental Combat Team dumps to Battalion Landing Teams and Companies.

Once established ashore and functioning, motor transport was entirely adequate to satisfactorily support this Division. Consequently, the eighteen (18) $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, cargo trucks, embarked primarily in anticipation of a possible change of target to a large land mass, were not unloaded but were returned to SAIPAN and turned in to the 7th Field Depot.

The repair and maintenance of vehicles was excellent, and maintenance facilities were adequate throughout the operation.

H. Road Construction and Repair:

There were some six (6) miles of roads constructed in the Fourth Marine Division's Zone of Action. The road net consisted of new roads and repaired Japanese roads. The existing Japanese roads found on IWO JIMA were poorly surfaced, of inadequate width, of insufficient number, and incapable of sustaining the traffic volume demanded by the operation. The terrain consisted of either: (1) a fairly level area covered with a heavy layer of volcanic ash, which, while not suitable as a wearing surface, had good drainage properties and was capable of supporting heavy loads if confined, or, (2) a heavily eroded sand-clay area with little or no vegetation. The quarries developed by this Division yielded high-grade surfacing material which was used to surface all existing roads and all newly constructed roads as well as the beach unloading and embarkation areas. This fill material was excellent in that little mechanical stabilization was necessary, as heavy traffic served the purpose of creating suitable compaction. Maintenance was confined to daily motor patrol, shaping and filling where necessary, and to sprinkling with water to settle dust and to prevent raveling. Mines were encountered and added to the problem of road construction.

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ANNEX I TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

The equipment and personnel available for road construction were put to maximum use by careful planning. Forward area road construction was confined to the building of pioneer roads and to the bulldozing of trails to permit passage of tanks or other vehicles. With the above exception, the developed road net, consisting of two-lane roads throughout the Division Zone, was adequate at all times to support the operation satisfactorily.

A more comprehensive report of road construction may be found in Annex KING and in Appendix 1 to Annex DCG.

I. Traffic Circulation:

Initially, traffic was handled by the three (3) Military Police Platoons attached to the Regimental Combat Teams. On D plus 7, the Provost Marshal, utilizing the Fourth and Fifth Platoons, assumed control of traffic circulation in the Division rear areas, including beaches, dumps, the vicinity of the Division Hospital and other important installations. In order to effect this, six (6) traffic control points were established along the beaches and at important junctions inland.

Because the majority of roads in the Division zone were extremely narrow, and improvement on these roads and construction of new roads was being carried on continuously, the Military Police were confronted with a major problem in the proper routing of traffic. Despite these conditions, the Military Police carried out their functions very capably and maintained a smooth flow of traffic throughout the remainder of the operation and during the period of reembarkation of the Division.

J. Salvage:

As the Salvage Section of Service and Supply Company did not land until D plus 6, initial salvage operations were limited to the assembly of salvaged material in beach dumps by the Shore Party and inland dumps by the various units of the Division. Immediately upon landing, the Division Salvage Officer established a salvage dump in close proximity to the Division dumps, and commenced collecting previously salvaged material from the Shore Party and all subordinate units. The Division Salvage Officer, together with the salvage section of Ordnance Company, conducted intensive operations throughout the Division zone during the remainder of the time this Division was on IWO JIMA.

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ANNEX 100 TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

All salvaged ordnance material was delivered to the Ordnance Company for repair and subsequent reissue to units. All other material was properly segregated in the Division Salvage Dump and all usable items were delivered to the Division Quartermaster for reissue. Prior to the departure of the Division for IWO JIMA, unserviceable salvaged material was transferred to the Island Garrison Forces. For further details on Salvage, see Appendices 3 and 4 hereto.

K. Medical Service and Evacuation:

Personnel of the Shore Party evacuation stations landed in five (5) sections on D-Day. Despite 80% casualties to Medical Officers and over 50% casualties to Hospital Corpsmen, three (3) well functioning evacuation stations were established by 1600 that day.

Because of the high rate of casualties, two (2) Medical Companies were landed on D plus 1 and were used to augment personnel at the beach evacuation stations from D plus 1 until D plus 24.

Throughout the IWO JIMA Operation, the Fourth Marine Division stations evacuated eight thousand one hundred sixty-seven (8,167) casualties, of which five thousand one hundred fifty (5,150) were Fourth Marine Division personnel. Casualties were given excellent first aid and shock treatment, and no casualty was kept on the beach over thirty (30) minutes except when his condition required more prolonged therapy.

Air evacuation was excellent, and was of considerable aid in keeping hospital beds free for incoming casualties. Three hundred and fifty (350) Fourth Marine Division patients were evacuated by air between D plus 13 and D plus 23.

The Division Hospital was established on D plus 9, and was gradually expanded to three hundred and fifty (350) beds. After D plus 9, night evacuation ceased as all casualties occurring after 1730 were sent to the Division Hospital. All possible cases were evacuated from the hospital each morning by water or air. The hospital functioned for two (2) weeks, from D plus 9 to D plus 23, inclusive, during which time one thousand four hundred sixty-five (1,465) patients were admitted and one hundred twenty-six (126) major operations were performed.

Because of the coolness of the climate, porosity of the soil and absence of major sanitary hazards, such as swamps

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ANNEX DDD TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

malaria vectoring mosquitoes, etc., IWC JIMA was a remarkably healthful island from an epidemiological standpoint.

Due to indoctrination, previous combat experience, and intensive overall training in sanitation, routine sanitary measures were excellent.

Heads were constructed from sunken drums and prefabricated head tops. Drums and shell packing cases, half sunken in the porous soil, provided very satisfactory urinals.

The airplane spraying of DDT solution destroyed the few mosquitoes, and effectively prevented an excessive population of flies. In addition to airplane spraying, approximately eight hundred (800) gallons of 5% DDT solution in diesel oil was sprayed on scattered indicated sites by the MECon Unit.

Galley s were opened in rear areas on D plus 17, and were operated in accordance with the provisions of the Medical Standard Operating Procedure. Augmentation of the ration by fruit juices and fruits proved valuable.

The Graves Registration Section buried one thousand eight hundred and twenty (1,820) men between D plus 5 and D plus 27. Prompt burial, early spraying of the areas with DDT solution, followed by frequent spraying with diesel oil, effectively prevented all fly breeding in the area. Within the limitations imposed by the nature of the terrain and operations, enemy dead were expeditiously buried by unit burial details, and constituted no appreciable sanitary hazard.

No epidemics or unusual diseases occurred, and the number of organic medical cases was extremely low.

Transportation of medical equipment and supplies was very satisfactory, and resupply of front line units was effected promptly. In spite of the high number of casualties, and the length of the operation, medical supplies were sufficient in all reports.

For further details on medical activities, see Appendix 2 hereto.

L. Burial:

The Graves Registration Section of the Fourth Marine Division began operations on IWC JIMA on D plus 5. Due to the

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ANNEX CCG FOR PUBLICATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

lack of firm roads and organic transportation, bodies were collected from the beaches during the first few days and hand carried by litters to the cemetery which was located between Airfield #1 and Yellow Beach Two. Because of the extremely congested area throughout the Division zone, the site of the cemetery was on a thirteen (13) percent slope sown with enemy mines. Although efforts were made to clear all mines from this area, some were so deeply embedded in the soil that they were not discovered until excavation had unearthed them. However, these mines caused little damage and did not cause any serious delay in burial operations. The soil here was composed of black volcanic sand, the looseness of which caused the abandonment of individual grave digging. Excavation had to be accomplished with large engineering equipment. After excavating to a depth of three and one half (3½) feet, individual graves were dug one (1) foot deep and three (3) feet apart from center to center of adjoining graves. Most of the digging and leveling was done with bull dozers; however, graders and pan loaders were used to level off the slope so that the final grade of the cemetery was ten (10) percent. After leveling, a top layer of clay was spread over the cemetery for the purpose of holding the sand underneath and to facilitate mounding.

The first burials were made on D plus 5 and continued through D plus 27. During the twenty-two (22) days of operation, there were many new innovations employed such as new methods of finger printing, better listing and control of personal effects and an individual ceremony for each body beneath a burial ensign.

Throughout the operation, a total of one thousand eight hundred and twenty (1,820) dead were buried in the Fourth Marine Division Cemetery. The minimum number of burials a day was twenty-seven (27) (D plus 24), and the maximum was two hundred and forty-seven (247) (D plus 11). More than one thousand five hundred (1,500) bags of personal effects were turned over to the Personal Effects Officer of the Division.

Of necessity, the Third Marine Division Cemetery was established alongside that of the Fourth Marine Division. The Graves Registration Sections of both Divisions cooperated closely, and despite many difficulties, such as the presence of mines and subjection to occasional mortar, artillery and small arms fire, and the rapid accumulation of the dead, carried out their assigned missions in an excellent manner.

The two (2) Division Cemeteries were so planned and arranged that they merged into one joint cemetery, which, if

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 ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

completed in accordance with plans, will be a worthy monument to those who rest there. Upon departure of this Division from the area, responsibility for the completion and maintenance of the Division Cemetery was assumed by Garrison Forces.

M. Reembarkation:

1. Planning

Planning for reembarkation began on 5 March (D plus 14) with the assignment of transports of TU 12.6.2, plus AP-172 CAPE JOHNSON, AK-41 HERCULES, AK-43 JUPITER, XAK CHINA VICTORY and LSD-2 BELLEGRUVE, for lifting of personnel and equipment of the Division for return to Base Camp. Detailed loading plans were prepared for the convoy unit loading of all supplies and equipment. At the request of the Division, AP-103 PRESIDENT POLK was substituted for AP-172 CAPE JOHNSON, on 12 March.

2. Loading

Loading commenced on 14 March from Blue Beaches, using six (6) LSTs, fourteen (14) LSMs and one (1) LCT for lifting troops and equipment to transports. As assault units were still committed, only support elements were available for reembarkation. Adverse surf and sea conditions during the entire loading period, caused the parting of lines and considerable damage to both landing craft and transports. Beaches were restricted to the extent that a maximum of five (5) landing craft could be accommodated at any one time. However, due to advance preparation by the Fourth Pioneer Battalion, approaches and assembly areas were very good. Units were instructed to embark all serviceable equipment and all remaining ammunition and supplies except fuel and rations. Personnel, except advance parties, were embarked upon completion of loading of cargo and as tactical units were relieved from combat assignments. Due to heavy sea conditions, LSTs were utilized insofar as was practicable for the embarkation of personnel.

Shipping was loaded as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>BASIC ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CARGO OF</u>	<u>LOADING DATES</u>
APA-172 GRIMES	25th Marines	25th Marines	14-18 March
APA-178 LANDER	25th Marines	4th MeIBn	14-16 March
		5th AmphTracBn	
		10th AmphTracBn	
		VMC-4	
		HqBn	
APA-234 BOLLINGER	14th Marines	14th Marines	14-15 March

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

SHIP	BASIC ORGAN- IZATION	CARGO OF	LOADING DATES
APA-177 KINGSBURY	23rd Marines	4th EngrBn	14-18 March
APA-133 BECKHAM	24th Marines	4th ServBn	14-15 March
		4th AmphTrkCo	
		4th PionBn	
		VMO-4	
		1st ProvRktDet	
		HqBn	
		14th Marines	
APA-228 ROCKBRIDGE (F)	23rd Marines	23rd Marines	15-16 March
XAK CHINA VICTORY	Det 4th 155How	4th 155 HowBn	15-19 March
	Bn VAC.	HqBn	
		5th AmphTracBn	
		4th MTBn	
		4th ServBn	
		2nd Arm1AmphBn	
		3rd AmphTracBn	
APA-222 PICKAWAY	24th Marines	24th Marines	17-19 March
		1st JASCC	
APA-233 SEVIER	2nd Arm1 Amph	24th Marines	17-19 March
	Trac Bn	4th TkBn	
		4th Pion Bn	
		VMO-4	
		1st JASCC	
AP-103 PRESIDENT POLK	Hq Bn	HqBn	16-19 March
		1st Prov RktDet	
		3rd AmphTracBn	
AK-41 HERCULES	4th MTBn	4th MTBn	
		VMO-4	
		HqBn	
		1st ProvRktDet	
		2nd Arm1AmphBn	
		4th Engr Bn	
		4th Pion Bn	
		4th Tk Bn	
AK-43 JUPITER	4th MTBn	4th MT Bn	16-20 March
		4th EngrBn	
		4th PionBn	
		10th AmphTracBn	
		HqBn	
LSD - 2 BELLEGROVE	4th TkBn	4th TkBn	15-18 March
		10th AmphTracBn	
		2nd Arm1AmphBn	

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ANNEX 000 TO OPERATION REPORT -- IWC JIMA (CONT 1).

TU 12.6.2 was redesignated TU 51.29.2 prior to departure from IWC JIMA on 20 March.

3. Return to HAWAIIAN Area

TU 51.29.2, less AK-43 JUPITER, departed from IWC JIMA at 0720, 20 March enroute to HAWAIIAN Area via GUAM and ENIWETOK. AK-43 JUPITER was unable to join convoy because screws of LSM containing last load of cargo became fouled and LSM was unable to come alongside. The JUPITER was given orders to complete loading and proceed separately to ENIWETOK, rejoining TU 51.29.2 at that point. The convoy arrived at APRA HARBOR, GUAM, at 1600, 22 March, and discharged LCMs and LCVPs. The KINGSBURY embarked one hundred nine (109) casualties of Fifth Marine Division, the LANDER embarked two hundred (200) casualties and the BECKHAM embarked two hundred fifty-five (255) casualties for transportation to the HAWAIIAN Area. The convoy departed from GUAM at 1000, 23 March. It arrived at ENIWETOK at 0845, 27 March, where the JUPITER, AK-43, joined, and the convoy departed at 0700, 28 March. At 0400, 4 April, TU 51.29.2 was dissolved. The ROCKBRIDGE, PRESIDENT POLK and KINGSBURY proceeded directly to KAHULUI HARBOR, MAUI and the remaining ships proceeded to PEARL HARBOR to await berths at KAHULUI.

In general, ships of TU 51.29.2 did everything within their power to make the return trip pleasant and restful for the troops embarked. The majority of the ships did not institute water hours, but allowed water to remain on constantly. Food was plentiful and tastefully prepared, fresh meats and fresh bread being particularly appreciated. AK-41, HERCULES and AK-43, JUPITER, treated embarked troops to a beer party at ENIWETOK. Troops were loud in their praise of the treatment accorded them, and generally felt that this voyage was the most pleasant of the many they have made.

4. Debarkation

The ROCKBRIDGE, KINGSBURY, and PRESIDENT POLK arrived at KAHULUI HARBOR 1200, 4 April. It was found upon arrival, that the Supply Service, FMF, Pacific had provided an efficient staff and an adequate number of vehicles to handle the debarkation of troops and equipment. Due in a great measure to their planning and efforts, troops were debarked and dispatched to the Base Camp in record time, and ships were unloaded and docks cleared prior to 2400. ROCKBRIDGE, KINGSBURY and PRESIDENT POLK departed at 0700 5 April, and GRIMES, LANDER, SEVIER and BOLLINGER arrived at 0800. Debarkation and unloading again proceeded rapidly, ships departing at 0700, 16 April. PICKAWAY, BECKHAM, HERCULES and JUPITER arrived

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

at 0800. Unloading of PICKAWAY and BECKHAM was rapid, but that of HERCULES and JUPITER was slower, as two hundred and fifty (250) tons of ammunition were aboard each of these ships. Unloading was completed at 0600, 7 April and ships sailed at 0700. The BELLEGROVE discharged amphibian tractors at MAALAEA BAY on 6 April and tanks at KAHULUI HARBOR on 7 April. The CHINA VICTORY was delayed because of necessity of repairs at PEARL HARBOR and did not arrive until 15 April. This ship was unloaded by commercial stevedores and departed 17 April.

N. Recommendations:

In view of the fact that the Division has, in separate correspondence, submitted its recommendations for changes in major items of equipment, no comment on these items is included herein. On the basis of experience gained in the IWC JIMA and other operations, the following recommendations are submitted for consideration:

1. That the Division's immediate supply source be so stocked with certain items of supply and equipment, particularly clothing and individual equipment, that immediately upon arrival in rehabilitation area, the Division may draw these items in order to provide for the comfort of the men and to make possible the immediate institution of individual training.
2. That all supplies and equipment required for an operation be delivered to Division at least thirty (30) days prior to commencement of embarkation, it being believed that this is the minimum time required to receive, process, distribute, and service such equipment or supplies.
3. That a new type 5-gallon water can which does not impart an unpleasant taste to water be made available to this Division for use in subsequent operations. If this is not practicable, it is recommended that the proper agency conduct experiments as required, in order to develop a standard procedure for minimizing present difficulties with the can now in use.
4. That the practice of conducting conferences between the representatives of this Division and higher echelons be continued and that emphasis be placed on early conferences between representatives of the Division and leading representatives of all ships in which this Division will embark, and that correct ship characteristics be made available to Division at the earliest practicable date.

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ANNEX DCG TC OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

5. That in coming operations this Division be permitted to load a minimum of 80 drums of gasoline on each LST (except Hospital LSTs) carrying LVTs of this Division.

6. That the Navy provide heavier salvage boats, with trained crews, in order that beaches may be expeditiously cleared.

7. That initial resupply shipments, particularly of ammunition, be carried in LSTs to the Target and loaded for selective discharge therefrom, it being believed that the distribution of this cargo among two or more LSTs will not only decrease the possibility of loss of the initial resupply shipment due to enemy action, but it will also facilitate the expeditious unloading of items as required.

8. That direct control of LSTs, LSMs and LCTs, during the unloading phase at the Target, rest with the TransRon Control officers as directed by the TransRon Commander. Past experience has proven that this provides a flexible and expeditious method of effecting adequate supply during the critical phases of the landing.

9. That "B" rations not be carried in assault shipping, but that certain components of the "B" ration, such as fruits, juices, coffee, sugar, milk and ingredients for baking, be made available to the Division for inclusion in the mounting-out rations, and that the new type "C" be used to replace the old type "C" ration.

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HEADQUARTERS
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

20 April, 1945.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA

DIVISION SHORE PARTY REPORT

Enclosure: (A) Overlay - beach and dump areas - 1:20,000.
(B) Medical Evacuation Report.

I - Planning and Preparation:

A. Organization:

1. General - basic elements:

(a) 4th Pioneer Battalion	38	-	656
(b) 133rd Naval Construction Battalion	25	-	911
(c) 1st JASCO (det)	10	-	174
(d) Replacements	136	-	2567
(e) 442nd Army Port Co	5	-	211
(f) 4th MP Co	2	-	50
(g) 4th Ordnance Co (det)	1	-	20
(h) 4th S&S Co	2	-	83
	219	-	4672

(Does not include Beach Party Personnel)

2. Division Shore Party Headquarters:

(a) Det 4thPnrBn	5	-	11
(b) Det 1stJASCo	2	-	22
(c) Det 4thOrdnanceCo	1	-	0
	8	-	33

3. RCT-23 Shore Party by beaches, including Shore Party Hdqtrs
(Yellow Beaches)

(a) Headquarters:

(1) HqCo, 133rdNCB	8	-	150
(2) Det H&SCo, 4thPnrBn	1	-	1
(3) Det 1stJASCo	1	-	19
(4) Det 4thOrdnanceCo	0	-	10
(5) Det 4thMPCo	1	-	25
(6) Det 4thS&SCo	1	-	13
(7) Naval Beach Party	3	-	43
	15	-	261

(b) Left Assault BLT Shore Party: (Yellow Beach #1)

(1) Co"A", 4thPnrBn(less dets)	4	-	92
(2) Det H&SCo, 4thPnrBn(USN)(MC)	1	-	16
(3) Co"A", 133rdNCB	5	-	190
(4) Det 1stJASCo	1	-	19
(5) Naval Beach Party	3	-	43
	14	-	360

(c) Right Assault BLT Shore Party: (Yellow Beach #2)

(1) Det Co"A", 4thPnrBn	4	-	92
(2) Det H&SCo, 4thPnrBn(USN)(MC)	0	-	3
(3) Co"B", 133rdNCB	3	-	190
(4) Det 1stJASCo	1	-	19
(5) Naval Beach Party	3	-	43
	11	-	347

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

(d) Reserve BLT Shore Party:

(1) Co"C", 133rdNCB	4	-	190
(2) Det 1stJASCo	1	-	19
(3) Naval Beach Party	3	-	43
	8	-	252

(e) Ship Platoons:

(1) Det CoHq plus 3dPlat442ndArmyPortCo	1	-	72
(2) Replacements	52	-	957
	53	-	1029

4. RCT-25 Shore Party by beaches, including Shore Party Headquarters (Blue Beaches)

(a) Headquarters:

(1) H&SCo, 4thPnrBn	6	-	72
(2) Det 1stJASCo	1	-	19
(3) Det 4thOrdnanceCo	0	-	10
(4) Det 4thMPCo	1	-	25
(5) Det 4thS&SCo	1	-	70
(6) Naval Beach Party	3	-	43
	12	-	239

(b) Left Assault BLT Shore Party: (Blue Beach #1)

(1) Co"B", 4thPnrBn	8	-	182
(2) Det H&SCo, 4thPnrBn(USN)(MC)	1	-	15
(3) Det 1stJASCo	1	-	19
(4) Naval Beach Party	3	-	43
	13	-	259

(c) Right Assault BLT Shore Party: (Blue Beach #2)

(1) Co"C", 4thPnrBn	8	-	170
(2) Det H&SCo, 4thPnrBn(USN)(MC)	0	-	2
(3) Det 133rdNCB(USN)(MC)	1	-	7
(4) Det 1stJASCo	1	-	19
(5) Naval Beach Party	3	-	43
	13	-	241

(d) Reserve BLT Shore Party:

(1) Co"D", 133rdNCB	4	-	184
(2) Det 1stJASCo	1	-	19
(3) Naval Beach Party	3	-	43
	8	-	246

(e) Ship Platoons:

(1) 442ndArmyPortCo(less dets)	2	-	75
(2) Replacements	48	-	910
	50	-	985

5. RCT-24 Shore Party: (Division Reserve)


(a) Ship Platoons:

(1) 2dPlat442ndArmyPortCo	2	-	64
(2) Replacements	36	-	700
	38	-	764

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APPENDIX B TO ANNEX DQG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

6. Diagrams Showing RCT and BLT Shore Party Organization:
(a) Organization of assault RCT Shore Party Headquarters:




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APPENDIX I TO AMTRAC DOC, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

(b) Organization of Assault BLT Shore Party:



* - Personnel return to normal duties at end of reconnaissance phase.

** - Personnel of Reserve BLT Shore Party will be employed primarily to bring Service Platoon to strength stated and to reenforce as required.

7. Plan of Employment of 8th Field Depot Personnel:

- One beach team to be assigned to each BLT beach.
- One dump team to be assigned to each RCT beach.
- One platoon of ammunition company to be assigned to the Division beaches.
- One depot company to be assigned to the Division beaches.

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APPENDIX 1 TO AREA DOC, TO OPERATION REPORT - TWO JIMA (CONT'D)

B. Equipment:

1. Organic origin and initial assignment of equipment by RCT beaches:

(a) RCT-23 beaches:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ORGANIC ORIGIN</u>	<u>LOADED ON</u>	<u>BEACHES</u>
2 trucks, 1/4 ton, 4x4	133 NCB	APA 196	Yellow 1 & 2
1 trailer, 1 ton, 2 wheel, water	"	"	"
2 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, dump	"	"	"
2 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	"	"	"
1 compressor, air, 210 cu.ft.	"	"	"
1 truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	4thPnrBn	APA 158	Yellow 1
1 truck, 1 ton, 4x4	"	"	"
3 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, dump	133 NCB	"	"
1 trailer, 1/2 ton, dump	4thPnrBn	"	"
1 trailer, 1 ton, water	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-9, utility	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-6, utility	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-9, w/shovel dozer	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-9, w/crane	4thEngrBn	LSM 206	"
1 tractor, TD-9, w/shovel dozer	4thPnrBn	"	"
1 pump, 4"	8thFldDepot	"	"
1 power winch	"	"	"
1 crane, 3/4 cu.yd.	133 NCB	"	"
3 tractors, D-8, w/blade	"	"	"
1 tractor, HD-10, w/blade	"	"	"
4 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, dump	"	"	"
1 truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-9, w/shovel dozer	4thPnrBn	APA 207	Yellow 2
1 tractor, TD-14, w/bullclam	4thEngrBn	"	"
1 tractor, TD-9, utility	4thPnrBn	"	"
1 trailer, 1/2 ton, dump	"	"	"
1 truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	"	"	"
1 truck, 1 ton, 4x4	"	"	"
1 cargo carrier, M29C	"	"	"
1 pump, 4"	8thFldDepot	"	"
1 trailer, 1 ton, water	133 NCB	"	"
1 truck, 1/2 ton, 4x4, ambulance	"	"	"
3 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, dump	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-18, w/blade	4thPnrBn	LSM 202	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/angle dozer	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-9, w/crane	4thEngrBn	"	"
1 power winch	8thFldDepot	"	"
1 tractor, TD-9, w/shovel dozer	4thPnrBn	"	"
1 crane, 3/4 cu.yd.	133 NCB	"	"
3 tractors, D-8, w/blade	"	"	"

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APPENDIX TO THE JIMA INFORMATION REPORT - TWO JIMA (CONT'D)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ORGANIC ORIGIN</u>	<u>LOADED ON</u>	<u>BEACHES</u>
4 trucks, 2½ ton, 6x6, dump	133 NCB	LSM 202	Yellow 2
1 truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo	"	"	"
2 tractors, HD-7, w/blade	"	APA 154	Yellow (Res)
5 trucks, 2½ ton, 6x6, dump	"	"	"
1 truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	"	"	"
2 power winches	8thFldDepot	"	"
1 crane, 1/2 cu.yd.	133 NCB	LSM 48	"
1 tractor, HD-10	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/360° crane	4thPnrBn	"	"
1 tractor, HD-10	133 NCB	LSM 59	"
1 crane, 3/8 cu.yd.	4thEngrBn	"	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/360° crane	4thPnrBn	"	"

(b) RCT-25 beaches:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ORGANIC ORIGIN</u>	<u>LOADED ON</u>	<u>BEACHES</u>
1 tractor, TD-14, utility	4thPnrBn	APA 120	Hq Blue
2 tractors, T-6, utility	"	"	"
1 trailer, 1/4 ton, spare parts	"	"	"
1 trailer, 1/2 ton, dump	"	"	"
1 trailer, 1 ton, greasing	"	"	"
1 trailer, 1 ton, water	"	"	"
1 trailer, 4 wheel, stockroom	"	"	"
1 truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	"	"	"
1 truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, dump	"	"	"
1 truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo	"	"	"
1 equipment, welding, electric	"	"	"
1 compressor, air	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/bull clam	4thEngrBn	APA 157	Blue 1
1 trailer, 1/2 ton, dump	4thPnrBn	"	"
1 trailer, 1 ton, water	"	"	"
2 trucks, 1/4 ton, 4x4	"	"	"
1 truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, ambulance	4thMarDiv	"	"
1 crane, 1/2 cu.yd.	133 NCB	LSM 60	"
3 tractors, TD-9, w/shovel dozer	4thPnrBn	"	"
3 tractors, TD-18, w/blade	"	"	"
5 trucks, 2½ ton, 6x6, dump	"	"	"
1 cargo carrier, M29C	"	"	"
1 pump, 4"	8thFldDepot	"	"
1 power winch	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/360° crane	4thPnrBn	LSM 323	"
1 crane, 3/4 cu.yd.	133 NCB	LSM 241	Blue 2
1 tractor, TD-9, w/crane	4thEngrBn	"	"
2 tractors, TD-9, w/shovel dozer	4thPnrBn	"	"
3 tractors, TD-18, w/blade	"	"	"

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

ITEM	ORGANIC ORIGIN	LOADED ON	BEACHES
1 tractor, TD-14, w/blade	4thPnrBn	ISM 241	Blue 2
1 trailer, 1/2 ton, dump	"	"	"
1 truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	"	"	"
5 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, dump	"	"	"
1 pump, 4"	8thFldDepot	"	"
2 power winches	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-9, utility	4thPnrBn	APA 193	"
1 trailer, 1 ton, water	"	"	"
1 truck, 1 ton, cargo	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/blade	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/blade	"	ISM 239	"
1 crane, 3/8 cu.yd.	4thEngrBn	"	"
1 tractor, HD-10-W	133 NCB	"	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/360° crane	4thPnrBn	ISM 70	"
1 crane, 3/8 cu.yd.	4thEngrBn	ISM 145	Blue (Res)
2 tractors, D-8, w/blade	133 NCB	"	"
3 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, dump	"	ISM 238	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/360° crane	4thPnrBn	"	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/blade	"	"	"
1 truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	133 NCB	APA 190	"
7 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, dump	"	"	"
1 tractor, TD-14, w/360° crane	4thPnrBn	ISM 74	"

2. Plan of employment of the 8th Field Depot equipment:

(a) The following equipment was to be assigned to each beach and dump company:

(1) Beach Company:

- 2 cranes, crawler tracklaying.
- 2 tractors, TD-9, w/swing cranes.
- 2 tractors, w/dozers.
- 1 tractor, utility.
- 1 truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4.

(2) Dump Company:

- 2 cranes, crawler tracklaying.
- 1 tractor, w/dozer.
- 1 tractor, utility.
- 1 truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4.

C. Training:

1. Pioneer Battalion:

(a) Phase I - Individual Instruction - Schools (4 wk period):

- (1) Weapons - .50 caliber, TSMG, LMG, BAR, and bazooka. Instructions to and familiarization by all hands.
- (2) Demolitions, mines, and booby traps - principles and fundamentals. Instructions to and familiarization by all hands.
- (3) Equipment Operators School Tractors, angle-dozer, shovel

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX BCG, 10 OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

- loader, utility tractors, tractor cranes, and equipment maintenance.
- (4) Radio Operators School, SCR-300. Four men per company.
- (5) Supply Checkers School, beach and dump. Thirty men per company.
- (6) Close order drill; physical conditioning.
- (b) Phase II - Unit Training (4 wk period):
 - (1) Infantry tactics, offense and defense by squad, platoon, and company.
 - (2) Laying and removal of mines, and booby traps by squad, platoon, and company.
 - (3) Unit training in field fortifications and camouflage.
 - (4) Continuation of equipment operators school.
 - (5) Weekly review, supply checkers and radiomen, SCR-300.
 - (6) Division CPX, 31 October, 1944, camp area.
- (c) Phase III - Combined Arms Training (5 wk period):
 - (1) Five day amphibious exercise with RCT. Training conducted with NCB, JASCo, and Beach Party in Shore Party problem. Command functions stressed; token supplies unloaded.
 - (2) Five day unit infantry field firing problem; zeroing of weapons; bazooka firing.
 - (3) Seven day amphibious exercise with RCT and attachments. Ship to shore; shore party exercise.
 - (4) Succeeding two day Division CPX stressing, regards Pioneer Battalion, command procedure and beach security.
 - (5) Twenty-four hour field problem stressing disposition for and beach security.
 - (6) Field problem, Pioneer and Naval Construction Battalions and JASCo attachments stressing field work in secondary missions i. e. infantry division reserve.
 - (7) Division CPX conducted within camp area. C.O.'s in their respective areas. Command procedure stressed.
- 2. 133rd Naval Construction Battalion:
 - (a) One week period devoted to reorganization of battalion for Shore Party missions
 - (b) Two week physical conditioning period (Concurrent with other training).
 - (c) One week Shore Party indoctrination period. Given to officers and men by movies and lectures by the officers and men of Company "A", 4th Pioneer Battalion.
 - (d) One week period devoted to combat doctrine by instructors from RCT-23 and Company "A", 4th Pioneer Battalion.
 - (e) Five day amphibious exercise with RCT-23 and attachments. Shore Party missions stressed; token unloading.
 - (f) Seven day amphibious exercise with RCT-23 and attachments. Shore Party missions stressed.

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OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

- (g) Succeeding two day Division CPX. Command procedure and beach security stressed.
- (h) One week period of instruction for supply checkers, mines and booby traps, given by Company "A", 4th Pioneer Battalion.

II - Movement to Objective:

A. Loading and movement plan:

1. The Division Shore Party Commander and Communications Officer were embarked with Division Headquarters. Because of the limited facilities of this APA, the remainder of the Division Shore Party Headquarters was transported to the target aboard the APA carrying RCT25 Headquarters. Although it is highly desirable to have the Division Shore Party Commander together with his Headquarters, this should not be accomplished at the expense of separating him from Division Headquarters.
2. Shore Party Headquarters of the assault RCT's were embarked with the Headquarters of their respective Combat Teams. Except for equipment and maintenance personnel embarked on the LSM's assigned to each of the four assault BLT's for the movement and landing of Shore Party equipment, BLT Shore Parties were embarked on the APA's of the Landing Teams to which attached.
3. Ship Platoons taken from replacements were, in so far as possible, embarked initially on the vessel they were to unload. It was, however, necessary to transfer ship platoons from APA's to preloaded LST's at the target.
4. Prior to departure from the base camp, Corps Shore Party liaison personnel were attached to the Division Shore Party. One officer and two enlisted men were assigned to and embarked with each assault BLT Shore Party. One additional officer was carried with Division Shore Party Headquarters.
5. Shore Party equipment was lifted aboard vessels according to plan set out in paragraph I. B..

B. Shipboard Training:

1. Training enroute to target included:
 - (a) Equipment maintenance.
 - (b) Personnel and individual equipment inspection.
 - (c) Briefing by respective section leaders in duties and accomplishment of same by Shore Party.
 - (d) Briefing of personnel in overall picture of operation.
 - (e) Briefing of proposed attachments to Shore Party organization.
 - (f) Instruction in the missions, capabilities, and limitations of supporting elements of or attached to the Division.
 - (g) Physical conditioning.

C. Forward Area Rehearsal:

1. Because no landing was made, only debarkation and approach drills were accomplished.

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OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

III - Ship to Shore Movement:

A. Elements of the Shore Parties, including personnel and equipment, were landed as follows:

1. Yellow Beaches:

UNIT	: TO LAND	: TIME	: WHERE	: REMARKS
:	:	: LANDED	: LANDED	:
ReconSec, BLT 1	Yellow 1	H/17	Yellow 1	Shore Party Commander, Ass't Beachmaster, and 25 enlisted.
Main Body, BLT 1	Yellow 1	H/45	Red 2	Contacted reconnaissance Section Yellow 1 at 1015.
Equip - APA 158	Yellow 1	H/45	Red 2	1 HD-7 tractor w/dozer and 1 TD-9. Tractor, utility, landed with personnel.
Equip - LSM 206	Yellow 1	1500	Yellow 1	All equipment on 206 as noted in II, B, 1, (a) above.
Recon Sec, BLT 2	Yellow 2	H/17	Yellow 2	
Main Body, BLT 2	Yellow 2	1200	Yellow 2	1 TD-14 tractor w/bull clam dozer (armored) landed in 1 LCM.
		1300	Blue 1	LCVPs with personnel.
		1300	Yellow 2	1 LCM w/TD-9 tractor, utility. Personnel plus Ass't Shore Party Comdr.
Equip - LSM 202	Yellow 2	1600	Yellow 1	On order, LSM 202 beached, unloaded 1 TD-18 tractor w/dozer (armored), and retracted.
BLT 3 SP (Reserve)	Yellow 1	1500	Red 2	Moved to Yellow 1 on landing.
RCT SP Hqtrs	Yellow 2	1630	Yellow 2	1st Section.
	Yellow 2	1700	Yellow 1	2nd Section.
				1st Section established CP complete w/communications and security on Yellow 2. 2nd Section reported to CP at 0800, D-plus-1.
Equip - LSM 202	Yellow 2	D/1	Yellow 1	LSM 202 finished unloading equipment except for 1 large crane which was not unloaded. Finally went w/ship to Saipan.
		1300		
Equip (Balance)	Yellow 1 & Yellow 2	D/2 to D/7	Yellow 1 & Yellow 2	As needed on the beaches.

2. Blue Beaches:

UNIT	: TO LAND	: TIME	: WHERE	: REMARKS
:	:	: LANDED	: LANDED	:
Recon Sec, BLT 1	Blue 1	0925	Yellow 2	Ass't Shore Party Comdr and 10 enl.
Main Body, BLT 1	Blue 1	1005	Yellow 2	
Equip - APA 157	Blue 1	1200	Yellow 2	TD-14 bull clam.
Equip - LSM 60	Blue 1	1025	Blue 1	Dozers and sleds landed during morning, remainder during afternoon.
		D/1		
		1700		
		D/1		

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ANNEX DDC TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Blue Beaches (cont'd):

Recon Sec, BLT 3	:Blue 1	: 0925	:Blue 1	:Shore Party and three enlisted.
Main Body, BLT 3	Blue 1	1000- 1015	Blue 1	2nd Platoon - 8th wave. 1st & 3rd Platoon - 9th wave.
Equip - APA 193	Blue 1	1015	Blue 1	TD-14 dozer (TD-9 blade)(armored).
Equip - LSM 241	Blue 1	1025 D/1 1700 D/1	Blue 1	Dozers and sleds landed during morn- ing, remainder during afternoon.
RCT SP Hqtrs	Blue 1	1635	Blue 1	
Assault Equip - APA 120	Blue 1	1635	Blue 1	2 T-6 utility tractors.
Other Equip	Blue 1			On tank and half-track LSMs, those dozers and cranes landed on various beaches from D-plus-2 to D-plus-3.
RCT SP Motor Transport - APA 120	Blue 1		Blue 1	Maintenance Equipment & vehicles landed from D-plus-4 to D-plus-7.
BLT SP (Reserve)	Blue 1	1800	Yellow 2	Embarked aboard APA 120 ("D" Co, 133 NCB).
Equip - AKA 66	Blue 1	D/7	Blue 1	8 trucks, on order from Blue Control since D-plus-3. All other NCB equip ment for Blue Beaches had been por- tioned to Assault BLT and RCT SP Headquarters.

IV - Narrative of Shore Party Activities:

A. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-day:

- (a) Division Shore Party Commander reported on board the Fourth Division Control Boat with the Transron Beachmaster and the Division Shore Party Communications Officer at 0900.

B. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-day:

- (a) The reconnaissance sections of the assault BLT Shore Parties were boated with the fifth wave and landed on Yellow 1 and Yellow 2 at 0920. The beaches were receiving heavy fire at this time which restricted movement of these elements, and caused severe casualties. By 0930 both assault BLT Shore Party Commanders, and the Beachmaster for Yellow 2, had become casualties. At 0945 the main body of the Shore Party for Yellow 1, under command of the Assistant Shore Party Commander, landed on Red Beach 2. Two tractors, one utility and one bull dozer, were also landed at this time. Contact was established with Yellow 1 at 1015 and the Assistant Shore Party Commander assumed command of that beach at 1045. The utility tractor was employed to assist

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

landing of vehicles, and the bull dozer was used to cut a road through the terrace to aid movement of tanks. All personnel were initially employed to aid evacuation of casualties. By 1100 the Shore Party Medical Officer and 70% of the corpsmen had become casualties, together with one Shore Party Officer, the Beachmaster, and members of both Beach and Shore Party. The tactical situation on Yellow 2 was such that some elements of the assault troops were still in the immediate beach area at 1100, and the Shore Party had not landed. Need for a bull dozer to assist the tanks resulted in dispatching one LCM of the 8th Baker wave, containing an armored TD-14 bull clam, at 1130. At 1200 the remainder of the wave was dispatched to the beach. Of this section of the wave, one LCM containing the Assistant Shore Party Commander, the communications team, twenty men of "A" Company, 4th Pioneer Battalion, and a utility tractor, landed on Yellow 2. The remainder of the wave, consisting of "B" Company, 133 NCB, and the Shore Party medical section, landed on Blue Beach 1.

The Assistant Shore Party Commander upon verifying the report that the Shore Party Commander was a casualty, assumed command of the beach at 1330. A CP was set up on the left flank of the beach and communications were established with Yellow Beach 1 and Blue Beach 1 at 1400.

Heavy fire on Blue 1 prevented movement of "B" Company, 133 NCB, and caused excessive casualties including 100% of medical personnel during the afternoon.

At 1400, floating dump cargo began to land on both beaches. Heavy fire prevented more than one boat to land at a time. LVTs carrying loads from preloaded LSTs were also being dispatched to the beach and the need for additional bull dozers ashore resulted in dispatching LSM 206 to Yellow 1 at 1400. The LSM beached and completely unloaded on right flank of that beach. The tractors were moved immediately to left of Yellow 1 to prepare a road to permit passage of LVTs to front lines. Enemy machine gun fire slowed progress of the road which finally stopped 100 yards inland when one tractor struck a mine. It was not until the next day that clearance of the mine field was completed and work could be resumed.

The armored tractor on Yellow 2 was employed to construct a road inland on left flank of that beach, but enemy fire caused work to secure there at 1500.

At 1430, the Reserve BLT Shore Party landed on Red 2. Contact was made with Yellow 1 and personnel were ordered to dig in on

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DQG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

the left flank of that beach.

Heavy machine gun and small arms fire had inflicted heavy casualties to tractor drivers on Yellow 1 and LSH 202 was ordered to the beach to unload an armored TD-18 dozer at 1600.

RCT-23 Shore Party Headquarters landed on Yellow 2 at 1645. The Transport Division Beachmaster landed with the Shore Party Commander and immediately repeated earlier requests for relief Beach Parties for Yellow Beaches. RCT Shore Party CP was established in vicinity of block house at TA 149 B; communications were established with Yellow and Blue Beaches; and at 1730 the RCT Shore Party Commander assumed control.

Conditions on Yellow 2 at that time were critical. "B" Company, 133 NCB, was still on Blue Beach 1 and heavy mortar fire which had fallen on beaches during afternoon had reduced Shore Party personnel on the beach to two officers and forty-two enlisted men, all of "A" Company, 4th Pioneer Battalion. "B" Company, 133 NCB, was ordered to move at once, and arrangements were made with the Shore Party Commander of Blue 1 to evacuate casualties from Yellow 2 over Blue Beach.

Two aid stations were established on Yellow 1 during the afternoon. Regimental Surgeon, RCT-23, evacuating casualties on left flank, and the battalion aid station of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which had landed at 1500, was operating in the center of the beach.

Shore Party Commanders were instructed to make a road reconnaissance from the beach to Air Field #1 and resume construction of roads. Reconnaissance reports were received at the Shore Party CP at 1930 indicating roads could be completed by noon of D-plus-1 from both beaches.

At 1900, heavy mortar fire falling on Yellow 2 started a fire in a small arms dump. Armored tractor of "C" Company, 4th Engineer Battalion, which was on the beach, was employed to put it out. Remaining ammunition and supplies on the beach were moved to reveted dumps about 100 yards inland by 2200 and suffered no more damage. All supplies landed on Yellow Beach 1 were turned over to RQM-23 which was operating dumps on the beach.

During the afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines landed on Yellow 2 and moved into firing position along entire length of that beach. Positions were about 25 yards from the water's edge restricting unloading on the beach to the vicinity of the Jap lugger on the left flank. This condition did not change during the entire operation. At the same time, elements of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines, landed on Yellow 1 and by morning of D-plus-1 guns of this battalion had restricted operations to the left flank of this beach.

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APPENDIX I TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Heavy fire continued to fall on beaches during the night. Limited unloading of high priority cargo was carried on, and Shore Party personnel were employed to assist artillery in moving ammunition to gun positions and moving ammunition and supplies to infantry units.

Beach defenses which had been set up by the weapons sections of the Shore Party during the afternoon were reinforced on both beaches by LVTs during the night. Defenses on Yellow 2 were further reinforced by elements of Regimental Weapons of RCT-23 and 1st Battalion, 14th Marines.

C. Blue Beaches:

1. D-day:

(a) Because of the tactical plan, but one of the two Blue Beaches was to be used initially. The assault BLT Shore Parties were to share the operation of Beach Blue One. The reconnaissance elements were landed at 0925 in the vicinity of the right flank of Beach Yellow 2. Heavy enemy fire of large and small caliber caused excessive casualties and limited the activity of remaining personnel of these sections. The remainder of the assault BLT Shore Parties (less equipment and personnel embarked in LSMs) boated in call waves landed on Yellow 2 and left flank of Blue 1 between 0955 and 1015. The armored dozer of BLT 3 Shore Party and the bull clam of BLT 1 Shore Party were immediately employed in drawing vehicles from the surf. The personnel divided into groups and began the tasks of carrying and evacuating casualties, retrieving small arms ammunition, salvaging weapons, and clearing a pillbox that was delivering fire on the beach. The Weapons Section of the Shore Parties placed their guns and dug in, but soon released their equipment to the Landing Teams.

At about 1130, BLT 3 Shore Party moved by platoons to the vicinity of the wrecked Jap APD, center of Beach Blue 1 (See enclosure (A)). The Shore Party Commander and his Executive Officer were wounded and evacuated in attempts to reconnoiter the possibilities of Blue One for exploitation. Two platoons reached Blue 1 center, dug in and immediately started unloading vehicles and ammunition from LCVPs and LCMs. The armored dozer started a road from the beach but was in such demand for retraction of boats and salvage of vehicles that little road work could be accomplished. Small parties from the Shore Party continued the carrying and evacuation of casualties and the salvaging of weapons.

The medical evacuation stations initially set up were obliged to operate less many of the corpsmen. Casualties among the Beach Party and Shore Party medical personnel were heavy.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

The afternoon of D-day, BLT 1 Shore Party evacuation station was operating under one doctor and BLT 3 Shore Party evacuation station was manned entirely by enlisted personnel.

Beach Party communications with Blue Control were insufficient and finally ceased entirely. SCR 536s were used as a last resort and succeeded only temporarily in maintaining contact.

Personnel casualties rather than materiel casualties were responsible for this lack of contact.

RCT-25 Shore Party Headquarters arrived at the beach in vicinity of the beached Jap APD at 1630. Contact was established with each of BLT Shore Parties by wire and control of Blue Beach was assumed at 1700. Working parties had been depleted by casualties and loss of contact between platoons. Reorganization took place and a reinforced medical evacuation station was set up on Blue Beach 1. Tactical displacement of weapons for beach defense occupation of Jap APD and establishment of contact with adjacent units was undertaken. Salvage of ammunition of all types and of flame throwers and bazookas assumed paramount importance. Constant heavy enemy fire prevented efficient unloading and development of the beach. The heavy fire drawn by beached LSMs was too great a hazard to risk landing Shore Party equipment and the target presented by groups of men working on the terraces precluded anything but the primary engineering that could be accomplished by personnel and equipment already ashore.

BLT 1-25 Shore Party continued work in the vicinity of Yellow 2 throughout D-day. Application of the efforts of this unit in that area was considered much more feasible under the circumstances since it was already set up and in operation. Moreover, at the time a shift of personnel was contemplated, this unit was involved in setting up and supplying a battery of the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines.

Contact was established with the 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion and a workable routine formulated for control and dispatch of LVTs as directed by RCT-25 Shore Party Headquarters. Radio communication with Blue Control via SCR 300 rather than by Beachmaster equipment facilitated the handling of requests of an emergency nature for supplies and LVTs.

At 1800 elements of "D" Company, 133 MCB, reached RCT-25 Shore Party CP from Yellow Beaches. They were immediately organized into working units, tactically disposed, directed to dig in and await orders. Several small groups were employed initially in casualty evacuation and salvage.

Units of the 24th Marines and RCT-25 Headquarters began crossing the beach and checking through the Shore Party CP at 1830.

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APPENDIX 1 TO THE JOURNAL OF THE LANDING OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

A flash red at 1915 did not interfere with work proceeding in vicinity of the beach. Unloading of LCVPs, evacuation of casualties, attempting to rescue beached boats, and retrieving 75 mm gun and 81 mm mortar ammunition awash in the surf continued. Requests for ammunition, flame throwers, flame thrower fuel, bazookas and automatic weapons were being received by radio, telephone, and runner. Supplies accumulating on the beach and organic Pioneer Battalion weapons were being dispatched under BLT guides and Shore Party personnel via LVTs and dozer hauled sleds. Requests that could not be met were relayed to Blue Control for compliance. At 2400, 10 LVTs landed with assorted ammunition and were dispatched to units having placed priority requests.

Note: No contact had been established with LVTAs but the R-3 of RCT-25 assured that they were being employed by the RCT for defense in vicinity of Blue 2. LVTs under Shore Party control were tactically disposed initially but demand for them as transportation assumed critical proportions beyond their value in defense and they were released as required to haul supplies.

D. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-1 day:

(a) Division Shore Party Commander in answer to a request from an unknown source for additional personnel on the beaches advised RCT Shore Party Commanders to request RCT Commanders to land elements of Ship Platoons for this purpose.

At 0900, Division Shore Party Commander issued orders to Division Shore Party Headquarters aboard the Hinsdale to boat and report to Division control vessel.

Division Shore Party Commander landed at 1100 to inspect beaches and confer with RCT Shore Party Commanders.

At 1300, Division Shore Party Headquarters, under the Shore Party Operations Officer, ordered to land on Yellow Beach 2. Landing effected at 1530. Established CP at 165 X-ray and installed wire communications with the RCT Shore Party Headquarters. Delay in landing caused by enemy fire on beach.

Division Shore Party Commander returned to Division control vessel and reported results of inspection ashore to Division logistical representative.

E. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-1 day:

(a) Inspection of beaches revealed the area in vicinity of the wrecked Jap lugger to be the only suitable unloading point on Yellow 2, remainder of the beach was too narrow to permit operation and was almost completely blocked by wrecked landing craft.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Construction of a road to the air field continued and by 1200 was passable for LVTs.

Operations on Yellow 1 were confined to the left flank but development of two unloading points and location of RCT-23 dumps in that area necessitated its early development for accelerated unloading. Reserve BLT Shore Party which was located on left flank of Yellow 2 was ordered to remain on Yellow 1 and work under direction of RQM-23 who was assisting the Shore Party in unloading operations.

Control was requested to send LSM 202, with remainder of Shore Party equipment to the beach at 0800. At 0830 control reported it was unable to contact LSM 202.

At 0830, urgent messages from units of the 24th Marines for rations, water, and ammunition were received. Four LVTs were loaded and dispatched to the 24th Marines and additional LVTs which reported in from Blue Beach were loaded and returned. Battalion Quartermasters of the 24th sent working parties to carry rations to their units.

During the morning relief of Beach Parties on both beaches was accomplished.

At 1030, R-3, 24th Marines, reported that Engineers were clearing and marking lanes through the mine field behind Yellow 2.

At 1130 control reported LSM 202 on its way to the beach. It landed to left of lugger and unloaded all equipment except the large crane.

Mortar and artillery fire which had fallen periodically all morning became intense at 1330, and continued until 1500, causing damage to equipment and inflicting severe casualties to personnel, including the acting Shore Party Commander of Yellow 2. Company Commander of "B" Company, 133 NCB, was named Shore Party Commander of Yellow 2. At 1530, advance CP of Division Shore Party landed on Yellow 2 and established Division Shore Party CP at 165 X-ray.

By 1700, beached landing craft completely blocked Yellow 2 and control was notified to send all traffic for Yellow Beaches to Yellow 1. Underwater demolition teams were requested by the Beachmaster to clear wreckage on Yellow 2.

Unloading continued throughout the day on Yellow 1. Two roads were completed which enabled LVTs to proceed to the air field from that beach. LSMs carrying rations and ammunition began to land on Yellow 1 during the afternoon. LVTs continued to land carrying loads from LSTs and shore based LVTs were used to haul supplies from beach to dumps.

Communications personnel succeeded in overhauling wire lines during the day and by 1800 permanent wire facilities were com-

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plotted.

A flash red warning at 1900 caused unloading to stop on Yellow 1. Work resumed at 2000 when air raid did not materialize and continued throughout the night with frequent interruptions caused by enemy fire falling in the area.

F. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-1 day:

(a) Intermittent enemy artillery and mortar fire increased in intensity until by 0300, activity on the beach had to cease. NCB personnel and Pioneers were occupied to a great extent in litter bearing. At 0400, a small ammunition dump south of beached Jap APD was struck and destroyed causing work in that area to pause for about an hour. It also interfered with passage of LVTs along beach.

At 0600, a check of casualties was made and all elements of RCT-25 Shore Party were directed to report to Beach Blue 1 for organization of that beach. Because of the proximity of front line activity, Blue 1, for unloading purposes was confined to the limits: Beached Jap APD south to right flank of Yellow 2 (See Enclosure (A)). This one beach was to be operated by both Shore Parties reinforced by "D" Company, 133 NCB.

The area north of Jap APD to be developed for unloading as equipment and beach matting became available from Shore Party LSMs and as the tactical situation permitted.

Requests for the beaching of Shore Party LSMs were issued at 0630 and at 0730 control radioed that the ships were on their way to Blue Beach 1 to land south of APD as directed. Enemy fire again increased in intensity in immediate area of proposed landing point. LSMs were directed to stand off until shelling decreased. By 0920, fire had let up and two LVTs with priority supplies for BLT 1 and BLT 3, RCT-25 landed and were dispatched without causing any notable increase in artillery or mortar fire falling in vicinity of beach. Shore Party LSMs were again directed to stand in to beach and land. At 1050, LSM 60 and LSM 241 beached and all dozer equipment, beach matting and sleds were unloaded. The ships were then ordered to retract with remaining Shore Party equipment in order to prevent congestion of a limited area with vehicles and cranes that appeared useless and could only draw further enemy fire.

Requests for landing of Combat Team Equipment, half-tracks, rocket trucks, etc., were transmitted to Blue Control along with requests for supplies of a priority degree. Empty LCMs were required for loading half-tracks from Yellow 2 and transferring them via water to Blue Beach. However, initial LCMs when unload-

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APPENDIX 1A10 ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

od were immediately returned with casualties in order to attempt obtaining sufficient supplies ashore to handle needs of two combat teams. LCVPs were unable to land without swamping. Development of Blue Beach 2 by levelling terraces and dozing beach revetments was undertaken. New limits assigned arbitrarily from Jap APD north 500 yards. See Enclosure (A) "Blue Beaches 1 and 2 as operated". A road from APD over terraces to join airport road was begun, and a mine detail was set to work investigating and removing aerial bombs from area behind beach redesignated as Blue 2 for purposes of developing dumps in this vicinity. At 1130, a check was run with "A" Company, 4th Engineer Battalion, on mined area near Jap LSMs beyond new Blue 2 to Jap road toward airport from quarry and a road along beach was begun. By 1230, Beach Blue 1 had become congested with beached small boats and surf was deemed too heavy for LCPV traffic. All LVTs had been shifted to an unloading point north of APD. Three roads were cut and laid with beach matting on Beach Blue 1 for continued unloading of LCMs. LVT traffic from preloaded LSTs permitted building up limited dumps along Blue 2. Occasional LVTs were sent direct to BLTs requesting supplies contained. By 1500, small arms ammunition, 75 mm gun ammunition, water, 10-in-1 rations, anti-personnel mines, and fuel had been accumulated from LVTs and placed in dumps along Blue 2 and from LCMs and placed in dumps along Blue 1. The situation was becoming acute because of lack of transportation. Enemy fire was still persistent enough to preclude the decision to reload Shore Party LSMs and unload trucks. Enemy fire increased in intensity for twenty minutes and then ceased. Both Shore Party LSMs were then requested to stand in to beach and an effort was to be made to clear up fire hazard then existing. A flash red at 1550 prevented immediate landing of LSMs but by 1640 they reached beach and the remainder of the Shore Party equipment started to unload. In the proposed dump area a TD-18 dozer had struck a mine and was completely demolished. Removal of supplies from beach was impeded until a more thorough probing could be conducted. Two large Shore Party cranes were immobilized on beach, one from shrapnel and the other from salt water flooding occurring as LSM backed off while crane was still on ramp. Request from many sources for 81 mm and 60 mm mortar ammunition, flame throwers and their fuel, pyrotechnics, sand bags, bazookas, and bazooka ammunition had reached such frequency and beach dumps were becoming congested with so much apparently non-essential supplies it was decided that only critical items would be unloaded. Empty LVTs were held available for dispatching emergency

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX BCG, OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

supplies direct from beaches to BLTs. Three LCMs reputedly containing 81 mm and 60 mm mortar ammunition and sand bags were beached and unloaded. The actual cargo was 75 mm gun ammunition and water. It was not until 1815 that one LCM with 81 mm and 60 mm ammunition arrived at Blue Beach. It was unloaded and dispatched to BLTs on the line. Five LVTs were sent to Yellow Beaches to investigate possibility of drawing these critical items from dumps there.

A flash red at 1855 announced by the Beachmaster over his loud-speaker caused activity along the beach to cease momentarily. It was directed by RCT-25 Shore Party Headquarters that beach operations would continue during condition red until the ships at sea began anti-aircraft firing. Activity was immediately resumed and continued until an anti-aircraft barrage actually began. This lasted about three minutes.

At 1915, enemy fire on beaches became intense. New types of explosions were resulting; several air bursts occurred. By 2000, fire was heavy and remained heavy for a period of about an hour. The air and rocket fire bursts had caused casualties among Shore Party personnel and driven all boat traffic well off the beach. From 2100 threatening fire was intermittent and it was not until 2430 that small boat traffic resumed. What may have been 20 mm fire was sporadically directed at beach but seemed to be striking in water off Yellow 2.

Note: Information from RCT-25 and contact with a platoon of LVTAs established LVTAs as part of beach defense under RCT-25 Shore Party Headquarters with mission of guarding flank of Beach Blue 2 and vicinity of quarry. LVTs of 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion not employed for transportation, were tactically disposed south from LVTAs.

G. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-2 day:

- (a) Division Shore Party Commander returned to shore at 0900 and although beaches still under RCT control began coordination of supply and Shore Party activities. Transron Beachmaster and Beach Party landed at 1600 and set up in vicinity of Division Shore Party Headquarters. Elements of 21st Marine Shore Party landed and assigned to assist in development of Yellow Beaches. Division Shore Party Commander directed to take over and consolidate beaches. Shore Parties reverted to Division control by receipt of message at 2045. Surf during the course of the day was high and impeded unloading of small craft. Frequent enemy mortar and artillery fire on beaches. Evacuation satisfactory.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Enemy fire hit and ignited dump on Beach Blue 1 at about 2000. Considerable delay was experienced in getting salvage craft on station to fight fire. When craft finally arrived at about 0045, D-plus-3 day, it readily brought fire under control.

H. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-2 day:

- (a) Construction of a lateral beach road at water's edge was begun, and artillery was requested to remove guns which were on water's edge to positions inland. This move was not completed until D-plus-3 day and road construction was stopped.

Roads inland from both beaches were joined at lower edge of air field, and were passable to DUKWs, LVTs, and trucks by noon.

At 1200, HqCo, 133 NCB, sent to RCT-23 dump to work as dump labor party, and the Shore Party Motor Transport Section was established and in operation on Yellow 1 with all vehicles and tractors pooled on that beach.

Operations on Yellow 2 during the day were limited to clearing wreckage from the beach. Activity of Naval demolitions teams necessitated closing beach to all boat traffic.

Units of RCT-21 of the 3rd Marine Division landed across Yellow 1 during the day preventing continuous unloading of supplies. By 1600, amphibious trailers which had landed during the previous twenty-four hours threatened to block the entire beach. Since no prime movers were able to move them through the soft sand, supplies were removed from the trailers and sent to dumps in LVTs. The trailers were then parked on the north end of Yellow 1.

"C" Company, 4th Medical Battalion, landed at 1300 to operate aid stations on Yellow Beaches.

A flash red was received at 1730 but personnel were instructed to remain at work until ship's anti-aircraft fire started and unloading continued. Ships on the beach making smoke during flash red necessitated large security elements to guard against counter landings. The Beachmaster was requested to have ships retract or not make smoke during air alerts.

Commanding Officer of RCT-23 notified Shore Party Commander that BLTs 1 and 2 would reinforce beach defenses during night if necessary. Arrangements were completed by 1900 for movement of BLTs to beach if needed but no enemy action occurred during the night.

I. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-2 day:

- (a) At 0030 report from Division indicated there were four barges off Red Beaches headed north. Three boats on Beach Blue were held on beach but other boat traffic in vicinity was directed to lay well off in order to prevent confusion in event of a counter landing. By 0115 small boats were unloaded and had shoved off. All shore party personnel were directed to take up defensive positions.

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APPENDIX I TO ANTELL DOC, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

By 0130 a report, source unknown, informed that unidentified barges were DUKWs. A check with RCT-25 and Division Shore Party Operations Officer verified this. Conference with Beachmaster at 0445 resulted in the decision that surf was too heavy for LCVPs and that only larger craft could be permitted to unload on Blue Beach. All loaded LVTs and LCMs were directed to land. By 0650 the enemy fire on beach had decreased and LCMs and LVTs were being unloaded. Trucks and five DUKWs were used to carry supplies being unloaded to inland revetted dumps. Mortar ammunition arriving in small quantities was immediately transferred to LVTs and hauled to BLTs. 100 Octane fuel was delivered in vicinity of APD to LVT bivouac area. Fuel lubricants and small arms were hauled to dumps. Rations and water were left on beach. Available vehicles were used to clear beach of 75 mm gun and small arms ammunitions that had accumulated. At 1025 enemy artillery began shelling beach. By 1028, 100 octane gasoline in vicinity of APD was hit and exploded. Fire spread to a quantity of 75 mm gun ammunition and small arms. Before arrival of fire boat, 100 yards of beach from APD south were ablaze. All boats were directed to stand well off beach until situation got under control. Shore Party fire apparatus proved inadequate and shrapnel had rendered it inoperative. Enemy fire and exploding ammunition permitted little unloading. The fire boat had arrived at about 1130 and fire was under control within 20 minutes. Damaged ordnance remaining necessitated cutting new roads to reach dumps from beach. Arrangements were made to obtain efforts of bomb disposal personnel for removing debris caused by fire. Boats of personnel and supplies began landing at about 1300. Supplies were of a priority degree and were divided among requesting units and dispatched to them. Duds caused a slow up in process of clearing beach of unharmed ammunition and unloading of other ammunition from incoming boats tied up vehicles. Request was made that fire boat remain off Blue Beach for similar emergency until beach could be thoroughly cleared. Several requests for supplies made to control in course of day were unable to be met. Five amphibian tractors per RCT-24 and RCT-25 were sent to Yellow Beaches for mortar ammunition, grenades, and K rations. At 1645, two officers and fifty-two enlisted men reported to RCT-25 Shore Party CP from ship's platoon of 30th Replacement Draft. They were assigned by RCT-25 to the Shore Party and were in turn assigned by Shore Party to reenforce Shore Party elements on Blue Beach 1 to assist in clearing beach of scattered ammunition.

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

ion.

A flash red occurred at 1730 and anti-aircraft fire from ships caused a pause in beach activity. By 1800, fire at sea had ceased and unloading resumed. 55 gallon drums of Napalm, lubricating oil, and 80 octane gasoline were being unloaded on beach to be picked up by Tank Battalion in accordance with a priority request made earlier in afternoon. Unloading from amphibian tractors was proceeding on Beach Blue 2. A threatened rocket barrage at 1845 had failed to materialize, but fire lanes had been made in supplies spread along beach road on Beach Blue 1 and Blue 2. The Shore Party fire pump that could be salvaged had been serviced but still remained inoperative. The navy fire boat that had previously been employed was standing off the beach. Fuel and Napalm being unloaded were left in defilade of road cuts through terraces to beach. An armored dozer was working in the vicinity of beach and on call for fire control and ammunition along beach was gradually being carted back to dumps. Enemy fire broke out at 2045 following our artillery barrage, at about 2015. Only occasional bursts occurred in vicinity of beach but activity on beach was considerably slowed. Most of the fire was occurring between dumps and airport road causing unloading in dumps to cease. At 2200 after a brief cessation of fire the beach again came under an enemy barrage, hitting the Napalm drums causing an explosion and spread of flames that immediately got out of hand.

The first navy fire boat to arrive had pump trouble and was unable to obtain the necessary pressure for reaching the blaze. A second fire boat was requested and required two hours to arrive. Note: Same remarks as for beach defense D-plus-1 day apply.

J. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-3 day:

- (a) At about 0045 fire boat arrived off Blue Beach and extinguished blaze.

Surf such that LCMs and LCVPs could be used for unloading personnel only on Yellow 1 and LCMs only could be used for this purpose on Blue. This condition continued throughout the day.

The beaches as of 1600 were obstructed by the following wrecked or beached craft: 40 LCVPs, 6 LCMs, 36 LVTs, 16 DUKWs, 4 LVTAs, and 4 hulks partly demolished by demolitions charges but still a navigational hazard.

K. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-3 day:

- (a) Received message at 1000 from Division Shore Party Commander that Shore Parties were now under Division control. At 2045, 21 February, the Shore Party Commander was notified by Division Shore Party Commander that Shore Party of RCT-21 less 1st Battalion was

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OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

assigned to Yellow Beaches for duty. This Shore Party was assigned to operate Yellow 2, and the Shore Party Commander of RCT-21 was named Shore Party Commander of Yellow 2. "B" Company, 133 NCB and remaining personnel of "A" Company, 4th Pioneer Battalion were ordered to report to the Shore Party Commander of Yellow 1 for duty there, placing entire Shore Party of RCT-23 on Yellow Beach 1.

Clearance of wreckage on D-plus-2 allowed full operation of all beaches during the day and by 1600 Beachmasters were notified that 3 LCTs, 2 LSMs, and 2 LSTs could be unloaded simultaneously. Lateral beach road was completed during the day.

L. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-3 day:

(a) By 0230 despite continued enemy bombardment that rekindled the beach fire, the navy fire control boat had the blaze under control, but because of damaged ordnance, unloading on Beach Blue 1 was temporarily abandoned. Beach Blue 2 had continued operation throughout, but to a very limited extent and only on the extreme end of its redesignated northern flank.

Blue Control was notified that all boats containing ammunition of any type should be directed to report to beach for unloading. Beach Blue 2 was the designated beach and amphibian tractors were to be used for transportation from beach to dumps because no beach matting had been laid on this beach. Blue 1 was actively being cleared of debris resulting from fire. Responsibility for beaches redesignated as follows: Shore Party for BLT 3 would operate Blue 1 using all trucks available; Shore Party for BLT 1 would operate Blue 2 using amphibian tractors exclusively. The dumps beyond Blue 2 were to be mutual dumps for both beaches and an additional dump area was under development directly behind Blue 1.

The plan was set up for continuous expansion toward the quarry using beaches toward north as available and necessary and dump area as vacated by units then present, but retaining an assigned area for possible reembarkation of Division. BLT 1 Shore Party, because of fewer casualties among officers and experienced enlisted personnel, was assigned the expanded beach. Further, because of surf and wrecked boats on beaches it was recommended that all unloading be via LCT or larger craft. All loaded smaller craft still afloat would be unloaded immediately if possible.

Unloading began at about 0930 and continued rather heavily unhampered by enemy fire. Vehicles, ammunition, priority signal

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OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

equipment, fuel, water, and rations were unloaded from LSMs and LCMs. Critical item list had been considerably reduced, but 81 mm and 60 mm mortar ammunition still maintained high priority. At 1030 telephonic message from Division Shore Party informed the Division had assumed control as of 2045, 21 February. Request for more men on Blue Beaches was placed with Division Shore Party.

An LCT with some 81 mm and 60 mm mortar ammunition arrived at Blue 2 and was immediately unloaded into LVTs for dispatch to BLTs of the 24th and 25th Marines. The quantity was insufficient to meet the needs for the night and at 1245 additional mortar ammunition was requested of Blue Control.

By 1505 the mortar fire and small arms fire falling in vicinity of Jap LSMs right flank Beach Blue 2 intensified and worked along beach in a southward direction. Size of enemy caliber had increased. A ration dump and a vehicle were struck but fire was immediately brought under control in each instance. The vehicle, a 6x6 dump truck working on Blue 1 in vicinity of a beached LSM, was damaged beyond repair; rations permitted salvage. The enemy fire continued until 1530 driving boat traffic off beach.

By 1600 enemy barrage lifted and unloading resumed. Fuel, water, and rations were the main items being unloaded. Absence of 81 mm mortar ammunition necessitated another request to Blue Control. A detail of 40 men from "D" Company, 133 MCB, was directed to scour beach and surrounding areas for all available 81 mm mortar ammunition and an investigation of dumps beyond other beaches was conducted.

By 1700 all beaches had been sufficiently cleared of ordnance debris from fires to permit free passage of trucks and LVTs to dumps from all unloading points. Unloading continued unhampered throughout evening.

M. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-4 day:

- (a) Surf conditions substantially unchanged. Landing of personnel from all types of landing craft on Yellow Beaches continued. By message sent at 1215 reported landing of Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, on Yellow 2 to Division control. Marked progress was made in development of roads and unloading points on Yellow 2 and Blue 1 this date. Approximately 200 men from 21st Marines Shore Party assigned to Blue Beaches.

N. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-4 day:

- (a) Preparatory work was started to establish a 4th Division dump in area 164 Y. Revetments for fuel and ammunition storage were dug during the day.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT (CONT'D)

Commanding General, 4th Marine Division landed on Yellow 2 at 1100, and proceeded to Division CP.

At 1300, RQM-23 secured his dumps and left the beach. The RQM had worked with Shore Party continuously during period from D-day to D-plus-4 and the assistance rendered to the Shore Party at a time when the only remaining Shore Party officers were members of a Naval Construction Battalion, not sufficiently experienced in Shore Party work to direct unloading operations, cannot be over estimated. At 1700 one dump and two beach teams of the 8th Field Depot reported in to the Shore Party CP. One beach team was assigned to each beach and the dump team was sent to Division Dump.

At 1730, HqCo, 133 NCB, was ordered to move to Division Dump and work as labor party.

During the night ammunition and fuel was unloaded and moved to the Division Dump.

O. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-4 day:

(a) At 0145 warning was received by phone from Division Shore Party of an unidentified craft 4000 yards off shore of Red Beaches headed north. Investigation identified it as an enemy pontoon barge. (A pontoon barge bearing the bodies of dead marines was dragged in by LCMs and secured to the wrecked Jap APD on Beach Blue 1 at 0500; reported to have broken loose from its moorings on Green Beaches.)

At 0200 a radio call from Blue Control and an announcement from the Beachmaster indicated that 3 LCMs of 81 mm mortar ammunition were on their way toward Blue Beach 1. The 24th and 25th Marines were notified, 5 amphibian tractors were obtained and guides were obtained to take the ammunition directly to BLTs. The actual cargo of the LCMs was 80 octane fuel and 55 gallon water drums. At 0600, six officers and 160 men from 21st Marine Shore Party arrived to augment RCT-25 Shore Party on Blue Beaches. Additional supplementary effort was obtained from ship's platoon of USS Hendry; two officers and ninety men arriving ashore on LSM 241 loaded with organizational gear for 24th and 14th Marines. The Replacement Draft was assigned to dumps. Enemy artillery fire broke out at 0700. This fire apparently directed at beached LSM, was of small caliber but worked the beach over from Blue 2 to Blue 1 and back rather thoroughly, causing slight damage. Fire lifted by 0730 but LSM had gotten underway and proceeded to Yellow Beaches. Request for its return was immediately sent to control, because forty members of Replacement Draft remained aboard. It was not until 1300 that it finally reached Beach Blue

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DQG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

One to continue unloading.

Small boat traffic, winding up floating craft smaller than LCTs was handled. Three LCVPs broached, one completely swamped, others were salvaged successfully. Because of trouble with LCVPs it was decided to transfer cargo to LVTs. Conference with 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion Officer indicated infeasibility of this plan and it was proposed to leave LCVPs until afternoon for calmer surf. With this exception, general unloading was considered to be in effect.

Enemy fire on beach occurred at 1435 and again at 1515 with little or no damage except to a vehicle in vicinity of beach dumps. All craft remained on beach and except for a pause in activity on Blue 1, unloading continued.

Units from 8th Field Depot, 24th Replacement Draft, and 30th Replacement Draft reported to Blue Beaches for assignment. Orientation, location, and assignment of units arriving enmasse on an already crowded beach and subjected to enemy fire, posed a handicap in efficient employment of these personnel and it was not until D-plus-5 that it was possible to use these personnel to best advantage, applying an adequate schedule.

The surf conditions during the afternoon did not improve and the only unloading was from an LST on Blue Beach 2 and from two LSMs on Beach Blue 1. Personnel in excess of those required to handle these ships were employed straightening dumps, moving supplies from revetments along beach roads to inland dumps, generally policing beach, and improving sanitation. A detail from the Shore Party was assigned to assist in body removal from beach area. All matting that could be salvaged was being used to improve roads. The navy was attempting to remove debris obstructing landing points; Shore Party equipment and personnel were involved.

An air raid alert at 1930 and ship anti-aircraft fire caused cessation of beach activities for one-half hour.

P. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-5 day:

- (a) Surf conditions allowed landing of LCMs or larger craft for discharging cargo on all beaches.

Corps Shore Party Commander assumed control of beaches at 1700.

Q. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-5 day:

- (a) One large crane and three tractor cranes were permanently assigned to the Division Dump in addition to two bull dozers.

At 0900, heavy construction equipment began to arrive on the beaches for the 133 NCB and control was requested to give it lowest priority in unloading from AKAs, to permit the 133 NCB to

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DQG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

locate a dump site.

Unloading continued normally throughout day and night with expansion of beaches now permitting 3 LCTs, 3 LSMs, 3 LSTs, to unload simultaneously.

R. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-5 day:

- (a) Request was placed with Beachmaster to keep unloading slots on both beaches filled (amounting to as many as 4 LSTs, 4 LSMs, or 4 LCTs or any combination of same). Planned development, if more beach matting became available, or if clay from quarry became available would increase capabilities of beaches to a combination of six ships. Rough weather and an anticipated storm limited ships available. Only three were kept on beach throughout morning.

A beach company, a dump company and two elements from Replacement Drafts available to Shore Party were assigned exclusively to dumps under the control of Blue Beach Shore Party Headquarters. It was necessary to reinforce this detail with elements of 21st Marine Shore Party. An ammunition platoon from 8th Field Depot replaced 21st Marine Shore Party.

Enemy shelling during day was comparatively light and but slightly interfered with unloading. The only time it noticeably effected beach operations was at 1130.

All remaining vehicles and equipment of Shore Party were ordered ashore for establishment of a motor transport compound and dispatching organization. It was believed that enemy activity had declined enough to permit a compound and its activities to proceed at a central point without jeopardizing equipment because of necessarily restricted operating area. Eight MCB trucks and the Pioneer Battalion spare parts trailer arrived at 1815 on an LCT.

As per request from RCT-25, all small boats containing enlisted men's packs were assigned priority of unloading and were received at beach by 1815.

An LST and an LSM arrived on beach at 1830. The Beachmaster conferred with Blue Control and indicated that nothing further was expected for Blue Beaches.

A flash red existing in the early evening of 25 minutes duration did not interfere with unloading. A flash red from 2045 until 2200 however stopped all unloading. The LST turned out the battle lights on it's tank deck and handling of load was impossible. The LSM began making smoke while beached and was directed to retract as a precautionary measure against counter landing through this cover.

Unloading resumed at 2200.

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S. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-6 day:

- (a) Surf conditions unchanged from previous day. Ponton barge adrift in surf at roadway unloading point on Yellow 1 threatened to stop operations at the point. Repeated requests made for salvage craft.

Ammunition resupply ship to be unloaded into DUKWs. Division Shore Party Commander directed orally by D-4 to coordinate activities of 4th Division DUKWs and unloading therefrom. DUKW liaison officer furnished to Division Shore Party Commander.

As of 1400, redesignation of south portion of Yellow 1 and north portion of Red 2 as Black Beach, to operate under 3rd Marine Division control. Shore Party, 21st Marines, released to 3rd Marine Division.

T. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-6 day:

- (a) Unloading proceeded normally throughout the day until 1400 when Shore Party RCT-21 reverted to 3rd Marine Division control. The left flank of Yellow Beach 1 was redesignated as part of Black Beach and assigned to that Division.

"C" Company, 133 NCB was moved to Yellow 2 to relieve Shore Party of RCT-21 and Company Commander of "C" Company, 133 NCB, was named Shore Party Commander of Yellow 2. Personnel of Yellow 1 Shore Party were moved to center of Yellow 1 and beach continued to operate from that point. The evacuation station on Yellow 1 was located on Black Beach and was to remain there to be operated jointly by both units.

At 2000, 20 mm and 40 mm fire began to fall in beach area but subsided after about 30 minutes causing no damage.

U. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-6 day:

- (a) At 0215 a report from 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion indicated contact with small group of enemy swimmers in vicinity of quarry. Shore Party personnel not engaged in unloading were alerted. The report was further checked with RCT-24, RCT-25, and through the Division Shore Party with the D-3. A small skirmish, in which three of the enemy were killed and the remaining four dispersed, appeared to be the outcome. Word of the incident had been passed to the Beachmaster to alert his crew. Using his bullhorn he inadvertently magnified the incident in his announcement to a "break through" on the right flank causing consternation and alarm among troops on the beach. This resulted in strict Shore Party control of the use of the speaker system for all but unloading directions.

The unloading in course of the morning proved slow. Request for up to six ships of any type and placed with Beachmaster. Blue

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Control announced that there were none available. Two enemy shells landed on Blue Beach 1 in the course of the morning but did no damage.

Two LCTs carrying returning casualties and remaining equipment, supplies, and ship's platoon personnel from AKA 66 and APA 206 reached the beach in the late afternoon.

A flash red at 1900 caused no delay except that one LCT on beach retracted and was immediately directed to return to beach.

V. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-7 day:

- (a) Surf of increasing volume. LCMs could be handled only with considerable risk of broaching even when anchored to tractors. Conditions suitable for larger craft. Derelict pontoon barge removed from Yellow 1. Considerable difficulty was experienced this date in getting craft sent to Blue Beaches which, for this reason, operated at about 25% of Shore Party capacity.

W. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-7 day:

- (a) Control was notified at 0800 to commence landing Construction Battalion equipment as available and thirty men were released from the Shore Party to the 133 NCB to operate it's dump. The sporadic mortar fire which had fallen daily on the beaches, became intense at 1000 causing light casualties to personnel. Additional equipment was dispatched to Division Dump to expand facilities there. Two large cranes received from 8th Field Depot were assigned to the dump. Unloading activity on both beaches was normal throughout the afternoon and night. Fifty percent of LVTs of 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion were assigned to 3rd Marine Division and caused unloading to slow up during afternoon.

X. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-7 day:

- (a) Unloading throughout day proceeded quite heavily. Four LSMs, 1 LST, and 4 LCTs plus many LCMs carrying remnants of 4th Marine Division cargo, were unloaded. All Blue Beach Shore Party vehicles, plus 10 trucks from Corps Shore Party, and 12 LVTs were kept busy. Two additional cranes were obtained from Corps to facilitate handling heavier cargo in LSMs. The first indication of Island Command equipment was noted in gear marked for 21st NCB and rear echelon gear for 133 NCB. Opening of the quarry for obtaining clay for beach roads was discussed with Engineers. Enemy fire in greatest intensity of past four days broke out at 2000 and continued for 30 minutes. Damage occurred to a Motor

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Transport Battalion wrecking truck in vicinity of Shore Party fuel dumps. An armored dozer was dispatched but fire had gone out without materially endangering dumps. Work had not stopped on Blue Beach 2 and was resumed on Blue Beach 1 at 2045.

Y. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-8 day:

(a) Unloading to continue from LCTs or larger craft.

Z. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-8 day:

(a) Unloading proceeded normally throughout the day. All Shore Party trucks were assigned to Yellow 1 and all available LVTs to Yellow 2. Majority of unloading was confined to fuel and ammunition. Some garrison forces supplies began to land and required hauling to Green Beach thus tying up available trucks and LVTs. Short bursts of 20 mm and 40 mm fire falling on beach at 2030 did no damage, but had harassing effect and caused craft to retract.

AA. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-8 day:

(a) Small arms fire and mortar fire in vicinity of beached LST on Beach Blue 2 where unloading of 80 octane gasoline was proceeding necessitated backing off the LST at 0230. Apparently all assault force supplies had landed for unloading seemed to be entirely Island Command material and equipment at this point. Unloading continued normally. Road construction in area of Blue Beaches was greatly enhanced by landing of an LSM of beach mat on Blue Beach 1. Corps Shore Party assumed responsibility for beach road on Blue 1; Engineers, for road from quarry to airfield, and the Shore Party for all other roads in beach and dump area plus proposed construction of two clayed landing points seventy-five yards wide. Engineers announced that quarry would be opened D-plus-9 day.

BB. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-9 day:

(a) Directed by Corps Shore Party to furnish ship platoons for 13 LSMs or LCTs and 2 LSTs on basis of 20 men per LSM or LCT and 40 men per LST. Yellow Beach Shore Party Commander directed to furnish 180 men from 133 NCB. Blue Beach Shore Party Commander directed to furnish 160 men from "D" Company, 133 NCB. Total personnel required: 340.

CC. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-9 day:

(a) The 1st Platoon of the 442 Army Port Company reported from Blue Beach and was sent to RCT-23. At 1200, an order was received from Division Shore Party Commander to embark Shore Party personnel on LSMs and LSTs to act as ship's platoons on basis of 20 men

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APPENDIX 1-13 OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

per LSM and 40 men per LST. A total of 7 LSMs and 1 LST to be manned by personnel of Yellow Beaches.

Shore Party Motor Transport Section reported all vehicles operative except four trucks and two tractors damaged beyond repair. Salvage of wrecked vehicles in beach area 90% completed.

Unloading on Yellow Beach 1 decreased throughout the day and by 1900 no ships were on the beach. Control reported no ships available until morning.

Ship's platoons placed aboard three LSMs and one LST during the day.

DD. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-9 day:

- (a) Unloading proceeded normally throughout the day. Construction was begun in clay surfacing all roads in vicinity of beach and leveling two 75 yard wide unloading points with a possible third for Division reembarkation. Shore Party was to devote 2 dump trucks to continuous hauling of clay for beach roads; other vehicles as they could be spared. Engineers were unable to work quarry at night consequently limiting Shore Party construction of landing points and roads to periods when unloading was heaviest.

"D" Company, 133 NCB, attached to Blue Beach Shore Party were directed to put men aboard designated LCTs, LSMs, and LSTs.

Except for equipment operators and truck drivers, all NCB personnel from Blue Beaches became ship's platoons.

EE. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-10 day:

- (a) Division ordnance representative directed to secure from ammunition resupply ship at 1445.

442 Army Port Company transferred to Division Shore Party control at 1500. Company Headquarters and one platoon to report in morning. Company assigned to work Division Dump under direction of Yellow Beach Shore Party Commander.

Enemy shelling in vicinity of Division Shore Party CP at 1600 caused casualties among replacement personnel.

FF. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-10 day:

- (a) At 0800 Control reported presence of sand bar off Yellow 1 would prevent further use of that beach by LSMs and LSTs. An LCT which attempted to land beached, was unloaded, and abandoned on the beach.

At 1000, the 2nd Platoon of the Army Port Company landed and was sent to Division Dump to work as dump labor detail.

At 1200, unloading on Yellow 1 was completed and Shore Party conducted salvage operations on beach during remainder of the day. Notified by Division Shore Party Commander at 1500 that 442 Army Port Company now under Division Shore Party control and assigned

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)
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to the Division Dump. The 1st Platoon of the Army Port Company moved to Division Dump from RCT-23 dump at 1600.

GG. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-10 day:

(a) At 0250 a flash red caused 2 LSMs on beach to make smoke and an LST to turn off its tank deck battle lights. LSMs were directed to retract and unloading at all points ceased. A gas alert passed at 0340 from Division was not relayed to units of the Shore Party until verification could be obtained. An all clear on gas alarm was received at 0345.

Unloading proceeded normally throughout day. Last remnants of the Motor Transport Battalion gear reached beach. All equipment of the Division reaching beach indicated that Trans Group Baker was completely unloaded. Largest proportion of supplies and equipment arriving belonged to elements of the Island Command. Calls began coming in from Island Command elements requesting information concerning their personnel and material that may have crossed beach. Request from Blue Beach Shore Party Headquarters for assistance from various units regarding handling, supervision, and disposition of their equipment and personnel met with results that were entirely unsatisfactory. It posed an administrative and operational problem for Blue Beach Shore Party that could not be adequately handled and because of unfamiliarity with markings, units, and areas of Island Command elements, the Shore Party Dumps were rapidly filling with material that could not be identified.

At 1600, an enemy shelling in beach area, dump area, and in vicinity of Shore Party Motor Transport compound disrupted Blue Beach 1 causing casualties among replacement personnel attached to Shore Party. Work on beach resumed by 1615.

Naval gunfire illumination was being wind-blown into Shore Party dumps behind Beach Blue 2 threatening fire in the fuel and ammunition. The Naval Gunfire Officer of RCT-25 was contacted and adjustment was made. The threat was removed by 2130.

A flash red occurred at 2200 and the all clear at 2400. The same condition as heretofore prevailed. LSMs began making smoke while still beached. Beachmaster instead of ordering retraction, advised LSMs to cease smoking. The LSMs complied with this order and work continued.

HH. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-11 day:

(a) No comment.

II. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-11 day:

(a) Company Commander and remainder of Army Port Company reported in

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APPENDIX I OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

from Blue Beach at 0800. He was ordered to report to Division Dump, assume command of 1st and 2nd Platoons, and work as directed by Shore Party Officer-in-Charge.

Salvage operations continued on Yellow 1 during the day. No craft attempted to land.

Unloading on Yellow 2 proceeded normally during day. Two drifting ponton barges threatened to block beach, and salvage vessel was requested at 1200.

The Force Beachmaster relieved Trans Group Baker Beach Parties at 1500, and repeated requests to control for salvage vessel to move derelict pontoon barges. At 1600 barges were blocking Yellow 2 to extent that only 1 LSM could beach at a time. Unloading virtually stopped during the night.

JJ. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-11 day:

- (a) By 0100 all LSMs had been unloaded and beach was clear of all ships. Blue control announced no prospects for any more ships during night.

An awkwardly loaded LST carrying extremely heavy crates of Island Command construction materials and equipment reached the beach at 0600. A request was placed with Corps Shore Party for a finger lift (LST finger lift was loaded behind crates on tank deck).

Army Garrison Transportation Group Officers investigated beaches discussing Shore Party procedure preparatory to taking over. Shore Party Commander for Island Command remained with Blue Beach Shore Party Headquarters for observation.

All unloading was Garrison Force equipment, personnel, and supplies. With exception of gear aboard LST 928, unloading proceeded normally. Guides from various units claiming materials unloaded, assisted considerably in keeping Shore Party Dumps clear, but the problem in long hauls for trucks and LVTs tied up transportation.

A twenty minute flash red at 2135 caused same difficulty as previously noted. Smoking was ordered to cease and the LST was directed to leave it's battle lights on so that unloading could proceed.

KK. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-12 day:

- (a) No comment.

LL. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-12 day:

- (a) Activity on Yellow Beach 1 confined to salvage and construction of roads on beach area. The Beachmaster was secured by Force

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ANNEX I TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Beachmaster indicating that Navy would not send any more ships to that beach. Plans were made to move part of personnel to Yellow 2 to assist there.

Salvage operations by the Shore Party on Yellow 2 succeeded in clearing ponton barge from beach and permitted LSMs to resume landing. Beach was in full operation throughout the day. All of the cargo being unloaded was property of Garrison Force units. Difficulty in locating units and organizational dumps slowed down unloading. Lack of area on Yellow 2 for establishing miscellaneous dumps necessitated hauling to units of Garrison when possible.

MM. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-12 day:

- (a) No comment.

NN. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-13 day:

- (a) Effective 1200, 3rd Marine Division Shore Party directed by Corps Shore Party Commander to take over and operate Beach Yellow 1. "A" Company, 4th Pioneer Battalion released from Beach Yellow 1 and assigned to Shore Party Commander of Blue Beaches. 4th Pioneer Battalion basic element to operate Blue Beaches under direction of Blue Beach Shore Party Commander. 133 Naval Construction Battalion (less "D" Company) basic element to operate Beach Yellow 2 under direction of Yellow Beach Shore Party Commander.

OO. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-13 day:

- (a) 0800 notified by Division Shore Party that remainder of Yellow 1 was to be assigned to 3rd Marine Division. Elements of 4th Division Shore Party to secure as relieved by 3rd Marine Division. At 1200, Yellow Beach 1 was transferred to 3rd Marine Division. "A" Company, 4th Pioneer Battalion, moved to Blue Beach and "A" and "B" Companies of the 133 NCB were assigned to Yellow 2. Yellow Beach now operated entirely by personnel of 133 NCB.

PP. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-13 day:

- (a) Normal unloading throughout day. Received additional personnel from an Army Port Company to assist in labor on beaches. Difficulty was encountered with transportation via LVTs and trucks to operational areas of units to whom materials, equipment and supplies are being delivered. Beach Blue 2 was without trucks for a period of two and one-half hours awaiting the return of transportation assigned to hauling for Island Command elements from beaches to west side of Airfield #1. Also many Army vehicles arrived at beach from ship without any operators,

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

tying up Shore Party vehicles because a Shore Party driver had to be put aboard to handle unloading and disposition of each vehicle.

"A" Company, 4th Pioneer Battalion, was released from Yellow Beaches, and assigned to Shore Party on Blue Beaches.

A message received at 2105 from Headquarters of the Island Command permitted dim lights in hauling. At the time of receipt this appeared unsafe in vicinity of Blue 2 so limitation was placed upon interpretation of the order. However, lights below deck level on LSMs were permitted, greatly facilitating night unloading of these craft.

QQ. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-14 day:
 - (a) No comment.

RR. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-14 day:
 - (a) No comment.

SS. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-14 day:
 - (a) Unloading proceeded normally.

At 2010 activity to seaward off quarry in vicinity of hydrographic survey LCMs was investigated. Report received indicated small arms fire and blinking lights were being used to indicate an LCM had broken away from it's mooring and was adrift with an inoperative motor.

TT. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-15 day:
 - (a) No comment.

UU. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-15 day:
 - (a) Unloading normal. Considerable difficulty was experienced in locating Garrison Force dumps. Headquarters and 1st Platoon of the Army Port Company were released from Division Dump and sent to Blue Beach. Activity in Division Dump confined to unloading ammunition which was arriving from west beaches.

VV. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-15 day:
 - (a) Unloading proceeded normally.

WW. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-16 day:
 - (a) No comment.

XX. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-16 day:
 - (a) No comment.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION ORDER - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

YY. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-16 day:

- (a) With exception of difficulty with lifts requiring a 20 ton boom (Le Tourneau Crane) causing delay in unloading one LSM on beach, unloading proceeded normally.

ZZ. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-17 day:

- (a) Informed orally by Corps Shore Party Commander that 4th Marine Division to be released from Shore Party activities at 0800, 9 March.
Division Shore Party Commander attended conference at 2000 at Division Headquarters with ACofS, D-4 and the CofS regarding the organization and employment of 4th Pioneer Battalion upon release from Shore Party activities.

AAA. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-17 day:

- (a) Unloading normal. Notified at 1800 that Garrison Forces would take control of beaches 0800 D-plus-18. 133 NCB to revert to Garrison Force control at that time.

BBB. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-17 day:

- (a) Notified at 1800 that Garrison Forces would take control of beaches at 0800, 9 March, 1945.

CCC. Division Shore Party (General):

1. D-plus-18 day:

- (a) 0700 Battalion Commander, 4th Pioneer Battalion, called conference of company commanders and staff officers regarding organization and mission of 4th Pioneer Battalion on release from Shore Party activities.
0800 All Shore Party activities taken over by Army Garrison Force. 4th Pioneer Battalion reverted to Division control.
Division Shore Party disbanded.

DDD. Yellow Beaches:

1. D-plus-18 day:

- (a) 0800 relieved by Army Garrison Force Shore Party.

EEE. Blue Beaches:

1. D-plus-18 day:

- (a) 0800 relieved by Army Garrison Force Shore Party.

V - Comments and Observations on Related Items Affecting Shore Party Operations:

A. Casualties:

1. By units:

- (a) 4th Pnr Bn - 18 officers and 220 enlisted.
- (b) 133 NCB - 10 officers and 220 enlisted.
- (c) 1st JASCo - 2 officers and 41 enlisted.

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TO AMEMB LOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

2. By beaches:

- (a) Yellow - 17 officers and 282 enlisted.
- (b) Blue - 13 officers and 196 enlisted.
- (c) Division Shore Party Headquarters - 0 officers and 3 enlisted.

B. Beach Conditions:

1. Grade and Surface:

- (a) Beach Yellow 1 had a slope of 10-50% from water's edge to toe of terrace, but other beaches had much more abrupt slopes (30-150%). The conformation of the beaches changed constantly and rapidly by surf action and quickly filled in areas of beach which were partially blocked by disabled craft and vehicles. The surface of all beaches consisted of a thick layer of fine volcanic cinders which closely resembled coarse sand. This surface would not support wheeled traffic until it had become somewhat compacted, and due to excessive slopes combined with the loose surface, some areas would not accomodate tracked vehicular traffic.

2. Surf, type of carft that could be landed:

- (a) The surf was generally high on all beaches but was especially high when the wind was from an easternly direction. LSTs and LSMs could be landed at all times, but LCMs and smaller craft could be landed only with extreme difficulty under the best surf conditions. LCTs could be used except when surf was running at its highest, but only if anchored ashore by deadmen and if kept free of backwash from larger beached craft.

3. Obstructions - broached craft, vessels, etc:

- (a) The beaches were blocked by broached enemy vessels at the points noted on enclosure (A). By noon of D-plus-1 our disabled craft and vehicles had blocked approximately 75 percent of the tenable beaches, and had to be cleared before large scale unloading could be started. Due to the tactical situation Blue Beach 2 and part of Blue Beach 1 were not tenable at this time.

4. Enemy obstacles - mines:

- (a) Mine fields located from one hundred to three hundred yards inland from the beaches and generally paralleling them restricted Shore Party activities. Mines had to be located and removed before dumps and roads could be developed.

C. Enemy Action Affecting Unloading, General Comments:

- 1. Shore Party personnel were subjected to heavy periodic artillery, mortar, and small arms fire during the first five days of the operation; thereafter, until D-plus-10, they were subjected to spasmodic mortar, artillery, small arms, and sniper fire. On D-plus-2, accurate mortar and artillery fire destroyed practically all supplies as fast as they were landed on Blue Beach 1, and on this account it became necessary to land a greater part of the supplies required for the period over the Yellow Beaches. Due to enemy action initially and the subsequent lack of shipping, Blue Beach 2 was never fully developed for unloading

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

supplies. Generally, enemy fire caused heavy casualties in Shore Party personnel, limited unloading during the first two days to the highest priority cargo, and seriously delayed general unloading.

D. Use of LVTs and DUKWs:

1. Initial use:

(a) LVTs and DUKWs were employed in the early phases of the operation to transport priority supplies from ship to shore and to move badly needed items from the beaches to the front. LVTs were also employed for defense of the beaches, and along with the DUKWs were used to evacuate casualties.

2. Use during the general unloading:

(a) During this phase of the operation LVTs and DUKWs continued to be employed as in the early phases of the operation when required for such missions. However, during this period they were committed largely to moving supplies from landing craft and vessels to the beach and inland dumps. Both LVTs and DUKWs proved well adapted for unloading from LCTs, LSMs, and LSTs. Due to the speed of the seagoing DUKWs on land and in water and further due to their ability to launch and land under adverse surf conditions, they were found to be very effective in evacuating casualties and were used constantly for this purpose. It is to be noted in this connection that the prime mission of the DUKWs was transporting ammunition for the artillery and they were used for other unloading of supplies only when made available to the Shore Party by the artillery.

3. Liaison:

(a) Each Amphibian Tractor Battalion furnished a liaison officer to its respective RCT Shore Party. These liaison officers maintained contact with the Shore Parties, and directed the activities of the LVTs on the beach. This liaison was adequate and effective. Liaison for DUKWs was established at the DUKW landing points on the beach when and as required, and was also found to be adequate.

E. Operation Of Beach Dumps w/Locations:

1. The beach dumps for Yellow Beaches were established as noted on enclosure (A). They were initially operated by quartermaster personnel from RCT-23, assisted by personnel from the Shore Party. On D-plus-4, Division dumps were established and on D-plus-5, the Division Quartermaster assumed control and, assisted by Shore Party personnel, operated them. Continuing from this time, all Division supplies landed on Yellow Beaches were moved directly from the beach to the Division dump.
2. Dumps established behind Blue Beaches, as noted on enclosure (A), were initially operated by Shore Party personnel. On D-plus-5, operation of dumps was turned over to personnel of the 8th Field Depot assigned by the Division Shore Party Commander to work Blue Beaches under the direction of the Blue Beach Shore Party Commander. Control of dumps was

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OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

maintained by Blue Beach Shore Party Headquarters, and additional working personnel were furnished to dumps by this headquarters from attached elements of Replacement Drafts. Rations, water, and designated types of ammunition were transferred from Blue Beach dumps to the Division dump commencing D-plus-6 day.

F. Traffic Control in Beach Areas Including Dumps:

1. Traffic control was established in the beach and dump areas by the Shore Party Commanders, and was enforced by the MPs assigned for Shore Party duties. Later they were supplemented by personnel from Corps Shore Party MPs.

G. Steps Taken To Improve Beach Roads and Unloading Points:

1. Initially beach roads and landing points were constructed by BLT Shore Parties and were surfaced with beach matting as equipment, personnel, and matting became available. Later, beach lateral roads along most beach areas were surfaced with beach matting by the 8th Field Depot. In the meantime, Shore Party personnel, assisted by the 4th Engineer Battalion, proceeded to surface the landing points and more important roads in the beach and dump areas with clay, finally replacing the beach matting on Blue Beaches with clay.

H. Fire (Damage) Control and Preventative Measures:

1. Comment on effectiveness of naval fire fighting equipment:
 - (a) Naval fire fighting equipment proved largely ineffective in control of fires on the beach due to the fact that it required too much time to summon such equipment through channels and get it to the scene of the fire. When on station, however, it proved of great value.
2. Preventive and control measures exercised:
 - (a) Normally revetments were prepared prior to delivery of supplies to dumps. Very inflammable materials in congested areas were covered with earth. Water pumps as available were placed at central points and made ready, and tractor dozers were held available at dump locations for action against fires. No occasion arose which required the use of the water pumps, subsequent to the time such pumps were available, but tractor dozers proved effective in fighting several small fires.

I. Salvage:

1. Friendly material:
 - (a) Shore Parties commenced salvage operation on D-day. Initially, troop combat equipment was collected, conditioned, and turned over to the RCTs, and naval equipment was delivered to the Beach masters. Later, supplies and equipment for troops were collected and delivered to the Division Salvage Officer; naval equipment continued to be delivered to the Beachmasters.
2. Enemy material:
 - (a) Very little encountered.

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OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

3. Salvage of wrecked craft and its effect upon Shore Party operations:

- (a) On D-day, Shore Parties started salvaging wrecked and disabled tracked and wheeled vehicles from the beaches and continued until the beaches were largely clear of the latter. Wrecked LVTs, LVTAs, and tanks were beyond the capacity of Shore Party salvage equipment. The vehicles salvaged were moved inland from the beaches so that owners could recondition and reclaim same.
- (b) Naval personnel commenced clearing the beaches of disabled floating craft on D-plus-2 and continued until the beaches were largely clear. It is to be noted in this connection that the demolition method of destroying boats on the beaches is not very satisfactory due to the fact that the motors and keels are generally left undemolished and form navigational hazards which in many cases are more dangerous to landing operations than the original craft.
- (c) The salvage of wrecked craft by the Shore Parties and naval personnel delayed the unloading of supplies because of the fact that considerable personnel and equipment were required from the Shore Parties to affect the salvage, and further because unloading operations were interrupted by the firing of each demolition charge. Considerable delay was experienced in suitable naval salvage craft reporting to station. The vast extent of salvage activities and also breakage of lines which eventually resulted in an acute shortage of these items further slowed progress in salvage operations.

J. Employment of Wharfs, Piers, Ponton Docks, etc:

- 1. Surf and beach conditions did not permit their use.

K. Effectiveness and Adequacy of Ship to Shore Cargo Control:

- 1. In numerous instances during the course of the operation, low priority supplies were sent ashore in lieu of high priority cargo which had been requested. Selective unloading continued beyond the period of any preconceived plan, and the above statement is made to describe a situation which resulted primarily from these circumstances and not to censure the system of control.
- 2. On the other hand, Shore Parties frequently received information from control vessels that certain priority supplies had been dispatched to the beaches. When these supplies did not arrive on the beaches, there was no satisfactory means available to trace the cargo beyond the control vessel. It is, therefore, recommended that a more suitable system of communications be established between the beaches and traffic control boats and that a tender be made available to each RCT and Division beach on station close to shore twenty-four hours a day. This boat would be used by a Shore Party representative for checking on boated cargo in the vicinity of the traffic control boat.

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3. It is also felt that naval personnel particularly should be thoroughly indoctrinated with the conception that during the early phase of an amphibious operation the primary consideration is not to unload ships but is to place at the disposal of troops ashore those supplies they request. It follows then that control must keep the Shore Party Commanders informed at all times as to the status of requests for priority cargo.
 4. Subject to the above comments, ship to shore cargo control was, from the point of view of the Shore Party, considered adequate.
- L. Provisions For Beach Dump and Rear Area Defense:
1. Each Shore Party unit established all-around security and coordinated their security with adjacent Shore Parties and other units so that an all-around security system was established for the entire beach and dump areas. The main lines of Shore Party defense were to seaward and to the Division north flank. LVTs and LVTAs supplemented the beach defenses particularly on the north flank.
- M. Use of 8th Field Depot Personnel and Equipment Within the Shore Party:
1. How employed:
 - (a) Yellow Beaches:
 - (1) The personnel furnished for these beaches consisted of two beach teams and one dump team of about 2 officers and 30 enlisted in each. The beach teams were used for checking supplies as they crossed the beach, and the dump team was employed in the operation of the dumps.
 - (b) Blue Beaches:
 - (1) One beach team, one dump team, one ammunition platoon (2-65) and one depot company (3-147) were furnished to these beaches. The beach team, dump team, and ammunition platoon were used to operate the dumps; the depot company was employed as working details on the beach.
 2. Additional facilities:
 - (a) Additional personnel and equipment of the 8th Field Depot, operating under Corps Shore Party Control, developed beach areas and assisted in Shore Party activities in the Division zone of action as requested.
 3. Effectiveness:
 - (a) The Corps Shore Party reinforcing elements assigned to this Division and the manner in which they performed their duties contributed substantially to the efficient handling of supplies within the Division beach and dump areas.
- N. Use of Divisional Replacements:
1. Ship Platoons:
 - (a) Replacements initially were assigned as Ship Platoons on all APAs on the basis of one officer and twenty men per hold, two men per

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - TWO JIMA (CONT'D)

small boat, and one officer and twenty men per preloaded LST. They functioned as Ship Platoons until their respective ships were unloaded.

2. Ashore:

- (a) The problem of organizing, disposing of, and applying the efforts of such disjointed units combined with the immediate requirements for them by RCTs precluded efficient application of replacement personnel in Shore Party activities ashore.

O. Function of the Shore Party as a Supply Agency:

1. Yellow Beaches:

- (a) Issue from beach dumps or from beach:

- (1) The quartermaster of RCT-23 was on the beach during the first four days of the operation and relieved the Shore Party of supply functions for that RCT. Supplies landed were placed in RCT dumps and issues were made from that point. However, during the earlier phases of the operation some supplies were issued to units of RCT-24 from the beach. Artillery ammunition landed was loaded on artillery vehicles at the beach. After Division dumps were established on D-plus-5, issues were made by the Division Quartermaster from these dumps; artillery ammunition continued to be claimed at the beach by the 14th Marines.

- (b) Method or plan for coordinating of supply:

- (1) Initially requests were submitted through the RQMs. Later, when division dumps were established, requests were submitted by RCTs through the Division Quartermaster. Liaison was maintained with the 14th Marines during all phases of the operation to insure expeditious delivery of artillery ammunition landed.

- (c) Experienced QM personnel:

- (1) Division Quartermaster personnel attached to the Shore Party were assigned to RCT-23 dumps on D-plus-1, and further assigned to division dumps on D-plus-5.

2. Blue Beaches:

- (a) Issue from beach dumps or from beach:

- (1) Requests for supplies from the Shore Party dumps were initially received by radio, telephone, or runner from units as small as companies of RCT-25 and RCT-24. If the request could be met from supplies ashore an LVT was dispatched to the requesting unit with as much of the required material as could be made available. Guides were furnished by the unit placing request or were obtained from Shore Party personnel. Normally the smaller units made no demand for supplies but were interested only in obtaining weapons that the Shore Party had salvaged. Organizations such as tank

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APPENDIX I TO AMFLEX DOC, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

companies, rocket detachments, engineer platoons, and communication sections required supplies that had not accumulated on beaches. Requests of this nature and coordinated requests from BLT and RCT quartermasters were relayed as priority requirements to Blue Control for earliest dispatch to beach.

- (2) Enemy activity, surf conditions, and abnormal use of certain types of ammunition plus destruction of beach supplies by fire necessitated a priority unloading routine that extended for four days. Beyond D-plus-3, materials had accumulated in protected dumps and it was only an occasional priority request that required action by Blue Control.
- (b) Method or plan for coordinating of supply:
- (1) Ammunition of all types, fuel, and salvaged equipment were issued without accountability. An attempt at control of rations and water, though never critical items, was maintained by requiring an officer's signature on any request granted. An officer's signature plus some semblance of an organizational request for a company or larger were requirements levelled at straggler control and at precluding constant issue to individuals. No attempt was made to portion or record supplies drawn from dumps. Strict control was exercised over the issue of post exchange supplies and fruit juices. A signed request from the RCT quartermaster, countersigned by RCT Shore Party Commander was necessary before rations of this type could be drawn from dumps. This assured comparatively equal distribution.
- (c) Experienced QM personnel:
- (1) At no time did Division Quartermaster personnel operate from Blue Beach dumps. However, by D-plus-7 all supplies of an issue nature received on Blue Beaches and similar supplies already in dumps were transferred to Division Quartermaster dumps.
 - (2) Military Police attached to Blue Beach Shore Party by RCT-25 were used extensively in guarding ration, water, post exchange, and clothing dumps.

P. Shore Party Communications:-

1. During the early phases of the operation, the RCT Shore Party Commanders and the Division Shore Party Commander were aboard the respective control vessels. Although the Shore Party lateral net was available for the exclusive use of the Shore Party, no direct radio communications existed between the Shore Party Commanders afloat and Shore Party elements ashore. Naval communications and tactical channels were found inadequate to handle the traffic between the several echelons of

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APPENDIX 1 TO JNRC LOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Shore Party Command during this period. It is therefore considered imperative that space be allowed aboard the several control vessels to enable the Shore Party Commanders afloat to man radio equipment for keeping in communication with their units on the beach.

2. On D-plus-2, Division Shore Party Headquarters ashore established communications with the Division logistical representative aboard the Division control vessel by TBX over the Division logistical control net.
3. Although the Division Shore Party continued to guard the Division logistical control net and all Shore Party elements continued to guard the Shore Party lateral net, after Division Headquarters landed on D-plus-4 radio was almost entirely replaced by previously operative wire communications.
4. Shore Party communications were furnished by nine Shore Party communication teams of one officer and nineteen men, each from 1st JASCo. The Commanding Officer of 1st JASCo was Division Shore Party Communication Officer. One team was assigned to Division Shore Party Headquarters, one to each assault RCT Shore Party Headquarters, and one to each BLT Shore Party of the assault RCTs.
5. Subject to the opening remark above, Shore Party communications were considered excellent.
6. For further information on Shore Party communication see ANNEX LOVE, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, ATTACHED JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY REPORT.

Q. Garrison Force Shore Party:

1. At 0800, 9 March, the Garrison Forces took over the operation of the Division beaches. During a forty-eight hour period prior to this time no less than three Garrison Force officers reported to the Division Shore Party Commander that each was to take over on the Division Beaches as Shore Party Commander. In each case the officer requested assistance, advice, and information preparatory to taking over control. These requests were willingly fulfilled at the expenditure of a considerable amount of valuable time. Yet in no instance did one of these officers have any information as to what personnel or equipment would be available to him, nor had he formulated any plan for his operation of the beaches. That this situation caused considerable delay and wasted effort is self evident.
2. It is, therefore, considered essential that prior to any future operation the Garrison Force Shore Party Commander, in conjunction with the Landing Force Shore Party Commander, consider a plan whereby the former accedes to control of the beaches. Such a plan should be set out in sufficient detail as to apply to the transition on the various subdivisions of the beaches.

VI - Comments and Recommendations:

A. Shore Party Organization:

1. Comment:

(a) The numerical strength of the Division Shore Party was increased

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APPENDIX I TO AMEMB LOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

by elements of the Corps Shore Party was sufficient to support the operation. A temporary organization made up basically of the organic Pioneer Battalion and an attached Naval Construction Battalion or any other temporarily attached unit is not satisfactory and does not meet the requirements of an efficient Shore Party. It is apparent that training a Shore Party for one operation is of no future benefit to the Division and is in fact a detriment. Neither is it of any lasting benefit to the attached unit so trained, and is, from their point of view, a waste of valuable time they might better spend preparing for the execution of their primary mission. Each time an inexperienced unit is attached to the Division for Shore Party activities the Pioneer Battalion must of necessity devote a large portion of its own training period to instructing and attempting to indoctrinate the attached unit. Furthermore, unless the same Shore Party organization functions on a permanent basis from operation to operation its combat proficiency can never be improved.

It must be noted that for each operation in which this Division has been engaged a different Shore Party organization has been employed. The Division is now faced again with organizing and training a Shore Party anew for a future operation. The Division Shore Party as such, therefore, has received no benefit from the past combat experience of the Division. It has, on the contrary, suffered heavy casualties among experienced Pioneer Battalion personnel; casualties brought about largely by spreading experienced men and officers thinly throughout the entire Division Shore Party to control, direct, and reinforce inexperienced units

2. Recommendations:

- (a) It is recommended that a permanent organization of size and composition adequate to furnish the basic elements of a Division Shore Party be authorized each Marine Division. The present Pioneer Battalion meets neither of these requirements.

A suggested organization to meet the minimum requirements in keeping with the above recommendation is a small Shore Party regiment consisting of a Headquarters and Service Company and two Pioneer Battalions. The composition of each battalion in both equipment and personnel should be similar to those of the present Pioneer Battalion. Headquarters and Service Company of the regiment should be similar in organization to that of the Headquarters and Service Company of the present Pioneer Battalion.

B. Shore Party Equipment:

1. Comment:

- (a) The equipment of the Pioneer Battalion alone is insufficient to operate a Division beach. It is in fact approximately the amount

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

required to operate a Regimental Beach.

The TD-9 shovel loader is of little value for beach operations except as modified with an "A" frame crane attachment. Even then it is too light and lacks the advantages of a swing crane. On the Iwo Jima operation, however, two Shore Party shovel loaders were used to load clay for road and beach development. Finger lift attachments were not employed.

Under present allowances, no Pioneer Battalion tractors are equipped with winches. On Iwo Jima, as on previous operations there was a definite need for heavy tractors with winches for the salvage of vehicles and other heavy machinery in the beach area. These are also invaluable for discharging heavy loads which must be "snaked" or skidded off landing craft.

2. Recommendations:

- (a) That two, one-half or three-quarter cubic yard capacity shovel cranes be added to the authorized allowance of each Pioneer Company and that two TD-9 shovel loaders be deleted therefrom.
- (b) That one heavy tractor (TD-18) with large, slow speed, single drum, back take-off winch be added to the authorized allowance of each Pioneer Company.

C. Ship to Shore Movement:

1. Comment:

- (a) Elements of the Shore Party, particularly the BLT Shore Party reconnaissance sections landed on the beaches before they could serve any useful purpose. This resulted in early excessive casualties among officers and other key Shore Party personnel. In all instances the reconnaissance sections consisting of key specialists were virtually annihilated. Of four BLT Shore Party Commanders, three became casualties very soon after landing and the same ratio existed among BLT Beachmasters. The landing of Shore Party equipment was from small craft and LSMs as required and on the whole was satisfactory.

2. Recommendations:

- (a) Since the reconnaissance sections of the Shore Party serve no useful purpose that cannot be accomplished when the main elements of the Shore Party land, it is recommended that these sections land on call with the remainder of the Shore Party.

D. Employment of LSMs for landing cargo:

1. Comment:

- (a) The service rendered by the LSMs in landing cargo cannot be overstated. Some difficulty, however, was experienced in operating cranes within the confined space of the well deck.

2. Recommendations:

- (a) The suggestion that a travelling crane be installed on the port side of the LSM is submitted for consideration. If such a modif-

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APPENDIX I TO THE JIMA OPERATION REPORT - TWO JIMA (CONT'D)

ication is feasible it will materially enhance the unloading of these craft ashore.

VII - Employment of 4th Pioneer Battalion Subsequent to Termination of Shore Party Activities:

Upon reversion of the 4th Pioneer Battalion to Division Control at 0800, 9 March, 1945, the following reorganization, based on personnel and equipment then available was effected.

A. Organization:

1. Engineer and Maintenance Units:

- (a) Officer-in-Charge - Battalion Engineer Officer.
- (b) Personnel - 4 officers and 90 enlisted; consisting of equipment operators, maintenance personnel, commissary personnel, and other specialists who could not be employed within the tactical organization.
- (c) Equipment:
 - (1) 11 tractors with dozers.
 - (2) 14 cranes.
 - (3) 3 trucks, 1-ton.
 - (4) 10 trucks, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, dump.
 - (5) 1 truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, cargo.
 - (6) 5 trucks, 1/4 ton; 4 w/trailers.
 - (7) 5 tractors, utility.

2. Tactical Units:

- (a) Officer-in-Charge - Under normal battalion control - Battalion Commander.
- (b) Personnel - 17 officers and 380 enlisted as follows:
 - (1) Battalion Headquarters Company - 5 officers and 26 enlisted:
 - a. Communication Section - furnished by 1st JASCo, 1 officer and 30 enlisted.
 - b. Medical Section (Navy) - 1 officer and 10 enlisted. Additional enlisted from Division Surgeon on request.
 - (2) Company "A" - 3 officers and 81 enlisted, organized and equipped as follows:
 - a. Company Headquarters - 1 officer and 13 enlisted.
 - b. One (1) platoon (Rifle) - 1 officer and 44 enlisted.
 - c. LMG Section - 1 officer and 24 enlisted.
 - d. Automatic weapons:
 - 1. 4 BARs.
 - 2. 3 LMGs
 - 3. 2 .50 Cal. MGs.
 - (3) Company "B" - 5 officers and 138 enlisted, organized and equipped as follows:
 - a. Company Headquarters - 2 officers and 13 enlisted.

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IN DEPENDENT TO INDEX DOC, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

- b. First Platoon - 1 officer and 43 enlisted.
- c. Second Platoon - 1 officer and 41 enlisted.
- d. Third Platoon - 1 officer and 41 enlisted.
- e. Automatic Weapons:

- 1. 5 BARs.
- 2. 6 LMGs (1 section to each platoon).
- 3. 3 .50 Cal MGs.

- (4) Company "C" - 4 officers and 115 enlisted, organized and equipped as follows:

- a. Company Headquarters - 1 officer and 10 enlisted.
- b. First Platoon - 1 officer and 35 enlisted.
- c. Second Platoon - 1 officer and 35 enlisted.
- d. Third Platoon - 1 officer and 35 enlisted.
- e. Automatic Weapons:
 - 1. 5 BARs.
 - 2. 6 LMGs (1 section to each platoon).
 - 3. 3 .50 Cal MGs.

B. Missions:

1. Engineer and maintenance units:


- (a) Develop roads, parking areas, and landing areas for reembarking Division.
- (b) Assist Division QM in movement of Division supplies.
- (c) Assist in reembarkation of Division.

2. Tactical units:

- (a) Be prepared to assemble on one hour's notice as Division Reserve; not so committed.
- (b) Provide beach defense within Division zone.
- (c) Assist Division QM in movement of Division supplies.
- (d) Assist in reembarkation of the Division.

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**ENCLOSURE "A" TO APPENDIX I
TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION
REPORT - IWO JIMA
OVERLAY-BEACH & DUMP AREAS**

— ROADS
— BEACHED ENEMY CRAFT

REFERENCE MAP: SPECIAL AIR & GUNNERY
TARGET MAP 1:20000

NOTE: BLUE BEACHES SHOWN AS DEVELOPED.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA

MEDICAL EVACUATION REPORT

For the Iwo Jima Operation the evacuation of wounded was organized under the Shore Party Evacuation Officer, designated as the Division Evacuation Officer, assisted by four Combat Team Evacuation Medical Officers, each to be landed with their assigned corpsmen and medical supplies on each of the four assault beaches. It was planned to set up evacuation stations at strategic spots to most effectively and efficiently treat and evacuate the wounded of the division.

Accordingly, the four evacuation teams were boated with the shore party personnel supporting each of the assault landing teams, and were put ashore from 30 to 90 minutes after "H" hour. One Fourth Pioneer Medical Officer and 12 corpsmen landed at 0930 on beach yellow one under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. Almost immediately this group sustained casualties, equipment was destroyed, and they were unable to organize or establish an evacuation station. By 1100 the doctor and six corpsmen were wounded and evacuated. Four more corpsmen were killed.

At 1000 a Medical Officer, Dental Officer, and eight corpsmen of the 133rd Naval Construction Battalion landed on beach yellow two under heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire. This evacuation team was dispersed and sustained casualties so that they were never able to establish an evacuation station in their sector. By late afternoon the doctor, dentist, and five corpsmen were casualties and evacuated.

Another Fourth Pioneer Medical Officer and 14 corpsmen were landed on beach blue one at 0930 under enemy fire. By 1130 the doctor and three corpsmen were casualties and evacuated. The remaining corpsmen joined a beach party medical platoon of the USS NAPA (APA 157) and worked effectively while under direct enemy fire caring for casualties in the beach area of yellow two. The second Medical Officer and nine corpsmen of the 133rd Naval Construction Battalion were landed on beach blue one at 1100. These men were scattered and unable to organize an evacuation station due to the heavy enemy fire. By 1130 this Medical Officer was a casualty and evacuated.

At approximately 1500 on D-day the Shore Party Evacuation Officer landed on blue one with 20 replacement corpsmen and two Pioneer corpsmen. There was no equipment for establishing an independent aid station. The enemy fire in the area at this time was sporadic but effective and many casualties needed treatment on the spot. A quick reconnaissance revealed no organized evacuation of wounded on either beach blue one or yellow two. The Shore Party Evacuation Officer was unable to reach yellow one at this time. It was decided to set up an evacuation station immediately on beach blue one at the only existing road of egress from the front lines. With the aid and equipment of a beach party medical platoon of the USS SANBORN (APA 193), five of the 133rd Naval Construction Battalion corpsmen and the 20 replacement corpsmen, an aid and evacuation station was established by 1600.

Work was continuous throughout the night. It was impossible to keep adequate records the first day but it is estimated that over 200 casualties were evacuated during the first 24 hours. There were many casualties among the shore party and beach party personnel, but fortunately no one was hit in the aid station itself. By the following morning, on D-plus-1 day, a critical shortage of medical supplies existed, i.e. litters, blankets, plasma, etc., and urgent requests for re-supplies, corpsmen, and doctors were sent out at 1000 via the Beachmaster.

By 1100 on D-plus-1 another evacuation station was established on beach yellow two with two beach party medical platoons aided by six Pioneer corpsmen. The

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ENCLOSURE (B) IS ATTACHED TO ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Medical Officer, Dental Officer and eight corpsmen of the Tenth Amphibian Tractor Battalion were found operating an aid station between beaches yellow one and two. Due to their poor location away from the natural flow of evacuation they were never able to evacuate many. Since the enemy shelling continued, it was decided to leave them at their original site to treat and evacuate the wounded in that vicinity. On yellow one the surgeon of the Twenty-Third Marines and one beach party medical platoon were found evacuating for the Twenty-Third Marines. Since all the evacuation medical officers for that Regiment had been wounded and evacuated, it had been necessary for this Medical Officer to remain on the beach and evacuate. In spite of the heavy toll in casualties, (i.e.) 80% of the evacuation medical officers and approximately 50% of the corpsmen, medical evacuation stations on each of the established Fourth Marine Division assault beaches were in operation. Beach blue two was not developed until a later date.

There remained a critical shortage of medical evacuation personnel, and when "A" and "C" Medical Companies landed between 1600 and 1700 on D-plus-1 day, they were immediately assigned to evacuation stations. "A" was placed at the blue one station and "C" at the yellow two station. Shortly thereafter one-half of "C" was transferred to yellow one beach, relieving the Twenty-Third Regimental Surgeon to return to his Regimental duties. With this bolstering of personnel it was possible to begin keeping adequate records of casualties and to give more efficient treatment to the wounded.

From this time the personnel problems were never acute in the evacuation stations, and it was possible to fortify the assault teams with replacement corpsmen and docotrs. The following accounts for the personnel received and assigned by this office: at 0900 on 21 February 20 corpsmen of "D" and "E" medical companies were obtained. Ten were immediately dispatched to the Twenty-Third Regiment, and remaining ten retained at the blue one station for further assignment. Frequent requests were being received from regiments and battalions for replacement collecting sections. They were losing corpsmen rapidly as casualties. At 1300 on the 21st ten corpsmen of "E" company were sent to the Twenty-Fourth and ten men of "A" company to the Twenty-Fifth Regiments. At 1700 that date fuel and ammunition dumps were blown up about 100 yards distance from the blue one station. It was impossible to leave due to the presence of several casualties. Fires in the medical supplies from hot fragments blown from the dumps were fought until 2400. Two casualties received slight additional wounds from this but no other losses were inflicted.

On February 22, at 0845, ten corpsmen of "B" medical company were sent to the Twenty-Fourth Regiment. A request was sent to the Division Surgeon at this time for more corpsmen and medical supplies. At 1100 eight men of "E" company were assigned to the Twenty-Fifth Regiment and nine men of "D" company were sent to the Twenty-Fourth Regiment. At 1230 "A" Medical Company, minus one medical officer and 21 corpsmen, were released from beach blue one to return to the USS HINSDALE (APA 120). The others were held at the aid station to assist in evacuation.

On February 23 one Medical Officer of the Thirtieth Replacement Draft was transferred to the Twenty-Fifth Regiment. At 0730 a shelling of the beach closed the blue beach evacuation station, but casualties were removed without loss to the

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ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - TWO JIMA (CONT'D)

yellow two station for evacuation. At 1500 this date "B" Medical Company officers and men came ashore, and were assigned to work at the blue one station temporarily. At 1530 the Division Surgeon visited the station. On February 24 another medical officer of the Thirtieth Replacement Draft was transferred to the Twenty-Fifth Regiment.

Shore Party Doctors of the 21st Regiment were functioning at the yellow one station with two medical officers of "C" medical company, evacuating casualties of that Regiment as well as for some of the Fourth Marine Division. However, from this date the bulk of the Fourth Marine Division casualties were going out over the blue one station, while the yellow one station evacuated largely for the Third Marine Division. The yellow two station was never able to get many of the wounded off the beach after the first days due to the lack of boats and unsatisfactory location. At 1730 on the 24th, six men of "E" company were transferred to the Twenty-Third Regiment. On 25 February, ten men of "A" company were transferred to the Twenty-Fourth Regiment. On the 26th of February, six Thirtieth Replacement corpsmen were transferred to the Twenty-Third Regiment and the following day six more were transferred to the Twenty-Fifth Regiment.

Throughout the first 11 days of the battle the beaches were under enemy fire. Mortar, artillery, rocket and small arms fire were received at frequent intervals both day and night on and near the beaches. Shore and beach party personnel received upwards of 50% casualties. Evacuation sections received numerous casualties. On D-plus-1 day a direct hit was made in the yellow two evacuation station, killing one beach party doctor, a corpsman, and wounding several others. No patients were hit. Fortunately no other stations received direct hits, and no patients under care ever received any further serious injury. Treatment and evacuation of casualties continued unceasingly throughout the operation in the face of direct enemy fire. Many hundreds of casualties received excellent and expert first-aid and shock treatment, practically none were kept on the beaches over 30 minutes at any time, and considering the seriousness of the wounds the physical condition of the patients was excellent when they were received aboard the hospital ships.

In determining the sites of our evacuation stations several factors had to be taken into consideration. The safety factor, while of great importance, is often over-emphasized. To maintain a safe distance from enemy fields of fire, from our own ammunition and fuel dumps, and from concentrated areas that may draw enemy fire are points to consider. But to allow these factors to predominate will often leave an evacuation station isolated and ineffectual in serving its purpose. An example of this was illustrated by the Tenth Amphibian Tractor Battalion station. This was excellently sited, and was relatively safe, but it was so far from natural roads of egress and from the beach that it could never be used efficiently as an evacuation station.

On the other hand, the station on beach blue one was located primarily where casualties from the front could be readily received and just as readily evacuated. The station was placed as close to the main road leading from the beach to the front as was possible, and at the same time near where the majority of the boats bringing personnel and supplies to the beach were landing. These boats had to be obtained as opportunity presented in order to get the constant flow of casualties to the

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beach. Shore and beach parties are glad to have the station so strategically located. It simplifies their problem of furnishing boats for evacuation of wounded and for delivering incoming medical supplies.

The construction of the evacuation stations is a gradual and progressive thing. On D-day and D-plus-1 the Beach Blue One Station was located in a cleared area of approximately 30 yards long by 15 yards wide right on the beach. The only protection was a waist high revetment of sand bags on the landward side. A medical supply dump was established nearby. As time and opportunity presented, facilities were expanded and dug in deeper. When available the Shore Party furnished a Seabee platoon and bulldozer to clear and revet three areas each 20 by 30 yards. Tarpaulin were placed over each so that there were three enclosures to house casualties temporarily for first aid and shock therapy with protection against the weather. Sand bags and sand revetments provided fairly good protection against any but direct hits from enemy shell fire. Thus was established the finished evacuation station. But for the first days of the battle there was little more protection than for the other personnel ashore. There was neither time nor equipment to establish elaborate stations early in the operation. The main concern was treating and evacuating the many casualties coming to the beach continuously.

In addition to treating the casualties that funneled through 24 hours a day from the front and surrounding areas, it was our responsibility to get them evacuated safely and rapidly to the ships off shore designated to receive them. In spite of the many hazards faced, the undertaking was successful. In contrast to previous operations evacuation continued throughout the day and night from the first, and no casualty was kept on the beach for more than a few minutes unless being treated for shock. The presence of the LST(H)s off shore was a marked advance in the evacuation chain afloat. Better records were kept from the initial phases, the badly wounded were given further medical care necessary immediately, and casualties were routed directly to ships designated to receive them. This precluded the necessity of each boat load of wounded looking for a ship to take them on. Casualties evacuated at night were received and held on the LST(H)s. This alone was a great boon, for on previous operations casualties had been known to float around all night in an open boat looking for a ship to receive them.

Initially, casualties were evacuated largely by LCVPs and LCMs which had brought personnel or supplies ashore. However, after D-day these boats became increasingly difficult to obtain and very dangerous to use. Stormy weather with heavy off shore winds resulted in the broaching and loss of many LCVPs and LCMs. By manning bow lines and loading the boats rapidly with wounded a vast majority got off the beach safely. Those that did broach were salvaged immediately, and no casualties were lost to the sea. At night occasionally evacuation was via LSMs or LCTs - the only ships that could approach the beaches at the time.

By D-plus-4 all small boats were ordered to stay clear of the beaches, and our subsequent evacuation was done via LVTs and DUKWs. The former were most cooperative and did an efficient and successful job evacuating to the LST(H)s off shore. This time LVT(4)s with ramps were used exclusively, which had marked advantages over the

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ENCLOSURE (8) TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

older, less roomy LVT(2)s. But their inherent limitations remained; and, when, on D-plus-9 day, the LST(H)s with their attached floats were withdrawn, the LVTs could no longer be used. They were too rough and unmaneuverable to unload casualties to large ships. It was fortunate that DUKWs could be obtained at this time, and these again, as on previous operations, proved to be the most efficient and satisfactory means of evacuating. They were roomy, comfortable, and maneuverable. They could be loaded with casualties right at the aid station or even at the more remote Division Hospital and dispatched directly to the hospital ships without further transfer of the patients. They were maneuverable and could unload at the ships as well as LCVs or LCMs. Furthermore they were not stopped by the existing surf, nor, as on Saipan, by reefs. To date they are the vehicle of choice to evacuate casualties.

Until D-plus-9 evacuation continued day and night, the LST(H)s holding all casualties sent out after dark. On February the 28th, these ships were withdrawn. But by then our Division Field Hospital was operable, so that from that time, all casualties received at night were held and treated there. On March 5 the Corps Surgeon ordered all evacuation to be done over purple beach on the west side due to off shore winds and high surf on the east. The Corps Evacuation unit was to do this evacuating. Air evacuation, controlled by Corps, began on this date too.

On March 8, evacuation of casualties was returned to the eastern beaches due to another shift in the wind. All evacuation from this time on was done through the blue one and yellow one stations. DUKWs were used exclusively at this time and very successfully. Hospital ships were receiving the casualties. All casualties received at night were now held ashore in the division and corps hospitals. White cases, those hospitalized 14 days or less, were now being held in field hospitals ashore. This procedure was followed until the island was officially secured and the Fourth Marine Division was embarked. The evacuation was closed March 15, 1945, and at this time all remaining sea evacuation was turned over to the Third Marine Division station on beach yellow one.

Aside from the primary function of treating and evacuating the wounded, one of the busiest and most important tasks was acquiring and supplying medical gear and supplies to the forward elements as well as to beach stations. As always this was most difficult and critical during the first days of the operation. Again the resupply of litters and blankets failed on D-day and D-plus-1. The litters exchanged from the ships receiving casualties never seem to reach the beaches during this period. Because of the treacherous beaches and heavy losses by enemy gunfire, much of the pre-arranged supplies never reached the evacuation station. Truck loaded medical supplies and gear landed days late, and ambulance jeeps were wrecked and lost at the water's edge. Casualties were being evacuated from the lines by LVTs and Weasels, but the vast majority were brought out by litter bearers. Much of the medical gear was lost initially and none was coming in. Urgent messages eventually brought some litters, blankets, plasma, etc. from the ships, but for three days it was touch and go to meet the demand. Again was demonstrated the necessity for close liaison and cooperation between the medical units and the fleet

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DOC, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

and between the Medical Officers of the Navy and the Marines.

On this operation brandy was in great demand by the front line troops. It proved a valuable stimulant to those subjected to the exhaustion and the exposure in the battle lines. Another article in increasing demand was serum albumin. This proved to be efficient and easy to give in the front line areas. It seemed to be as effective as plasma in the treatment of shock and could be given much more rapidly, allowing more rapid evacuation. Finally, it was so much easier to carry in the quantities necessary to treat the many seriously wounded. More serum albumin was needed than was available. A good deal of plasma was given at the evacuation stations, and by D-plus-6 units of whole blood brought in from the ships and later by air were given. This was an important adjunct in treating severe shock, though its most important use seems to be in ships or in field hospitals where definite treatment is to be given.

STATISTICS

During the entire battle of Iwo Jima from D-day until the island was secured casualties of the Fourth Marine Division were treated and evacuated and for the last eight days of the campaign evacuation was for the entire corps. In addition records were kept of the patients seen. The name, serial number, rank, and organization of each patient was obtained. The diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of each was noted and whether it was a battle casualty, also the disposition. The heavy losses to the evacuation personnel on D-day and the lack of established evacuation stations made such records unavailable for the first 24 hours, which was an unavoidable lapse. However, it is felt that records from the LST(H)s during this period should offset the loss.

For the 26 days of the battle the Fourth Division stations evacuated a total of 7,227 patients, 4,916 of which were of the Fourth. In addition to this were 940 patients evacuated without records on D-day; those evacuated over purple beaches by corps from March 6 to March 8; and those evacuated by air. Records for the latter two were kept by our division field hospital.

The following interesting information is acquired from the records:

Totals Evacuated:

DATE	STATION	OFF EVAC	ENL EVAC	TOTAL	DAY'S TOTAL
2-19-45	Blue 1	8	162	170	4thMarDiv - 167 Corps - - - 3
2-20-45	Blue 1	9	226	235	4thMarDiv - 228 Corps - - - 2
2-21-45	Blue 1	3	272	275	4thMarDiv - 272 Corps - - - 3
2-22-45	Blue 1	3	113	116	4thMarDiv - 551
	Yellow 1	(Reports not broken down.)		365	Corps - - - 9
	Yellow 2	Evac since 2-20-45.)		79	
2-23-45	Blue 1	1	130	131	4thMarDiv - 380
	Yellow 1	(Reports not broken down)		132	Corps - - - 20
	Yellow 2			137	

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX I TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

DATE	STATION	OFF EVAC	ENL EVAC	TOTAL	DAY'S TOTAL
2-24-45	Blue 1	2	149	151	4thMarDiv - 238
	Yellow 1	(Reports not broken down)		39	Corps - - - 6
	Yellow 2			54	
2-25-45	Blue 1	7	241	248	4thMarDiv - 132
	Yellow 1	7	259	266	Corps - - - 420
	Yellow 2	5	38	43	
2-26-45	Blue 1	8	284	292	4thMarDiv - 332
	Yellow 1	14	343	357	Corps - - - 320
	Yellow 2	0	3	3	
2-27-45	Blue 1	7	312	319	4thMarDiv - 364
	Yellow 1	17	229	246	Corps - - - 201
	Yellow 2	consolidates report with Yellow 1 hereafter.			
2-28-45	Blue 1	5	244	249	4thMarDiv - 269
	Yellow 1	7	254	261	Corps - - - 241
3-1-45	Blue 1	16	263	279	4thMarDiv - 291
	Yellow 1	7	248	255	Corps - - - 243
3-2-45	Blue 1	7	333	340	4thMarDiv - 279
	Yellow 1	10	297	307	Corps - - - 268
3-3-45	Blue 1	4	289	293	4thMarDiv - 311
	Yellow 1	13	465	478	Corps - - - 460
3-4-45	Blue 1	1	207	208	4thMarDiv - 212
	Yellow 1	8	245	253	Corps - - - 249
3-5-45	Blue 1	3	101	104	4thMarDiv - 108
	Yellow 1	0	50	50	Corps - - - 46
3-6-45	Blue 1	0	52	52	4thMarDiv - 52
	Yellow 1	0	0	0	Corps - - - 0
3-7-45	Blue 1	(No evacuation)			
	Yellow 1	(No evacuation)			
3-8-45	Blue 1	1	74	75	4thMarDiv - 76
	Yellow 1	4	78	82	Corps - - - 81
3-9-45	Blue 1	6	215	221	4thMarDiv - 227
	Yellow 1	5	99	104	Corps - - - 38
3-10-45	Blue 1	6	93	99	4thMarDiv - 78
	Yellow 1	1	114	115	Corps - - - 136
3-11-45	Blue 1	1	9	10	4thMarDiv - 4
	Yellow 1	1	13	14	Corps - - - 20
3-12-45	Blue 1	2	66	68	4thMarDiv - 54
	Yellow 1	4	103	107	Corps - - - 121
3-13-45	Blue 1	1	53	54	4thMarDiv - 55
	Yellow 1	4	114	118	Corps - - - 117
3-14-45	Blue 1	0	45	45	4thMarDiv - 38
	Yellow 1	3	126	129	Corps - - - 136
3-15-45	Blue 1	3	31	34	4thMarDiv - 29
	Yellow 1	(No evacuations)			Corps - - - 5

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DOG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>OFF EVAC</u>	<u>ENL EVAC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DAY'S TOTAL</u>
3-16-45	Blue 1	0	9	9	4thMarDiv - 9
	Yellow 1	(No evacuations)			*Corps - - - 0
GRAND TOTAL		209	7018	7227	4thMarDiv - 4916

*-Includes all organizations ashore not of the Fourth Marine Division.

Classification of casualties by organizations at Blue 1 Station:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>23R.</u>	<u>24R.</u>	<u>25R.</u>	<u>14R.</u>	<u>ENGR.</u>	<u>PIR.</u>	<u>HQ&SER.</u>	<u>NSIC*</u>	<u>UNIDEN**</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2-19-45	13	19	49	3	1	7	5	11	62	170
2-20-45	11	49	73	3	1	10	10	18	60	235
2-21-45	11	44	45	0	9	15	7	19	60	275
2-22-45	4	38	45	6	2	3	5	6	7	116
2-23-45	0	89	21	1	0	1	5	8	6	131
2-24-45	2	101	15	1	5	6	4	5	12	151
2-25-45	29	122	38	2	2	1	6	10	28	248
2-26-45	95	36	120	1	5	2	15	7	11	292
2-27-45	91	34	166	5	3	1	19	0	0	319
2-28-45	79	32	99	1	2	1	18	13	4	249
3-1-45	70	63	113	2	2	2	8	14	5	279
3-2-45	18	130	153	1	8	1	22	4	3	340
3-3-45	55	122	62	0	4	1	3	36	10	298
3-4-45	57	122	17	1	3	1	5	2	0	208
3-5-45	14	53	20	0	3	0	7	7	0	104
3-6-45	3	7	12	0	0	0	0	0	30	52
3-7-45	No evacuations.									
3-8-45	15	39	7	0	0	0	0	5	9	75
3-9-45	33	44	25	3	1	0	4	70	40	221
3-10-45	3	12	26	2	2	0	6	41	7	99
3-11-45	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	7	0	10
3-12-45	7	2	44	0	3	1	1	6	4	68
3-13-45	4	0	33	0	3	1	1	7	5	54
3-14-45	3	4	22	0	2	0	3	8	3	45
3-15-45	4	6	18	0	1	1	1	3	0	34
3-16-45	0	4	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
Total	622	1174	1230	32	62	55	155	307	366	3003

*-Includes Replacement Battalions, 133 NCB, etc.

**Many of these had been recorded previously at our 4th Division Field Hospital, after 2-28-45.

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 (S) TO ANNEX D-1 TO ANNEX D-2, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

Classification of casualties by prognosis over Blue 1 Station:

DATE	RED*		BLUE**		WHITE***		DEAD	
	NO.	PERCENT	NO.	PERCENT	NO.	PERCENT	NO.	PERCENT
2-19-45	37	33%	39	34%	35	31%	3	2%
2-20-45	53	22%	58	29%	88	44%	3	1%
2-21-45	56	25%	62	28%	102	46%	2	.9%
2-22-45	17	16%	24	23%	62	59%	2	1%
2-23-45	13	8%	36	24%	100	67%	1	.6%
2-24-45	20	14%	38	21%	77	57%	2	1%
2-25-45	40	16%	63	25%	141	57%	0	0%
2-26-45	46	17%	68	26%	145	55%	0	0%
2-27-45	68	22%	101	33%	139	45%	0	0%
2-28-45	21	8%	106	43%	120	48%	1	.4%
3-1-45	37	14%	126	51%	86	35%	2	.8%
3-2-45	68	21%	129	42%	108	35%	5	1%
3-3-45	53	22%	92	38%	90	37%	3	1%
3-4-45	64	33%	92	46%	39	19%	0	0%
3-5-45	33	33%	42	42%	25	25%	0	0%
3-6-45	4	18%	11	50%	7	31%	0	0%
3-7-45	No evacuation.							
3-8-45	18	30%	33	55%	9	15%	0	0%
3-9-45	38	28%	79	42%	52	27%	0	0%
3-10-45	38	32%	47	54%	12	13%	0	0%
3-11-45	2	20%	6	60%	2	20%	0	0%
3-12-45	15	28%	26	49%	12	23%	0	0%
3-13-45	12	22%	33	62%	8	16%	0	0%
3-14-45	13	28%	32	72%	0	0%	0	0%
3-15-45	3	8%	17	50%	14	42%	0	0%
3-16-45	0	0%	2	22%	7	78%	0	0%
TOTAL	878	24%	1362	36%	1480	39%	24	1%

- *-Requiring over 30 days hospitalization.
- **--Requiring over 14-30 days hospitalization.
- ***-Requiring less than 14 days hospitalization.

Classification of casualties by diagnosis over Blue 1 Station (No. & Percent):

DATE	BELLY		CHEST		HEAD		EXTREM.		MULT.		COMB FAT		MISC&SICK	
	NO.	PERCENT	NO.	PERCENT	NO.	PERCENT	NO.	PERCENT	NO.	PERCENT	NO.	PERCENT	NO.	PERCENT
2-19-45	10	8%	7	6%	14	12%	49	42%	10	8%	8	7%	16	14%
2-20-45	11	5%	6	2%	17	8%	96	47%	14	6%	15	7%	33	16%
2-21-45	6	2%	5	2%	16	7%	112	51%	20	9%	13	5%	50	22%
2-22-45	2	1%	2	1%	10	9%	23	21%	15	14%	24	22%	29	27%
2-23-45	3	2%	5	3%	17	11%	46	31%	15	10%	28	18%	36	24%
2-24-45	2	1%	8	5%	20	14%	50	36%	12	8%	37	27%	6	4%
2-25-45	5	2%	10	4%	38	11%	65	26%	29	11%	54	22%	43	17%
2-26-45	7	2%	11	3%	24	8%	72	26%	16	5%	71	25%	73	26%
2-27-45	4	1%	12	3%	31	10%	102	33%	15	4%	62	20%	72	23%
2-28-45	5	1%	6	2%	22	8%	79	31%	7	2%	46	18%	89	36%

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX I TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

DATE	BELLY		CHEST		HEAD		EXTREM.		MULT.		COMB FAT		MISC & SICK	
3-1-45	5	2%	8	3%	24	11%	91	40%	13	5%	34	15%	51	22%
3-2-45	8	2%	8	2%	23	7%	133	42%	19	6%	66	21%	83	26%
3-3-45	8	3%	8	3%	21	9%	70	30%	9	3%	38	12%	78	33%
3-4-45	16	7%	9	4%	24	12%	79	40%	16	7%	24	12%	54	27%
3-5-45	10	7%	5	3%	12	8%	33	23%	8	5%	20	14%	50	35%
3-6-45	2	3%	2	3%	9	17%	18	33%	6	11%	10	18%	6	11%
3-7-45	No evacuations.													
3-8-45	9	4%	15	6%	31	13%	54	23%	15	6%	35	11%	69	31%
3-9-45	3	3%	3	3%	7	7%	35	35%	12	12%	11	11%	29	29%
3-10-45	2	2%	6	7%	13	15%	21	24%	10	12%	5	5%	28	32%
3-11-45	2	20%	0	0%	0	0%	6	60%	0	0%	2	20%	0	0%
3-12-45	2	2%	6	8%	10	14%	21	31%	9	13%	4	5%	26	38%
3-13-45	4	7%	9	16%	10	18%	12	22%	10	18%	2	3%	6	11%
3-14-45	4	9%	2	3%	6	14%	18	47%	7	13%	0	0%	5	9%
3-15-45	0	0%	1	2%	2	5%	10	29%	1	2%	6	17%	14	41%
3-16-45	0	0%	1	11%	0	0%	3	33%	0	0%	4	44%	1	11%
TOTAL	140	4%	111	3%	401	11%	1279	34%	271	7%	619	17%	937	24%

Classification of wounds by casuative agents at Blue 1 Station (No. & Percent):

DATE	SHRAPNEL	SMALL ARMS	BLAST CONCUSSION	MISCELLANEOUS*
2-19-45	51 44%	24 21%	12 10%	28 24%
2-20-45	86 57%	28 12%	10 6%	26 17%
2-21-45	90 50%	34 18%	17 9%	37 21%
2-22-45	46 48%	11 11%	12 12%	26 27%
2-23-45	58 43%	22 16%	16 11%	39 28%
2-24-45	44 53%	21 25%	6 7%	12 14%
2-25-45	65 51%	23 10%	10 7%	28 22%
2-26-45	102 43%	91 39%	17 7%	23 9%
2-27-45	130 48%	74 27%	18 6%	46 17%
2-28-45	91 46%	47 24%	17 8%	36 19%
3-1-45	113 49%	73 29%	21 8%	41 16%
3-2-45	145 51%	62 21%	24 7%	52 18%
3-3-45	79 38%	68 33%	15 7%	44 21%
3-4-45	93 51%	63 33%	7 3%	16 8%
3-5-45	54 54%	26 26%	4 4%	16 16%
3-6-45	17 42%	9 22%	4 10%	10 24%
3-7-45	No evacuations.			
3-8-45	33 56%	15 25%	2 3%	9 15%
3-9-45	88 48%	52 28%	14 7%	28 15%
3-10-45	31 34%	50 55%	4 4%	5 5%
3-11-45	8 80%	2 20%	0 0%	0 0%
3-12-45	31 53%	7 12%	3 5%	17 28%
3-13-45	18 33%	29 53%	2 3%	5 9%

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX I TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SHRAPNEL</u>	<u>SMALL ARMS</u>	<u>BLAST CONCUSSION</u>	<u>MISCELLANEOUS*</u>
3-14-45	13 28%	26 57%	1 2%	5 11%
3-15-45	11 41%	8 29%	0 0%	8 29%
3-16-45	1 20%	3 60%	0 0%	1 20%
TOTAL	1410 45%	868 29%	236 7%	560 19%

*Includes burns, etc.

Since 2,694 out of 4,916 casualties evacuated for the Fourth Marine Division were over the Blue 1 Station it is believed the figures presented are typical of the casualties for the division throughout the battle. Since the wounded were kept for so short a period at our stations the percent of dead is not indicative of the rate of death sustained.

These statistics show that an average of 107.8 patients per day were evacuated including one day no casualties at all went out of the station. 389 were evacuated the first 24 hours, 664 the first 48 hours, and 845 the first 72 hours.

In treatment a total of 189 units of plasma, 29 units of serum albumin, and 48 units of whole blood were given.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A brief review of evacuation personnel and experiences during the battle of Iwo Jima is presented. In general the work of evacuation was efficient and effective - a vast improvement over previous operations was realized both by the naval forces afloat and Marine units ashore. Casualties were gotten off the beach both day and night from the beginning and arrived aboard ships in record time after being wounded.
2. In spite of high casualty rates the shore party evacuation personnel did a fine job throughout; and the medical companies, later attached, though relatively inexperienced, did remarkable work. Beach party medical platoons were cooperative and worked well, but generally did not remain ashore long enough to become integrated in the organization. The value of a division evacuation officer was demonstrated on D-day when we were able to establish adequate evacuation facilities for the wounded of the division in spite of heavy initial losses to the combat team evacuation personnel.
3. The limited use of Weazels initially suggested a valuable function for these vehicles in the future for evacuating wounded on sandy terrain where ambulance jeeps cannot operate. DUKWs again proved to be the vehicle of choice to evacuate casualties off shore, and it is highly recommended in future operations to obtain DUKWs initially for the specific function of evacuation. In addition movement of casualties and medical supplies in the beach areas was necessary throughout. It is recommended that an ambulance jeep, two Weazels, and eight DUKWs be specifically assigned to the Shore Party Medical Section for future operations.
4. Medical resupply during the early phases of the battle remains a problem. Critical shortages of litters, blankets, serum albumin, etc. developed during the first three days. Beneficial and valuable results were obtained in the increased use of serum albumin in the front lines and in administration of brandy to cases of fatigue and exhaustion. Plasma and whole blood were invaluable in the treatment of shock.

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TO ANNEX DCG, TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (CONT'D)

To maintain adequate liaison, cooperation, and contact between medical forces afloat and ashore it is recommended that a medical officer thoroughly familiar with the situation and problems ashore be maintained with the medical staff afloat.

5. Statistics show a great increase in the number of casualties evacuated over previous operations. Casualties observed proved to be much more seriously wounded than ever before, the vast majority being from shell fragment. Many concussion cases were seen, and combat fatigues with associated neuroses were a major problem. Records were, in general, excellent, but many casualty tags were found incomplete.

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HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 April, 1945.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA

MEDICAL REPORT

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX DOD. MEDICAL REPORT

1. PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EMBARKATION

A. PREPARATORY PERIOD

(1) PLANNING AND TRAINING:

During the period following the return of this Division from the Saipan-Tinian operation, replacement personnel were received and trained. Requisitions were prepared and submitted. Medical Company personnel were alternately assigned to the U. S. Army Station Hospital for training. However, a Division Hospital would have provided facilities and opportunity for much more adequate and satisfactory professional training of personnel. Surgeons who were not given the opportunity to touch a knife for six months prior to the operation had to perform the most difficult and extensive type of abdominal operations during the battle. Since the organic medical personnel must treat all injuries and diseases under the arduous conditions of combat, surely they should be allowed the professional experience of treating division personnel during rehabilitation and training periods. This point cannot be too strongly emphasized.

Personnel not required for hospital duty continued with field training. Selected groups were assigned to the Division Jungle and Scout Sniper Schools for varying periods. At a series of semi-monthly meetings of Medical Department Officers problems were presented and thoroughly discussed.

(2) HYGIENE AND SANITATION

The four principal problems encountered during the preparatory period were:

a. An epidemic of infectious hepatitis affecting approximately 300 patients. This epidemic developed aboard ship while enroute to camp from the Saipan-Tinian operation; reached its peak in late September; and declined in early November. No deaths occurred, but prolonged hospitalization was necessary.

b. Skin diseases, principally fungus infections and skin ulcers, were frequent in spite of the cool autumn climate. The admission rate from August to January was over twice the rate during March, April and May. The chief cause was a lack of hot water showers, as the water was so chilly that troops did not bathe frequently or thoroughly.

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SG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

c. A considerable percentage of physically and mentally unfit troops were furnished to the division as replacements. Many of these were convalescent from hospitals, and were in no condition to endure the rigors of combat training. 15% of Medical Surveys involved replacement troops.

d. The maintenance of a balanced, diversified diet for troops. An insufficient amount of fresh fruits and vegetables and fresh meat was provided. Since avitaminosis and malnutrition were widespread after the Saipan-Tinian operation complete rehabilitation of troops was delayed.

Specific measures for preventing disease during the oncoming operation were:

a. Comprehensive training of the battalion 3 man sanitary squads, and the 50 man sanitary squad of the attached 133rd Naval Construction Battalion, by the M & E Control Team.

b. The inoculation of all personnel against plague, cholera and epidemic typhus. These inoculations were completed in an average of less than 15 days on approximately 25,000 men. No serious reactions occurred, and less than 0.1% were admitted to the sick list. All personnel received a tetanus booster, and most troops received a typhoid booster and cowpox vaccination during the same period.

c. The impregnation of utility uniforms with dimethyl-phthalate and 10% DDT in talc. The uniforms of approximately 15% of the troops were impregnated prior to embarkation. Because of a shortage of clothing, it was necessary to treat the remainder aboard ship shortly before D day. A new suit of clothing should be issued to each man about one month prior to embarkation, to be stenciled, impregnated, and reserved for D day. Furthermore, the supply of reserve clothing carried to the target by the quartermaster should be impregnated.

(3) SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

The procurement of supplies was effected by the Commanding Officer of the Medical Battalion, with the assistance of the Division Medical Property Officer, and was accomplished very efficiently. Crating and marking proceeded rapidly. Twenty Wilson drums were packed with essential assault supplies and carried in the Division Reserve. Because of supply and transportation difficulties from the States complete refitting of

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

critical medical equipment and supplies was not fully accomplished until just prior to embarkation. This resulted in considerable difficulty in distribution as many units had embarked prior to receipt of supplies designated for them. Complete distribution was effected during rehearsal and staging periods.

Previous experience revealed that one of the most important preliminary measures necessary to insure proper and efficient sanitation is the procuring of sufficient quantities of quartermaster supplies. Accordingly a list of minimum necessary supplies and their recommended distribution was compiled and submitted to the quartermaster, who in turn, procured, carried, and distributed them during the operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That a Marine Division operate a Division Hospital with complete medical and surgical facilities during the rehabilitation and training period.
2. That hot water showers be provided in the base camp.
3. That the ration allowance for rehabilitating troops be augmented by more fresh fruits, fresh vegetables and fresh meat.
4. That a new utility uniform be issued to each man one month prior to embarkation for stenciling, impregnation with dimethylphthalate and DDT, to be reserved for D day.
5. That the reserve supply of clothing, to be carried to the target by the quartermaster, be impregnated with dimethylphthalate and 10% DDT in talc prior to embarkation, under the supervision of the Medical Department.

B. EMBARKATION AND MOVEMENT TO THE TARGET:

Embarkation of this division commenced on the 27th of December, 1944 and was completed on 3 January, 1945, except for loading minor elements and shifting personnel after the rehearsal.

In general, medical personnel embarked with the RCT and Support Group units to which attached, on transports and smaller craft as designated, with the advice of unit medical officers.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

The Medical Battalion (less detachments) was embarked as follows:

H&S Co. (less Supply Section) . . .	APA 193-Sanborn
Supply Section	APA 190-Pickens
A Co. (less Collecting Section). . .	APA 120-Hinsdale
B Co. (less Collecting Section). . .	APA 118-Hendrix
C Co. (less Collecting Section). . .	APA 196-Logan
D & E Co.	APA 193-Sanborn

Hospital Sections of medical companies were embarked on ships having the largest casualty capacity, when practicable, to facilitate the care of casualties received on board, during the initial stages of the battle.

One (1) Medical Officer and two (2) men from A Medical Company embarked on LST(H) 931, and a similar group from C Company embarked on LST(H) 930, to act as 4th Division liaison medical personnel during the period these ships were to remain on stations at the target.

Organic vehicles were combat loaded with essential items of equipment and supplies to supplement that designated as "hand carry". Seabags were packed with battle dressings, plasma, serum albumin and other items essential in the early stages of the assault. These were loaded in troop spaces, to be carried ashore by assault medical troops.

Two and one-half (2½) ton 6 x 6 trucks, for the first time organic to the Medical Battalion, were combat loaded with equipment and supplies essential in establishing surgical units ashore.

RCT reserve medical resupply items were loaded as designated, with the advice of unit medical officers. Attached Medical Companies carried an additional reserve, which was loaded on ships to which they were assigned. The remaining Medical Battalion equipment and supplies were divided between two APA's and an AK. H & S Medical Battalion carried a division reserve in addition to that loaded by RCT's and medical companies.

For detailed loading, attention is invited to paragraph 2 of Annex Dog.

The loading priority given medical equipment and supplies proved generally satisfactory.

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APPENDIX 2-10: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

During the trip to the combat area, sanitary conditions aboard ships were satisfactory. No epidemics or unusual diseases occurred.

2. DEBARKATION AND SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

Medical personnel attached to Regimental Combat Teams debarked as directed by unit commanders. In general they were boated as follows: Company Aid men with platoons; Battalion Aid Station personnel with Battalion Command Posts and Regimental Aid Station personnel with Regimental Command Posts. Collecting Section detachments were boated with the Battalion Command Posts to which attached. Shore Party Medical Personnel in support of Battalion Landing Teams were boated prior to H hour.

Personnel of the assault landing teams landed between H plus 3 and H plus 90 minutes (0903 to 1030) on D day. Reserve Landing Teams and Regimental Command Posts of the two (2) Assault Combat Teams were landed by H plus 265 minutes (1315). Four Medical Shore Party evacuation teams were landed between H plus 30 and H plus 120 (0930 to 1100). The Shore Party Medical Officer (Battalion Surgeon, Fourth Pioneer Battalion) and his Hospital Corps personnel, were landed at H plus 6 (1500).

Personnel of the Reserve Combat Team completed boating at 1535 and had landed by 1900 on D day.

Able and Charlie Medical Companies, less collecting sections, were ordered ashore at 1100 on D plus one (1) to support the 25th and 23rd Combat Teams in evacuation of casualties from the beaches. Able Medical Company landed at 1530 on D plus one (1) and Charlie Medical Company at 1430 on D plus one (1).

Because of an order to unload APA 118, Baker Medical Company was landed at 1630 on D plus 3, without prior approval by Division Headquarters.

A total of one (1) Medical Officer and nine (9) Hospital Corpsmen of the 10th Amphibious Tractor Battalion and eighty (80) corpsmen from Dog and Easy Medical Companies were ordered ashore between the period 1630 on D day to 1015 on D plus 3, in response to requests for replacements. During the same period two (2) Medical Officers, one (1) Dental Officer and forty (40) Hospital Corpsmen of the 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts landed and were assigned as replacements by the Shore Party Medical Officer.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

The Division Surgeon and his assistants were landed on the morning of D plus 4, the Commanding Officer of the Medical Battalion on D plus 5, and H&S Company, Fourth Medical Battalion on D plus 6. Dog Medical Company landed at 1400 on D plus 8 and Easy Medical Company at 1045 on D plus 10.

Medical equipment and supplies urgently needed by assault troops, were sent ashore when requested. Otherwise they were landed in accordance with unloading priority. This proved generally satisfactory.

Attention is invited to Regimental Combat Team reports and Section 4 of Annex Dog for detailed debarkation and landing.

3. ASSAULT PHASE.

A. SHORE EVACUATION.

During the twenty-six (26) days of the battle of Iwo Jima, the Fourth Marine Division shore evacuation stations evacuated 8,167 casualties, of which 5,150 were Fourth Division Personnel.

The Senior Medical Officer of the Pioneer Battalion was designated as the Shore Party Evacuation Officer. Under him were four evacuation teams, each composed of one medical officer and 10 to 14 hospital corpsmen, to be landed on each of the four assault beaches. Accordingly the four evacuation teams were boated with shore party personnel supporting each of the assault landing teams, and were put ashore during the first two hours after H hour. So violent was the enemy fire along the beaches, that these teams were unable to set up effective evacuation stations, and heavy casualties were sustained.

At 0930 one Medical Officer and 12 corpsmen of the Pioneer Battalion landed on Yellow One beach. Almost immediately this group suffered casualties, their equipment was largely destroyed, and they were unable to organize or establish an evacuation station. By 1100 the medical officer and 6 corpsmen had been wounded and evacuated and 4 corpsmen had been killed.

At 1000 a Medical Officer, Dental Officer and 8 corpsmen of the 133rd Naval Construction Battalion landed on Yellow Two beach under heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire. This team sustained casualties, were dispersed, and were unable to set up an evacuation station. By late afternoon the Medical

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ING: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D) -----

Officer, Dental Officer, and 5 corpsmen were casualties and evacuated.

A Medical Officer and 14 corpsmen of the Pioneer Battalion were landed at 0930 on Blue One beach. By 1130 the Medical Officer and 3 corpsmen were wounded and evacuated. The remaining corpsmen joined a beach party medical platoon on Yellow Two beach and worked effectively.

At 1100 a Medical Officer and 9 corpsmen of the 133rd Naval Construction Battalion were landed on Blue One beach, but were dispersed by heavy mortar fire and were unable to organize an evacuation station. By 1130 the Medical Officer had been wounded and evacuated.

A Medical Officer, Dental Officer, and 8 corpsmen of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion landed on Yellow One beach at 1330 and set up an aid station between Yellow One and Yellow Two. They were located away from the natural flow of evacuation, but did a magnificent job of treating casualties in their area during the first 7 days of the battle.

The Shore Party Evacuation Officer landed on Blue One beach at 1500 with 2 Pioneer Battalion corpsmen and 20 replacement corpsmen, and set up an evacuation station along the only main road of egress from the front lines. Working continuously throughout the night, they treated and evacuated 389 casualties during the first 24 hours.

In the meantime, the Regimental Surgeon of the 23rd Marines, assisted by one beach party medical platoon, was evacuating from Yellow One beach.

Thus in spite of the heavy toll in casualties: i.e. 80% of the shore party medical officers and approximately 50% of the corpsmen; evacuation stations were established and functioning in each of the three established Fourth Marine Division assault beaches by 1600 on D day.

On D day and D plus one (1) forty (40) corpsmen from the collecting section of D and E Medical Companies were sent in as replacements to the regiments. However there was a critical shortage of medical evacuation personnel, and Medical Companies A and C were landed at 1600 on D plus one (1). Company A began evacuating at the Blue One beach station. Company C set up an evacuation station on Yellow Two beach.

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APPENDIX 2 TO AMPLIX DCG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

Shortly thereafter one-half of Company C was transferred to the Yellow One station to relieve the Regimental Surgeon of the 23rd Marines and permit him to return to his regimental duties. With this increase in personnel it was possible to give more efficient treatment to the wounded; and also keep adequate records.

At about 1800 on D plus one (1) a large ammunition dump 150 yards from the Blue One station was blown up, and burned with intermittent explosions for two hours. At 1700 on D plus two (2), large fuel and ammunition dumps were blown up about 100 yards from the Blue One station. All personnel continued to work at the station treating casualties. They fought fires started in their medical supplies by hot fragments until 2400.

On D plus three (3) Medical Company B was ordered ashore, as the APA on which they were embarked was completing unloading. They were ordered to Blue One evacuation station. A surgical team of A Medical Company, composed of two surgeons and 3 corpsmen, was ordered to return to the APA on which they had embarked, to perform surgery. They were returned to Blue One evacuation station on D plus seven (7).

On the night of D day there was a critical shortage of blankets, litters and plasma. Recurring shortages occurred during the first three days, resulting from difficult surf conditions and destruction of supplies by enemy fire. After D plus three (3) there were adequate supplies. Whole blood was used by all stations after D plus six (6) with excellent results. The Blue One station administered 189 units of plasma, 29 of serum albumin and 49 of whole blood.

Until D plus nine (9), when the Division Hospital was established; a replacement pool of corpsmen was established at Blue One beach evacuation station. All replacements and detachments were sent to this pool, and thence to the regiments, as ordered by the Division Surgeon. This procedure prevented the confusion that would otherwise have resulted, since personnel from Blue One station guided the replacements directly to the designated regiment or battalion. Furthermore, by keeping this pool built up, it was possible to furnish replacements to regiments immediately upon request.

While some of the early casualties were evacuated by LVT'S most of them were evacuated by the LCVP's and LCM's which had brought personnel ashore. After D day these craft became

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DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D) -----

increasingly difficult to obtain and very dangerous to use as stormy weather and heavy off shore winds resulted in the broaching of a large number of them. By D plus four (4) all small boats were ordered to stay clear of the beaches, and subsequent evacuation was via LVT's and DUWK's. After D plus nine (9), when the LST(H)'s were withdrawn, it was no longer possible to use LVT's as they were too unmaneuverable to unload casualties on large ships. DUWK's were obtained, and again, as on previous operations, proved the most efficient means of evacuating casualties. They were loaded with casualties immediately in front of the evacuation station, or even at the Division Hospital, and dispatched directly to ships without further transfer of patients.

Until the Division Hospital was established on D plus nine (9), casualties were evacuated day and night. On and after D plus nine (9) all casualties occurring after 1700 were received in the Division Hospital.

On March 7, all water evacuation was assumed by corps on Purple beach on the western shore, because of surf conditions. The Fourth Division resumed evacuation from the eastern beaches the following day.

Throughout the first 11 days of the battle our beaches were under fire. Mortar, artillery, rocket and small arms fire was received at frequent intervals both day and night. Shore and beach party personnel suffered over 50% casualties. Throughout, the work and spirit of the doctors and corpsmen was magnificent. Due to their unselfish devotion to duty the several thousand evacuated casualties received excellent first aid and shock treatment. No casualty was kept on the beach over 30 minutes except when his condition required more prolonged shock therapy.

The use of Weasels would have greatly facilitated the handling of casualties along the beaches particularly during the early phases of the battle, when jeep ambulances could not travel along the soft sandy beach.

Shore evacuation stations were set up with the aid of the Shore Party bulldozers. An area approximately 20 feet by 30 feet would be dug out, its walls would be reinforced with sandbags, and a tarpaulin supported by a central ridge pole would serve as a roof and blackout. There were three of these installations adjoining each other on Blue One beach, and a single installation on each of the two Yellow beaches. These

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APPENDIX 2 TO AMEMB DOC: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

stations adequately protected casualties while they were being treated for shock and awaiting evacuation. They provided ample working room for medical personnel. Furthermore, they would have been a valuable annex to the Division Hospital, had all evacuation been suspended due to bad weather, for 50 or more of the less seriously wounded could have been treated and retained at these stations.

Records of 2,694 casualties from the Blue One beach evacuation station reveal the following statistics:

Red Injuries - -	24%	Wound Fragment- -	45%
Blue Injuries- -	36%	Wound Gunshot - -	29%
White Injuries -	39%	Blast Concussion -	7%
Dead - - - - -	1%	Miscellaneous - -	19%
Head - - - - -	11%		
Chest - - - - -	3%		
Abdomen - - - - -	4%		
Extremities - - - - -	34%		
Blast Concussion - - - -	7%		
Combat Fatigue - - - -	17%		
Misc. and Sick - - - -	17%		

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Shore Party Evacuation Station personnel be landed on a hotly contested beachhead not earlier than H plus five (5) hours.

2. That two (2) Weasels be assigned to the Shore Party Evacuation Officer to be used in transfer of patients along the beach.

B. EVACUATION BY WATER.

While shore to ship evacuation of casualties, and their subsequent treatment is a responsibility of the U. S. Navy, it is also of direct concern to the Landing Force. During the early phases of the attack the functions of Naval and Landing Force Medical personnel overlap and are intimately related. Medical Companies work aboard ship for several days, and should be strategically located on ships so as to permit them to function at maximum capacity. The urgency of the early establishment of a hospital ashore is directly dependent upon the efficiency of water evacuation and adequacy of facilities for mass treatment of casualties aboard. Therefore the following general observations

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and recommendations are submitted.

(1) CASUALTY EVACUATION LST's.

Their use marked a definite advance in the chain of water evacuation, resulting in a more equitable distribution of casualties; earlier treatment of serious cases; and making night evacuation feasible. However these LST(H)'s were not sufficiently equipped for the adequate treatment of casualties; when LSM's were evacuating, the transfer of patients through hatches was slow and difficult; the pontoon barges were not completely satisfactory; and the complement of medical personnel was inadequate. LST(H)'s provide a source of complete information for recording casualties, since all evacuated casualties flow through them. Their reports, however, are sent to higher echelon; and Marine Divisions are not informed. Since the report is typewritten, an additional copy could easily be made available to the Division Surgeon concerned. The Fourth Marine Division assigned one Medical Officer and two hospital corpsmen (from medical companies attached to RCT's) to each of its two assigned LST(H)'s. In addition to assisting in the treatment of casualties, this liaison team sent complete evacuation records to the Division Surgeon.

Each LST(H) began to receive casualties at about H plus 40. Most of the casualties received during the first 6 hours were in shock, since beach evacuation stations were unable to set up and administer shock therapy because of heavy enemy fire. A large percentage of these cases required treatment prior to further evacuation to APA's, and the number of doctors and hospital corpsmen aboard was insufficient.

When assaulting a hotly contested beachhead, the relative importance of two of the functions of the LST(H)'s can not be too strongly emphasized:

- a. During the early phase, and prior to establishment of fully functioning shore evacuation stations, their primary function is to render shock therapy and apply splints and dressings.
- b. After shore evacuation stations are established, their main purpose is to effect an equitable distribution of casualties to APA's and AH's.

On D plus 3, as a result of a heavy sea for 3 days, the constant pounding of LVT's punctured the outboard pontoons of the casualty transfer barges. The LST(H) mentioned off Blue Beach one. The bar

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seriously impeding the handling of casualties, until a serviceable one was obtained on about D plus 5. The same condition applied in lesser degree to the pontoon barge of the LST(H) 930. These pontoon barges should be protected by bumpers or fenders.

The transfer of patients from the pontoon barge to the LST(H) was slow and was the occasion for considerable delay. The addition of a second crane would double the speed of transfer, since the pontoon barge is sufficiently long to permit the simultaneous use of two cranes.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That LST(H)'s be specially fitted for the transfer and mass treatment of casualties, and used for that purpose only.
2. That the LST(H) pontoon barges be protected by fenders or bumpers.
3. That a second crane be added to LST(H)'s to transfer casualties from the pontoon barge.
4. That a complete Medical Company (less collecting section) be embarked on each LST(H) to augment the organic Medical Staff during the early phases of the attack.
5. That a copy of the LST(H) casualty report be sent to the Division Surgeon concerned.

(2) DISTRIBUTION OF CASUALTIES TO SHIPS.

Although distinctly improved as compared to former operations, several deficiencies were noted. There was an inadequate number of LCVP's to provide for transfer of casualties from LST(H)'s to APA's. Consequently an APA would be ordered to take station near an LST(H) and receive all casualties from her. This procedure compensated for the shortage of LCVP's, but the individual APA would be kept at this station too long; and as many as 100 to 140 casualties would be taken aboard within the space of 2 to 4 hours before she was relieved by another APA. The surgical facilities of this APA would be grossly overtaxed, and emergency surgery could not be performed early due to the deluge of patients. In the meantime the surgeons of other APA's would be comparatively idle.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That not over 50 consecutive casualties be transferred to one APA while other APA's in the Transport Division receive none.

2. That the number of ambulance LCVP's be increased to a minimum of 8 per LST(H) to be used exclusively for transfer of casualties from LST(H)'s to APA's and AH's.

(3) FUNCTION OF SPECIALISTS.

The assignment of a specialist to each Transport Division or Squadron (e.g. ophthalmologist, psychiatrist, etc.) is theoretically sound; but it is not of practical value during the early stages of an opposed landing. The transfer of special cases to certain designated APA's results in confusion and causes ambulance LCVP's to make longer runs than would otherwise be necessary. Frequently an LCVP would come alongside the APA on which the ophthalmologist was embarked; delayed 15 minutes to transfer one mild eye injury; then proceed to another APA to discharge 4 or 5 seriously wounded cases. Either all casualties should be unloaded on the APA to which the eye injury is delivered, or else the other cases should be delivered to a separate APA first. The specialist could function ashore in the Division Hospital when established.

An ophthalmologist attached to a Marine Division could function aboard ship during the early phases of the assault in the same manner as an ophthalmologist attached to a Transport Squadron; and would be available for the Division Hospital during later phases.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That an ophthalmologist be added to the T/O of a Marine Division to be placed in the F & S, Medical Battalion as Division Ophthalmologist.

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APPENDIX C INDEX LOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

C. FOURTH MARINE DIVISION CASUALTIES, IWO JIMA OPERATION.

(1) CASUALTIES-- REPRESENTATIVE TOTAL AS PER EARLY MEDICAL RECORD SECTION FIGURES. (INCLUDING 1,774 K.I.A.)

INJURIES:

Wound Fragment - - - - -	3,789
Wound, Gunshot - - - - -	1,377
Amputation, Traumatic - - - - -	36
Blast Concussion - - - - -	307
Burns - - - - -	74
Other Injuries (sprains, etc.) - - -	217
Injuries, Type Unknown - - - - -	225
K. I. A., Cause Unknown - - - - -	140
TOTAL	6,165

DISEASES:

Fatigue Combat - - - - -	695
Psychoneurosis - - - - -	75
Communicable Diseases - - - - -	47
Gastro-Intestinal Diseases - - - -	16
Dental - - - - -	28
Others - - - - -	110
TOTAL	971

TOTAL, ALL CAUSES - - - - - 7,136

(2) TYPES OF INJURIES.

Wound, Fragment - - - - -	3,789	65.08%
Wound, Gunshot - - - - -	1,377	23.80%
Amputation, Traumatic - - -	36	0.67%
Blast Concussion - - - - -	307	5.35%
Burns - - - - -	74	1.30%
Other Injuries (sprains, etc.) -	217	3.80%
TOTAL - - - - -	5,800	100.00%

Table (2) includes 1,634 dead; and does not include 140 dead, cause unknown; or 225 injuries, type unknown.

Since traumatic amputation and blast concussion were not caused by small arms fire, these injuries may be grouped with fragment wounds and the total compared to gunshot wounds.

Wound, Gunshot - - - - -	1,377	25.00%
Wound, Artillery, Mortar, etc. -	1,377	25.00%

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The true figure would undoubtedly show less than 25% gunshot wounds, since the 225 cases listed as "Injuries, type unknown" represent casualties evacuated on D day when most of the wounds were due to mortar fire and land mines.

(3) REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION, FRAGMENT AND GUNSHOT WOUNDS.

Region	Fragment	Regional % Fragment	Gunshot	Regional % Gunshot	Regional % Frag.&GSW
Head	776	20.48	232	16.81	19.54
Neck	76	2.00	45	3.30	2.36
Chest	258	6.76	142	10.33	7.76
Abdomen	171	4.51	79	5.76	4.87
Pubis & Testes	5	0.13	3	0.24	0.17
Back	251	6.73	81	5.90	6.45
Buttocks	67	1.76	25	1.81	1.80
Extremities	1,167	30.82	616	44.73	35.54
Multiple	1,018	26.81	154	11.12	22.51
TOTALS	3,789	100.00%	1,377	100.00%	100.00%

Of special interest is the high percentage (20.48) of fragment head wounds. This was due to the very soft sandy character of the soil, which resulted in a more vertical shell blast effect than occurs when shells land on firm terrain.

(4) MEDICAL PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

	Enl.	Med. Off.	Dental Off.
2-19-45 to 3-19-45			
KILLED IN ACTION	61	0	0
DIED OF WOUNDS	8	1	0
WOUNDED AND EVACUATED	203	4	1
SICK AND EVACUATED	9	0	0
COMBAT FATIGUE - EVACUATED	54	3	0
WAR NEUROSIS - EVACUATED	1	0	0
EVACUATED REASON UNKNOWN	2	0	0
MISSING IN ACTION	1	0	0
TOTAL	339	8	1
PERCENTAGE LOST	34.4%	11.4%	7.7%
WOUNDED - RETURNED TO DUTY	57	1	1
SICK - RETURNED TO DUTY	12	1	0
COMBAT FATIGUE - RETURNED TO DUTY	10	0	0
INJURY - RETURNED TO DUTY	1	0	0
TOTAL	80	2	1
GRAND TOTAL	419	10	2

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APPENDIX 2 TO AMER DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

D. THE REGIMENTS AND BATTALIONS.

Hospital Corpsmen casualties in assault units were very high, as shown by the following table:

	On Board D Day	On Board After Combat	Combat Losses	%Combat Losses
2-19-45 to 3-19-45				
Hdqtrs. Co., Hdqtrs. Bn.	12	12	0	0
Reconn. Co.	4	4	0	0
Tank Bn.	11	10	1	9.1
Hdqtrs. Service Bn.	8	8	0	0
S & S Co.	8	8	0	0
Motor Trans. Bn.	11	11	0	0
Engineer Bn.	21	15	6	28.5
Pioneer Bn.	36	20	16	44.4
H&S 14th Marines	12	11	1	8.3
1st Bn-14th Marines	12	12	0	0
2nd Bn-14th Marines	13	12	1	7.6
3rd Bn-14th Marines	13	13	0	0
4th Bn-14th Marines	13	13	0	0
H&S 23rd Marines	16	14	2	12.5
1st Bn-23rd Marines	41	14	27	65.8
2nd Bn-23rd Marines	42	24	18	42.8
3rd Bn-23rd Marines	41	15	26	63.4
H&S 24th Marines	17	11	6	35.3
1st Bn-24th Marines	39	23	16	41.0
2nd Bn-24th Marines	39	15	24	61.5
3rd Bn-24th Marines	39	19	20	51.3
H&S 25th Marines	15	13	2	13.3
1st Bn-25th Marines	41	13	28	68.3
2nd Bn-25th Marines	40	20	20	50.0
3rd Bn-25th Marines	40	23	17	42.5
24th Replacement Draft	7	7	0	0
30th Replacement Draft	32	24	8	25.0

Infantry Regiment casualty Rate: 23rd Marines, 52.14%;
24th Marines 49.25%; 25th Marines 49.26%.

A further analysis of the above table reveals that the casualty rate of infantry battalion corpsmen was 54.1%. Corpsmen attached to E & S of the infantry regiments suffered 20.8% casualties, most of which occurred when they were sent forward to replace battalion corpsmen.

In addition to these casualties the five Medical Companies had 81 casualties, most of which were suffered by corpsmen attached to the regiments.

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In view of the high hospital corpsmen rate, representing the loss of trained men who are difficult to replace, it is recommended that untrained personnel be utilized as stretcher bearers in so far as is possible.

Despite a casualty rate of over 50%, and continuing heavy enemy fire, regimental medical officers and corpsmen worked for twenty-five days without relief.

Evacuation from the front lines was excellent, considering the roughness of the terrain, and was effected only by complete devotion to duty and utter disdain of fatigue. It was necessary to carry stretcher cases a considerable distance to ground which permitted jeep ambulances. The use of relatively untrained personnel as litter bearers would have prevented the excessive fatigue of stretcher bearing corpsmen. Initial treatment of casualties in battalion aid stations was most excellent. Wounds were dressed, and shock and hemorrhage were treated so efficiently that many casualties who should have died early, reached the shore evacuation stations and Division Hospital. In addition to the use of Morphine and plasma, a large amount of serum albumin was used, and proved to be very efficacious in the early treatment of shock and hemorrhage. Because it can be administered more rapidly than plasma, and transported to the front lines much easier, its use should be increased.

On 10 March, 1945 a Provisional Battalion was organized. The following medical personnel were provided:

1. 1 Medical Officer from "C" Medical Company
- 1 Medical Officer from "A" Medical Company
- 1 Hospital Corpsman from "D" Medical Company
- 1 Hospital Corpsman from Motor Transport Battalion
- 3 Hospital Corpsmen from Service Battalion
- 5 Hospital Corpsmen from 24th Replacement Draft

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That two (2) Weasels be furnished each Infantry Regiment for evacuation of casualties from sandy and swampy terrain.
2. That relatively untrained personnel be utilized to relieve hospital corpsmen as stretcher bearers.
3. That the use of Serum Albumin in front line areas be increased.

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E. THE MEDICAL BATTALION.

The Medical Companies were employed in a diverse and fluid manner on the Iwo Jima operation; as required by the tactical situation. In the Operation Plan companies A, B and C were attached to RCT's 25, 24 and 23 respectively, and companies D and E were to establish the Division Hospital. Initially all Medical Companies were employed aboard ship. Since both D and E companies were embarked on the USS SANBORN, D Medical Company was ordered to the USS BAYFIELD on the afternoon of D plus 1, since the BAYFIELD was the only APA in the squadron that remained in the area at night, and received all night evacuation casualties. All companies worked efficiently and performed a large volume of surgery aboard ship.

A, B and C Companies evacuated casualties from the beaches; and later were employed at the Division Hospital. D and E Companies came directly from APA's to the hospital.

The Collecting Sections of A, B and C Companies were landed with the RCT's to which they were attached. By the afternoon of D plus 3 the 80 hospital corpsmen of D and E collecting sections had been sent to the regiments as replacements. It later became necessary to send corpsmen from the hospital sections of all medical companies to the regiments.

The average casualty rate for the five medical companies was 24.14%. All of these casualties were incurred by personnel serving with the regiments or at shore party evacuation stations.

2-19-45 to 3-19-45	On Board	On Board	Combat	%Combat
	D Day	After Combat	Losses	Losses
H&S Medical Bn.	54	54	0	0
A Medical Co.	73	51	22	30.17
B Medical Co.	68	52	16	23.5
C Medical Co.	73	63	10	13.8
D Medical Co.	74	58	16	21.6
E Medical Co.	73	56	17	23.3

Equipment was satisfactory. There was an adequate number of jeep ambulances and litters. The allowance of quartermaster gear was adequate in all respects.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That each Medical Company be embarked on a separate APA.

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DIVISION HOSPITAL.

The Fourth Marine Division Hospital functioned for two weeks, from 1 March, 1945 to 14 March, 1945 inclusive, during which time 1,465 patients were admitted, and 126 major operations were performed.

(1) PHYSICAL ASPECT.

On D plus 6 the Division Surgeon and Commanding Officer of the Medical Battalion located the site at TA 165 K on the eastern edge of Airfield No. 1. Running through this location was a good road to the front lines and evacuation beaches. On either side of the road were uncovered water reservoirs 15' by 30' and 8' below the surface. These reservoirs had concrete decks and concrete walls 8 inches thick. Of the five, two were badly damaged by naval gunfire.

A considerable amount of sniper fire was encountered in this area from the high ground in the rear of the front lines. Therefore in addition to bulldozing trenches for ward tents, a large amount of ground was pushed to the north, further defilading the area.

The Fourth Engineer Battalion bulldozed five long trenches, providing space for 4 batteries of 6 storage tents each; one battery of 3 storage tents; and the Division Medical Dump. The depth of the trenches and deep sinking of the ridge poles placed tops of the tents below the level of the revetments. The coolness of the climate permitted placing 6 storage tents in a line to form a ward.

The water reservoirs were ideal for operating rooms. The Engineers constructed an entrance ramp, and erected a wooden framework over which a tarpaulin served as a roof. Two reservoirs were used as operating rooms, one as a receiving room, and the other two for H&S, Medical Battalion and the Malaria and Epidemiology Control Team. Each reservoir provided more than ample space for two major operating tables. It might be well to interject the following observation here, Regardless of the courage of individual surgeons and their assisting corpsmen, better and more rapid surgery will be done under fire if their operating room is well protected. Many times, from D plus 9 until D plus 20, while operating with sure, and unbothered technique when mortars were landing in the near vicinity, a doctor or corpsman would observe "Thank God for this place." Conclusion: It is advisable to expend

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extra initialing and effort torevet the operating rooms. An additional well defiladed tent was set up to provide space for two major operating tables to treat compound fractures of the femur and tibia.

The expansion occurred gradually during the first six days that the hospital was in commission. Six major operating tables and 350 beds were available on D plus 15.

The lack of sandbags constituted the chief difficulty experienced in setting up the wards. These were necessary to prevent the sides of the bulldozed trenches from caving in. This deficiency was partially compensated for by the use of lumber. The main road running through the area was watered several times daily by the Engineers. A tremendous amount of dust was blown over the hospital area from the airfield, but due to the complete black out arrangement of the tarpaulins and tents, it did not infiltrate.

The initial bulldozing and repair work was done by the Engineers on D plus 6 and 7. By the evening of D plus 7 number 1 operating room was prepared, and two batteries of storage tents had been set up. Had it not been for difficult surf conditions, which materially delayed unloading of the Medical Company gear from APA's the Division Hospital would have been functioning on D plus 7.

(2) PERSONNEL

On the Iwo Jima operation, the flexibility of the five medical companies, and their ability to work together as an efficient single unit, was admirably demonstrated.

On D plus 9, D Medical Company set up an operating room and receiving ward with the gear of B and C Company, since their gear was not ashore, and B and C Companies were employed in evacuation stations.

On D plus 10, E Medical Company and all of the equipment of D and E Company was landed, moved to the division Hospital, and placed in operation.

On D plus 11 B Medical Company was ordered to duty at the hospital. Because of the vast amount of surgery, teams composed of two surgeons and 6 corpsmen were detailed from both B and C Companies. Thus by D plus 14 the Division Hospital was staffed by 3 complete medical companies, and surgical detachments from the other two.

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The spirit and unselfish devotion to duty of all doctors and corpsmen was highly commendable. No one thought of sleeping as long as casualties were arriving. The careful postoperative treatment rendered to all patients was particularly noteworthy.

This Division is fortunate in having 12 surgeons who are capable of performing major abdominal and traumatic surgery. The operating teams were composed of two well qualified surgeons, rather than a surgeon and a relatively untrained assistant.

Due to the fact that our Division Psychiatrist was the only psychiatrist on Iwo Jima, he was loaned to Corps. He worked at Corps Medical Company A, where the combat fatigue cases of the three divisions were sent. He performed a valuable service, examining 700 cases. Of these he returned approximately 140 cases to duty. Only one of these cases developed a recurrent combat fatigue.

The lack of an ophthalmologist was keenly felt almost every night. There were a large number of eye injuries, chiefly resulting from the sharp edged volcanic sand being blown into the eyes. Each night approximately two eye injuries would be sent to the Corps ophthalmologist; however this number taxed his capacity as the other two divisions were doing likewise. Remaining eye injuries were necessarily treated at the Division Hospital. An ophthalmologist is not only needed by a Marine Division during combat, but is also constantly required during the rehabilitation phase.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That an ophthalmologist be added to the T/O of a Marine Division, to be placed in H&S, Medical Battalion, as the Division Ophthalmologist.

(3) EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

In spite of the heavy casualties, equipment and supplies were adequate. The Division Medical Dump was conveniently located in the hospital area. The surgical instruments of all five Medical Companies were utilized; permitting sterilization of sets of instruments while several major operations were in progress, and thereby materially lessening the delay between operations.

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There was an insufficient number of large Kelly hemostats, intestinal clamps, and kidney pedicle clamps. These shall be re-requisitioned upon return to base camp.

The atraumatic intestinal sutures proved to be invaluable. There was a shortage of atraumatic sutures on a straight needle, and an additional supply was procured from the 38th Field Army Hospital. The majority of small intestinal repair work can be performed with twice the speed with a straight needle. The consensus of opinion of the Fourth Marine Division Surgeons is that the ratio issued should be three straight needles to one curved needle.

More efficient laundry equipment was badly needed. A large volume of surgical linen was washed in three hand operated washing machines, but the process was slow and inefficient. Drying of the laundry presented a major problem because of dust from the airfield. It is understood that 5 mobile laundry units have been added to the T/A of the Medical Battalion, and will be available in the near future.

The new oxygen reduction valves functioned perfectly and proved invaluable, particularly in the treatment of chest wounds. An adequate supply of the large commercial oxygen cylinders was available.

The York flake ice machine was set up in a receiving ward, but never functioned, since running water under pressure was required, and no pressure pump was provided, or could be procured on the island.

The most striking advancement on this operation was the availability of whole blood and penicillin. The packaging of the whole blood is most efficient, as it remained cool and did not hemolyze even though some packages were removed from the reefer at the blood bank 24 hours before all the 16 contained pints were used. A total of 668 pints were administered at the Division Hospital. At no time was the supply deficient.

Three portable Hawley fracture tables, which had been made by the Naval Construction Battalion while in base camp, proved invaluable. With these tables it was possible to apply plaster hip spicas to all fractures of the femur and massive lacerations of the buttocks and thighs.

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was stationed on the beach to meet all incoming craft, and guide equipment and supplies to the Division Medical Dump, consequently we suffered no loss. All equipment and all unexpended packaged supplies were reembarked.

(4) HYGIENE AND SANITATION.

Sanitation, because of the porosity of the soil, presented no major problem. Sunken barrels with prefabricated tops provided heads. Because of the time element and rapid turn-over of patients, a complete galley was not set up. C rations were heated in a G. I. can and tongue blades were used as spoons. Hot coffee was available. Water supply was adequate, being obtained from water trailers and 50 gallon drums.

(5) SECURITY

Blackout entrances were provided for all operating rooms, receiving tents and wards, and a guard was posted on the central road to prevent any infraction of complete blackout discipline. Camouflage nets were spread over operating rooms and tents.

A perimeter defense was set up using Marine personnel of the medical companies. We were authorized to request defense from the Reconnaissance Company, but this was not deemed necessary. The perimeter defense made contact with the 14th Artillery Regiment on the right, and was contacted by the Ordnance Company on the left.

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(6) DIVISION HOSPITAL STATISTICS.

The following table reveals not only the daily admissions, but also the rapid turnover of patients as shown by daily evacuations:

*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	TOTALS
ADM.	24	110	50	79	32	227	171	261	107	119	119	69	59	38	1465**
DUTY	0	1	0	7	2	4	2	0	4	1	3	41	22	32	119
DIED	0	3	6	5	5	5	5	5	7	3	2	4	2	1	53
EVAC.	2	24	70	62	83	78	249	160	193	73	82	92	66	59	1293
(USA)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
(VAC)	2	2	3	0	1	15	9	61	34	6	5	11	7	10	166
(AIR)	0	0	0	7	25	20	56	46	32	6	77	43	10	28	350
WATER	0	22	67	55	57	43	184	53	127	61	0	38	48	21	776
REM'G	22	104	78	83	25	165	80	176	79	121	153	85	54	0	- - -

* This line denotes days of the month (March).

** Of this total 114 were non-division personnel.

Of the 1465 admissions there were 1091 wounds, 140 other injuries, and 234 medical cases.

WOUNDS

FRAGMENT	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	-660
Head & Neck	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	105
Buttocks	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	30
Upper Extremities	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	120
Lower Extremities	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	140
Chest	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	29
GUNSHOT	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	-431
Head & Neck	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	72
Buttocks	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	12
Upper Extremities	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	95
Lower Extremities	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	76
Chest	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	33
Back & Shoulder	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	51
Abdomen	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	19
Testicles	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	2
Multiple	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	164
Back & Shoulder	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	75
Abdomen	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	42
Testicles	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	1
Multiple	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	25

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~~APPENDIX 19 TO ANNEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)~~

OTHER INJURIES

<u>BURNS</u>			26
Chemical (Phosphorus)	19	Unclassified	7
<u>BLAST CONCUSSION, ATMOSPHERIC</u>			72
General	47	Abdomen	6
Head	14	Chest	5
<u>DISLOCATION</u>			1
Shoulder	1		
<u>FRACTURE, SIMPLE</u>			4
Upper Extremities	1	Lower Extremities	3
<u>CONTUSIONS</u>			9
Foot	4	Buttocks	1
Shoulder	1	Arm	2
Finger	1		
<u>ABRASIONS</u>			1
Elbow	1		
<u>SPRAIN JOINT</u>			22
Ankle	17	Knee	5
<u>STRAINS, MUSCULAR</u>			5
Back	5		
TOTAL OTHER INJURIES			140

Of the 234 medical cases, 145 were admitted with a diagnosis of Fatigue, Combat, and further transferred to Corps Medical Battalion (Company "A") for psychiatric evaluation.

SURGICAL OPERATIONS

<u>AMPUTATIONS</u>			18
Lower Extremities	14*	Upper Extremities	4
<u>CASTS (Simple Fractures)</u>			4
Lower Extremities	1	Upper Extremities	3
<u>CASTS (Compound Fractures)</u>			35
Lower Extremities	26**	Upper Extremities	9
<u>FRACTURED MANDIBLE</u>			1
<u>TRACHEOTOMY</u>			3
<u>BLADDER REPAIR</u>			1
<u>ORCHIDECTOMY</u>			1
<u>MAJOR DEBRIDEMENTS</u>			19
<u>ABDOMINAL</u>			47
TOTAL			129

* 2 bilateral

** 18 spicas

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PHOTOGRAPHIC INDEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D) -----

For a more detailed analysis of patients admitted to the hospital, attention is invited to the Fourth Medical Battalion Report.

(7) CLINICAL OBSERVATIONS.

1. The number of admissions is no criterion of the amount of work done; nor is the total number of major operations performed an index of the number of surgical hours. The wounds were universally more extensive than had previously been encountered.

2. Large mortars and land mines accounted for the majority of these mutilating wounds, but a special sniper bullet inflicted its share of massive injuries. A typical abdominal wound caused by this bullet is exemplified by the following case. There was a small (1cm) wound of entrance in the right flank; yet there were five large (5 cm) wounds of exit in the parietal peritoneum, some of which were at right angles to each other, with massive lacerations of the right kidney, right lobe of the liver, jejunum and ascending colon. Two fragments of the bullet were recovered and given to JIC Poa for analysis. The surgeons believe that these wounds were inflicted by either an explosive bullet; or a special type of fragmentation bullet. At least they were not caused by an ordinary dum dum bullet.

3. Lacerations of the small bowel were repaired by simple closure, or by resection and end to end anastomosis as indicated, the abdomen being closed without drainage. An exteriorization was performed on all large bowel lacerations. Ten grams of sulfanilamide was placed in the peritoneal cavity and abdominal wall routinely. All patients with abdominal wounds received 20,000 units of penicillin every three hours night and day. In spite of the extensive intra-abdominal damage, it is believed that a very large percentage of these cases will recover, due to whole blood and penicillin. All abdominal cases will be traced through various hospitals and made the subject of a special report at a later date.

4. All cases with abdominal wounds, and massive wounds received 20,000 units of trivalent gas gangrene anti-toxin. This dosage was repeated on the second and third days to the most severely wounded patients. No gas gangrene infection developed in the hospital.

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5. In massive hemorrhage, blood and plasma must be administered not only in large amounts, but also rapidly. The value of administration of whole blood via the femoral veins cannot be too strongly stressed. A pint of blood will run into a femoral vein in 12 to 15 minutes; while 30 to 40 minutes is required by vein of the arm. Two and three way administration is vital; that is, two pints of blood should be running into the two femoral veins while plasma is injected into an arm vein. This procedure prevents irreversible shock. It prepares a patient quickly for major surgical arrest of hemorrhage.

6. No reactions of any kind were noted in connection with the administration of 668 pints of type O prepared whole blood. As many as 13 pints were administered to one case within 6 hours.

7. Adequate closure of the external wound, very conservative administration of blood and plasma, and continuous oxygen therapy is the early treatment of choice of chest wounds.

8. Major surgical cases can be evacuated to ships on the first or second postoperative day if DUWK's are available to take them directly from the hospital to the ship without necessity of further transfer.

G. AIR EVACUATION.

Air evacuation exceeded our fondest expectations, and played an important role in keeping our hospital beds free for incoming casualties. As shown in the table under Division Hospital Statistics, 350 patients were evacuated by air from 4 March, 1945 to 14 March, 1945.

Casualties were screened by our Air Evacuation Medical Officer at the Division Hospital, and taken via jeep ambulance to the Air Evacuation Center, less than one-half mile distant. There they were further screened by a U. S. N. flight surgeon, and evacuated directly to U. S. Navy Base Hospital at Guam.

No chest or abdominal wounds were evacuated by air since these cases cannot tolerate high altitude. However compound fractures in plaster casts, and massive laceration cases were evacuated.

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REF ID: A66000 DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D) -----

The psychological, as well as the physical benefit incident to being transported to a base hospital far from the battle zone within the space of a few hours is of inestimable value.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That air evacuation of selected casualties to base hospitals be expanded as much as possible.

H. HYGIENE AND SANITATION.

(1) TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE.

Iwo Jima is a young island of volcanic origin, characterized by rough, eroded, precipitous terrain; an overlay of brown black, sharp edged, extremely porous volcanic sand; and sparse scrubby vegetation. Occasional underground rumbles, several warm springs, steam vents, and widely disseminated sulfurous emanations argue the complete dormancy of subterranean activity. During the operation the climate was cool and dry, the temperature varying between 56°F. and 84°F. The scanty rainfall was rapidly absorbed by the porous soil, and no standing water was observed. From an epidemiological standpoint, Iwo Jima was a remarkably healthful island.

(2) JAPANESE INSTALLATIONS OF SANITARY IMPORTANCE.

As is typical with the enemy, every means was employed to collect and store rainwater. The island was covered with large concrete catch basins and buried drums connecting with simple gravity systems to impound the rainfall.

A large incinerator, believed to have been used for cremation, was discovered in a 200 bed hospital cave in the north eastern sector of the island.

No Japanese galley facilities were in evidence, since the enemy was forced underground by heavy fire. Enemy garbage and ration tins had apparently been disposed of by burial.

(3) GENERAL SANITARY MEASURES.

Due to indoctrination, previous combat experience, and intensive overall training in sanitation, routine sanitary measures were excellent. During the battle phases of the

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DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

battle, and in the front lines, human excreta was disposed of in slit trenches or shallow holes. Prefabricated head tops were placed over sunken drums, and the resultant heads were sprayed periodically with a cresol oil mixture. Urinals were easily provided by merely sinking perforated drums or 105 mm shell packing cases in the porous soil. All areas were routinely policed to insure burying of ration tins and residue. The violence of combat prohibited many sanitary measures near the front lines, but policing in the area was efficient as the battle line moved forward.

The 50 man sanitary squad of the attached 133rd Naval Construction Battalion was not used as originally intended because of its more urgent employment with the Shore Party which had received heavy casualties. The small size of the island, the ease in establishing early efficient sanitation, and the lack of large preexisting sanitary hazards decreased the need of major sanitary projects. Had the Fourth Marine Division remained on Iwo Jima for an appreciable length of time after the cessation of enemy resistance, the 50 man sanitary squad would have been invaluable in connection with the construction of adequate sanitary facilities of semipermanent nature. Future operations in malarious areas will demand the existence and use of this sanitary squad.

The supply of water was adequate at all times. The initial allowance was one gallon per man per day. This was increased to two gallons per man per day when galleys were opened, and later increased to over two and one-half (2½) gallons per man per day.

Due to a diminishing supply of C and 10 in 1 rations and a large supply of B rations, galleys were opened on D plus 17 for all units not in the front lines. These galleys were operated in accordance with the rules outlined in the medical SOP, except that screened mess halls were not deemed necessary because of the low incidence of flies. Water was heated by water heating units or immersible oil heaters. Washing of mess gear was strictly supervised and all galleys were inspected daily by a medical officer.

The daily diet was markedly improved by fruit juices and fruits, which prevented the widespread avitaminosis that occurred during the Marianas operation. All of the fruit juices and fruits carried by the division were not consumed because of the coolness of the climate. The amount allowed for this operation would be barely sufficient for an operation in a warmer climate.

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Mosquitoes constituted no hazard. A few adult aedes aegypti and culex quinquefasciatus were collected. Apparently all mosquitoes were destroyed later by airplane DDT spray.

Flies were negligible in number on D day. By D plus 5 a precipitous increase occurred in all areas. At first the common housefly was in preponderance. As the operation progressed the large green and blue bottle flies increased until they were virtually the only flies in evidence along the front lines. This, of course, indicated the prevalence of breeding in decomposing flesh. The combination of cool dry climate, porous soil, early installation of sanitary facilities, efficient burial parties, and the liberal use of DDT resulted in adequate fly control.

(4) SPECIAL SANITARY PROBLEMS.

a. Enemy food caches, blasted by gunfire constituted a fly breeding hazard. These areas were ground sprayed with 5% DDT in deisel oil.

b. POW's were heavily infested with lice and were dusted with 10% DDT in talc.

c. Occasional foxholes became infested with fleas. Bedding and clothing of affected personnel were dusted with 10% DDT in talc with excellent results.

d. All enemy water catch basins and drums were drained or filled to eliminate the hazard of standing water.

(5) ENTOMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Flies, lice, fleas, mites and mosquitoes were present on Iwo Jima. No diseases occurred in which these vectors could have played a part. Airplane and ground spraying of DDT effectively controlled these insects. Lice constituted no particular hazard to our troops because of impregnated clothing. However their final eradication will probably present a difficult problem to garrison forces, since the underground maze of caves and tunnels harbors an extensive population of lice.

(6) MALARIA AND EPIDEMIC CONTROL UNIT ACTIVITIES.

TheMECon. Officer of the Fourth Marine Division was given control of the airplane spraying of DDT over Iwo Jima by FMF, Pac. Such a responsibility entails continuous inspection

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APPENDIX 2 TO AMPLY DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D) -----

tion of all captured areas by our MECon. Team. Their performance was highly commendable, since they traveled and inspected constantly, completely disregarding the intermittent enemy fire that enveloped all areas. In addition the MECon Unit:

a. Sprayed 5% DDT in deisel oil in all galleys, hospital areas, around Regimental CP's, 3rd Division Regimental CP's, Corps Evacuation Hospital, Division Cemetery, enemy food caches, pillboxes and caves and many other indicated sites.

b. Set up a distribution center from which all units could obtain 5% DDT in oil as required.

c. Questioned, examined and made stool cultures and stained slides of all patients admitted to the hospital with gastro-intestinal symptoms, and all POW's. Results showed none of the virulent intestinal pathogens, such as the Shigella or Typhoid groups.

d. Took thick and thin blood smears from the 56 POW's.

MECon. teams are performing a vital function in pacific amphibious warfare. However they are handicapped by lack of organic transportation as their work entails continuous traveling. 1/4 ton 4 x 4's are needed for transporting personnel who inspect areas, supervise the installation of sanitary facilities, collect specimens of insects and pests, and estimate droplet dispersion of airplane sprayed DDT. One (1) ton 4 x 4's are required to deliver DDT solution to units, and to transport a power sprayer for the ground spraying of DDT. These vehicles are required for similar functions at the base camp during rehabilitation. Furthermore, MECon. equipment and supplies are of a highly specialized nature, and should be combat loaded on organic vehicles enroute to a target. A minimum of two 1/4 ton 4 x 4 cargo trucks and two 1 ton 4 x 4 trucks are required.

(7) BURIAL OF THE DEAD

The Graves Registration Section began work on preparation of the cemetery on D plus 2. Excavation of trench graves was hampered by the presence of a large number of land mines. Burial began on D plus 5, and by D plus 26, 1,820 bodies had been interred. In addition to land mines, the Graves Registration Section was subjected to fairly heavy intermittent mortar fire, and occasional sniper fire, in the collection and burial of the dead. Eleven men were wounded by mines, booby traps and snipers. Early spray

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OG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

with DDT, followed by frequent spraying with deisel oil effectually prevented all fly breeding in the area.

Enemy dead were buried early by unit burial details, and constituted no appreciable sanitary hazard.

(8) USE OF DDT.

a. GROUND APPLICATION.

524 gallons of 5% DDT in 5% deisel oil (231 lbs. of DDT concentrate) was sprayed over Fourth Marine Division areas, and 254 gallons (112 lbs. DDT concentrate) was sprayed over other areas on Iwo Jima. Although the airplane application of DDT is highly efficacious in overall control of insects, it must be supplemented by more concentrated ground spraying of selected sites. Ten (10%) DDT in talc was valuable for the spraying of clothing infested by fleas and lice. One fact is noteworthy: All personnel bitten by fleas had either worn their impregnated clothing for over 10 days, or had changed to clean untreated uniforms. Following DDT dusting of the clothing and bedding of personnel suffering flea bites, no further bites occurred.

COMMENT

The 3 gallon decontamination sprayer proved to be the most valuable spraying apparatus for ground spraying. It is easily operated, durable, and efficient. Flit guns are satisfactory for use in galleys, tents, and small closed areas. The 30 gallon paint sprayer is excellent in treating large areas.

b. AIRPLANE APPLICATION OF DDT.

Carrier based TBF's sprayed the southern 2/3 of the occupied zone on D plus 9, using 10% DDT in a carbon tetrachloride oil mixture. Approximately 2 quarts per acre was applied to 550 acres. Droplet dispersion was excellent. The results were manifest within a period of a few hours. There was a prompt decrease of flies in all sprayed areas. A definite residual effect was apparent for about 6 days.

Carrier based planes sprayed again on D plus 13. Coverage was not as uniform as they flew an irregular swath because of the position of the plane, but again

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

a decrease in the fly population was noted.

On D plus 22 a C47 from Saipan sprayed approximately 2,000 acres with 5% DDT in kerosene, delivering about one quart per acre. Thereafter one C47 sprayed DDT daily over areas designated by our MECOM Officer. Each spraying resulted in a decrease of flies.

Within the division, an apparatus was designed for spraying from an OYL to be used primarily for repeat spraying of small areas which were missed by faster planes or required a heavier concentration of DDT. Due to destruction of OYL's by enemy mortar fire, it was not possible to use one for this purpose although spraying of small isolated areas was definitely indicated.

COMMENT.

Airplane application of DDT is effective, practicable, and affords the most potent means of attacking mosquitoes and flies. In an area subject to malaria, dengue and dysentery its use is of inestimable military value. The method of application, however, remains a controversial subject. As a result of experience gained on Iwo Jima, the following observations and comments are submitted:

In combat several types of planes are necessary, each performing its own specific function. The same applies to the airplane application of DDT. Carrier based planes are of value before an airfield is seized and made operable. Land based planes should spray thereafter. An OYL or smaller plane is of distinct value in spraying small areas, because of its maneuverability.

The use of C47's for spraying combat areas is impracticable for many reasons. They are slow, unmaneuverable and offer excellent targets to the enemy. They can perform no other useful function since their fuselage is filled with DDT tanks. To retain them on the captured airfield is to crowd the field and risk their destruction by enemy fire. Basing them on other islands results in delay and is economically unsound.

P61's would be ideal for spraying a combat zone. These planes arrive early at a captured airfield. They are inoperative during the daytime, therefore using them for spraying would not affect their combat function. They are equipped to carry reserve fuel tanks, which could be easily

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

converted to DDT tanks, and attached to any particular P61 in a short time. Finally, this plane is fast and maneuverable, and could spray closer to the front lines without undue risk. In case P61s were not available P38s could be used, as they are equipped to carry two similar dropable tanks.

The most efficient concentration is for initial spraying 2 quarts per acre of 10% DDT. Solvent for preparing 10% solution in oil should be readily available. Oil solvents result in a longer residual effect than kerosene solvents.

(9) MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE.

On D plus 10 a POW who was a superior private in the Japanese Medical Corps was interrogated, and the following information was obtained:

- a. The most common diseases were dysentery and a nutritional disease believed to be due to a lack of vitamin B.
- b. The water from local wells was high in sulfate and magnesium content, producing diarrhoea and a high incidence of hemorrhoids.
- c. Amebic dysentery, treated by emetin, was acknowledged.
- d. Many of the dysentery patients developed "watery or bloody stools with acute colicky abdominal cramps."
- e. Many diagnoses of Paratyphoid A Fever were made; and the death rate of this disease was comparatively high.
- f. Intestinal parasites were frequent, and santonin was used in their treatment.
- g. Plague, cholera, malaria, dengue, typhus, scrub typhus, yellow fever and elephantiasis were denied.
- h. Enemy troops had been immunized against smallpox, typhoid and typhus.
- i. Mosquitoes were present from April to November, but carried no disease. The species was unknown.
- j. Only a small amount of quinine was on hand, and was used chiefly as an antipyretic.

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ATTENTION DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

Japanese medical equipment and supplies were essentially the same as on previous operations. Tourniquets were large and made of excellent rubber. A great number of ampules for injections were present. Vitamin pills were present in large quantities. An abundance of non-essential medical supplies for treating chronic diseases and medical cases were found even in overrun line aid stations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That a 30 day allowance for a Marine Division in a combat theater be 2,000 pounds of DDT concentrate, and 500 pounds of 10% DDT in talc, for ground use only.

2. That three gallon decontamination sprayers be issued on a basis of 400 per Marine Division. They should be equipped with a standard whirlplate nozzle and a delivery aperture of 58 to 62 gauge.

3. That one paint sprayer (as supplied by the Engineer Battalion) per 5,000 men be made available for spraying DDT solution.

4. That two 1/4 ton 4x4 cargo trucks and two 1 ton 4x4 trucks be added to the Marine Corps TBA for Division MECon units.

5. That one unit be given complete control of airplane DDT spraying, during the assault phase, as in the Iwo Jima operation, and that this unit be authorized to request spraying direct from the air activity concerned.

6. That carrier based VT's spray captured areas initially; and that P61's or P38's be utilized to spray DDT after a captured airfield is operable.

7. That OY1's be utilized to supplement the faster planes by spraying small indicated areas.

8. That DDT spraying apparatus be standardized for each type of plane to be used and made easily interchangeable from one plane to another.

9. That 10% DDT in Deisel or heavier oil be used for initial airplane spraying.

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APPENDIX 2 TO A-1 DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

I. MEDICAL RECORDS.

(1) PLANNING AND TRAINING.

In past operations most casualties were difficult to account for after leaving Battalion Aid Stations. In many instances the only record available was that made by Company Aid Men. Other cases were initially treated by non-Regimental or non-Division activities and either further evacuated or returned to duty after a period of treatment. In other instances cases were picked up at the front lines by LVT's and DUWK's and carried directly to ships without being seen by Division Medical Personnel. Regimental Administrative Casualty Sections, based on the only information available to them, reported many of these cases as Evacuated or Missing in Action. After extensive investigation on the part of the Casualty and Medical Sections of all Echelons their true status was subsequently revealed.

A Field Casualty Report was required from all Aid Stations, daily. In too many instances, however, entries were illegible or inaccurate. Furthermore, it seemed nearly hopeless to expect more efficient recording under battle conditions. No satisfactory system was available for the consolidation of information, so received, and its dissemination to all Echelons.

While the proper recording and reporting of casualties is a responsibility of the Medical Department, the problem of bringing some semblance of order out of this confusion seemed almost insurmountable.

A program of indoctrination of personnel handling records "Under Emergency Conditions" was inaugurated. The importance of making legible entries on Emergency Medical Tags and in Aid Station logs and reports was stressed.

Division Medical Installations were required to submit the following reports to the Medical Record Section:

a. EVACUATION STATIONS AND LST(H)'s.

(1) 1700 - Dispatch or telephone report of total casualties evacuated or received during the 24 hour period ending at 1600.

(2) 0700 - Field Casualty Report, or roster of casualties by name, rank, organization, serial number, diagnosis, prognosis and disposition during the 24

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

hour period ending at 2400.

b. REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION AID STATIONS.

(1) Field Casualty Report. (See a.(2) above).

c. MEDICAL COMPANIES.

(1) 1700 - Evacuation Report. (See a.(1) above).

(2) Report of Admissions and Dispositions during the 24 hour period ending at 2400.

(3) Recapitulation which includes breakdown by classes, total cases evacuated by water, air or other means, and a bed report.

The Medical Record Section was reorganized. It was believed that this section, to function efficiently, should have a complete file of all Division Personnel. Accordingly, an attempt was made to obtain 3 x 5 cards. They were not immediately available in sufficient quantities and time was short. Rather than see the plan fail for lack of material many Hospital Corpsmen procured cards in a nearby town in sufficient quantities for their units. As a result of this enthusiasm the file was completed and contained a card on each officer and man in the division, including attached units. This card contained full name, rank, organization, serial number, religion and next of kin.

The responsibility of this section was to:

a. Receive reports from lower echelons.

b. Record all personnel casualty information, so received, on personnel cards.

c. Consolidate numerical reports of evacuation for submission to higher echelons as required.

d. Prepare a consolidated report of Admissions and Dispositions in Medical Battalion installations for distribution to all units concerned.

e. Prepare a consolidated Report of Casualties evacuated over Division Beaches, for distribution to all units concerned.

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APPENDIX

DOC: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

f. Prepare and submit a consolidated report of casualties to BuMed. at the earliest time possible after the battle.

g. Receive and transmit to BuMed. all originals and copies of Emergency Medical Tags.

h. Consolidate and evaluate all information on personnel Killed or Missing in Action. Write up health records on deceased personnel and submit to BuMed.

When the situation and facilities permit, (d) and (e) are mimeographed for distribution to all units concerned.

In order to obtain information on casualties evacuated without record, Division Medical personnel were placed on board the LST(H)'s supporting this division's evacuation beaches.

All LVT and DUWK drivers were instructed to stop at Shore Evacuation Stations, before leaving the beach with casualties, in order that proper record might be made.

(2) ASSAULT PHASE.

While Shore Party personnel landed early on D day reliable records could not be maintained until late on D plus 1, due to tremendous losses of personnel and equipment. During the first few days the battle was so intense that it was difficult or impossible to keep reliable records at regimental and battalion aid or at evacuation stations. This initial deficiency of reports was compensated for by reports received from Fourth Division medical personnel on the LST(H)s.

After the initial period, reports were submitted regularly from all units. These reports showed marked improvement over former operations in legibility and accuracy of entries.

The Medical Record Section landed on D plus 5 and was temporarily attached to Division Headquarters for the duration of the operation. This attachment was considered advisable so that they might function in close proximity to the Division Administrative Casualty Section, in order that information on file in each section would be more readily available to the other, and because the only available mimeograph machine was located in the Adjutant's Office.

(THIRTY)

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LOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D) -----

On D plus 5, the Record Section commenced checking reports, and by the end of the day the first report of Evacuation was ready for mimeographing. A total of 13 Evacuation Reports and 14 Division Hospital Reports of Admissions and Dispositions listing 7,081 evacuated casualties, had been mimeographed and distributed by D plus 25 (16 March, 1945). Only forty copies could be made due to a shortage of mimeograph paper; although 80 copies would have permitted a more valuable distribution. Distribution was made to all Division and Non-Division Units concerned. Copies were also forwarded to the Casualty Section and Surgeon's Office, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and to the Division Rear Echelon.

In view of the large amount of work performed by the Medical Record Section, and the value of early distribution of Evacuation Reports, a mimeograph machine and an adequate amount of mimeograph paper should be provided for this section.

The present T/O allowance for the Medical Record Section is inadequate.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That a mimeograph machine and an adequate supply of mimeograph paper be included in the T/A for Headquarters and Service Company, Medical Battalion, for primary use by the Medical Record Section.

2. That the T/O allowance for H & S Co. of the Medical Battalion be increased by the addition of 1 Chief Pharmacist's Mate, 1 Pharmacist's Mate First Class and 2 Pharmacist's Mates Second Class, making a total of 3 Chief Pharmacist's Mates, 5 Pharmacist's Mates First Class, 11 Pharmacist's Mates Second Class, 10 Pharmacist's Mates Third Class, 16 Hospital Apprentices First Class and 4 Hospital Apprentices Second Class. This increase to be used exclusively in the Medical Record Section.

4. REEMBARKATION.

Reembarkation of the Fourth Marine Division was begun on D plus 24 (3-15-45) and was completed on 3-20-45.

In general, Medical personnel were reembarked with RCT and Support Group units to which attached, as designated by the organization TQM.

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APPENDIX C ANNEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D) -----

The Medical Battalion (less detachments) was reembarked as follows:

H & S Company	APA 222	PICKAWAY
Supply Section	APA 178	LANDER
A Medical Company	APA 178	LANDER
B Medical Company	APA 222	PICKAWAY
C Medical Company	APA 177	KINGSBURY
D Medical Company	APA 222	PICKAWAY
E Medical Company	APA 222	PICKAWAY

Organic vehicles not destroyed in combat, were loaded with equipment and supplies and reembarked. All undestroyed equipment, and all remaining packaged supplies were loaded.

Due to the loading schedule which called for loading of Medical Company personnel and gear on D plus 23 (3-14-45) it was necessary to decommission the hospital on that date, while a small pocket of enemy resistance remained. However only 7 casualties were sent to Corps after the Division Hospital was decommissioned; the minor injuries being evacuated to ships on which their units were to be embarked by our evacuation stations which were not decommissioned until D plus 26 (3-17-45).

In conclusion, the activities of the medical department were made possible only because of the superb cooperation of other units. Shore party evacuation stations were excavated by the Pioneer Battalion. The Engineer Battalion repeatedly rendered efficient aid in establishing and expanding the Division Hospital. The Quartermaster promptly furnished all items requested. The Motor Transport Battalion assisted materially in the movement of equipment and supplies, and repair service for organic Medical Department vehicles.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That a Marine Division operate a Division Hospital with complete Medical and Surgical facilities during the rehabilitation and training period.

2. That hot water showers be provided in the base camp.

3. That the ration allowance for rehabilitating troops be augmented by more fresh fruits, fresh vegetables and fresh meat.

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APPENDIX TO AMEMB DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D) -----

4. That a new utility uniform be issued to each man one month prior to embarkation for stenciling, impregnation with dimethylphthalate and DDT, to be preserved for D day.

5. That the reserve supply of clothing to be carried to the target by the Quartermaster be impregnated with dimethylphthalate and 10% DDT in talc prior to embarkation under the supervision of the medical department.

6. That Shore Party Evacuation Station personnel be landed on a hotly contested beachhead not earlier than H plus five (5) hours.

7. That two (2) Weasels be assigned to the Shore Party Evacuation Officer to be used in transfer of patients along the beach.

8. That LST(H)'s be specially fitted for the transfer and mass treatment of casualties, and used for that purpose only.

9. That the LST(H) pontoon barges be protected by fenders and bumpers.

10. That a second crane be added to LST(H)'s to transfer casualties from the pontoon barge.

11. That a complete Medical Company (less collecting section) be embarked on each LST(H) to augment the organic Medical Staff during the early phases of the attack.

12. That a copy of the LST(H) casualty report be sent to the Division Surgeon concerned.

13. That not over 50 consecutive casualties be transferred to one APA while other APA's in the Transport Division receive none.

14. That the number of ambulance LCVP's be increased to a minimum of 8 per LST(H) to be used exclusively for transfer of casualties from LST(H)'s to APA's and AH's.

15. That an ophthalmologist be added to the T/O of a Marine Division to be placed in the M&S Medical Battalion as Division Ophthalmologist.

16. That two (2) Weasels be furnished each Infantry Regiment for evacuation of casualties from swampy terrain.

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APPENDIX A DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D)

17. That marine personnel be utilized to assist hospital corpsmen as stretcher bearers.

18. That the use of Serum Albumin in front line areas be increased.

19. That each Medical Company be embarked on a separate APA.

20. That air evacuation of selected casualties to base hospitals be expanded as much as possible.

21. That the 30 day allowance for a Marine Division in a combat theater be 2,000 pounds of DDT concentrate, and 500 pounds of 10% DDT in talc, for ground use only.

22. That three gallon decontamination sprayers be issued on a basis of 400 per Marine Division. They should be equipped with a standard whirlplate nozzle and a delivery aperture of 58 to 62 gauge.

23. That one paint sprayer (as supplied by the Engineer Battalion) per 5,000 men be made available for spraying DDT solution.

24. That two 1/4 ton 4x4 cargo trucks and two 1 ton 4x4 trucks be added to the Table of Basic Allowances for Marine Division MECOn Units.

25. That one unit be given complete control of airplane DDT spraying during the assault phase, as in the Iwo Jima operation, and that this unit be authorized to request spraying direct from the air activity concerned.

26. That carrier based VT's spray captured areas initially; and that P61's or P38's be utilized to spray DDT after a captured airfield is operable.

27. That OY1's be utilized to supplement the faster planes by spraying small indicated areas.

28. That DDT spraying apparatus be standardized for each type of plane to be used and made easily interchangeable from one plane to another.

29. That 5% DDT in a Deisel or heavier oil be used routinely for airplane spraying; augmented by a 10% solution in an area heavily infested by large flies.

(FORTY-TWO)

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX DOG: MEDICAL REPORT (CONT'D) -----

30. That a mimeograph machine and an adequate supply of mimeograph paper be included in the T/A for Headquarters and Service Company, Medical Battalion, for primary use by the Medical Record Section.

31. That the T/O allowance for H & S Co. of the Medical Battalion be increased by the addition of 1 Chief Pharmacist's Mate, 1 Pharmacist's Mate First Class and 2 Pharmacist's Mates Second Class, making a total of 3 Chief Pharmacist's Mates, 5 Pharmacist's Mates First Class, 11 Pharmacist's Mates Second Class, 10 Pharmacist's Mates Third Class, 16 Hospital Apprentices First Class, and 4 Hospital Apprentices Second Class. This increase to be used exclusively in the Medical Record Section.

R. S. Silvis
R. S. SILVIS,
Division Surgeon.

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HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 April 1945.

Appendix 3 to Annex DOG to Operation Report - IWO JIMA.

Division Quartermaster Report.

- Enclosures:
- (a) 30 day Replenishment Equipment and Supply Chart, Iwo Jima Operation.
 - (b) Report of material issued by 8th Field Depot.
 - (c) Salvage Report.
 - (d) Shiploading data, Class I, III, and Fortification Materials.
 - (e) Overlay.
 - (f) Ration Report - Iwo Jima Operation.

1. PLANNING.

(a) PLAN OF RE-SUPPLY FOLLOWING SAIPAN-TINIAN OPERATION.

¶1) Upon return to Base Camp for rehabilitation following the Saipan-Tinian operation we were given to understand that in approximately four (4) months the Division must be re-equipped and prepared to take part in the Iwo Jima operation. During our absence on the Saipan-Tinian operation an agreement had been reached between officials of the Supply Service, the Sixth Base Depot and the Assistant Division Quartermaster, whereby certain equipment and supplies would be stocked at our immediate supply source, the Second Service and Supply Battalion. Against this stock the Division would place requisitions when the operational losses of the Saipan-Tinian operation were definitely known. At this time the Assistant Division Quartermaster, through inventory of all equipment and supplies remaining with the Rear Echelon, was in possession of fairly accurate figures of our estimate requirements. Instructions in force at that time contemplated leaving all equipment then with the combat echelon with other Marine organizations remaining on Saipan and Tinian and the agreement relative to re-supply contemplated stocking 100% of estimated require-

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Appendix A to Annex DOG to Operation Report - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

1. PLANNING (Cont'd)

(a) - (1) PLAN OF RE-SUPPLY FOLLOWING SAIPAN-TINIAN OPERATION (Cont'd).

ments in General Supply items; 50% on Ordnance items and approximately 50% on Engineer items. (The estimated requirements being the difference between the amount on hand in Rear Echelon as indicated by inventory and initial allowances). The agreement was closely followed with reference to Ordnance and Engineer items, but due to misunderstandings and in some cases non-availability of supplies was not followed closely with respect to General Supply items.

(2) Approximately a month elapsed before all units were able to furnish the Division Quartermaster with an accurate list of their actual shortages and before consolidated requisitions could be prepared upon the Second Service and Supply Battalion. Upon submitting these requisitions it was found that approximately 35% of the material was not available at the Second Service and Supply Battalion for issue, necessitating the re-requisitioning by that organization on the Sixth Base Depot via the Supply Service. In some instances this was not immediately done due to the fact that the Second Service and Supply Battalion was operating under the assumption that much of this material would be furnished them without requisition. Little, if any, of the equipment and supplies so requisitioned by the Second Service and Supply Battalion became available for reissue to the Fourth Division within thirty (30) days after the submission of their requisitions. Subsequent check-up by this office ascertained that it required an average of two and one half (2-1/2) weeks time for our requisitions to reach the Sixth Base Depot and in some instances a period of five (5) weeks elapsed between the dates of submission of our requests and their arrival at the Sixth Base Depot. It was also ascertained that considerable time elapsed between the time shipments were turned over to the Navy, by the Sixth Base Depot, for shipment and their arrival on Maui.

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DIVISION QUARTERMASTER OPERATIONAL REPORT - IWO JIMA (cont).

1. PLANNING (cont).

(a) - (3) Requisitions were submitted early for operational requirements for the Iwo Jima operation covering General Supply, Clothing, Engineer, Ordnance and Class 1 and 3 requirements. The requisitions for Class 1 and 3 supplies were based on estimated requirements inasmuch as figures on personnel and vehicles to be embarked were not known at that time. Some difficulty was experienced in securing Class 1 and 3 supplies in that the supplying agencies had not been authorized to furnish these items at that time. Not until 7 November, 1944 was the 6th Base Depot authorized to procure Fuel and Lubricants and the Army Quartermaster was authorized by higher echelon to supply rations on or about 7 November, 1944. Information on the actual number of personnel and vehicles to be embarked for the operation became available to the Division on 20 December, 1944. It is essential, however, that Class 1 and 3 supplies be assembled early even though it may involve shipment of supplies in excess of final amounts required for the operation in order that these supplies may be properly marked and otherwise prepared for shipment. It was further found that our original requisitions were not in wide variance with the amounts authorized later by higher echelon.

2. SUPPLY.

(a) ASSEMBLING EQUIPMENT.

(1) Work on assembling Class 1 and 3 supplies and Quartermaster supplies for the Iwo Jima operation commenced about 15 October, 1944 and continued until loading date. Approximately 50% of Class 1 and 95% of Class 3 supplies arrived during December 1944 and in many instances we were pressed for time to complete preparations for shipment.

(b) RE-EQUIPPING OF UNITS.

The re-equipping of units commenced about

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2. SUPPLY (cont).

(b) RE-EQUIPPING OF UNITS (cont).

15 September, 1944 and continued until 25 January, 1945 and necessitated several special trips to Supply Service Headquarters for conferences. Final issue of critical equipment was made after first rehearsal exercises while at Pearl Harbor during rehabilitation period. No shortages in critical equipment existed upon our departure from Pearl Harbor. This was due to the excellent cooperation of the Sixth Base Depot during the period 18 to 25 January, 1945.

(c) SHIPLOADING.

Class 1 and 3 supplies were loaded in accordance with Enclosure (d).. Quartermaster, Ordnance and Engineering equipment and supplies were equally distributed on the following ships:

USS ARTEMIS	AKA 21
USS SHOSHONE	AKA 65
USS SOUTHAMPTON	AKA 66

The total amounts shipped are indicated in Column one (1), Enclosure (a).. Original loading plans contemplated loading the USS ARTEMIS (AKA 21) with the view of returning the supplies placed aboard to Saipan in the event they were not needed at Iwo Jima. When it became apparent that the supplies aboard the ARTEMIS would not be needed she returned to Saipan and all supplies with the exception of a few items were turned over to the 7th Field Depot. The amounts so turned over are listed in Column 2, Enclosure (a).

(d) UNLOADING OF SUPPLIES.

The unusually heavy enemy fire received on the beaches and in the dump areas interfered greatly with the unloading of supplies on the beaches and the subsequent handling of this material in the dumps. Unloading was further complicated by bad weather and high seas after D day. Sufficient supplies were available ashore to satisfactorily support the operation. The control of unloading and the functioning of the

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DIVISION QUARTERMASTER OPERATIONAL REPORT - IWO JIMA (cont).

2. SUPPLY (cont).

(d) UNLOADING OF SUPPLIES (cont).

Shore Party was excellent and operated so as to permit the Division Quartermaster to gain almost immediate control of all supply with minimum losses of equipment. It is estimated that 90% of the supplies embarked by the Division Quartermaster were accounted for in the Dumps.

(e) SUPPLY PROCEDURE ASHORE.

The Division Quartermaster landed on D plus 4 (23 February, 1945). Due to difficult landing conditions, lack of space and congestion in rear areas, it was D plus 6 (25 February, 1945) before Division control was exercised over supplies. Prior to this time supplies were placed in shore dumps by the Shore Party. In most cases issues from these dumps were controlled by the Regimental Quartermasters of the Combat Teams. With the exception of the dump operated by the Regimental Quartermaster of the 23rd Marines no records were available on issues from these dumps. Locations of dumps established or taken over by the Division Quartermaster are indicated by overlay marked Enclosure (e). The Division Quartermaster controlled issues to organizations from the supply dumps by a "chit system" except in the cases of critical items which were issued only upon authorization of D-4. An attempt was made to issue only to Quartermasters whenever possible but issues were made to units down to including Companies and Detachments in emergencies and in some instances to individuals. Reports listing all material and supplies on hand were made to D-4 daily at 1600, the first report being submitted on 26 February, 1945. Daily Salvage Reports were also submitted to D-4, separate reports being submitted on Ordnance material. Receipts were taken for equipment and supplies issued to Division units as well as to organizations not connected with the Division. Equipment and supplies issued to other organizations will be invoiced to the respective organization. The Division Quartermaster will expend all equipment issued to Division Units.

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2. SUPPLY (cont).

(f) SALVAGE.

Prior to the landing of the Division Quartermaster and the Service Battalion, the Shore Party Commander conducted Salvage activities. Upon the landing of the Salvage Section on D plus 6 (25 February, 1945) Division Salvage parties were immediately placed in operation and a dump established under the supervision of the Division Salvage Officer. The Ordnance Company also operated a Salvage Party which collected only Ordnance material. Prior to establishment of Division Salvage Dump serviceable salvaged equipment was reissued to units without receipt. All Ordnance materiel was immediately turned over to the Ordnance Company for rehabilitation. The Division Quartermaster maintained a representative with the Ordnance Company and all salvaged Ordnance material as it was placed in serviceable condition was turned over to the Division Quartermaster for reissue to organizations. Serviceable salvage equipment of other classes was turned over to the Division Quartermaster for reissue by the Salvage Officer. Unserviceable salvage was held in salvage dump and prior to our departure turned over to the Salvage Section of the Island Garrison Forces. The time element and the fact that small arms brass at once became lost in the loose sandy soil of the island precluded the salvage of this material but artillery brass together with containers were collected and neatly stacked near artillery positions (the artillery Battalions did not displace during this operation) and thru arrangements, authorized by 5th Amphibious Corps, left in these locations to be picked up at a later date. A complete listing of equipment and supplies salvaged during the operation is contained in Enclosure (c).

(g) COMMISSARY AND SUBSISTENCE SUPPLIES:

The Division Commissary Section took over the operation of Regimental Combat Team 23 Ration Dump immediately upon landing on D plus 6 (25 February, 1945) and simultaneously established a

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2. SUPPLY (cont).

(g) COMMISSARY AND SUBSISTENCE SUPPLIES (cont).

Division Ration Dump in location indicated on Enclosure (e). Prior to that time Commissary personnel of the Service and Supply Platoons attached to Regimental Combat Teams 23 and 24 operated their respective ration dumps. The Division Commissary Section also took over the control of water issue, initially from the dumps and later by "chit" from the water distillation points. The rations embarked were sufficient. For detailed breakdown of amounts loaded, landed and distributed, see Enclosure (f). During the early stages of the operation the Fourth Division Ration Dump undoubtedly received some rations, the property of other organizations. This was due in part to the fact that our Commissary Section operated 24 hours per day and in many cases unloaded rations which had previously been refused by other dumps. A considerable amount of rations were furnished other organizations. Upon re-embarkation a total of 14,928 "D" rations and 29,268 "K" rations were placed aboard ships and all rations then remaining in the Division Dump were turned over to the Quartermaster, Island Garrison Forces. Field Baking equipment was not embarked but on D plus 13 a "Doughnut" bakery was established and frontline units furnished on the average of 2 doughnuts per man per day, with the rear area units receiving 1 per man per day whenever front line unit "quotas" were exceeded. Every effort was made to favor front line units in the issue of the type rations desired. All troops praised the new "C" ration and greatly preferred this ration to the "K" ration. The extra fruit juices, fruit, coffee and sugar were definitely a worthwhile adjunct to the regular ration. These "extras" should be made a part of the regular rations embarked to cover periods when landing rations only are used during coming operations.

(h) EQUIPMENT OF CASUALTIES.

All casualties returned to duty from shipboard or hospitals were "processed" through the Service Battalion and outfitted with clothing and equipment by the Division Quartermaster. They were

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2. SUPPLY (cont).

(h) EQUIPMENT OF CASUALTIES. (cont).

then turned over to the Provost Marshall who provided guides to their respective organization. A total of 420 casualties were so handled. This system functioned very satisfactorily,

(i) ADEQUACY OF SUPPLY.

In general the 30 day allowances of supplies embarked were adequate. The exceptions being sand bags, clothing and certain items of Ordnance, i.e., Mortars, BARS, M1917A1 Machine Guns, Grenade Launchers, 2.36 Rocket Launchers. The adequacy of "30 day replenishment" supplies however is largely dependent upon thorough salvage operations and must be supplemented by the immediate rehabilitation of salvaged material and reissue of this material to troops.

3. RE-SUPPLY.

(a) During the Iwo Jima operation it was only necessary to submit two (2) requisitions for re-supply equipment to the 8th Field Depot. Enclosure (b) indicates the articles and amounts requisitioned and the amounts furnished. The non-availability of Sand Bags was considered serious in that this material was badly needed for protection of distillation plants and hospital installations. The 8th Field Depot was most cooperative in furnishing items requisitioned as quickly as available but experienced some difficulty in landing re-supply equipment from re-supply ships. No requests were made upon other organizations for major items of supplies or equipment, with the exception of ammunition. This office, upon authority of D-4 or upon approved requests of other organizations issued the materials listed in Columns 3 and 4 of Enclosure (a) and Columns 4 and 5 of Enclosure (b).

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

(a) That the "immediate supply source" (at present the Second Service and Supply Battalion)

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DIVISION QUARTERMASTER OPERATIONAL REPORT - IWO JIMA (cont).

4. RECOMMENDATIONS (cont).

(a) - (cont).
of the Division be immediately stocked as follows in addition to their present stock levels, this material to be "frozen" until such time as our requirements for the coming operations are filled:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Initial Allowance</u>
General Supply (less tentage)	100%
Ordnance	50%
Engineer	50%
Utility Clothing & Underwear including Socks	100%
Other clothing	50%

(b) That Class 1 and 3 supplies be assembled immediately and that steps be taken to authorize supply sources (Army and Navy) to supply immediately.

(c) That the following allowances be established as "operational requirements" for any operation of less than 30 days duration:

1/2	Field Jacket per man
2	Coats, utility per man
2	Trousers, utility per man
2	Drawers, cotton, per man
2	Undershirts, cotton, per man
3	Socks, woolen, per man
1/2	Shoes, pair, per man
1/2	Blanket, per man
1/4	Poncho, per man

(d) That a limited amount of bakery equipment be carried on any operation over 10 days duration.

(e) That portable or mobile laundry equipment be embarked and operated under the supervision of the Division Quartermaster on any operation exceeding 15 days, to provide means for laundering hospital and dressing station linen, and as a means of salvage of clothing for reissue to troops.

(f) That only four (4) days "K" rations be carried and that the amount of "C" rations carried be increased accordingly.

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4. RECOMMENDATIONS (cont).

(g) That the "30 day replenishment" allowances on the following items be increased by 100% -

Mortars, 60 MM
Mortars, 81 MM
Guns, Machine, cal..30, M1917A1
Rifle, Auto. Browning, cal..30, M1918A2
Launcher, rocket, 2.36
Launcher, grenade, M7
Launcher, grenade, M8

(h) That the minimum of Division Supplies be palletized - that the Division be authorized an allowance of 2000 Wilson Drums in which to pack certain items of rations and Quartermaster Supplies.


J. E. FONDAHL,
Lt. Colonel, USMCR.,
Division Quartermaster.

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OFFICE OF THE DIVISION QUARTERMASTER
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

30-DAY REPLENISHMENT SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT CHART

IWO JIMA OPERATION

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I-T-E-M	1 Embarked	2 Artemis - 21	3 Corps Troops (a)	4 Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	5 4th Mar. Div. (c)	6 Island Command	7 Losses (d)	8 On Hand	9 Issued from Salvage (e)
GENERAL SUPPLY									
ACCESSORIES, baker.	1						1	0	
ACCESSORIES, replenishment, range field, M1937.	2	2					0	0	
ACCESSORIES & SPARE PARTS, range field, M1937.	15	5					0	10	
AXE, w/handle.	34	12		1	10		9	2	
BAG, clothing.	162	50					112	0	
BAG, food.	699				538		161	0	
BAG, officer, field, M1941.	48	16		3	1		17	11	
BOOK, field message.	2331	646			100		385	1200	
BOOK, memo, 3-1/2 x 5-3/4".	758				125		633	0	
BRESSARD, MP.	35						0	35	
BROOM, corn.	100	30		74	8		0	0	12
BROOM, pavement, w/o handle.	120	45		32	6		37	0	
BROOM, road fibre, 16" handle.	16	5					11	0	
BRUSH, camel's hair, round, #1.	6	2							

ENCLOSURE "A"

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I-T-E-M

GENERAL SUPPLY (CONT'D)

	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar.Div. (b)	4th Mar.Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issued from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
CHEST, mess., complete.	13	5					1	7	
CHEST, typewriter (standard) w/o typewriter.	2						1	1	
CHEST, tool, body, carpenter.									
CLOTH, abrasive, asstd., quires.	160	53					14	93	
COMPOUND, germicidal rinse, (3-1/4 oz units), units.	3928	2976		5280	96		576	0	
CLOTH, creosote, quires.	40	13			4		23	0	
CONTAINER f/bk med. jungle.	349	172			9		139	29	
COF, field, folding.	1000	334		62	166		0	438	
COVER, canteen.	2500	900	30	250	1063			257	
COVER, f/helmet, vari-colored.	1397	347			838		0	212	
CRAYON, lumber, red, dozen.	10						0	10	
CRAYON, marking, blue, stick.	47						47	0	
CUP, canteen, M1910.	500	115		316	1387		0	549	1867
CUTTER, wire, light, M1938.	12						11	1	
DIGGER, post hole.	5	1					0	4	
DISINFECTANT, gallons.	1430	495		30	60		845	0	
DUBBING, 6-oz. can, cans.	1600	536		1411			0	0	347
DUBBING, 5-lb. can, cans.	80	28		45			7	0	
ENAMEL, red, 8-oz. can, cans.	96				20		22	54	
EQUIPMENT, illuminating, set.	6	2					0	4	
GENERATORS, f/Coleman lantern.									
MANIFES, f/Coleman lantern.									
E.S., CHEST, tool, body.	5						5	0	
E.S., Equip., illuminating, set.	25	9					16		

ENCLOSURE "A"

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I-T-3-11

GENERAL SUPPLY (CONT'D)

	Emarked	Armenis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar.Div. (b)	4th Mar.Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
U.S., tools, bakery, set.	1						1	0	
EXTINGUISHER, fire, 1 quart, pump type.	24	24					12	43	
ITEM UNIT ascy. AWA, 111937	14	4			10		0	0	
LAG, storm	4						0	4	
LAG, canton yards.	340						350	0	
LAG, tent, storage, complete	64	18					44	2	
POCK, haversack.	1753	1520		1	353		0	0	71
SPRINK, mosquito, net, opt.	3397	466					21	910	
TOILET, large.	43	15					5	23	
GLASSES, 1/lantern oil (extra)	148	15						115	
GLASSES, work pairs.	1090	255	1	24	100		311	399	
GOOGLES, all-purpose, Polaroid.	636	300		1	74		117	194	
HALVARD, flag, 1', 2/1lag storm	733						733	0	
HAMMER, carpenter's.	10				2		3	0	
HAMMER, sledge, 2-1b, w/handle	15						0	15	
HAMMERS, axe, (extra)	46	48					43	0	
HAMMERS, 1/broom, pavement.	183	61		100			22	0	
HAMMERS, picket, (extra)	89						0	89	
HAMMERS, 1/100.	50	14		30			0	0	44
HAMMERS, pick axe, (extra)	163	48					0	120	
HAMMERS, 1/pick-mattock, intr.	87	87					87	30	
HAMMERS, saw, cross-cut, set.							0	0	
HATCHET, claw, w/handle.	12	4		1	1		4	2	
HAVESACK, MCP.									
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I-T-E-M									
GENERAL SUPPLY (CONT'D)									
Column No.	Emarked	Artemis	Coros Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar.Div. (b)	4th Mar.Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issued from Salvage (e)
HEATER, water, immersion type.	15	5		2	2		0	6	
HELMET, steel, complete.	873	300		9			564	0	
BODY, helmet, steel.					192		0	1140	192
HEADBANDS, helmet steel.					353		0	1389	353
LINER, helmet steel.					423		0	1412	423
NECKBAND, helmet steel.					390		0	1107	390
HOE, mortar, 10" blade.	3			3			0	0	
HOOK, brush, curved, w/handle.	16						4	12	
HOOK, hay, w/handle.	11	4					1	6	
INSECTICIDE, gallons.	495						495	0	
HOSE, w/flexible nozzle & filling station shut-off valve.	7				3		0	4	
INSECTICIDE, pyrethum-freon, 1-lb dispenser, lbs.	1500	500			100		250	650	
INSECTICIDE, concert. wdrrDDT, lb.	1000	340			640		0	20	
KETTLE, camo, w/cover.	9						0	9	
KIT, barber, complete.	7	2					3	2	
KIT, first aid, complete.	120	24					0	96	
KIT, fishing.	22						17	5	
KNAPSACK, extra.	125	50			215		0	0	140
KNIFE, fighting & utility.	1000	450		75	340		0	135	
KNIFE, haversack.	1812			1	633		1178	0	
KNIFE, hospital corps.	319	112			3		59	215	
LAMP, f/flashlight, 5-cell.	75						75	0	
LANTERN, oil, complete.	116	36			21		0	59	

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GENERAL SUPPLY (CONT'D)									
	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar.Div. (b)	4th Mar.Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Item No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
BARREL, portable, head.	940	260		28	246		41	365	
SOAP, red, 6-1b, lbs.	66						0	66	
SOAP, white, basic carbonate									
SOAP, hydrated, lbs.	3990	2990	50	5200	650		100	0	
SHED, guy, f/shelter, ea. half.	400	400					0	0	
SUITCASE, anti-chap.	397	249			125		223	300	
WEAPON, 13", M1942, w/scabbard.	62						42	20	
MACHINE, stencil cutting.	1	1					0	0	
WALLMOUNT, long handle, w/handle.	21						7	14	
WARRANT, 1qt, f/red ld paint, qt.	30				1		29	0	
WHEELS, w/o handle.	98			9	6		83	0	
WISLEN, red, 16", yards.	103	77					26	0	
WIRE, wire, common, asst'd, lbs.	15400	5600		1220	354		1226	6500	
WEAVING, mosquito, 34", yards.	612	356					0	256	
WEAVE, mosquito, cot.	2620	770			28		0	1822	
WEAVE, mosquito, head.	2620	900			55		62	1603	
OIL, linseed, raw, gallons.	5						2	3	
OUTFIT, cooking, pack, MC, M1942.	20	7			2		0	11	
OUTFIT, stencil, complete.	17	6					3	8	
PACK, MC, M1941, complete.	643	215			250		0	183	
PACKET, first-aid.	3493	1147	30		340		0	1976	
PAD, cotton.	1000	330			180		40	450	
PAINT, green, gallons.	40	10			2		23	0	
PAPER, flint (asst'd), quires.	250	82		1/2			0	167 1/2	
PAPER, fly, double sheets.	11200	3734		5700			1766		

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GENERAL SUPPLY (CONT'D)

	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar.Div. (b)	4th Mar.Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
PAPER, stencil, sheets.	1800	400	40				260	1100	
PAPER, toilet, rolls (1000 sht)	8760	2880		6820	900		0	0	
PAPER, toilet, packets (50 sht pk)	1500	500					1000		
PARA-DICHLOROBENZINE, lbs.	497	217			70		210		
PARAS SPARE, range field, M1937.	2						0	2	
PAULIN, large, 20 x 30'.	45	15	3	10	36		0	0	19
PAULIN, medium, 14'3" x 21'6".	47	14			2		6	25	
PENITE, 30 gal. drums, drum.	10	3					7		
PICK, clay, w/handle.	30						0	30	
PICK-MATTOCK, 6-lb, w/handle.	36	15					5	16	
PICK-MATTOCK, intr., w/handle.	350	120			86		0	144	
PINS, tent, rd, f/tent shelter.	2500	1000			245		1255	0	
PLIERS, side cutting, 8".	7						7	0	
POLES, f/tent, shelter.	200	100			110		0	0	10
PONCHO, rubberized, cloth.	973	415			2414		0	0	1354
POT, marking, complete.	5						0	5	
POUPE, f/packet, first-aid.	699		30		393		0	276	
PROJECTOR, pad, cotton, 2-ronas.	162	64					0	98	
RAKES, iron, w/handle.	50	17	3	7	16		0	7	
RANGE, field, M1937, complete.	15	5	6		6		0	0	2
ROLL, bedding.	12				3		0	9	
ROLL, clothing.	12				3		6	3	
SAW, cross-cut, hand.	24				1		5	18	
SAW, cross-cut, 2-man, w/handle.	2						0	2	
SAW, rip, hand.	12	4							

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I-T-E-M	Emarked	Artenis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar.Div. (b)	4th Mar.Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
GENERAL SUPPLY (CONT'D)									
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
SCABBARD, f/hospital corps kn.	213	142			1		70		
SCYTHE, w/snathe.	7						0	7	
SEALS, strapping, f/5/8" strapping (5000 per box) box.	10	2					4	4	
SEARCHLIGHT, port, comp. w/2 batt.	20			1			0	19	
SHOVEL, intr., M1910.	1000	270			711		0	19	
SHOVEL, R.P., L.H.	31	12		5	27		0	0	11
SHOVEL, R.P., S.H.	62	20		2			29	11	
SOAP, all purpose, cakes.	5900	1475		800	1742		1833	0	
SOAP, castile, lbs.	144	43					96	0	
SOAP, clean. & polishing, cakes	550	200		400	150		0	0	200
SOAP, paste, mechanic's, lbs.	2330	960		420			1500	0	
SOAP, saddle, lbs.	146	32					0	64	
SOAP, silt water, bars.	272			150			122	0	
SOAP, scouring, cakes.	500	200					300	0	
SPOONS, haversack.	2500	1240		1	630		629	0	
SPRAYERS, disinfectant, hand.	50				12		14	24	
STICKS, end, cot, (extra)	900	300					100	500	
STOOLS, camp.	135	60		3	53		69	0	
STRAPPING, steel, 5/8", lbs.	2000	600			100		400	900	
SUSPENDERS, pack, pairs.	699	250			85		0	364	
TABLE, folding.	10				4		2	0	
TAPE, friction, rolls.									
TENT, hospital ward, comp.	1						1	0	
TENT, pyramidal.	100	33		1					

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GENERAL SUPPLY (CONT'D)

	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar.Div. (b)	4th Mar.Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
UNIT, shelter, ea. half w/ignylit	737	240		1	591		0	0	95
UNIT, storage.	102	20	2		19		0	61	
TOOLS, sealing, f/5/8" straps.	2			1			1	0	
TOOLS, pioneer, M1, set.	3	1					0	2	
TOWELS, dish.	1397	850			330		217	500	
TOWELS, hand.	1397	697					300	900	
TURPENTINE, spirit, volatile, gal.									
TWINE, cotton, seina, 3-ply, lbs.	24						24	0	
WEDGE, wood splitting, steel, 5-lb., each.	16	5					11	0	
WHEEL-BARROW, steel.	10	4					0	6	
WHISKEY, N.C.O.	50	17					33	0	
WICK, f/lantern, oil, (extra)	949	59			24		666	200	
WIRE, screen, copper, asst'd lengths, square feet.	95339			100	5700		0	89039	
WOOD, steel, lbs.	584	130	15		125		164	100	
WHEEL, tightening, f/5/8" strapping.	2			1			0	0	
DRUMS, 55-gallon capacity, f/water.	1200		779	71		12	338	0	
DRUMS, 15-gallon capacity, f/water.	2850		149	42		559	2100	192	
CANS, expeditionary, 5-gallon capacity, f/water	20000		500	45		1599	10348	7508	
TWINE, sail, 1/2-lb. balls.	46							11	

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I-T-E-M ORDNANCE									
	Emarked	Armenis	Coros Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar.Div. (b)	4th Mar.Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
ATTACHMENTS, delinking, Cal..30.	53	10					43	0	
BAGS, f/lifting bars, 75MM PH.	2						2	0	
BANDOLEER, signal, M1.	17						17	0	
BAYONET, M1905 or M1.	326	59			102		165	0	
BELT, cartridge, rifle, M1910.	483	100			220		0	160	
BELT, magazine, M1937, (f/PAR).	100	-			130		0	0	30
BELT, pistol, web, M1912 or M1936.	434	161	30	75	223		0	0	5
CARBINE, Cal..30, M1.	409	129		135	235		0	0	90
CARRIAGE, 105MM How., M2A1.	3	1			2			0	1
CARRIAGE, gun, 37MM, M4 or M4A1.	3	1			3		0	0	1
CARRIAGE, pack How, 75MM, M1.	2				2				
CARRIER, grenade, M1918(hand)	53	18			5		30	0	
CHEST, arm & equipment.	4	1					0	3	
CHEST, BAR, (empty)	9	3					0	6	
CHEST, cleaning material & small stores, w/o contents.	12	4					8	0	
CHEST, misc, spr pts, w/o contents	2						0	2	
CHEST, supplies, w/o contents.	2						0	2	
CLEANER, rifle bore; 6-oz. can.	13972	4603			2318		0	7046	
COMPOUND, anti-seize, mica base.	21						21	0	
COMPOUND, rust prev. (all grades)	1035	345	250		15		0	425	
FLAME THROWER, mech, E-4-5, comm.									
GOGGLES, red, M1943, type 2.	59	19					40	0	
GRAPHITE, amorphous, 1-lb can.	3						3	0	
GREASE, graphite, light, lbs.	28						28	0	

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ORDNANCE (CONT'D)									
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
GLASSES, field (7x50) w/mil scale, comp w/case & strap.	29	9			7		0	13	
GREASE, ball & roller bearing, 1-lb can, cans.	3						3	0	
GREASE, C.D., 70.	700	210					150	0	
GREASE, rifle, capsule.	5472						5472	0	
GREASE, tank, fire contr. Scatube	6						6	0	
GUN, 4.2mm, horizontal (Anti Tank).	3	1			2		0	0	1
GUN, machine, cal. 30, M1917A1.	10				30		0	0	20
GUN, machine, cal. 30, M1919A4.	18	6		4	26		0	0	18
GUN, machine, cal. 50, M2.	10	4			1		0	5	
HOWITZER, 105MM, M2A1.	3	1			2		0	0	
HOWITZER, pack, 75MM, M1A1.	2				2		0	0	
LAUNCHER, grenade, M7, w/sight.	66	16	10		81		0	0	41
LAUNCHER, grenade, M8, w/sight.	51	1	20		86		0	0	98
LAUNCHER, rocket, At 2, 36" M2A1.	17				32		0	0	15
LAUNCHER, rocket, MK7 Experimental.	3				2		6	0	
MAGAZINE, assy, r/M1A1	3195	900			1456		0	839	
MAGAZINE, assy, r/Garbine.	996				538		458	0	
MASK, gas, KDO, Mk 1, complete.	37	17					20	0	
MORTAR, 60MM, M2.	12	4			7		0	1	
MORTAR, 81MM, M1.	4	1			3		0	0	
MORTAR, 60MM, Mortar, M2.	12				3		0	5	
MORTAR, 81MM, Mortar, M1.	4	1					0	2	
MORTAR, 60MM, Mortar, M2.	26								

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ORDNANCE (CONT'D)

	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
MOUNT, tripod, MG. cal. 30, M1917A1.	10	2			10		0	0	2
MOUNT, tripod, MG. cal. 30, M2.	18	6			32		0	0	20
MOUNT, tripod, MG. cal. 50, M3.	10	4			1		0	5	
OIL, pres. lubr. 4-oz can. cans.	13972	4350			5990		180	2952	
OIL, neatsfoot, gallons.	30	6					0	24	
OIL, recoil, heavy, 1-qt. can.	376	122			13		241	0	
OIL, recoil, light, 1-qt. can.	81	33					48	0	
OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium, gallons.	510	160		48	35		267	0	
PAPER, lens tissue, quires.	73	5			4		64	0	
PATCHES, cut, cotton flannel.	1 M	40000		40000	210M2		390M2	320M2	
PISTOL, automatic, cal. .45, M1911.	24			1	4		0	0	1
POCKET, mag, dbl-web, f/Carbine, M1	1200	400			357		443	0	
PRIMER, synthetic, rust inhibiting	205	65					140	0	
PROTRACTOR, fan, range deflection	2						2	0	
RAGS, cotton, (100 lb. bale), lbs.	10300	3500		2800	600		3400	0	
RIFLE, automatic, cal. .30, M1918A2	34	10			47		0	0	23
RIFLE, U.S., cal. .30, M1.	247	87		11	161	1	0	0	13
PROTRACTOR, xylonite, semi-circular, MG, 10", graduated in mils.									
PROTRACTOR, xylonite, semi-circular, 12", grdt in mils & yds.	2						2	0	
SCABBARD, bayonet, M3 or M7.	435	132			96		207	0	
SHOTGUN, Winchester, M1912, 12gag.	12						1	11	
LIGHT, rifle, grenade, launch, M15	95						95	0	

* M2 - thousand and M - one million.
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ORDNANCE (CONT'D)

Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Embarked	Armenia	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
SCALE, plotting, flat, boxwood, 10" rdt in meters & yds, 1/20000.	1						1	0	
SCALE, plotting, triangular, boxwood, 12", w/scale, graduated.	2						2	0	
SLINGS, carrying, MG & ammo.	136	61					75	0	
SODA ASH, (Sodium Carbonate) lbs.	905	324			300		41	240	
SOLVENT, dry-cleaning, gallons.	450	150			330		0	0	30
SOLVENT, gun.	1						1	0	
TAPE, waterproofing, 4"x50', rolls	15						15	0	
TELESCOPE, observn, M43 or M49.	1						0	1	
THINNER, f/synthetic enamels.	55	55					0	0	

ENGINEER

ANTONIA, 500 CC, bottles.	3	1					2	0	
AMMONIUM, alum. sulphat, crystl, lbs	3465	2200					0	2265	
BAG, sand, w/strings.	500000				600		499400	0	
BAG, water, steriliz'g, w/cover.	37	12					5	20	
BINDER, load, hvy duty, w/30' chain	1						0	1	
BLACKOUT, hand lamp, "Conti-Glo"	6	2					0	4	
BOAT, plastic, bladder	2						0	2	
BOLT, drift, 3/4"x20" (Bx of 50) box.	11	4					0	7	
BOX, match, waterproof.	140						0	0	
BOX, can, infantry.	2						0	2	
ENCLOSURE "A"									

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ENGINEER (CONT'D)

	Embarked	Artemis	Cor's Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar.Div. (b)	4th Mar.Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
BRONCHESOL, Pur-green, indicator solution, PH, 500 CC, bottle.	15						0	15	
BRONTHYMOL, blue, indicator, solution, PH, 500 CC, bottle.	15						10	5	
CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE, wdr, lbs.	315	105		136			74	0	
CARBON, pwdrd, activated, lbs.	759	250		550			0	0	41
CARBON, tetrachloride, colored, 500 CC bottle, bottles.	3	2					1	0	
CDO UNIT, canteen size, (10 units per pkg), each.	2969	1000		1000			969	0	
CELLULOSE, transparent, 20x30", sht.	65						0	65	
CHLORINE, gas, cylinders.	18						2	16	
CLIMBERS, trees, each.	23						0	23	
CLOTH, cotton (40"x250yds), rolls.	16	4					8	4	
COMPRESSOR, air, CFM 6.5.	1						1	0	
CONVEYOR, roller, stl, 10' length.	28						28	0	
CUTTER, bolt, 3/8" capacity.	7	2					0	5	
DEMOLITION, equip., engineer.	3	1					0	2	
DRILLS, twist, high speed, each.	1						1	0	
DURA-SEAL, matte, 24"x144", rolls.	18	5					0	13	
EQPT, carpenter, pltn, engr, set.	2			1			0	1	
EQPT, drafting, company, set.	1						1	0	
EQPT, drafting, supp., set.	1						1	0	
EQPT, elec. lgt, set, w/o generator	2	1					0	1	
EQPT, pioneer, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th, 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 76th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 99th, 100th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 109th, 110th, 111th, 112th, 113th, 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th, 118th, 119th, 120th, 121st, 122nd, 123rd, 124th, 125th, 126th, 127th, 128th, 129th, 130th, 131st, 132nd, 133rd, 134th, 135th, 136th, 137th, 138th, 139th, 140th, 141st, 142nd, 143rd, 144th, 145th, 146th, 147th, 148th, 149th, 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, 154th, 155th, 156th, 157th, 158th, 159th, 160th, 161st, 162nd, 163rd, 164th, 165th, 166th, 167th, 168th, 169th, 170th, 171st, 172nd, 173rd, 174th, 175th, 176th, 177th, 178th, 179th, 180th, 181st, 182nd, 183rd, 184th, 185th, 186th, 187th, 188th, 189th, 190th, 191st, 192nd, 193rd, 194th, 195th, 196th, 197th, 198th, 199th, 200th, 201st, 202nd, 203rd, 204th, 205th, 206th, 207th, 208th, 209th, 210th, 211st, 212nd, 213rd, 214th, 215th, 216th, 217th, 218th, 219th, 220th, 221st, 222nd, 223rd, 224th, 225th, 226th, 227th, 228th, 229th, 230th, 231st, 232nd, 233rd, 234th, 235th, 236th, 237th, 238th, 239th, 240th, 241st, 242nd, 243rd, 244th, 245th, 246th, 247th, 248th, 249th, 250th, 251st, 252nd, 253rd, 254th, 255th, 256th, 257th, 258th, 259th, 260th, 261st, 262nd, 263rd, 264th, 265th, 266th, 267th, 268th, 269th, 270th, 271st, 272nd, 273rd, 274th, 275th, 276th, 277th, 278th, 279th, 280th, 281st, 282nd, 283rd, 284th, 285th, 286th, 287th, 288th, 289th, 290th, 291st, 292nd, 293rd, 294th, 295th, 296th, 297th, 298th, 299th, 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443rd, 444th, 445th, 446th, 447th, 448th, 449th, 450th, 451st, 452nd, 453rd, 454th, 455th, 456th, 457th, 458th, 459th, 460th, 461st, 462nd, 463rd, 464th, 465th, 466th, 467th, 468th, 469th, 470th, 471st, 472nd, 473rd, 474th, 475th, 476th, 477th, 478th, 479th, 480th, 481st, 482nd, 483rd, 484th, 485th, 486th, 487th, 488th, 489th, 490th, 491st, 492nd, 493rd, 494th, 495th, 496th, 497th, 498th, 499th, 500th, 501st, 502nd, 503rd, 504th, 505th, 506th, 507th, 508th, 509th, 510th, 511st, 512nd, 513rd, 514th, 515th, 516th, 517th, 518th, 519th, 520th, 521st, 522nd, 523rd, 524th, 525th, 526th, 527th, 528th, 529th, 530th, 531st, 532nd, 533rd, 534th, 535th, 536th, 537th, 538th, 539th, 540th, 541st, 542nd, 543rd, 544th, 545th, 546th, 547th, 548th, 549th, 550th, 551st, 552nd, 553rd, 554th, 555th, 556th, 557th, 558th, 559th, 560th, 561st, 562nd, 563rd, 564th, 565th, 566th, 567th, 568th, 569th, 570th, 571st, 572nd, 573rd, 574th, 575th, 576th, 577th, 578th, 579th, 580th, 581st, 582nd, 583rd, 584th, 585th, 586th, 587th, 588th, 589th, 590th, 591st, 592nd, 593rd, 594th, 595th, 596th, 597th, 598th, 599th, 600th, 601st, 602nd, 603rd, 604th, 605th, 606th, 607th, 608th, 609th, 610th, 611st, 612nd, 613rd, 614th, 615th, 616th, 617th, 618th, 619th, 620th, 621st, 622nd, 623rd, 624th, 625th, 626th, 627th, 628th, 629th, 630th, 631st, 632nd, 633rd, 634th, 635th, 636th, 637th, 638th, 639th, 640th, 641st, 642nd, 643rd, 644th, 645th, 646th, 647th, 648th, 649th, 650th, 651st, 652nd, 653rd, 654th, 655th, 656th, 657th, 658th, 659th, 660th, 661st, 662nd, 663rd, 664th, 665th, 666th, 667th, 668th, 669th, 670th, 671st, 672nd, 673rd, 674th, 675th, 676th, 677th, 678th, 679th, 680th, 681st, 682nd, 683rd, 684th, 685th, 686th, 687th, 688th, 689th, 690th, 691st, 692nd, 693rd, 694th, 695th, 696th, 697th, 698th, 699th, 700th, 701st, 702nd, 703rd, 704th, 705th, 706th, 707th, 708th, 709th, 710th, 711st, 712nd, 713rd, 714th, 715th, 716th, 717th, 718th, 719th, 720th, 721st, 722nd, 723rd, 724th, 725th, 726th, 727th, 728th, 729th, 730th, 731st, 732nd, 733rd, 734th, 735th, 736th, 737th, 738th, 739th, 740th, 741st, 742nd, 743rd, 744th, 745th, 746th, 747th, 748th, 749th, 750th, 751st, 752nd, 753rd, 754th, 755th, 756th, 757th, 758th, 759th, 760th, 761st, 762nd, 763rd, 764th, 765th, 766th, 767th, 768th, 769th, 770th, 771st, 772nd, 773rd, 774th, 775th, 776th, 777th, 778th, 779th, 780th, 781st, 782nd, 783rd, 784th, 785th, 786th, 787th, 788th, 789th, 790th, 791st, 792nd, 793rd, 794th, 795th, 796th, 797th, 798th, 799th, 800th, 801st, 802nd, 803rd, 804th, 805th, 806th, 807th, 808th, 809th, 810th, 811st, 812nd, 813rd, 814th, 815th, 816th, 817th, 818th, 819th, 820th, 821st, 822nd, 823rd, 824th, 825th, 826th, 827th, 828th, 829th, 830th, 831st, 832nd, 833rd, 834th, 835th, 836th, 837th, 838th, 839th, 840th, 841st, 842nd, 843rd, 844th, 845th, 846th, 847th, 848th, 849th, 850th, 851st, 852nd, 853rd, 854th, 855th, 856th, 857th, 858th, 859th, 860th, 861st, 862nd, 863rd, 864th, 865th, 866th, 867th, 868th, 869th, 870th, 871st, 872nd, 873rd, 874th, 875th, 876th, 877th, 878th, 879th, 880th, 881st, 882nd, 883rd, 884th, 885th, 886th, 887th, 888th, 889th, 890th, 891st, 892nd, 893rd, 894th, 895th, 896th, 897th, 898th, 899th, 900th, 901st, 902nd, 903rd, 904th, 905th, 906th, 907th, 908th, 909th, 910th, 911st, 912nd, 913rd, 914th, 915th, 916th, 917th, 918th, 919th, 920th, 921st, 922nd, 923rd, 924th, 925th, 926th, 927th, 928th, 929th, 930th, 931st, 932nd, 933rd, 934th, 935th, 936th, 937th, 938th, 939th, 940th, 941st, 942nd, 943rd, 944th, 945th, 946th, 947th, 948th, 949th, 950th, 951st, 952nd, 953rd, 954th, 955th, 956th, 957th, 958th, 959th, 960th, 961st, 962nd, 963rd, 964th, 965th, 966th, 967th, 968th, 969th, 970th, 971st, 972nd, 973rd, 974th, 975th, 976th, 977th, 978th, 979th, 980th, 981st, 982nd, 983rd, 984th, 985th, 986th, 987th, 988th, 989th, 990th, 991st, 992nd, 993rd, 994th, 995th, 996th, 997th, 998th, 999th, 1000th	2						1	* 1	

ENCLOSURE "A"

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I.T.E.M.									
ENGINEER (CONT'D)									
Column No.	Embarked	Artists	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
EQPT, pioneer, squad, engr, set.	3	1					0	2	
EQPT, sign painting, set.	5						2	3	
EQPT, water supply, set.	2						1	1	
EQPT, water supply, supp, set.	1						0		
E.S., Acetylene, 1/2 inch, air.	2						1	1	
E.S., demolition, equip, engr.	15						2	2	
E.S., equip, blt smith, small, set.	1						1	0	
E.S., equip, blt smith, supp, set.	1	1					0	0	
E.S., equip, drafting, company.	8	2					1	5	
E.S., equip, drafting, sup, company.	4	1					3	0	
E.S., equip, intr., infantry.	1						0	1	
E.S., equip, photo, camera	1	1					0	5	
E.S., transit, engineer's complete, set.	1						0	1	
E.S., equip, photo lab., set.	4	1					0	3	
E.S., equip, photo mixer, set.	1						0	1	
E.S., equip, pion, plat, engr, set.	2	1					1	0	
E.S., equip, pion, add, engr, set.	3	3					1	4	
E.S., equip, pipefitting, set.	4	1					2	1	
E.S., equip, tinsmiths, comp, set.	6						0	6	
E.S., equip, welding, elec, set.	7	1					6	0	
E.S., equip, wldg, oxy-actln, set.	6						2	4	
E.S., kit, demolition, inf, Ml.	103	25					23	50	
E.S., outfit, sketching, comp, set.	14	2					4	3	
E.S., ster, comp, graph, comp, set.	3						2	1	

* These sets are incomplete.

ENCLOSURE "A"

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ENGINEER (CONT'D)									
Item	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FABRIC, Impregnated, rolls.	3720	1240	150		56		2274	0	
FLOODLIGHT, pedestal type	3	1					0	2	
FLUORESCENT SATIN, "Conti-Glo"	1						1	0	
FORK, stone, 30" long.	4	1		1			2	0	
GLOVES, leather, barbed wire, pr.	3000	950					400	1650	
GLUE, gallon.	3						0	3	
GRIP, wire, eccentric type, each.	2						2	-0	
KIT, camouflage, cream, each.	476	100					0	376	
KIT, demolition, infantry, Ml.	28	14					14	0	
HANDLE, f/hook, lug or timber carrier, extra, each.	5						5	0	
LEVEL, locator, hand, each.	2	2					0	0	
KIT, water purification chemical, f/bag, water, steriliz'g., ea.	574	200					0	374	
LAMP, elec, 60 watt, each.	400	200					0	200	
LAMP, elec, 200 watt, each.	100						55	45	
LUMBER, f/pioneer roads, unit.	2						2	0	
MAT, beach roadway, sq. ft.	79000						79000	0	
MATCHES, water-resisting, box.	1999	4496					603	6900	
MAUL, wood, round, 36" hdl, each.	2	1					1	0	
NET, camouflage, 15 x 15'	140	43			2		10	30	
NET, camouflage, 22 x 22'	23				2		21	0	
NET, camouflage, 29 x 29'	129	44			15		10	60	
NET, camouflage, 36 x 44'	69	23					0	46	
ORTHOTOLIDIN, tablets, each.	20000	300					7200	12000	

ENCLOSURE "A"

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I-T-E-M

ENGINEER (CONT'D)

	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
OUTFIT, sketching, complete.	5	2					0	3	
PAINT, congl, asst. colors, gal.	106	75			1		0	70	
PENCIL, wax, asst. colors, each.	4						4	0	
PIPEFITTING, additional, set.	2	1					0	*1	
POST, drive, long, each.	19200		24	5258	146		13782	0	
POST, drive, short, each.	38400			8775	165		29460	0	
ROPE, sisal, 1/2" diameter, ft.	600	200		200			0	200	
ROPE, sisal, 3/4" diameter, ft.	600	200					40	360	
ROPE, sisal, 3/4" diameter, ft.	3750	1250					2200	300	
ROPE, sisal, 1" diameter, ft.	3700	1000	100				2300	300	
SCREW, wood, FHB, asst'd, unit.	34	14					0	20	
SODA ASH, purite, lbs.	4500	1500		2925			75	0	
STAND, f/conveyor roller, each.	27						27	0	
STAPLES, fence, lbs.	900	300					200	400	
STEEL, blacksmith, units, each.	14						14	0	
STERO-COMPARAGRAPH, complete.	1						1	0	
STERO-SCOPE, magnifying, folding.	3	1					0	2	
TUBE, tin, 4x35", each.	5						0	5	
WATER PURIFICATION UNIT.	1						1	0	
WELL CASING, 6", ft, w/couplers & drive heads, each.	85			40			45	0	
WELL CASING, 8", ft, w/couplers & drive heads, each.	85						85	0	
WIRE, barbed, concertina, coils.	5000						3981	0	
WIRE, barbed, twisted, 100-lb. coil	2400						161	0	

*This set is incomplete.

ENCLOSURE "A"

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ITEM	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
ENGINEER (CONT'D)									
WIRE, steel, galvanized, 100-lb coils, No. 16, BWG.	5						1	1	
WIRE, netting, 1-1/2" mesh (chicken wire), 150 rolls.	100	3					67	0	
WIRE, steel, galvanized, 100-lb coils, No. 10 BWG.	11	3					6	2	

CLOTHING

BLANKETS, green, wool, each.	20038	66		219	6150		6990	0	
COATS, utility.	7105	2369		100	2960		1675	0	
DRAWERS, cotton.	23400	7800		410	11045		4145	0	
SHOES, field, pairs.	10260	3420	33	4496	1816		493	0	
SOCKS, wool, pairs.	23350	7737		800	20667		0	0	
TROUSERS, utility.	12200	4066		100	11614		0	0	
UNDERSHIRTS, cotton.	23400	7800		400	14173		1022	0	

CHEMICAL WARFARE

AGENTS, decont (Chl of Lime), lbs.	8900	2900		2652			3343	0	
APPARATUS, Decon, hand, M1, 3-gal.	22	3		1	11		0	2	
APPARATUS, Decon, hand, M2, 1 1/2-gal.	103						0	103	
CANNISTER, mask, gas, M10A1, extra.	2970	990					0	1980	
COVER, protective, individual.	1400	500			54		0	346	

ENCLOSURE "A"

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I-T-E-M

CHEMICAL WARFARE (CONT'D)	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
COVERALL, 2-piece, Navy Type, ea.	2976	992					0	1934	
GRAYON, vesicant det. M7, box.	467	100					0	307	
CURTAIN, gas-proof, M1, each.	293	100					0	193	
EQUIPMENT, Decont., squad, each.	2						2	0	
E.S., Equip., decont., squad.	7						7	0	
E.S., KIT, fuel filling, f/Flame Thrower, portable, M1A1.									
CYLINDERS, Ignition, f/flame thrower, M2-2.	3914				100		714	3100	
FLAME THROWER, port. M2-2, comp.	19	6 @ 25			5		0	1	
E.S., KIT, service, f/flame thrower, portable, M2-2.					1		0	0	1
NAPALM, thickener, lbs.	11325				100		11725	0	
FUNNEL, M1, f/apparatus, decon. M2	130	5			2		0	123	
GAS, acetylene, cylinder, each.	10		2	1	5		1	1	
GAS, CO ₂ , cylinder, each.	3				3		0	0	
GAS, nitrogen, cylinder, each.	300				10		0	290	
GAS, oxygen, cylinder, each.	43		4	1	13		13	17	
GLOVES, rubber, acid, pair.	13	6					6	6	
GLOVES, woolen, pair.	2976	993					0	1934	
IMPREGNITE, shoe, 3-oz can, cans.	5000	2000		3266			0	0	266
KIT, chemical agent, detector, M9.	32	10					13	4	
KIT, fuel filling, f/flame thrower, portable, M2-2.	1						1	0	
KIT, serv, f/flame thrower, M2-2.	1							0	

ENCLOSURE "A"

@ 13 were organ. equip. of C.T.

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I-T-E-M									
CHEMICAL WARFARE (CONT'D)									
Column No.	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues from Salvage (e)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
KIT, gas mask, waterproof, M1.	2120	700			62		938	370	
KIT, repair, gas mask, Co, Mk II.	45						45	0	
KIT, repair, gas mask, Unvs1, M3.	9						9	0	
MASK, gas, lightweight (Army)	2113	708		31	436		0	938	
M/PALM, 5 1/2-lb can, cans.	151						131	20	
OINTMENT, BAL, 1/2-oz, tube.	5763	1728			61		0	3974	
OINTMENT, protective, S-461, tube.	5763	1921			62		0	3780	
PAINT, red, vescent-det, M5, 4-oz.	730	250					230	250	
PAPER, 1st, vescent-det, M6, book.	89	30					0	59	
POWDER, decontaminating, lbs.	1800	600		2850		100	0	0	1750
PROTECTOR, collective, M3, each.	1						0	1	
SHIELDS, eye, package.	2740	649					1	2090	
SOLVENT, f/powder, decontaminating, lbs.	18850	6450		4500			7900	0	
SET, impregnate, field, M1.	212	71					1	140	

FUEL

GASOLINE, 100 Octane, gallons.	114950	22000	110	165	11800	84700			
GASOLINE, 80 Octane, gallons	230100	33000	3840	8590	38669	31020	114981		
GASOLINE, white unleaded, gals.	15400	5500	715	165	6143	3080			
GASOLINE, 73 Octane, gallons.	4950				4237		715		
OIL, diesel, 52 cetane, gallons.	10100	27500	3740	14640	3885	15855	45385		
KEROSENE, gallons.	990		5			775	80		

ENCLOSURE "A"

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I-T-E-M

FUEL (CONT'D)

	Embarked	Artemis	Corps Troops (a)	Units other than 4th Mar. Div. (b)	4th Mar. Div. (c)	Island Command	Losses (d)	On Hand	Issues From Salvage (e)
Column No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
LUBE OIL, SAE-10, gallons.	1155	490			220	3355			
LUBE OIL, SAE-30, gallons.	9350	2750	330	601	861	1650	3158		
LUBE OIL, SAE-50, gallons.	15400	5500	330	60	780	5665	3065		
SEARLUBE, SAE-90, lbs.	49910	15410		620	1495	8510	23875		
GREASE, G.P., #1, lbs.	5625	1875	50	175	250	1625	1650		
GREASE, G.P., #2, lbs.	3000	750			550	900	800		
GREASE, G.P., #3, lbs.	725	350					375		

- (a) Includes 3rd, 5th Divisions and VAC Troops.
- (b) Includes all Army and Navy Units, attached or separate from 4th Marine Division.
- (c) Includes all units 4th Marine Division (Reinf), except Army and Navy Units.
- (d) Includes battle losses, oilferage, equipment sunk or which did not arrive in Division Dump, equipment on which no records available during early stages of operation.
- (e) See Salvage Report.

ENCLOSURE "A"

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"REPORT OF MATERIAL ISSUED BY EIGHT FIELD DEPOT"

COLUMN NO.	1	2	3	I S S U E S			7	8
				Corps Trips	Units other than 4th Div	Fourth Div		
		Am't rec'd by DivQM f/Depot	Am't rec. I/Depot by DivQM				Lost in Combat	On Hand
*GENERAL SUPPLY								
		AXE, w/handle	15	0				
		BOOK, memo, 3½ X 5-3/4"	25	0				
		CAN, meat, M1932, w/cover	630	153		153		
		CANTEEN, M1910	240	240		240		
		COVER, helmet, vari-color, rev	750	0				
		CUP, canteen, M1910	819	576		576		
		BODY, helmet, steel, M1	209	181		181		
		LINER, f/helmet, steel, M1	137	48		48		
		NECKBAND, f/liner, Helmet,	400	48		48		
		HEADBAND, f/liner, Helmet.	400	48		48		
		HAVERSACK, MCP, M1941	64	64		64		
		HOSE, w/flex. nozzle & filling station hand shut-off valve	3	0				
		FIRE UNIT, M1937, comp.	15	0				
		BORK, haversack	500	20		20		
		KNIFE, haversack	200	15		15		
		KNIFE, fighting & utility	65	65		65		
		MUSLIN, white, 72", rolls	2	0				
		PACK, M1941, comp.	400	200		200		
		PONCHO, rubber. cloth, camou.	1615	45		45		
		SHOVEL, intren., M1910	300	148		148		
		SHOVEL, RP., SH.	25	0				
		SPOON, haversack	450	22		22		
		TABLE, folding	5	0				
		TWINE, sail, ½lb. ball, balls	50	0				
ORDNANCE								
		MANDOLEER, f/BAR, right	4	0				
		MANDOLEER, f/BAR, left	4	0				
		BARREL, spare, D-35388, f/BMG	5	0				
		BELT, magazine, f/BAR	41	0				
		DEPEND. SUPP. kit, service,	1	0				
		Flame Thrower, port., M2-2						
		FLAME THROWER, port., M2-2, comp.	11	6		1		5
		GLASSES, field, 7 x 50, w/mil scale. comp. w/case & strap	5	0				
		GUN, 37MM, M3 or M3A1 (antitank)	3	0				
		GUN, machine, cal..30, BMG, M1917A1	18					

ENCLOSURE (b)

UNCLASSIFIED

"REPORT OF MATERIAL ISSUED
BY EIGHT FIELD DEPT"
(Continued)

REPORT OF MATERIAL ISSUED BY EIGHT FIELD DEPOT (Continued)			I S S U E S				Lost in Combat	On Hand
Am't reqn by DivQM f/Depot	Am't rec. f/Depot by DivQM	Corps	Tr'ps	Units other than 4th Div.	Fourth Div.			
COLUMN NO.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<u>ORDNANCE (Cont'd)</u>								
GUN, mach, cal..30, BMG, M1919A4	12	0						
KIT, serv, f/flame thrower portable, M2-2	5	0						
LAUNCHER, grenade, M7	212	15	10		5			
LAUNCHER, grenade, M8	216	40	20		20			
LAUNCHER, rocket, AT, M9A1	17	5						5
MAGAZINE, assembly, f/carbine	878	0						
MORTAR, 60MM, M2	1	0						
MORTAR, 81MM, M1	4	3						3
MOUNT, tripod, BMG, M1917A1	3	6						6
MOUNT, tripod, BMG, cal30, M2	4	0						
RIFLE, auto, cal30, Brown- ing, M1918A2	56	25						25
SIGHT, M4, w/case, carrying M14	6	2						2
SLING, f/carbine	50	0						
<u>ENGINEER</u>								
BAG, sand, w/string	135000	0						
EXPEND.SUPP., kit, demol, infantry, M1	10	0						
KIT, demolition, inf., M1	50	0						
<u>CHEMICAL</u>								
MASK, gas, serv., lightweight Army, M3A1-10A1-6	280	0						
<u>CLOTHING</u>								
DRAWERS, cotton	9555	17400	2	1725	15673			
SHIRT, flannel	375	0						
UNDERSHIRTS, cotton	9555	11250	14	403	10833			
COATS, utility	7500	7495	18	361	7116			
TROUSERS, utility	10005	11600	26	576	10998			
JACKETS, field, O.D.	750	0						
BLANKETS, wool, green	2205	0						
SOCKS, wool, prs	11400	12840	16	261	12563			
*NOTE: Eight Field Depot furnished Salvaged General Supply Only No re-supply is included in this group.								

*NOTE: Eight Field Depot furnished Salvaged General Supply Only
No re-supply is included in this group.

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SALVAGE AND CAPTURED MATERIAL COLLECTION REPORT SERVICEABLE AND REPAIRABLE SUPPLIES

LOCATION: IWO JIMA
TYPE OF SUPPLIES: Individual Equipment.

ARTICLES	QUANTITIES		RETURNED TO DIV. SUPPLY DUMPS	OTHER DISPOSI- TION
	UNIT	8th F.D.		
COLUMN NO. 1	2	3	4	5
BANDOLEER, f/BAR	464	*188	276	
BASIN, wash, collap.	5	* 4	1	
BAYONET, M1905 or M1	169	* 7	146	16
SCABBARD, M1 or M1A1.	182	* 16	151	15
BELT, cartridge, rifle, M1910	2157	*264	1468	106
		*319		
BELT, magazine, web, f/BAR	558	29	315	16
		*198		
BELT, pistol, web, M1918	1237	64	671	315
		*187		
BUCKET, collap.	7	* 3	4	
CAN LID, M1910	6737	217	5233	541
		*746		
COVER, canteen, M1910	5966	18	4888	477
		*583		
CUP, canteen, M1910	2779	41	1586	542
		*610		
CASE, dispatch & map	23	* 14	9	
CASE, rod, cleaning, M1	31	* 18	13	
CILP, magazine, M1	2500			2500
COMPASS, lensatic, limonous dial	51	* 16	26	9
CASE, carrying, compass.	180	* 63	108	9
HELMET, steel, M1	2473	88	1939	84
		*362		
LINER, Helmet, steel, M1	2471	105	1871	108
		*387		
COVER, camouf., rev., f/helmet	1850	*276	1468	106
KNIFE, fighting & utility	378	* 71	283	24
SCABBARD, f/knife, fighting	434	*102	311	21
KNIFE, hospital corps	25	* 14	10	1
SCABBARD, f/knife, hosp. corps	38	* 18	19	1
MACHETE, 18"	9	* 4	5	
SCABBARD, f/machete, 18"	15	* 8	7	
MASK, gas, serv. lt-wgt., Army	2140		1720	420
CARRIER, for	3763	1732		
		*2031		
CANISTER, for	3956	1623	108	
		*2225		
FACE PIECE, w/hose, for	3848	1623		
		*2225		
CLOTH, anti-dim	91			

ENCLOSURE (c)

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TYPE OF SUB-EQUIPMENT (Continued)

COLUMN NO.	2 2	3 3	4 4	5 5
COVER, protective, individual	99		99	
KIT, waterproofing, gas-mask	158		158	
OINTMENT, B A L	175		175	
OINTMENT, S-461	247		247	
MASK, respirator, dust	8	2		
		* 6		
MASK, gas, service, M4, Navy	202	202		
CARRIER, for	77	77		
NET, mosquito, cot	164	44	4	
		*116		
NET, mosquito, head	133	31		
		*102		
PACK, U.S. Army type	246	37	167	
		* 42		
PACK, officers, field	51	* 31	20	
HAVERSACK, MCP, M1941	2433	54	1534	208
		*637		
KNAPSACK, MCP, M1941	697	29	484	97
		* 87		
CAN, meat, M1932	461	54	311	20
		* 76		
COVER, M1932, f/can, meat	355	30	237	20
		* 68		
FORK, haversack	185	* 32	145	8
KNIFE, haversack	105	* 41	55	9
SPOON, haversack	169	* 29	124	16
SUSPENDERS, pack, pre	1666	52	1009	142
		*463		
PACKET, first-aid	1581	16	1328	184
		* 53		
POUCH, f/packet, first-aid	2585	16	2186	182
		*201		
PICK-MATTOCK, intrenching, M1910	1051	* 21	985	45
CARRIER, f/pick-matt., intren.	915	* 36	834	45
HANDLE, f/pick-matt., intren.	1006	* 31	930	45
POCKET, mag., dbl web, f/carbine	819	*161	542	116
PONCHO, rubberized cloth	1127	44	556	41
		*486		
POUCH, jungle, medical	587	*154	425	8
POUCH, pliers	64	* 35	29	
SHOVEL, intren, M1910	1445	*132	1228	82
CARRIER, shovel, intren, M1910	1632	*136	1370	123
TENT, shelter half, w/o ropes	415		215	39

ENCLOSURE (c)

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COLUMN NO.	1	2	3	4	5
GENERAL SUPPLY (continued)					
PIN, tent, round		241	* 44	184	
POLE, f/tent, shelter half		296	* 58	210	
CLOTHING					
BLANKET, wool, green		1431	21	1281	51
			* 78		
COAT, utility		613	231	*382	
DRAWERS, cotton		524	155	*369	
JACKET, field		113	31	* 82	
LEGGINGS, canvas, prs.		260	67	70	
			*123		
SHIRT, cotton		441	120	*321	
SHORTS, flannel		79	37	* 42	
SHOES, field, prs.		286	40	*246	
SOCKS, wool, prs.		605	187	*418	
TRICHERS, S.S.		521	113	*408	
TRICHERS, utility		853	351	*502	
UNIFORM, cotton		495	93	*402	
PROTECTOR, pad, cotton		37	7	19	
			* 11		
MESS EQUIPT.					
BRACKET, f/unit, fire, M1942		2	2		
CARRIER, food, vacuum, w/o pans		1	* 1		
PAN, bake, w/o cover		1	1		
COVER, f/pan, bake		2	2		
PAN, roasting		2	2		
MISCELLANEOUS					
AGENT, decontaminating, lbs.		480	*480		
SOLVENT, 2/Agent, decon., lbs.		15000	*15000		
ALARM, gas		3		3	
AXE, w/handle		19		19	
BOX, ammo, cal..30, M1		637	* 27		610
CAN, expeditionary, 5-gal, gas		124	*124		
CART, hand, ammo., M3		11	7	2	
			* 2		
COMPOUND, rust preventive, gal		10		10	
CONCERTINA, barbed, rolls		27		27	
COT, field		124	30	85	
			* 9		
CURTAINS, gas, impregnated		2			
CYLINDER, oxygen, (empty)		11	9		

ENCLOSURE (3)

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COLUMN NO.	2	3	4	5
MISCELLANEOUS (Continued)				
BELT, life, flotation, Navy	746			**746
JACKETS, life, Navy	63			** 63
PRESERVER, life, Navy	16			** 16
ORDNANCE				
RIFLE, U.S., cal..30, M1903	1			1
RIFLE, U.S., cal..30, M1	2315		2017	67
CARPIER, U.S., cal..30, M1	898		702	116
RIFLE, PAK, cal..30, M1918A2	284		137	138
GUN, machine, cal..30, M1917A1	25		19	5
GUN, machine, cal..30, M1919A4	98		78	12
GUN, machine, cal..50, M2, HB	38		33	
MORTAR, 60MM, M2	16		11	6
MORTAR, mortar, 60MM, M2	4		3	
MORTAR, tripod, MG, M1917A1	12		8	
MORTAR, tripod, MG, M1919A4	28		26	
MORTAR, tripod, MG, cal..50, M3	9		8	
GUN, 37MM, M3 or M3A1, AT	6		2	5
MOUSEZER, pack, 75MM	1		2	2
MOUSEZER, 75MM	1			1
ROCKET, rocket, 2.36", AT	66		52	20
THROWER, port., M2-2	53		17	5
ROCKET, 12-gauge, riot-type	6		3	2
PIN, cal..30 or .50	6		26	
WEAPON, mech., cal..30	6		6	
BARREL, M1905 or M1, w/scabbard	387		387	
BARREL, w/scabbard	205		205	
BASE PLATE, f/81MM, mortar	2		2	
BASE PLATE, f/60MM, mortar	1		1	
MAGAZINE, F/BAR	1871		1871	
MORTAR, 60MM, Garrett, shoulder type	1		1	
SLING, gun, (leather), M1907	305		305	
PISTOL, auto., cal..45, M1911A1	2		2	2
GUN, sub-mach., TSMG, cal..45	1		1	1
GUN, anti-tank, 75MM	2		2	2
CASE, oil & thong	157		157	
TOOL, combination, M3	143		143	
CRADLE, f/mount, tripod, cal..30	1		1	
LAUNCHER, grenade, M7 /M1917A1	10		10	
LAUNCHER, grenade, M8	21		21	
BARREL, MG, cal..30, M1919A4	12		12	
CONTAINER, f/rocket, (empty)	12500		12500	
DEVICE, firing, release	100		100	
PATCHES, CLEANING, rifle.	30000		30000	
SIGHT, M4, mortar type	1			
ENCLOSURE (c)				

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	2	3	4	5
ORDNANCE (continued)				
TUBE, f/75MM	1	*1		
TUBE, f/105MM	8	*8		
CAPTURED JAP EQUIPMENT				
GUN, anti-air, cal..51	1	*1		
GUN anti-tank, 47MM	2	1		
		*1		
GUN, machine, cal..25, heavy	3	*3		
HAMMER, sledge, 5-lb., w/o handle	1		1	
HAMMER, sledge, 16-lb., w/o handle	7		7	
MAINET, large, w/handle	5		5	
MAINET, small, w/handle	3		3	
PICK, clay, large, w/o handle	470		470	
PICK, clay, small, w/o handle	1		1	
SHOVEL, RP, LH	7		7	
SHOVEL, RP, SH.	36		36	
HANDER, extra, f/shovel, RP, SH	48		48	
SHOVEL, scoop, w/handle	8		8	
SHOVEL, SP, SH.	8		8	

NOTE: * Indicated material turned over to Island Army Salvage Officer.
 ** Indicates material turned over to the Navy

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I-T-E-M	TOTAL UNITS EMBARKEED *	TOTAL EMBARKEED **	AKA - 21	EACH OF 3 AKA's	EACH OF 12 AKA's	EACH OF 4 LSM's (Tks)	EACH OF 12 LST's (Inf)	EACH OF 5 LST's (Arty)	EACH OF 4 LST's (SP)
WATER, 5-gal. expd. cans	20000	100000		700	1325		50	200	100
WATER, 15-gal. drums.	2350	42750		150	200				
WATER, 55-gal. drums.	1200			400					
SAND, sand, each.		502000	30000	30000	25000		2000	10000	2000
WIRE, barbed, coils.		1200			100				
WIRE, barbed, (Pal).	60	1200		20					
WIRE, concertina, coils.		2700	300	200	150				
PICKUPS, drive, long.		19200		3200	600				
PICKUPS, drive, short.		33400		6400	1600				
BEACH MAT, sq.ft.		30000	4000	4000	2000				10000
BRIDGE & ROAD UNITS	5	55000	2	1					
GASOLINE, 100-Octane, dr.	2090	114950	400	250	75	10			
GASOLINE, 80-Octane, dr.	3660	201300	600	500	125	15			
GASOLINE, 80-Oct. (Pal)	120	22700		40					
GAS, 80-Oct., 5-gal. cans.	1200	6000			100				
GASOLINE, white, drums.	280	15400	100	40	5				
GASOLINE, 73-Octane, dr.	90	4950		30					
OIL, diesel, drums.	1795	98725	500	225	50	5			
OIL, diesel, (Pallets)	12	2280		4					
OIL, kerosene, drums.	13	990		6					
LUBE OIL, SAE-10, drums.	21	1155	9	4					
LUBE OIL, SAE-30, drums.	140	7700	50	30					
LUBE OIL, SAE-50, drums.	230	15400	100	60					
GEAR LUBE, SAE-90, bail.	434	10350	134	100					
GREASE, GP, #1, bails.	225	12375	75	50					
GREASE, GP, #2, bails.	120	3000	30	30					
GREASE, GP, #3, bails.	29	725	14	5					

* Indicates unit mentioned in item column.

** Indicates total in gals., lbs., sq.ft., bd.ft.

ENCLOSURE "D"

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SECRET





L-O-A-D-I-N-G D-A-T-A

ITEM	Artem- 1s AKA-21	3 AKA	12 APA	3 LSM	1 LSM Ser#9	1 LSM Signal Ser#10	3 LST Inf.	6 LST Inf.	5 LST Arty.	2 LSD Hode	TOTAL UNITS	TOTAL RATIONS
B	140636											140636
B-Palletized							15643				234	93392
Fruit Juice(Pal)	36230	58955	18140			173330					133	603155
Hospital (Pal)		110000									90	30000
Fruit (Pal)		34230	27384			410760					123	842058
Coffee (Pal)	375000	56250	18750								41	768750
Sugar (Pal)	174930	34986	34986								20	699720
Milk (Pal)	299520	23040	23040								28	645120
Post Exchange		156000										468000
"10 in 1"	2720		9790									120200
"10 in 1" (Pal)							19550				255	117300
C-Troops			10152									121824
C-POW		20000										60000
C-Civilian		5000										15000
C-Dog		240										720
K-Troops		1248	4164	144	144	144	300	300	1500	192		67236
K-Troops (Pal)	5040	2520			40320						100	50400
K-POW		18756										56268
D			2736	288	288	288	576	576	576	384		47424
Assault			2040	288	288	288	600	600	600	384		46728
Grills			6000									96000
Heat Tabs			12000									120000

Only two of the three AKA's carry classified Revision. Note AKA 65 and 66.

SECRET

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IWO JIMA

SPECIAL AIR AND GUNNERY TARGET MAP

Scale 1:20,000

LEGEND

- 1 DIV QM CP
- 2 WATER DUMP
- 3 RATION DUMP
- 4 GENERAL SUPPLY DUMP
- 5 FUEL DUMP
- 6 FUEL DUMP
- 7 RATION DUMP

ENCLOSURE (E)

REPRO. BY G-2, 4th MAR DIV.

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OFFICE OF THE DIVISION COMMISSARY OFFICER,
NORTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

9-April 1945.

From: The Division Commissary Officer.
To: The Division Quartermaster.
Subject: Ration Report - Iwo Jima.

1. The following is a report on rations mounted out for Iwo Jima, and the resultant observations as to adequacies and deficiencies.

2. This office was authorized to mount out the following type rations in the quantities prescribed below:

<u>TYPE RATION</u>	<u>NO. DAYS</u>	<u>NO. EMBARKED</u>
"B" Rations	10 days	23,473 men
Hospital Rations	30 days	1,000 men
Supplementary Fruit Juice Rations	30 days	23,473 men
Supplementary Fruit Rations	30 days	23,473 men
Supplementary Coffee Rations	30 days	23,473 men
Supplementary Sugar Rations	30 days	23,473 men
Supplementary Milk Rations	30 days	23,473 men
PX Rations (Ration Accessory)	20 days	23,473 men
"10-in-1" Rations	10 days	23,473 men
"C" (All Troops) Rations	5 days	23,473 men
"C" (POW) Rations	15 days	4,000 POW
"C" (Civilians) Rations	30 days	500 Civ.
"C" (Dog) Rations	30 days	36 Dog
"K" (All Troops) Rations	5 days	23,473 men
"K" (POW) Rations	15 days	4,000 POW
"D" Rations	2 days	23,473 men
Assault Rations	2 days	23,473 men
Grills, trisland, foldable	8 days	23,473 men
Units, Heatabs, 8 per pkg, pkgs,	8 days	23,473 men

3. The following chart shows the distribution breakdown of the rations listed in paragraph (2):

RATION DISTRIBUTION CHART
IWO JIMA

ENCLOSURE (f)

- 1 -

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SECTION DISTRIBUTION CHART - TWO JIMA

TYPE OF RATIONS	4th Mar. Div.	3rd Mar. Div.	5th Mar. Div.	5th Amphib Corps	Island Comm.	Artemis AKA-21	Returned to Base Camp	Other	% Lost or Destroyed	Rations lost or destroyed	Rations Mounted Out
** HOSPITAL	53917	1678		10248	3865	140838			10%	24684	234730
OFFICE	446130	22000		28986	17600	38400		3933	3%	1094	30000
FRUIT	470000	36900		129725	27000			4350	7%	43987	603200
COFFEE	125500	89250		164000	13500	375000		1500	20%	174125	842100
SUGAR	152766	148440		182185	38651	174930		2748			768750
MILK	111770	108960		95240	27100	299520		2530			699720
"PX"	418660	7600		28000	4970		200	2000	2%	11400	468000
10-in-1	117620	6850		6270	20856	2720		720	41%	98330	237480
"C"	79440	5696		30088	20856			992	5%	10440	197512
##"K"	38544	3552		88968	8808	5040	29268	468		##1728	173640
"D"	7872	1152	9780				14928		28%	13692	47424
ASSAULT	46632										46632
GRILLS	2500		10000						86%	76500	89000
HEATLABS	11000		34000						75%	135000	180000
DOUGHNUTS	109284			1500				585			1113690
WATER	279700			16045	13355			2430			311530

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Notes on Ration Distribution Chart:

*(a) All "B" rations are computed, with one exception (see note (b) below), on the basis of four (4) pounds representing one (1) ration. EFM #1 lists the gross weight of one (1) ration as 4.8997 pounds. This office, for record purposes of this report, has arbitrarily taken four (4) pounds net weight to be one (1) ration.

*(b) 49,988 of the 53,917 "B" rations shown as issued to the Fourth Marine Division were actually issued by EFM #1, not on the basis of four (4) pounds per ration. The remaining 3,929 rations were issued to the Division bake shop for the purpose of making doughnuts.

*(c) Hospital rations are computed on the same basis as shown in paragraph (a).

*(d) "K" rations show a gain of 1,728 rations. This is caused by the fact that the Commissary dump received a number of cases that were not mounted out by this Division.

(e) 1. The following units are listed under column one (1) Fourth Marine Division:

23rd Marines	4th Pioneer Bn.
24th Marines	4th Medical Bn.
25th Marines	Div. Prov. Bn.
14th Marines	133rd N.C.B.
Headquarters Bn.	10th Amphib Tra Bn.
4th Tank Bn.	1st JASCo.
4th Engineer Bn.	V. M. O. - 4
4th Motor Transport Bn.	1st Prov. Rocket Det.
Service Troops	7th War Dog Det.
24th Replacement Draft	476 Amphib Truck Co.
30th Replacement Draft	Division Bakery

2. The following units are listed under column four (4) V-Phib Corps Troops:

95th N.C.B.	8th Field Depot
62nd N.C.B.	Headquarters Corps Troops
2nd Armored Amphib Tra. Bn.	2nd Bomb Disposal Co.
5th Amphib Tra. Bn.	

3. The following units are listed under column eight (8) "Others":

442nd Port Bn.

726th Signal Co.

4. LOSSES: This paragraph is an explanation of ration losses listed in column ten (10) of the Ration Distribution Chart shown in paragraph three (3).

(a) "B" Type: Ten percent (10%) of "B" rations mounted out were either lost or destroyed. This loss was anticipated in a greater percentage; due to difficulties in handling this type ration. From hearsay information, a number of "B" type rations were destroyed during the destruction of Bule Beach one (1) ammunition dump on D plus two (2) day. This information was received from a 5th Amphib. Trac. Bn. officer who stated that "he had to bulldoze destroyed rations into holes and bury them".

(b) Hospital Rations: The three percent (3%) loss is reasonable and was expected.

(c) Juice: Approximately seven percent (7%) of the fruit juice mounted out was either lost or destroyed. A much greater loss was expected. This loss occurred prior to taking over of the Commissary dumps by this office.

(d) Fruit: Approximately twenty percent (20%) of fruit was lost or destroyed. It is believed that troops ashore up until D plus six (6) day (when this office assumed control) pilfered the bulk of these fruit rations, as they were scattered along the road off Yellow Beach one (1), and were under no control until D plus six (6) day.

(e) PX Rations: Approximately two percent (2%) of PX rations were pilfered. This represents an unusually small percentage and can be explained by the fact that PX rations mounted out by other units might have ended up in the Fourth Division Commissary dumps.

(f) "10-in-1" Rations: From observation of the ration distribution chart it appears that approximately forty percent (40%) of the "10-in-1" rations were lost or destroyed. This office believes that these rations were not actually lost or destroyed. The following reasoning, based on available figures, tends to explain this loss.

The basic rations issued to troops are "B", "10-in-1", "C" and "PX" type. All other type rations are supplements to these four. By consulting column one (1) of the ration distribution chart on page two (2), it is observed that the total of the four basic rations issued for twenty seven (27) days subsistence is 285,522. On this basis approximately 10,577 troops were subsisted for twenty seven (27) days. From strength reports issued this office daily, it is known that the lowest strength of the Division at any time was approximately 14,000. By adding the 98,330 "10-in-1" rations, assumed to have been lost or destroyed, to the total of

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The four (4) basic rations issued and dividing this figure by twenty seven (27) days, it is found that approximately 14,000 troops were subsisted. It is reasonable to assume that the greater part of these missing "10-in-1" rations were appropriated by Division troops and consumed during the first seven (7) days of the operation. The above explanation also applies to the missing 10,440 "C" type rations. By adding these missing rations to the grand total issued it is found that the average daily basic ration issue strength is 14,600.

(g) "C" Type Rations: Of all the "C" type rations mounted out only five percent (5%) were lost, This loss is explained in preceding paragraph (f).

(h) "D" Rations: The loss of twenty eight percent (28%) is reasonable. Due to this small amount of cases (285) that this loss represents, it is easily seen how this amount could become dispersed and lost to all control during the first few days of the operation. In all probability, troops appropriated this ration for the purpose of making "hot chocolate" in the evening.

(i) Grills: The loss of eighty six percent (86%) of the grills mounted out can only be explained in the same manner as the loss of the "D" rations.

(j) Heatabs: The loss of seventy five percent (75%) of the heatabs mounted out can only be explained in the same manner as the loss of "D" rations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) "B" Type Ration: Ten (10) days for 23,473 men were mounted out. As far as this office is able to ascertain, approximately 30% of this type ration ended up in the ration dumps, and these quantities represented a poorly balanced ration. It is recommended that no "B" type ration be assembled by this Division in the next operation, Troops can be subsisted on "C" (NEW TYPE preferably) and 10-in-1 rations in a very satisfactory manner. There is also the danger of dysentery and other diseases resulting from the getting up of galleys to prepare this type of ration.

The doughnut shop was set up on D plus 13 day, 4 March 1945. By using the bulk of the shortening mounted out in the "B" ration and some shortening procured from a Navy ship, doughnuts were manufactured and issued to the regiments daily, during the period 4 to 14 March, 1945, both dates inclusive, and to rear area elements on 5 and 7 March, 1945, only. In the event the length of the next operation justifies, it is recommended that ingredients for bread and pastry baking be taken along with sufficient ovens

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and accessories. It is further strongly recommended that all ingredients be canned and not bagged; in the event bagged items are furnished, that they be packed in Wilson drums. These drums when emptied can be turned over to the Division Quartermaster for packing purposes.

(b) Hospital Ration: Of the 30,000 hospital rations mounted out none were issued to the Medical Battalion with the exception of fruit, juice, coffee, milk and sugar. No Medical Battalion units desired to set up galleys and use the hospital rations because the evacuation system was such that casualties only required fruit, juices, coffee, and items contained in the "10-in-1" and "C" ration (New Type). It is recommended that 30,000 hospital rations be mounted out for the next operation in the event that Medical Battalion units require the issue of such rations.

(c) Fruit Juice Ration: This ration, used for the first time by the Division, has proven eminently satisfactory. The ideal quantity which should constitute "one (1) ration" is three quarters of a pint of juice per man per day, or 50 rations in one case of 6 No. 10 cans. The variety should be as follows: equal quantities of orange, grapefruit, pineapple tomato, grape, and blended juice. It is recommended that thirty (30) days rations of fruit juice be mounted out for the next operation on the ration basis stated above.

(d) Fruit Ration: This ration, used for the first time by the Division has also, like the fruit juice ration proven very satisfactory. When eaten to supplement a "C", "K", or "10-in-1" ration, it has helped make such rations more palatable. The variety of fruit desirable is as follows: peaches pears, pineapple, figs, grapefruit, prunes in syrup, and apricots, all in equal quantities. The ideal quantity which should constitute "one (1) ration" is one-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) pint per man per day, or seventy-five (75) rations in one case of 6 No. 10 cans. It is recommended that thirty (30) days fruit rations be assembled for the next operation, on the basis stated above.

(e) Coffee Ration: This ration, used for the first time by the Division, has proven very satisfactory, considering the weather conditions throughout the operation. The ration allowance on coffee as computed by the Army at eight (8) pounds per hundred (100) men is adequate. No change is recommended. All coffee received was canned and it is recommended that thirty (30) days canned coffee be taken on the next operation on the ration basis stated above.

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(f) Sugar Ration: This ration, used for the first time by the Division, in conjunction with the coffee and milk ration, proved very satisfactory. The ration allowance on sugar as computed by the Army, at six (6) pounds per hundred (100) men, is adequate. All sugar mounted out for "Iwo Jima" was bagged. Because of weather condition, storage facilities, and for issue purposes, bagged sugar has proven unsatisfactory. It is recommended that thirty (30) days canned sugar, based on the above allowance, be carried on the next operation.

(g) Milk Ration: This ration, used for the first time by the Division, in conjunction with coffee and sugar ration, also proved very satisfactory. The ration allowance on milk, as computed by the Army, is ten (10) 14½-ounce cans per hundred (100) men, and is adequate. It is recommended that thirty (30) days canned milk, based on the above allowance be mounted out on the next operation.

(h) PX Ration (Ration Accessories): Twenty (20) days PX rations were taken on "Iwo Jima". This ration proved very essential for the health and comfort of all troops. Due to pilferage, it is recommended that thirty (30) days be assembled for the next operation.

(i) "10-in-1" Ration: From observation of the past three (3) operations it has been found that the "10-in-1" ration used in conjunction with the "C" and "K" ration produce the best combination for feeding troops in combat. This ration can also be broken down and prepared in galleys, if necessary, with satisfactory results. Empty "10-in-1" carton can be used for bread and pastry storage boxes. It is strongly recommended that thirteen (13) days "10-in-1" ration be mounted out for the next operation. This is an increase of three days, as compared with the past operation, and is justifiable increase provided no "B" rations are mounted out.

(j) "C" (All Troops) Ration: Reports compiled from actual issue figures and detailed questioning of various units has definitely proven that in a cold climate, as was encountered on "Iwo Jima", only three (3) days of the five (5) days "K" rations were consumed. Further details on why "K" rations should be decreased and "C" (NEW TYPE) rations increased in mounting out requirements can be found in paragraph (n). With the exception of approximately three hundred and fifty (350) cases of New Type "C" rations the Army furnished this office with old type "C", many of which were in bad condition, yet fit for consumption. Although old type "C" rations are none to palatable, they still were in greater demand for issue than "K". The New Type "C" rations

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rations all that can be desired in a field ration. The Division hospital found the new type "C" ration to be particularly ideal for feeding casualties, in the form of soup. All efforts should be made to procure the new type. It is recommended that thirteen (13) days NEW TYPE "C" rations be assembled for the next operation.

(k) "C" (POW) Ration: This office mounted out fifteen (15) days "C" rations for four thousand (4000) prisoners of War (60,000 rations) of which only twenty four (24) were issued. No recommendation are made for mounting out requirements for the next operation.

(l) "C" (Civilian) Ration: This office mounted out thirty (30) days "C" rations for 500 Civilians (15,00 rations) of which none were issued to civilians. No recommendations are made for mounting out requirements for the next operation.

(m) "C" (Dog) Ration: This office mounted out thirty (30) days "C" rations for Marine War Dogs. Although this type ration is probably sufficient, it is believed that dog rations can be greatly augmented by the additional mounting out of Killed Dog Food. No recommendations are made as to quantities of dog food to be mounted out for the next operation.

(n) "K" (All Troops) Ration: Based on data available from records of this office, it was found that only three (3) of five (5) days "K" rations mounted out were consumed by troops. Two thirds (2/3) of one (1) day were issued to all troops on D minus one (1) day, prior to landing, for consumption on D day. The remaining two and one third (2-1/3) days were consumed mainly by combat troops throughout the twenty six (26) days of combat. Combat troops were issued approximately one third (1/3) "K" ration daily prior to the jumping hour. This appears to be the only use of the "K" ration. In a cold climate as was experienced on Iwo Jima it has been proven that troops unanimously prefer New Type "C" and "10-in-1" to "K" rations. The "K" ration is an excellent ration for the purpose for which designed. It is recommended that four (4) days "K" rations be mounted out for the next operation. The quantity, when issued to combat troops on the basis of one third (1/3) ration daily, will suffice for a period of twenty (20) days.

(o) "K" (POW) Ration: This office mounted out fifteen (15) days "K" rations for four thousand (4000) prisoners of war (60,000 rations) of which none were issued. No recommendations are made for mounting out requirements for the next operation.

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(p) "D" Ration: Two (2) days "D" rations were mounted out in the past three (3) operations. This quantity is ideal. It enables this office to issue all troops one third (1/3) "D" ration prior to D day, the remainder being stored in the Commissary dumps for use as loading out rations (one day) in conjunction with return to base camp.

(q) Assault Ration: Two (2) days Assault rations were mounted out. The assault ration has definitely proven to be an ideal ration for the purpose for which it was designed. It is recommended that two (2) days Assault ration be taken on the next operation.

(r) Grills, Gri-stand, Foldable: Eight (8) days of this type grills were mounted out. Approximately three percent (3%) were actually issued. When this office assumed control of Division ration dumps, combat teams who really require this grill did not desire them, in spite of daily inquiries put forth by this office as to needs. Although it is believed that the combat teams managed to gain control of some of these grills, the bulk mounted out was not on the T/A basis of one (1) per three (3) rations, there would be required ten (10) days Cooker, hot-box type for the next operation.

(s) Units Heatabs, 8 per pkg., pkgs.: Eight (8) days of heatabs were mounted out. Approximately six percent (6%) were actually issued. When this office assumed control of Division ration dumps combat teams who really required this grill did not desire them, in spite of daily inquiries put forth by this office as to needs. Although it is believed that the combat teams managed to gain control of some of these heatabs, the bulk mounted out was not used. As they are incorporated in the quantity of Cookers, hot-box type mentioned in paragraph (r), none will be required for the next operation.

6. Palletization: One thousand and twenty five (1025) pallets of various type rations were mounted out for "Iwo Jima". Of this quantity approximately seventy (70) pallets arrived in Division Commissary dumps. This represents 6.8 percent of the total number of pallets mounted out. The bulk of the pallets that arrived in Division Commissary dumps were fruit pallets that were understowed on LSM-260. It is assumed that all other pallets were broken prior to unloading. From such observation it is believed that the purpose of palletization failed on this operation. It is recommended that for the next operation only hospital, fruit, fruit juice, coffee, milk, and certain bread and pastry ingredients be palletized.

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7. Water supply was ample at all times throughout the operation. Many units refused their full allowances. The water ration was established daily by the D-4 Section. It varied from three fourths (3/4) gallon for units not using "B" rations, to two and one half (2 1/2) gallons for units feeding the "B" rations. Water mounted out in five (5) gallon containers from our base camp was very unpotable as to palatibility, although not dangerous to the health. This condition was caused by the long period of storage. Water stored in containers made of galvanized iron (15 and 55 gallon type) did not deteriorate in taste.

8. Based on the assumption that the climate for the next operation will be similiar to, or colder than that encountered on "Iwo Jima", the following ration mounting out requirements represent the ideal variety for all troops to be subsisted during a period of thirty (30) days of combat:

<u>TYPE OF RATION</u>	<u>NO. DAYS</u>	<u>NO. MEN</u>
"B"	None	0
Bread and Pastry ingredients	30	No. personnel to be embark.
Hospital	30	1000
Supp. Fruit Juice	30	No. personnel to be embark.
Supplémentary Fruit	30	No. personnel to be embark.
Supplementary Coffee	30	No. peraoennel to be embark.
Supplementary Sugar	30	No. personnel to be embark.
Supplementary Milk	30	No. personnel to be embark.
PX	30	No. personnel to be embark.
"10-in-1"	13	No. personnel to be embark.
"C" (All Troops) <u>(NEW TYPE)</u>	13	No. personnel to be embark.
"C" (POW)	No recommendation	- - - - -
"C" (Civilian)	No recommendation	- - - - -
"C" (Dog)	30	No. dogs to be embarked
"K" (All Troops)	4	No. personnel to be embark

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<u>TYPE RATION</u>	<u>NO. DAYS</u>	<u>NO. MEN</u>
"K" (POW)	No recommendation	- - - -
"D"	2	No. personnel to be embark.
Assault	2	No. personnel to be embark.
Cookers, hot-box type	10	No. personnel to be embark.

C. L. McIndoe
C. L. Mc INDOE
Capt., ACM., USMC.,
Div. Commissary Officer.

ENCLOSURE (f)

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HEADQUARTERS,
FLEET MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 April, 1945.

Appendix 4 to Annex DCG to Operation Report - IWC JIMA.

Crinace Report

1. Supply of Crinace Materiel was generally very satisfactory on all items prior to mounting out except ammunition.
2. Division ammunition requisitions (based on current Unit of Fire Table, dated 21 March, 1944) for number of weapons to be employed on the operation, including all attached units, did not coincide with the list of mounting out ammunition compiled by Supply Service, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. This caused considerable confusion in the computing of loading data, since this was based on the Division requisitions, and loading plans had to be changed at the "last minute" when the information on actual mounting out ammunition was furnished.
3. In order that accurate loading plans be made by a Division prior to mounting out, correct information on how much ammunition, by number of rounds, that will be made available, should be furnished in sufficient time for combat loading plans to be made.
4. All ammunition that the Division was responsible for loading was not on hand in the Second Service and Supply Battalion Dumps at KAHULUI when the Division commenced embarkation. Ammunition was received during the entire period of embarkation, and in several cases, it was necessary to ferry ammunition to ships after they had been combat loaded.
5. The following list of ammunition shows the type and amounts received during December and January:

December

400	SHELL, HE, M71, w/ fuze PD M48, f/90mm Gun.
123,690	CARTRIDGE, AP-INC-TR, (2-2-1) cal..50 in M.L.B.
1,623	SHELL, HE, M48, (SC), w/f PD M48, 75mm Gun.
1,623	SHELL, HE, M48, (NC), w/f PD M54, 75mm Gun.
774	SHELL, WP, Smoke, Mk II, (NC), unf., 75mm Gun.
4,041	SHELL, APC, M61, w/f BD M66A1 & Tr., 75mm Gun.
3,100	GRENADES, Hand, Illuminating, Mk I.
6,305	MINE, anti-tank, HE, M1A1, w/f mine anti-tank HE, M1A1, complete.
6,012	BLOCK, demolition, M3, lbs.

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Appendix I to Operation Report - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

January

4,968 BOMB, smoke, Mk I/L, 2" Mortar, Mk 3.
4,468 SHELL, HE, M49A2, w/f PD M52, 60mm Mortar.
1,080 SHELL, smoke, WP, T-6, 60mm Mortar.
1,000 SHELL, smoke, HC, T-8, 60mm Mortar.
2,160 SHELL, smoke, WP, M60, w/f PD M57, 105mm How.
10,080 ROCKET, 4.5", Mk 3 TNT loaded and motor, 2.25", Mk 9.
20,112 ADAPTER, grenade-projection, M1.
400 GRENADE, rifle, smoke, colored, assorted.
4,425 GRENADE, hand, smoke, HC, M8, w/f M200A1.
126 SHELL, smoke, colored, assorted, BE, M84, w/f T-SQ,
M54, 105mm How.
4,326 SHELL, illuminating, M83, w/f M65, 60mm Mortar.
2,030 FLARE, trip, parachute, M48.
3,000 CANISTER, fixed, M2, 37mm Gun.
106,000 CARTRIDGE, ball, cal..45, M1911.
900 GRENADES, AT, M9A1.
10,080 FUZE, Mk 137-1.
300 PROJECTILE, APC, M61 (SC), w/f BD M66A1 & Tracer,
75mm Gun.
403,200 CARTRIDGE, ball, cal..30, M2, 8-rd. clips.

Had the Division been required to leave on the first scheduled date, critical shortages of the above items would have been serious. However, the delay of 30-days enabled this Division to receive, process and load shortages in mounting out ammunition so that at the time of embarkation the Division supply of ammunition was satisfactory.

6. It is believed that in order to have an adequate combat loading plan and to be able to follow this plan, that every effort should be made to have the mounting out ammunition available to the Division thirty (30) days prior to embarkation.

7. Adverse surf conditions and deep volcanic sand on the beaches caused considerable trouble and delay in unloading and establishing beach dumps. Because of these difficulties, ammunition was lost in sunk and broached landing craft. Deep volcanic sand prevented the use of trucks until adequate roads could be established, and as a result, the ammunition could not be moved inland from beach dumps to more suitable locations. The beaches were under heavy mortar and artillery fire continually and a large amount of ammunition was lost in the beach dumps.

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Appendix 4 to IWO JIMA to Operation Report - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

8. Division dumps were established D plus 6, and the Division started delivery of ammunition from the Division dumps to the Regimental Combat Team dumps D plus 7. Supply of ammunition to RCT dumps was adequate for most types of ammunition, and the Division was able to maintain a Regimental Unit of Fire in each RCT dump and a Division Unit of Fire in the Division dump throughout the operation, with the exception of the following items of ammunition:

- 60mm Mortar, Illuminating, M83, w/fuze time, M65.
- 75mm Pack Howitzer, HE, M48, and M54.
- 81mm Mortar, HE, M43A1, w/fuze M52.
- 81mm Mortar, HE, M56, w/fuze, M53.
- 105mm Howitzer, HE, M48, and M54.
- Grenades, hand, fragmentation, Mk IIA1, w/f M10A3.
- Grenades, hand, illuminating, Mk I.

These items became critical D plus 7 and remained critical as long as the various type of weapons could be used.

9. Generally speaking, it is believed that the amount of small arms ammunition carried by the Division was sufficient, but as on the SAIPAN-TINIAN operation, mortar and artillery ammunition was extremely critical. It is believed that at least ten (10) Units of Fire of mortar and artillery ammunition should have been carried as mounting out ammunition by the Division.

10. Resupply of ammunition was generally inadequate due to the unloading difficulties encountered, the late arrival of ammunition resupply ships and the apparent failure to selectively load these ships. Critical items of ammunition should be loaded so that they are readily accessible. At times, the Division had as little as three hundred (300) rounds of HE ammunition per Artillery Battalion after completion of morning preparation fires and would have had difficulty in carrying out additional fire missions. From D plus 7 on, it was impossible to maintain an adequate supply of artillery ammunition at the Artillery Regiment and on several days the Artillery Regiment fired more ammunition than was unloaded from the resupply ships. At no time, was the Division able to accumulate a reserve in the Division dumps. This inadequacy of ammunition resupply could have endangered the success of the entire operation.

(a) See enclosure (A) for list of ammunition lost or expended on the operation.

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Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

11. Organizational spare parts and accessories were adequate, but maintenance parts for the following weapons were critical throughout the operation, and it is felt that mounting out requirements should be increased:

Maintenance parts, tank, M4A3.
Maintenance parts, launcher, rocket, 2.36", M9A1.
Maintenance parts, rifle, automatic, cal..30, M1918A2.

12. Salvage and repair of ordnance materiel was very satisfactory. Due to deep volcanic sand on the beaches and the impracticability of salvage and repair crews to commence operations prior to D plus 5, a large quantity of small arms weapons were buried and ruined on the beaches. However, much of this equipment was recovered and made serviceable by repair crews.

(a) See enclosure (B) for the report of salvaged weapons that were repaired and returned to supply dumps for re-issue.

(b) See enclosure (C) for weapons that were repaired for RCTs.

(c) See enclosure (D) for weapons that were repaired for the Artillery Regiment and the Regimental Weapons Companies.

(d) See enclosure (E) for list of optical instruments repaired on the operation.

(e) See enclosure (F) for list of weapons lost or destroyed on the operation. It should be noted that enclosure (B) will considerably reduce this Division's combat losses on major items of ordnance.

13. Due to the possible presence of booby traps, extremely heavy enemy fire and the fact that many of the enemy weapons captured by this Division were emplaced in solid concrete or sealed in caves, enemy weapons were demolished or rendered unserviceable and no attempt was made to salvage or assemble them. The Ordnance Salvage and Repair Sections devoted their time and energy to the salvage and repair of friendly weapons.

(a) For itemized list of enemy weapons captured by the Fourth Marine Division, see Appendix Number 1 to Annex BAKER (Intelligence) to Operation Report - IWO JIMA,

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Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

14. The following recommended changes in the types of weapons carried by a Marine Division are considered necessary. The changes are based on experiences encountered during the past operations of this Division.

(a) Substitute the gun, 57mm, M1, for the gun, 37mm, AT, M3A1.

(b) Organize Division Mortar Battalion to consist of two (2) 4.2" Mortar Companies and one (1) 155mm Mortar Company.

(c) Increase the number of Motor Carriages, M7B1, to eight (8) per Regimental Weapons Company.

(d) Substitute tank, medium, T-26E1 for M4A3.

(e) Provide one (1) additional tank dozer per Tank Company.

(f) Add one (1) tank retriever to Tank Battalion Headquarters and one (1) tank retriever to Company Headquarters, Ordnance Company.

(g) Organize one (1) Tank Flame Thrower Platoon per Tank Company.

(h) Add twelve (12) Thompson sub-machine guns, cal..45, per Infantry Battalion for use in mopping up.

(i) Develop and provide a fuze for shell, 81mm Mortar, M56, to permit superquick or delayed action.

(j) Provide colored smoke rockets and colored smoke shell, 105mm Howitzer, for use in target designation.

(k) Provide demolition snake for use of tanks in clearing minefields.

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Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report -
IWO JIMA

Type Ammunition	Expended	Lost	Total
Cartridges:			
Carbine, cal..30	704,600	1,549,450	2,254,050
AP, cal..30, 5-rd. clips.	882,734	717,566	1,600,300
AP, cal..30, 8-rd. clips.	1,114,598	1,529,588	2,644,186
Tracer, cal..30, 5-rd. clips.	189,000	420,000	609,000
Belted, cal..30, (all ratios)	3,420,800	2,647,000	6,067,800
Grenade, Carbine, M6	8,612	7,668	16,280
Ball, cal..45.	58,200	136,740	194,940
Linked, cal..50, (all ratios)	90,700	141,880	232,580
Shells, shotgun, 12 gauge, #00 buckshot.	20,000	14,500	34,500
Shells, 60mm Mortar:			
HE, M49A2, w/f PD, M52.	102,521		102,521
Illum., M83, w/f T (fixed), M65	17,688		17,688
Smoke, WP, T-6	2,961		2,961
Smoke, HC, BE, T-8.	1,516	100	1,616
Shells, 81mm Mortar:			
HE, M43A1, w/f PD, M52.	30,599	1,000	31,599
HE, M56, w/f PD, M53.	19,128	1,000	20,128
Smoke, WP, M57, w/f PD, M52.	3,993	1,177	5,170
Shells, 37mm Gun:			
Canister, M2	4,808	552	5,360
HE, M63, w/f BD, M58.	5,260		5,260
APC, M51, w/tracer.	1,760	4,440	6,200
Shells, 75mm Gun:			
HE, M48, (SC) w/f M48	4,858	473	5,331
HE, M48, (SC) w/f M54	529	1,160	1,689
HE, M48, (NC) w/f M48.	198	152	350
HE, M48, (NC) w/f M54.	7,031	1,683	8,714
Smoke, WP, M64, (unfuzed)	3,282	654	3,936
Smoke, HC, BE, M89	180		180
APC, M61, w/f BD, M66A1	5,791	5,389	11,180
Fuzes, PD, M46	3,314	386	3,700
Shells, 75mm Pack Howitzer:			
HE, M48, w/f M48 (SF)	34,258	874	35,132
HE, M48, w/f M54 (SF)	19,873	1,489	21,362
Smoke, WP, M64, w/f M57 (SF)	8,019	1,125	9,144
HE-AT, M66, w/f BD, M62 (SF)	3,899	2,761	6,660
Canister, T-30.			

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ENCLOSURE (A) to Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report - IWO
JIMA (Cont'd)

Type Ammunition	Expended	Lost	Total
Shells, 105mm Howitzer:			
HE, M1, w/f M48.	46,160	4,254	50,414
HE, M1, w/f M54.	42,459	3,758	46,217
HE-AT, M67, w/f BD, M62	23	3,348	3,371
Smoke, WP, M60, w/f M57.	5,474	1,170	6,644
Smoke, HC, BE, M84, w/f M54.	35	174	209
Fuzes, CP, T-105	20		20
Grenades, Hand and Rifle:			
Fragmentation, Mk IIA1, w/f M10A3.	102,550		102,550
Smoke, HC, M8	2,675	550	3,225
Smoke, WP, M15.	16,925	4,600	21,525
Smoke, colored, asst'd.	1,008		1,008
Incendiary, Thermite, M14.	2,700		2,700
Incendiary, Frangible.	417	673	1,090
Illuminating, Mk I.	7,420	1,330	8,750
AT, M9A1.	8,971	5,699	14,670
Adapter, Grenade-Projection, M1.	8,672	6,784	15,456
Adapter, Grenade-Projection, Chemical, T2.	-	-	-
Rockets:			
AT, 2.36", M6	9,455		9,455
Smoke, WP, 2.36"	2,060		2,060
4.5" BR, w/f Mk 137	15,410	2,350	17,760
Pyrotechnics:			
Signals, Ground (f/Gren-Launcher all)	2,056		2,056
Signals, Smoke (f/Gren-Launcher all)	400		400
Flares, Trip (M48 & M49)	4,890	3,688	8,578
Mines, etc.:			
AT, M1.	20	555	575
APer, M2, M2A1, M3.	1,320	80	1,400
Torpedoes, Bangalore, M1A1.	1,730	110	1,840
Explosive, shaped charge, 40-lb., T-3	178		178
Grenades, Rifle, Smoke, WP, M19.	900	110	1,010
2" Mortars, Bomb, Smoke, Mk I/L.		3,070	3,070

ENCLOSURE (A)

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ENCLOSURE (B) to Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report -
IWO JIMA

Salvaged
&
Repaired

Carbine, cal..30, M1.	694
B.A.R., cal..30.	137
Rifle, cal..30, M1.	1,909
M.G., cal..30, M1917A1.	18
M.G., cal..30, M1919A4.	77
M.G., cal..50, M2.	33
60mm Mortar, M2.	9
2.36" Rocket Launcher.	42
Launcher, grenade, M8.	14
Launcher, grenade, M7.	17
Shotgun, 12-gauge.	2
B.A.R. magazines.	1,871
Carbine, Magazines.	492
Bayonet, M1, w/scabbard.	217
Bayonet, M1905.	409
Slings, rifle.	83

ENCLOSURE (B)

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ENCLOSURE (C) to Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report -
IWO JIMA

	Repaired f/RCT's.
Carbine, cal..30, M1.	116
B.A.R., cal..30	133
Rifle, cal..30, M1.	67
M.G., cal..30, M1917A1.	5
M.G., cal..30, M1919A4	12
Pistol, cal..45, M1911.	2
T.S.M.G., cal..45.	1
60mm Mortar, M2.	6
2.36" Rocket Launcher	20
Shotgun, 12-gauge.	2
Rifle, cal..30, M1903.	1
Flame Thrower, M2-2.	5

ENCLOSURE (C)

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ENCLOSURE (D) to Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report - IWO
JIMA

First Battalion, 14th Marines:

Issued one (1) 75mm Pack Howitzer.
Straightened elevating rockers on Pack Howitzer, #1262.
Replaced recoil mechanism.
Replaced one (1) breech ring.
Loosened stuffing box on recoil mechanism, #1667 and cleaned slides.
Replaced three (3) panoramic telescopes.
Replaced two (2) extractors.
Replaced one (1) firing pin holder.

Second Battalion, 14th Marines:

Replaced one (1) 105mm tube.
Replaced one (1) oil plug.
Replaced two (2) trigger shafts.
Replaced one (1) firing pin holder.

Third Battalion, 14th Marines:

Replaced two (2) operating latch, catch screw.
Replaced two (2) operating latch, catch screw.
Replaced one (1) firing pin and holder.
Replaced six (6) 105mm tubes.

Fourth Battalion, 14th Marines:

Issued one (1) 105mm Howitzer, #9550, complete.
Replaced one (1) 105mm tube.
Replaced two (2) operating latch, catch screw.
Replaced two (2) operating latch, catch screw.
Replaced one (1) firing pin and holder.

Made daily inspection of all guns and made adjustments when necessary.

Regimental Weapons Company, 23rd Marines:

Replaced one (1) 37mm tube.
Issued three (3) 37mm AT Guns that had been salvaged out of the field.

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ENCLOSURE (D) to Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report -
IWO JIMA (Cont'd)

Regimental Weapons Company, 23rd Marines (cont'd):

Half track #61416 was salvaged off the field. Replaced left track, fuel pump, distributor, starter, sprocket and guide, gas line and battery. Welded shell holes in side and floor of track. Made seat for driver. Straightened elevating shaft and moved right elevating hand wheel to left side. Straightened traversing shaft. Welded other bullet and shrapnel holes. Welded a 105mm Howitzer elevating hand wheel on to traversing shaft. Replaced 75mm tube. Cut one (1) track guide off Half-track #19882.

Regimental Weapons Company, 24th Marines:

Replaced one (1) 37mm breechblock complete and one (1) 37mm tube on salvaged gun #18294.
Removed shrapnel burns on sleigh and recoil mechanism.
Welded braces on shield on salvaged gun.
Salvaged half-track off the field.
Replaced radiator w/schroud.
Replaced brake drum.
Replaced back plates and shoes.
Replaced right front axle.
Replaced left brake tubing.
Replaced wheel, tire, and tube.
Replaced air cleaner.
Replaced right fender.
Straightened radiator shield.
Straightened radiator brace bottom.

Regimental Weapons Company, 25th Marines:

Replaced right axle arm for half-track.
Replaced radiator w/schroud.
Replaced elevating shaft housing 37mm Gun.
Replaced traversing mechanism 37mm Gun.
Replaced extractors 37mm Gun.
37mm Gun #18377 was rebuilt out of two salvaged guns and issued.
Replaced linkage system and detent.

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ENCLOSURE (E) to Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report -
IWO JIMA

OPTICAL INSTRUMENT REPAIR

14 Sight M1 Panoramic
19 Sight M12A2 Panoramic.
7 Sight M4.
2 Sight, M6 Telescope
1 Quadrant Gun M1.
12 Instrument light M14.
4 Instrument Light M13
3 Instrument Light M9
2 Mount Sight M23
4 Mount Sight and Quadrant 105mm
6 Mount Quadrant 75mm
4 Binoculars.
1 Circle, aiming M1
Replaced 75 Rice bulbs.
Replaced 11 Instrument Light M14
Replaced 4 Instrument Light M13.

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ENCLOSURE (F) to Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operation Report - IWO
JIMA

Weapon	(a) Number Employed	(b) Days Employed	(c) Lost
Carbines, cal..30, M1.	11,998	26	2,582
Rifles, cal..30, M1.	8,532	"	3,545
B.A.R., cal..30, M1918A2.	1,074	"	510
M.G.'s, cal..30, M1919A4	1,097	"	37
M.G.'s, cal..30, M1917A1.	162	"	79
Shotguns, Riot-type, 12-gauge.	250	"	250
Pistols, Automatic, cal..45, M1911A1.	1,331	"	198
T.S.M.G., cal..45, M1918A1.	111	"	23
M.G.'s, cal..50, M2 (HB)	467	"	17
37mm Gun, M3A1, AT	36	"	10
60mm Mortars, M2.	117	"	39
81mm Mortars, M1.	39	"	5
75mm Pack Howitzers	12	"	0
105mm Howitzers.	36	"	8
4.5" Launchers, Rocket, M7.	37	"	13
2.36" Launchers, Rocket, M9A1.	187	"	76
Flame Throwers, M2-2.	243	"	46

=====
-- Combat Vehicles. -- (a) -- (b) -- (c) --

Motor Gun Carriage, M3 (Half-Track)	15	26	0
Medium Tank, M4A3, w/75mm Gun.	48	"	9

=====
-- Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipment -- (a) -- (b) -- (c) --

Tanks, bull-dozer.	3	26	2
Tanks, Flame-Thrower, CB-M1.	4	"	0
Tanks, M4A2 (Flail)	2	"	1

ENCLOSURE (F)

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HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 April, 1945.

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT.

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATION.

Based on the scope of the operation and the outside possibility of an alternate target, an estimate of 62 $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6 trucks was made and approved. These trucks were divided 20 to H&S, 14 each to "A", "B", and "C" Companies. All 50 Dukws were scheduled to go.

Repair facilities were provided on the basis of 2 light 1-ton repair units per company, one for use as needed at forward RCT supply dumps and the other at company headquarters. Special repair facilities were concentrated in H&S for a centralized major repair section.

Due to expected terrain, all Weasels were taken. All $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton cargo trucks in the Division scheduled for the operation were provided with $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton 2 wheel cargo trailers by drawing-in of all these trailers from rear echelon units - 37 from artillery, 5 from ordnance and 8 from replacement stocks; and making the requisite distribution. 13- $3\frac{1}{2}$ -ton Amphibious Cargo trailers were preloaded with water, rations, and supplies. The Pintel, with which originally equipped, being too weak; heavier pintels, as used on 1-ton 4x4 trucks, were provided. They were top deck loaded on 2 LSTs for original handling by LVTs at target.

All vehicles in Motor Transport and Division were checked. Water proofing kits were provided as desired. Unserviceable batteries and spark plugs were replaced throughout Division. To meet the need, not being available through regular supply sources, 214 batteries and 1500 spark plugs were purchased locally. The major shortage was tires requisitions months old were unfilled. After a survey of tire needs by organizations was completed, a schedule was made for the exchange of worn tires on vehicles for tires in better condition on salvaged and used vehicles at the 2nd Service and Supply Battalion. 345 - 6.00-16, 175 - 9.00-16, and 290 - 8.25-20 tires were thus procured through exchange. Also procured were 25 spare wheels for $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton 4x4 trucks and 15 for 1-ton 4x4 trucks. All organizations in the Division were provided with one extra tire per vehicle to be embarked in addition to the regular spare carried.

Repair material and Spare parts requisitions were not being filled by Base Depots.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT. (Continued).

To provide these items and parts needed for the operation, the local market and through local suppliers their outside sources, were canvassed. The items and parts procured through open purchases can be divided into four categories.

(1) Those requisitioned and not available. (2) Those requisitioned and available but not in sufficient quantity. (3) Critical items requisitioned and not available when needed but were supplied to some extent at a later date. (4) Spare parts purchased on open purchase that were requisitioned but not available at time critically needed.

CATEGORY 1.

- A. Machine and Metal Screws assorted.
- B. Sheet, Cork gasket material.
- C. Battery Terminals.
- D. Brass stock, assorted size, round.

CATEGORY 2.

- A. Batteries for all vehicles - 214.
- B. Fittings and connections for copper tubing.
- C. Bulbs - double contact for stop and tail light.
- D. Rubberized and cloth insulated wire assorted gauges.

CATEGORY 3.

- A. Electrolyte.
- B. Bolts and nuts assorted.
- C. Hydraulic Brake fluid.
- D. Spark Plugs, assorted - 1500.
- E. Cotter and Woodruff keys assorted.
- F. Gasket Cement.
- G. Radiator hoses and clamps.

CATEGORY 4.

For I.H.C. M5H-6-6x6.

- 1. Starting Motor reduction gears.
- 2. Distributor Point sets.

For I.H.C. M-2-4-4x4.

- 1. Speedometer cable and shafts.
- 2. Differential gears.

Stockroom trailers-four 2 wheel 1-ton and one 4 wheel 2-ton were stocked. The four 2 wheel 1-ton stockroom trailers had each like stocks of fast moving items and were assigned 1 to each company. Slower and heavier items were stocked in the 4-wheel 2-ton stockroom trailer and assigned to H&S, which company carried the special repair facilities. Stocks were prescribed to be on a 30 day operational basis, but a margin, where available, was carried.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT. (Continued).

2. LOADING AND MOVEMENT

Approximately ten days prior to embarkation date, arrangements were made with 2nd Service and Supply Battalion for such transportation as available to augment Division Transportation. The need was anticipated as Division Transportation would be embarked during the phases of each Combat Team loading and the essential housekeeping functions for rations, supplies, PX, trash etc. had to be continued.

By this arrangement 40 trucks were made available and 25 operators. The additional operators to man the trucks provided and all additional shift operators were provided by the Division Motor Transport Battalion. These trucks and in addition 15 trucks allocated from Division, were to be used in dock area. It was arranged to quarter and ration all operators at the 2nd Service and Supply Battalion. A separate Motor Pool area was setup, and an officer, dispatchers, mechanics, and radio vehicles were assigned by Motor Transport.

In conference with Division TQM the tonnage to be hauled of various classes of supplies was determined and also the location of sources, destinations, and time wanted at ship-side. This covered supplies from dumps and depots and not organizational gear. The quantity of organizational gear to be transported, was determined by Motor Transport direct with the separate organizations.

The factors - (1) number of trucks that could be spotted and loaded at one time at loading points and loading time - (2) transit time to and from ship-side - (3) unloading time and number of trucks that could be spotted and unloaded at one time; were considered and the number of trucks that could be efficiently employed determined. Working parties required for loading and unloading were determined. These were provided by Division TQM.

Motor Transport Officers, NCOs and radio vehicles were provided for all loading and unloading points to insure steady flow of vehicles eliminate congestion, decrease or increase available transportation as needed. This was readily controlled through Motor Transport radio net from Motor Transport Headquarters, to loading and unloading points, Motor Park and Dispatcher office set up in proximity to docks.

Based on these transportation requirements truck assignments were made, operators provided. In addition to trucks assigned, an emergency pool of 10 trucks was provided at docks to handle incidental runs and any periodic heavy demands.

The Division Loading and Movement Group provided loading of ships in groups with three days allocated to each group.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT. (Continued).

The days were allotted as follows: 1st day-movement of supplies to ship-side locations, - 2nd day loading supplies aboard ship, - 3rd day loading of troops.

Docks were scheduled to be clear prior to arrival of the first transport division. However the local authorities had permitted the unloading of a merchant ship and jammed pier #1. By the 24th Of December it was obvious they could not effect clearance of the pier with their labor and transportation due to Christmas holidays. Replacement Battalions working party and Motor Transport trucks and drivers under direction of Division TQM's cleared dock in record time on Christmas Day and night. Loading of Division proceeded on schedule the morning of December 26th.

Practically all supplies, (ammunition, rations, water, fuel, QM supplies) except organizational gear was located in dock area. Hauls averaged about five miles except hauls to LSTs loaded at Maalaea Bay. The Division arrangement for use of freight cars to augment trucks, facilitated loading. Trucks on first movement day were allocated as follows:

Ammunition	25 trucks.
Fuel	10 trucks.
Rations and QM	10 trucks.
Emergency pool	<u>10</u> trucks.
TOTAL:	55 trucks.

These trucks were stationed at control point in dock area as previously arranged. This saved time and mileage to and from Camp.

Working parties were transported from Camp and, when reliefs necessitated, trucks transporting relief to docks carried relieved group back to Camp.

Trucks, approximately 25, were operated under Motor Transport control from camp to docks to transport organizational gear. Organizational transportation was preloaded, moved to ship-side for loading.

On the second day, the 10 emergency trucks handled needs in dock area and 10 trucks were also provided TQM for preloading of freight cars for next group to be loaded.

The third day all available transportation within Division under control of Division Motor Transport, was utilized to move troops. Troops for each Transport Division were moved in two movements. Distance Base Camp to Docks was approximately 15 miles; 30 miles round trip. Approximately 125 trucks were employed in each movement. Trucks in each movement were divided into convoy echelons predicated on number of troops of respective units for respective ships and docks.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT. (Continued).

(Two docks were used with two ships berthed at each dock). Troop loading area and convoy echelons to carry units were numbered to correspond. Convoy echelons of each movement left on 10 minute departure schedules. Echelons to respective docks were staggered to avoid congestion.

No congestion was experienced. Troops from first movement were all aboard ship before troops in second movement arrived. All troops were aboard in ample time prior to evening mess. Movement schedules on RCT personnel were prescribed by Division Motor Transport based on troops to be moved, transportation available and dead line time to be aboard. RCT cooperation was excellent.

In embarkation from Base Camp, during the loading of supplies, gear and troops; only on two occasions was it necessary to use trucks for second shifts at night. These were on ammunition when quantity for AK's was considerably increased over tonnage originally submitted. All movements of supplies were completed within prescribed time limits. The Division TQM submitted the tonnage to be moved and when wanted. Motor Transport determined trucks needed, time required to complete within TQM prescribed time, and starting times. The excellent understanding and cooperation of the Division TQM permitted Motor Transport to do its job on time, without confusion, smoothly.

Operations were materially assisted by the retention and utilization ashore of Motor Transport personnel and their embarkation on respective ships at completion of loading out of elements of the Division. This personnel was embarked on their respective ships at Maalaea Bay during the initial phase of the rehearsal.

3. LOADING OF MOTOR TRANSPORT

Motor Transport Personnel and equipment was loaded out as follows:

Personnel on thirteen ships.

Equipment on twelve ships.

H&S Co. - 4 ships.

"A" Co. - 4 ships.

"B" Co. - 2 ships.

"C" Co. - 3 ships.

"A", "B" and "C" Companies were attached to RCT 25, 24 and 23 respectively. Battalion, less the three (3) companies, was assigned to the Division Support Group. Fourth Marine Amphibious Truck Company and the 476th Army Dukw Company were attached to 24th Marines.

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ANNEX DQG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT. (Continued).

All Motor Transport gear was preloaded on organizational vehicles. RCT gear and Division gear were preloaded on the balance of the trucks except four (4) that were possibly to be unloaded during rehabilitation at Pearl after initial rehearsals at Maalaea Bay to effect readjustment of cargo loading.

A substantial rear echelon of 6 officers and 150 men was provided, based on contemplated need of moving the rear echelon and balance of Division equipment and supplies, to a forward Base Camp.

4. REHEARSALS

Transportation requirements on Division Motor Transport were light during rehearsals at Maalaea Bay. Fuel in drums was transported to selected beach refueling dumps for refueling of all LVTs participating in this rehearsal. Gasoline tankers were procured from Puunene Air Station, the 2nd Service and Supply Battalion and the Rear Echelon of the 476th Army Dukw Company for refueling of all Dukws during rehearsal. Eight jeeps were provided for use of Corps and Division on the beach from rear echelon vehicles.

Only transportation required during rehearsal at Forward Area was for NGF Parties and this was furnished by the Island Commander, Tinian, through arrangements made by VAC.

5. REHABILITATION PERIODS

During rehabilitation at Pearl, transportation was arranged for use of Division under control of dispatcher. Two (2) cars and 8 jeeps were provided by Corps. Additional jeeps were procured from Division replacement stock then in hands of 6th Base Depot. A few jeeps were unloaded from ships for use of RCT staffs.

"A" frames, propellar shafts, water proof clothing, and needed items were procured for the 4th Marine Amphibious Truck Company. Needed items were procured for Battalion and Transport Companies. Needed items for Motor Transport rear echelons were secured and shipped. For detail list, see enclosure "A".

Transportation needed at Saipan after rehearsal at Forward Area was provided by 2nd Marine Division.

6. OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA

On D-day, the 19th of February, the M29C of "B" Company was sent ashore by RCT 24, but failed to land as the landing craft transporting it capsized off Yellow Beach One. The crew reached shore safely.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT-- FWO JIWA.
MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT. (Continued).

On D plus 1, the tractor with angledozer and operator of "H&S" Company, through an error in unloading ship, was landed on Yellow Beach Two and was employed by the Shore Party at that beach. The first echelon of "C" Company with vehicles was landed on Yellow Beach Two. Company Headquarters was established approximately 150 yards south of the east edge of the central turning circle of Airfield #1--target square 164-Y. The advance element of "A" Company with its M29C landed on Blue Beach One. Due to adverse conditions in the area, the advance element was ordered reembarked by RCT 25. The M29C, however, remained ashore and operated with RCT 25.

On D plus 2 to D plus 4, the other elements of "C" Company with vehicles and equipment were established ashore. The Company Headquarters, as established, which was in close proximity to RCT 23 supply dump and Yellow Beach One, was maintained throughout the operation. Advance element of "A" Company with 2 trucks landed on D plus 3 and merged with "C" Company. The Division Motor Transport Officer, radio operator and M29C radio equipped, and runners, landed on D plus 4 and established initial Division Motor Transport CP at "C" Company Headquarters.

On D plus 5, the first echelon of "H&S" Company arrived ashore and was established in area previously selected by the Division Motor Transport Officer--target square 165-L.

On D plus 6, additional personnel of "H&S" Company landed. Also, "B" Company was established ashore adjacent to "H&S" advance echelon--target square 165-M. This location was in proximity to RCT 24 supply dump. "A" Company likewise was established ashore at previously selected location approximately 200 yards from Blue Beach One and adjacent to RCT 25 Headquarters and dump--target square 165-S.

On D plus 10, Battalion Headquarters and the remainder of "H&S" Company were established ashore and the Division Motor Transport CP was transferred from "C" Company to the Battalion area--target square 165-L.

The Motor Transport Battalion was accordingly established in the area; "C" Co. in area of RCT 23 dump and Yellow Beach One; "A" Co. in area of RCT 25 and Blue Beach One; "B" Co. in area of RCT 24 and Battalion; and "H&S" convenient to Division dumps and road net.

Service setups were as planned except that due to proximity to RCT dumps and short hauling distance from Regiment to Battalion dumps, no service or transport echelons were located at RCT dumps, trucks allotted reporting to dumps daily.

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ANNEX DQG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.

Motor Transport Report. (Continued).

The following Motor Transport vehicles and equipment were debarked:

<u>TRUCKS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1/4-ton 4x4	27
1/4-ton 4x4 w/radio	4
1-ton light repair	6
2 1/2-ton 6x6 cargo	43
2 1/2-ton 6x6 wrecking	1
2 1/2-ton 6x6 gasoline	2
Carrier M-29C	6
TD-9	8
Generators	2
 <u>TRAILERS</u>	
Steam Jennys	2
1/4-ton cargo	9
1-ton cargo	8
1-ton Greasing	2
2 Wheel water	37
2 Wheel Stockroom	4
4 Wheel Stockroom	1
Arc Welder	4
Machine Shop #1	2
Tire Repair	1
TOTAL:	169

Eighteen (18) 2 1/2-ton 6x6 trucks were not unloaded. Operational requirements were such that vehicles then ashore were deemed adequate and proved so.

In the initial phase, trucks could not be used due to beach and road conditions. The volcanic sand or ash was too soft for traction. As roads became established, trucks absorbed a steadily increasing proportion of the haulage job. Trucks generally began functioning the morning of D plus 4.

In the early stages, 6 trucks were assigned from "C" Company to Yellow Beaches for unloading of landing craft. These operated on a 24 hour basis. Five (5) trucks operated in like manner on Blue Beach. Three (3) trucks were assigned to burial officer. Balance of trucks were employed hauling RCTs supplies, Division "Q" supplies, and serving Division units and Division attached units.

Six 1/4-ton 4x4 trucks with trailers, 4 from Division Staff sections, 1 from Headquarters Company and 1 from "C" Company, 4th Motor Transport Battalion were furnished.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5-20 ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT. (Continued).

of 2 to each RCT. These were provided to increase the supply facilities from Regiment to Battalion dumps, since terrain conditions precluded extensive use of heavy transportation in some forward areas.

On D plus 10, Division delivery of rations, water, housekeeping and general supplies, ammunition and defense materials from Division dumps to Regiment dumps was established. Deliveries were made daily.

Additional emergency night deliveries were usual on ammunition, barbed wire, and illuminating shells. Truck platoons operating from Regiment dumps handled transport from Regiment to Battalion dumps.

Under this program certain daily truck assignments were established:

Commissary section	6
General supplies	2
Ammunition	5
Salvage	2
Burial	3
RCT's-5 per Regiment in lines, 3 per	
Regiment in reserve	13
Bomb disposal	<u>1</u>
TOTAL:	32

The additional trucks were employed to augment the above when needed and for transport needs of Division Headquarters, Headquarters Battalion, VM0-4, Replacement Battalions, additional ammunition requirements, prisoners, movement of dumps, clearing of areas, etc.

Approximately 10% of trucks were serviced daily. This servicing involved about 2 to 5 hours and included minor mechanical adjustments, repair of tires, radiators, and shell damage. Only one 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6 cargo truck was destroyed and permanently out of operation.

Total Motor Transport Battalion vehicle losses for the operation consisted of one 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6 cargo truck, one 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6 wrecker, one M29C, and one water trailer. Other vehicles damaged were repaired and returned to service.

7. SERVICE

A grand total of 1232 recorded jobs were completed in the course of the operation. These include repair jobs only and repair jobs involving replacement of elements or units. A classified breakdown of these jobs is as follows:

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Subject: ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
MOTOR TRAILER REPORT. (Continued).

<u>TYPE JOB</u>	<u>REPAIR ONLY</u>	<u>REPAIR INVOLVING REPLACEMENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Ignition	274	121	395
*Batteries Charged only			32
Power Train	57	40	97
Motors	38	9	47
Carburetors	60	14	74
Brakes	31	2	33
Cooling System	34	5	39
Chassis	20	13	33
Tires	33	18	51
Tubes	139	28	167
Welding			111
Lubrication and oil changes			79
Oil Filters			3
Machine shop special jobs			39
Tractor Overhaul			1
Salvage Jobs-vehicles			10
Construction Shape charge Launcher R.C.T.24			1
Jobs for 133rd Naval Construction Battalion			2
Job for 3rd Marine Division			1
Jobs for 5th Marine Division			3
Jobs for 8th Field Depot			5
TOTAL:			1232

*All batteries included in ignition repairs and replacements totaling 90, were also charged.

The tire repair trailer justified itself. The tire situation on embarkation for the operation was critical and tire stocks on hand small. While terrain and the short hauls did not place the strain on tires as at Saipan, the tire trailer enabled 33 tires to be rebuilt and used, as well as speeding up the repair of tubes. As a result, no tire shortage was experienced.

The salvage of vehicles, as noted, provided rebuilt engines, transmissions, etc., which facilitated repairs by unit exchanges, and made possible repairs that otherwise could not have been effected.

Operations were facilitated through Battalion radio net which provided communication direct between Companies and Battalion.

All personnel and vehicles were dug in. Areas were organized for defense against infiltration and contact established with adjoining units.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT. (Continued).

Congregation of personnel and promiscuous roaming were not permitted. As a result, though areas were sporadically under artillery and mortar fire, Battalion casualties were extremely low. "H&S" - 1 W&E, "A" Co. - 1 KIA, 2 W&E, 1 WNE, "B" Co. - 2 WNE, 2 shell shock and evacuated. Fourth Amphibian Truck Co. - 5 W&E, 1 WNE. 476th Army Dukw Co. - 3 W&E, 3 S&E. Total casualties - 21.

A temporary Provisional Battalion was organized and activated by Division on March 9th. Motor Transport assigned 6 officers and 90 enlisted to this Unit. Eight (8) .30 caliber machine guns and 2 1/4-ton 4x4 cargo trucks, with 1/4-ton trailers were also provided for the Provisional Battalion. This unit was disbanded and these officers, men, equipment and vehicles were returned to the Motor Transport Battalion on the afternoon of March 12th.

8. PREPARATIONS FOR RE-EMBARKATION

In accordance with allotment made by VAC, 11 additional 3 1/2-ton amphibious cargo trailers, or a total of 24, were collected for reembarkation to rear area. Of this number, 10 were in operative condition and 14 were in need of repair. Twenty-two (22) were supplied to the Division QM for a pre-loading with salvaged Division equipment.

On D plus 20, the 476th Army Dukw Company was detached to the Army Garrison Forces and at the same time the 22 Dukws operative out of the original 50, were transferred to the Army Garrison Forces.

On D plus 23, the 30 Dukws of the 4th Marine Amphibian Truck Company which were operative out of the original 50 were transferred to VAC. VAC loaned 2 of these to Division TQM for use in contacting ships during reembarkation. On D plus 26, by arrangement, the 30 Dukws were to be transferred to the Army Garrison Forces. 27 were delivered. The remaining 3, in VAC control, were to be delivered by VAC to the Army Garrison Forces.

Re-loading and re-embarking of the Division was started on D plus 23 and completed as far as Motor Transport Activities were concerned, at 2400 on D plus 27. As hauling of gear and supplies of Division organizations was completed, trucks were pre-loaded with battalion or Division gear. Motor Transport Officers and NCOs were stationed at dumps, beaches and aboard landing craft to supervise movement, loading and unloading of trucks.

Division transportation, as reembarked, was supplemented by the loan of 10 trucks and drivers from VAC. Arrangements were made for the loan of 10 trucks and drivers from VAC.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT. (Continued).

These trucks reported at 1830 on D plus 27 and were employed until completion of Division reembarkation on D plus 28.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
(Continued).

ENCLOSURE "A" - MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT.

Needed items for Iwo Jima Operation procured during Rehabilitation Period.

<u>Item #</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>CHEMICAL WARFARE</u> <u>Article</u>
1.	11	COVERS, protective, individual. 11
2.	16	MASK, Gas, service lightweight, (Army)M3-10-6.
3.	15	OINTMENT, protective, S-461, tube. 15
4.	16	OINTMENT, protective, BAL, tube. 16
		<u>ENGINEER EQUIPMENT</u>
5.	1	HOSE, f/equipment, welding, oxygen and acetylene set.
		<u>GENERAL SUPPLY</u>
6.	20	CAN, meat, w/cover.
7.	44	COVER, f/helmet, steel, complete, w/liner. 9
8.	47	CARRIER, f/pick-mattock, intrenching
9.	7	CUP, M1910, f/canteen, M1910.
10.	20	FORK, haversack.
11.	40	KNIFE, haversack, 13
12.	19	NET, mosquito, head.
13.	6	PACKETS, first aid.
14.	86	PONCHO, rubberized, cloth, camouflage. 21
15.	6	POUCH, f/packet, first aid.
16.	20	SPOON, haversack.
17.	5	TENT, shelter, each-half, w/1 guy line.
18.	5	BODY, steel, helmet. 2
19.	35	HEADBANDS, f/helmet, steel.
20.	35	LINERS, f/helmet, steel.
21.	35	NECKBANDS, f/helmet, steel.
	300	LIPSTICK, anti-chap.
		<u>ORDNANCE</u>
22.	60	MAGAZINES, assembly, f/carbine, cal..30, M1.
23.	26	POCKETS, magazine, double web, f/carbine.
	2	RIFLES, Caliber .30 M1.
	2	SLINGS, Rifle, caliber .30 M1.
	144	GREASE, Rifle, lubs. 1/4 oz.
1.	10	BULBS, battery charger.
2.	7	BATTERY, cable 36".
3.	3	CABLE, ignition, rolls 10 gauge.

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Subject: APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX DOG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA.
(Continued)

ENCLOSURE "A" - MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT.

<u>Item #</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Article</u>
4.	5	PERMATEX, Assorted.
5.	30	SHEETS CORK, gasket material.
6.	15	ELECTROLYTE, gallons.
7.	200	FITTINGS, assorted gas line
8.	20	BRAKE FLUID, Hydraulic.
9.	36 ft.	RADIATOR HOSE, assorted.
10.	4 gal.	SHEROLITE.
11.	50	LAMPS, auto, assorted.
12.	75	GASKET, paper assorted, yds.
13.	200	SPARK PLUGS.
14.	600	RIVETS, assorted.
15.	2	SHIM, stock sets.
16.	200	TERMINALS, assorted.
17.	100	COPPER TUBING, ft. 3/16"
18.	600	KEYS, (Woodruff), assorted.
19.	5	OIL PANS, for 6x6.
20.	100	REAR HUB, oil seals, 6x6.
21.	100	CENTER BEARING, oil seal, 6x6.
22.	20	FRONT HUB, Oil seal, 6x6.
23.	2	CARBURETOR, 6x6.
24.	2	CARBURETOR, 1-ton.
25.	10	CARBURETOR, repair kits, jeep.
26.	10	STARTING MOTORS, fields, 1-ton.
27.	2	REDUCTION GEAR HOUSINGS, 6x6.
28.	10	CLUTCH, repair kits, jeep.
29.	50	FRONT HUB, oil seals, 1-ton.
30.	10	DISTRIBUTOR CAPS, 1-ton.
31.	2	CYLINDER, HEAD, jeep.
32.	2	CRANKSHAFTS, jeep.
33.	75	ROLLER BEARING, transmission, main shaft, jeep.
34.	10	GENERATOR, fields, 6x6.
35.	12	KITS, No. 3 "A" frame installations w/tackle.
36.	1	WELDER, 200-300 amp, trailer mtd, ea Lincoln or equal WC# 59327.
37.	1	EQUIPMENT, welding electric arc (less welder).
38.	1	E. S. Equipment welding electric arc, set.
39.	50	BRUSHES, wire.
40.	5	PROPELLERS, for Dukw mod G.M.C.
41.	400	HOT PATCHES, assorted (G-6 - G-9).
42.	200	VALVE STEMS, (assorted).
43.	200	VALVE CORES.
44.	200	COATS, parka.
45.	164	TROUSERS, parka.

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A N N E X E A S Y

TO

FOURTH

MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

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COMMUNICATIONS

PART I - PRE-EMBARKATION

1. PLANNING

(a) Overall plans for the operation were announced in sufficient time to permit the formulation of a comprehensive and well integrated communication plan. Tentative communication plans of higher echelons were issued at an early date, making possible a series of conferences between the Attack Force Communication Officer, the Landing Force Signal Officer, and the several Division Signal Officers. These conferences served to eliminate most of the potential sources of trouble.

(b) In a few instances the communication plans of higher echelons were inadequate from the standpoint of Divisions and lower units. This Division was assigned insufficient voice calls and was obliged to make up the deficiency from the call list of another Division not participating in the operation. As it is now customary in radio dispatches and telephone conversations to refer to units by their voice radio calls rather than their actual names, each Division should be assigned sufficient voice calls to permit the assignment of a call to each organic or attached unit. A total of fifty voice calls per Division are required for this purpose. The number of CW calls required is considerably less, as CW calls are required only for those units which are equipped with CW radios. Twenty-five CW calls per Division should be sufficient.

(c) Instructions in CentComTwo relative to the crypto-aids to be landed by each Division were not explicit. This uncertainty was not eliminated by the Landing Force Operation Order.

(d) Air raid warning and anti-aircraft control instructions contained in the Joint Expeditionary Force Operation Order and in the Landing Force Operation Order caused some confusion in this Division, in spite of repeated efforts to clarify the matter. The Landing Force could completely eliminate the present uncertainty and confusion by announcing the effective air raid warning and anti-aircraft control conditions over the regular Landing Force wire and radio circuits, thereby relieving Divisions of the necessity of monitoring the Local Air Warning Net.

(e) Plans for using the shackle cipher as a means of authentication did not crystallize until after the Hawaiian rehearsal. Prior to that time, three widely differing sets of instructions for shackle authentication had been promulgated, and much

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

confusion had resulted, as attested by the large number of Hawaiian rehearsal messages which were incorrectly authenticated. Profiting by this experience, the Landing Force abandoned the message authenticator system and standardized a simple system of station authentication which was already in use in both the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. This system of station authentication proved very satisfactory in the ensuing operation.

(f) Last minute changes in the shackle cipher itself resulted in considerable waste of time and scarce materials. This Division had just completed the printing and distribution of some 36,000 shackle grids based on alphabets listed in the Landing Force Rehearsal Order when a new series was substituted, necessitating a complete re-printing and redistribution. It is believed that Landing Force could eliminate such difficulties and give considerable assistance to Divisions and lower echelons by assuming the responsibility for printing and distributing all shackle grids.

(g) The communication plan of this Division was embodied in the following documents issued prior to the operation:

- 4th Mar Div SIGSOP-3.
- 4th Mar Div SOI-6.
- 4th Mar Div Communication Guide for Commanders and Staff Officers.
- Annex How to 4th Mar Div Opn Plan No. 49-44.
- Annex How to 4th Mar Div Rehearsal Plan No. 2-44.
- Annex Charlie to 4th Mar Div Training Order No. 2-45.

(h) Owing to changes in plans of higher echelons, numerous changes were required in several of the above documents. In the case of SOI-6, a total of ten changes were issued, an excessive number in view of the difficulty in disseminating such changes, particularly after embarkation. It is hoped that an earlier crystallization of plans will be possible in future operations, in order to materially reduce the number of changes required.

2. ORGANIZATION

(a) The following communication units were attached to this Division for the IWO JIMA Operation, either for the performance of some special function or for the general reinforcement of the communication personnel of the Division:

- 1st Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO).
- Detachment 726th Signal Air Warning Company (726th SAW Det).

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

Detachment V Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion
(VAC Sig Det).

V Amphibious Corps Liaison Team (VAC Ln Team).

(b) An Air Liaison Party was assigned to each Landing Team, each Combat Team, and Division Headquarters. The battalion and regimental parties were each augmented for the operation by the addition of three enlisted, while the Division Headquarters party was increased by two officers and ten enlisted. These additions were necessitated by the operational requirements imposed by higher authority. The present T/O allowances are entirely inadequate to meet these requirements.

(c) Shore Fire Control and Naval Gunfire Liaison Parties were organized and assigned to Landing Teams, Combat Teams, and Division Headquarters in accordance with FMF Pac Special Order No. 86-44, which materially augmented the hopelessly inadequate T/O allowances.

(d) Nine Shore Party Communication Teams were organized from the Shore Party Section of the JASCO, one at T/O strength for each of the four Shore Parties of each assault Combat Team, and a somewhat larger team, comprising 2 officers and 19 enlisted, for the Division Shore Party. The duties of Shore Party Communication Officer were performed by the JASCO Commanding Officer.

(e) Administrative control of the various elements of the JASCO remained with the JASCO Commanding Officer.

(f) The 726th SAW Det, comprising 1 officer and 34 enlisted, and the VAC Ln Team, comprising 1 officer and 5 enlisted, were placed under operational control of the Division Signal Company. The VAC Sig Det, comprising 1 officer and 45 enlisted, was attached to the Division Signal Company.

(g) Replacement communication personnel accompanied the Division in the 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts. In accordance with orders from higher authority, these replacement personnel were not available for transfer to communication units of the Division until actually required as casualty replacements. This arrangement proved disadvantageous, for reasons which will be brought out later.

(h) At embarkation, the communication personnel strength of the Division was 26 below the authorized "T/O plus 5 percent". This strength was augmented for the operation by the addition of the 45 enlisted personnel of the VAC Sig Det and the 74 enlisted personnel of the 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts.

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.
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3. TRAINING

(a) Training for the next operation was begun immediately on return from the TINIAN operation. Training programs were conducted by all organizations, commencing with basic re-training and ending with several Division CPX's in which all units participated.

(b) As a large influx of new types of radio equipment had begun, special efforts were made to train technicians in the adjustment and repair of these sets. Maximum advantage was taken of the skill and facilities of the Division Signal Repair Section to train regimental and battalion repairmen. This training resulted not only in improved standards of maintenance in lower echelons, but created a closer liaison between the higher and lower echelons of repair.

(c) Advantage was also taken of the training facilities offered by the FM school conducted by FMF Pac. Selected personnel from all units were sent to this school with profitable results. It is hoped that this school will be available for additional training in the future, and that the school will be expanded to provide instruction in each new type of equipment as it is introduced to the Pacific theater.

(d) Special emphasis was also devoted to training in radio countermeasures. A representative of the Signal Officer's Section, FMF Pac, conducted a school in this subject for all radio operators of the Division. Although the course was of short duration and came too late in the training cycle for maximum effectiveness, the results were very good, and it is hoped that this type of training will be extended and intensified.

(e) Unfortunately, most of the replacements for the casualties suffered in the SAIPAN and TINIAN operations did not reach the Division until the training period was nearly over. As a consequence it was impossible, in the time available, to bring these replacements to the high state of training achieved by personnel who had completed the entire training program. Many of the replacements were ex-radar personnel with no experience in communications. These personnel were developed into passable voice radio operators in the time available, but will require a great deal of additional training before they can be assigned to other tasks.

(f) Communication personnel of the 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts did not arrive in time for adequate training, nor were they available for assignment to communication units where training could be most effectively and expeditiously carried out. Many of these replacements had had no experience in combat units, and were

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unfamiliar with much of the communication equipment in common use. This was particularly unfortunate in the case of non-commissioned officers who should have been ready to fill key positions in a Communication Platoon or Section. A few signal repairmen had had no experience in repairing the various types of radio equipment used by the Division, and in some cases had not even seen some of the equipment prior to joining the Division. There was not sufficient time to familiarize these men with this equipment prior to embarkation.

(g) Communication personnel of the Naval Gunfire and Air Liaison Parties were not as well trained as other communication personnel in the technique of communications. This deficiency does not reflect on the diligence of JASCO officers. It stems from an inherent defect in the JASCO structure. The officers assigned to Naval Gunfire and Air Liaison Parties are not communication officers, nor are they qualified to instruct their personnel in the technique of communications. This places the burden of instructing well over a hundred communication personnel in these teams on the shoulders of the two qualified communication officers in JASCO Headquarters. As these officers already have full-time executive and administrative duties it is a credit to them that the training reached as high a standard as it did. The situation was frequently aggravated by prolonged official absences of officers in charge of teams, and by last minute replacements of skilled officers with officers of no training or experience whatsoever.

4. EQUIPMENT

(a) The Division embarked for IWO JIMA in a generally excellent state of material readiness. The few shortages which remained had no serious effect on the ensuing operation.

(b) Excess equipment which the Division had on hand was utilized in two ways. In some instances the excess was placed directly in the hands of the using units to meet operational needs not provided for by the tables of allowances. In the remaining instances the excess was maintained on hand as an emergency pool. It was anticipated that difficulty would be experienced in establishing signal repair facilities on the exposed IWO beaches during the first few days of the operation, and that a considerable amount of damaged equipment would have to be replaced outright, pending eventual repair. The emergency pool was set up to meet this situation should it occur.

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

PART II - EMBARKATION

1. DIVISION HEADQUARTERS COMMUNICATION PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

(a) Communication personnel serving Division Headquarters were divided into three main groups. The largest group, comprising 12 officers and 200 enlisted, was embarked aboard the USS BAYFIELD, carrying the Commanding General. This group was of sufficient size to man a complete command post communication installation on a continuous basis, or to man for a limited period a complete command post installation plus a forward or rear echelon installation. This group relied upon installed shipboard communication equipment for communication afloat, and carried sufficient portable equipment, reinforced by hold-loaded vehicles, for communication ashore. Approximately 50% of the portable signal equipment and 25% of the signal vehicles were embarked on this ship. The Division Signal Officer, Signal Company Commander, JASCO Commander, Division Air Liaison Officer, and Division Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer were included in the group aboard the BAYFIELD.

(b) The second main group, comprising 9 officers and 134 enlisted, was embarked on board the USS MELLETTE, carrying the Assistant Division Commander. This group was of sufficient size to enable the ADC to take over the control of the Division, afloat or ashore, should the need arise. This group also relied upon installed shipboard facilities for communications afloat, and carried sufficient portable equipment, reinforced by hold-loaded vehicles, for communications ashore. Approximately 30% of the portable signal equipment and 25% of the signal vehicles were loaded aboard this ship. The signal group on the MELLETTE functioned under the Assistant Division Signal Officer.

(c) The third main group, comprising 2 officers and 52 enlisted, was embarked aboard LSM 260. This group consisted of the drivers necessary to man the 27 embarked vehicles, plus the operating portion of the 726th SAW Det and a small group of wiremen. This method of transporting some 50% of the signal vehicles, plus 20% of the portable signal gear (pre-loaded in vehicles) was an innovation which proved outstandingly successful, as it enabled this equipment to be landed expeditiously and without loss in spite of sea and beach conditions which were causing heavy losses to small boats and their cargos.

2. DIVISION SIGNAL SUPPLIES

(a) Signal replenishment supplies were divided equally

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

between two cargo ships, with a Signal Company officer aboard each to insure proper care in transit, to supervise selective unloading, and to assist in delivery to the beach.

3. SIGNAL COMPANY OPERATIONS DURING EMBARKATION

(a) During the embarkation period the Signal Company provided telephone, teletype, and messenger service between the dock area and the camp. An advance message center was established aboard the BAYFIELD prior to the embarkation of Division Headquarters, permitting the movement of the Division Command Post without interruption of communication.

PART III - MOVEMENT TO TARGET

1. SIGNAL COMPANY OPERATIONS ABOARD SHIP

(a) Throughout the entire voyage, continuous effort was devoted to perfecting the tactical communication set-ups aboard the BAYFIELD and MELLETTE. The final forms of these set-ups are illustrated in Appendices 1 and 2. The elaborate set-up aboard the BAYFIELD is the most effective transport communication installation ever employed by this Division. The success of this installation, in which 18 transmitters and 25 receivers were operated simultaneously and continuously for the first five days of the operation, was largely due to the boundless cooperation and untiring energy of the Communication Officer of the BAYFIELD. In the initial establishment of the communication set-up, this officer conducted exhaustive tests and devised a wide variety of technical expedients which made the simultaneous operation of so many equipments possible. In the ensuing operation the ship's communication crew were indefatigable in locating and remedying troubles and preventing serious interference with communications.

(b) In addition to establishing, testing, and exercising the tactical communication set-ups, the Signal Company provided administrative telephone and messenger service, and assisted the ships' communication forces by copying press, manning naval radio circuits, and standing communication office and coding room watches. The ships, on the other hand, provided the message centers with copies of all ship traffic. The Transport Squadron Flag Office provided guard mail service.

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

2. EQUIPMENT INSPECTIONS

(a) Frequent inspections of signal gear were made during the voyage, particular attention being paid to storage batteries. Ship's battery charging facilities were used when necessary.

3. TRAINING ABOARD SHIP

(a) Training of communication personnel was continuous throughout the voyage. All personnel were briefed on tactical plans for the operation, and regular schools were conducted in message center procedure, radio procedure, and communication plans. All personnel participated in daily physical exercises.

4. REHEARSALS

(a) Rehearsals for the operation were conducted in the Hawaiian area and again in the forward staging area. The rehearsal in the Hawaiian area, involving naval gunfire and the actual landing of troops, afforded a reasonably complete check on communication plans and facilities. As beach conditions prevented the landing of LSM 260, portable signal equipment was used extensively at the Division Command Post ashore. This did not detract from the value of the rehearsal, as it was very likely that conditions at IWO might necessitate similar arrangements.

(b) Several instances of radio interference were encountered in the Hawaiian rehearsal which necessitated frequency reassignments.

(c) Many difficulties inherent in the shackle system of message authentication became apparent in the Hawaiian rehearsal. As a consequence, the message authentication system was abandoned by the Landing Force in favor of a simple system of station authentication already in use in the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. The latter system proved highly satisfactory in the ensuing operation.

(d) As the rehearsal in the forward staging area did not involve the landing of troops, it provided an incomplete check on troop communications.

(e) In neither rehearsal were casualties assessed against communication personnel or equipment. As a consequence the plans for resupply of equipment and personnel were not exercised. This could have had serious results, as the problems of resupply of communication equipment and personnel, while satisfactorily solved in the ensuing operation, were the most pressing problems which arose.

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

PART IV - THE ASSAULT

1. OPERATION - GENERAL

(a) Communications in the assault were uniformly excellent. Not a single instance was reported in which a major unit lacked rapid and reliable communication with its superior, subordinate, or adjacent units.

2. OPERATION - MOVEMENT OF DIVISION COMMAND POST ASHORE

(a) A Division Advance Message Center was dispatched to the beach on the afternoon of D plus 3, and by nightfall a complete communication set-up had been established in preparation for the movement of the Division Command Post ashore. This movement took place on the following morning without interruption of communications. In view of the conditions which prevailed on the beach during the first three days of the operation, it is believed that the decision to retain the Division Command Post aboard ship until reasonably complete communication facilities could be established ashore contributed immeasurably to the full and uninterrupted control which the Commanding General was able to exercise during the crucial early stages of the operation.

3. OPERATION - RADIO

(a) A complete description of 4th Marine Division radio channels is contained in SOI-6. The net structure and assignment of frequencies proved sound, and no basic changes are contemplated for future operations. The effectiveness of the radio plan is attested by the fact that during the first four days of the assault, Division Headquarters remained aboard ship and relied almost exclusively on radio communication for control of subordinate elements. No communication failures of more than momentary duration occurred during this period.

(b) In a few instances radio circuits afloat were overloaded by the transmission of long encrypted dispatches or the transmission of long messages by Navajo talkers. These instances emphasized the need for radio teletype and voice scrambling equipment between Division and Corps, and voice scrambling equipment between Division and Regiment. The present means for handling encrypted radio dispatches are still too cumbersome and slow to handle such lengthy traffic as operation orders, dispatch summaries, and periodic reports. There are certain periods in every operation when such material must be handled by radio. With present security

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

devices these messages are a constant threat to communications.

(c) In expectation of beach conditions which would prevent the operation of TBX's during the initial phase of the assault, Shore Fire Control Parties were equipped with SCR-300's and were assigned SCR-300 channels on which to relay spotting information from the spotter to some location, ashore or afloat, where the TBX could be operated. As further insurance, each party was equipped with two SCR-536's tuned to its assigned shore fire control frequency. Both expedients proved necessary and effective.

(d) Owing to lack of equipment and personnel in Air Liaison Parties, the task of operating ground stations in the Support Air Observation Net was assigned to the Signal Company and to the Communication Platoons of Regiments and Battalions. This expedient was not completely satisfactory as the Signal Company and Communication Platoons are not provided with personnel and equipment for this purpose either, although they are somewhat better off than the Air Liaison Parties. In the future it is hoped that Air Liaison Parties will be provided with additional personnel and equipment so that all air-ground communications may be assigned to the JASCO.

(e) Crystal control of radios was widely used. Wherever possible at least one crystal controlled transmitter was employed on each net to accurately establish the net frequency. The crystal grinding shop of the 6th Base Depot filled all orders expeditiously in spite of the fact that it had just commenced operation and was hard pressed at times for materials with which to work.

(f) A normal amount of atmospheric noise was encountered in the operation. It caused no serious difficulty.

(g) Interference between friendly stations was reported in a number of instances, particularly in the case of the SCR-300. It was eliminated in every case by a judicious re-assignment of channels. The probability of this interference was enhanced somewhat by the failure of higher authority to space channels to the maximum extent within each Division. This Division, for example, was assigned SCR-300 channels 38, 39, and 40.

(h) The fourteen SCR-300 channels assigned to this Division for the operation were barely sufficient. In an operation involving a larger number of Divisions, communication in lower echelons would be seriously impaired by lack of SCR-300 channels. A set similar to the SCR-300 but operating on frequencies from 48 to at least 60 megacycles is urgently needed.

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

(i) Severe harmonic interference was received on several FM channels between 20 and 40 megacycles. This interference was generated by destroyer transmitters engaged in shore fire control communications, and was apparently occasioned by the use of excessive power together with improper antenna coupling.

(j) The radio installation aboard the BAYFIELD, by virtue of the large number of transmitters and receivers in close proximity, required considerable study and labor to reduce mutual interference to a workable level. The goal was finally achieved by extensive grounding and shielding of equipment, by judicious choice of antenna type and location, by use of coaxial antenna lead-ins, by use of minimum power and careful transmitter adjustment, and by proper assignment of equipment to each channel.

(k) Severe radar interference was encountered aboard the BAYFIELD whenever the SC-3 radar was in operation. Fortunately this radar was used only during red alerts. Each time the radar beam swept across the receiver antennas an extremely loud 60 cycle note made reception impossible. On shore, a 400 cycle note was picked up by all receivers within 150 yards of the AN/TPS-1 radar. This interference did not seriously interfere with reception, and beyond 150 yards no interference was noticeable.

(l) A number of enemy transmissions were reported on frequencies assigned to this Division. In most instances this interference appeared to be unintentional, and the transmissions were of short duration. At certain periods of the night, strong enemy signals were received from the Empire, but in no instances were these interpreted as jamming efforts.

(m) On one occasion the enemy made obvious attempts to interfere with the operation of the 4th Marine Division Reconnaissance Net. His efforts included both jamming (CW or 500 cycle audio tone) and deception (orders to secure net, assumption of friendly calls). As the enemy station failed to authenticate when challenged, his deceptive transmissions were disregarded. When the interference became intolerable, friendly stations shifted to another frequency, while two dummy stations continued to send operating signals on the jammed frequency. The enemy station remained on the old frequency for some time, but finally ceased transmitting and did not interfere with this net again.

(n) A few attempts were made, with the help of Division language officers, to intercept such enemy radio transmissions as were reported to Division Headquarters. The delay in reporting these transmissions, together with the inadequate number of available

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

equipment, robbed these attempts of any success. It is believed, however, that much information of immediate tactical value could be secured by the employment of a Radio Intelligence Platoon attached to the Division Signal Company.

4. OPERATION - WIRE

(a) Because of the relatively short distances involved, and the slow movement of the front lines in the face of heavy enemy resistance, the Division wire system was both compact and elaborate. A total of 48 locals and 29 trunks were connected to the Division switchboard. Three trunk lines were laid to each Regiment, laterals were laid between Regiments, important lines were "laddered" against the effects of enemy fire, and all trunks vulnerable to vehicular damage were overheaded. As a result of these precautions wire communication was highly reliable and handled a very heavy traffic load, both tactical and administrative, without difficulty.

(b) In the vicinity of command posts, overheading could not be resorted to for security reasons, and lines were laid on the ground. Because of the cushioning effect of the loose volcanic ash, this wire suffered little damage from foot traffic over a period of nearly a month. Where these lines crossed roads it was necessary to bury them for protection against vehicular traffic.

(c) As in previous amphibious operations, Switchboards BD-71 and BD-72 proved cumbersome, and for the weight of equipment involved did not furnish sufficient drops for battalions and regiments. A light-weight switchboard is badly needed.

(d) Teletype was operated with excellent success between Landing Force and Divisions. This form of communication is ideally suited to handling lengthy messages such as operation orders, dispatch summaries, and periodic reports. Unfortunately the currently authorized teletype equipment is too heavy and bulky for use at regimental command posts. A real need exists for a compact, light-weight teletype or tape facsimile equipment to be used between Division and Regiments.

(e) Telegraph equipment was simplexed on one line between Division and Landing Force, but was not used. No telegraph equipment was installed on lines to lower echelons.

(f) The present T/O allowances of wire personnel are generally adequate. Some re-distribution in rank is desirable in the Signal Company, as there are insufficient wire chiefs in that organization in view of the large number of lines.

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(g) Inasmuch as the wire facilities employed by Shore Fire Control and Naval Gunfire Liaison Parties are elementary in nature and can easily be installed by radio personnel, whereas the duties of radio personnel can be assumed by wire personnel only after considerable training, the substitution of radio operators for all wire personnel in these parties is advisable. Such a substitution would assist in meeting the needs of these parties for more radio operators.

(h) The Artillery Regiment, using a fire-direction telephone system paralleling the tactical system to its battalions, experienced a shortage in wire personnel. Two additional wire teams of four men each are necessary to handle the fire-direction system.

5. OPERATION - MESSAGE CENTER

(a) In spite of a traffic volume heavier than in any previous operation, message centers functioned with increased speed and precision. Between 3 January and 10 March, the Division Message Center alone handled a total of 9,924 messages. This figure does not include a large amount of intercept traffic routed to Division Staff Sections for information.

(b) The various cryptographic devices again proved slow and cumbersome. The Joint Assault Code is not well suited to encoding operation orders and dispatch summaries which constitute a large portion of the traffic requiring encryption. A complete revision of this code, based on a study of operational traffic, might produce a workable code, but a more promising solution to the problem of handling encrypted traffic appears to be in the use of teletype, tape facsimile, and speech scramblers, which provide a sufficient degree of mechanical security without sacrificing speed of transmission. The criticism of the Joint Assault Code applies equally well to the Hagelin Cryptographer and to a lesser extent to Navajo Talkers. Experience in this Division has shown that there are important differences in the vocabularies of Navajos assigned to different major units. As a consequence these units encounter considerable difficulty in communicating with each other by Navajo Talker.

(c) Messenger runs afloat were considerably handicapped by difficulties in obtaining boat service when needed. Inclusion of two DUKW's in the authorized transportation allowance of the Division Signal Company would solve this problem. As an alternative solution the appropriate Navy Operation Plan should specifically assign one or more LCP(L)'s to provide messenger service for the Division Message Center.

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(d) Messenger dogs were used with some success between Division and Regiments. Over the rather short distances involved the speed of these dogs was better than that of a foot messenger and about as good as that of a motor messenger. In a rapidly moving situation, or over extended distances, it is doubtful if the dogs would compare as favorably with foot and motor messengers.

(e) A general increase in the T/O allowance of Division Message Center personnel is required to handle the rapidly increasing traffic load resulting from improved radio and wire communications. In spite of the presence of 10 message center personnel of the VAC Sig Det, Division Message Center personnel were severely pressed to handle the heavy traffic load expeditiously and without error. In an extended operation on a large land mass the shortage of messengers would be acute.

6. OPERATION - MOTOR TRANSPORT

(a) Motor transport personnel of the Signal Company performed an outstanding job in keeping the 51 motor vehicles of the Signal Company in excellent running condition throughout the operation. In spite of the entirely inadequate allowance of motor transport mechanics and supervisory personnel, five major repair jobs and 62 jobs of lesser importance were performed during the operation.

(b) Inasmuch as the vehicles of the air liaison parties can be driven by radio operators, whereas truck drivers can operate radios only after considerable training, the substitution of radio operators for truck drivers in the air liaison parties is advisable, and would assist in meeting the needs of these parties for additional radio operators.

7. OPERATION - AIR WARNING

(a) The 726th SAW Det, operating in the immediate vicinity of the Division Command Post, provided Division Headquarters and the ADC with a continuous and accurate flow of information relative to friendly and enemy air activity. Its AN/TPS-1 radar was the first radar to be set up on the island. The performance of this detachment was outstanding in every respect.

8. EQUIPMENT - RADIO

(a) Due to short distances, favorable terrain, and the slow moving tactical situation, portable radio equipment turned in an excellent performance on IWO JIMA. It is questionable, however, whether the same standard of excellence could be maintained with

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portable equipment at extended distances on a large land mass, particularly in a rapidly moving situation. Under such circumstances it appears likely that the weight of the larger portable sets would seriously limit their utility, while their low power output would be inadequate to cover the distances involved. To meet such conditions it will be necessary to place primary reliance upon vehicular sets such as the SCR-193, SCR-299, SCR-399, SCR-508, SCR-608, and TCS, reserving portable equipment for those instances where terrain conditions or enemy action prevent the use of a vehicular set.

(b) MZ equipment turned in its usual excellent performance. The versatility of this set, based on its ample power output, wide frequency range, adaptability to remote control, and proven reliability, make this set the most generally useful set the Marine Corps has today. The increasing demand for communication at extended distances over all types of terrain makes an increased distribution of these sets imperative. The present TCS remote control equipment should be provided with an integral interphone system, however, as a separate phone line from the set to the remote position is required at present.

(c) SCR-300 equipment performed outstandingly. As this set has insufficient channels for an operation involving more than three divisions, there is an urgent need for a similar set in the frequency band from 48 to at least 60 megacycles.

(d) The IWO JIMA Operation was the first to see a wide distribution and employment of SCR-536's. Performance was very good. The assignment of a frequency to each lettered rifle company appears to be satisfactory. A few BA-38R batteries were tested on the operation and were reported to have an average life of 30 hours. As this is several times the life of the BA-38, the new batteries are an outstanding improvement and will contribute immeasurably to the future success of the SCR-536.

(e) During the course of the operation a few SCR-694 radios were obtained from the Navy and issued to JASCO teams. While the rather narrow frequency range of the SCR-694 limits its general usefulness, its generous power output, relatively light weight, and convenient operating features make it a desirable set for Shore Fire Control Parties.

(f) The M-29 Cargo Carrier was used on an experimental basis as an operating vehicle for both the TCS and SCR-808 radio equipments. Low silhouette, ability to negotiate almost any terrain, plus ease of mounting radio equipment make the M-29 carrier an ideal radio vehicle. As sustained road movement is seldom

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required of Marine Corps radio vehicles, the relatively short road life of the M-29 carrier (as compared with a jeep) is no real disadvantage. The ability of the M-29 carrier to place a powerful radio where it is needed when it is needed should be fully utilized.

(g) TBX-8's were used by this Division for the first time in the IWO JIMA Operation. Some difficulty was experienced in loading up the transmitter at certain frequencies when using the crystal oscillator, a defect which should be eliminated at once. Otherwise the set performed excellently. Operators were generally enthusiastic about the many improvements incorporated in this set. Because of its wider frequency range it is more generally useful than the SCR-694, its closest competitor. A gasoline engine generator, a vehicular power pack, and a quieter hand generator are needed before the full value of the TBX-8 can be realized.

(h) The first samples of Headset MHS-11 and Microphone MT-1 were received along with the TBX-8. In the opinion of all those who have had the opportunity to use the new headset, it is the best headset yet developed for military use. One instance of cord trouble, in the cord joining the two earphones, was reported. Microphone MT-1 is much superior to the T-45 lip microphone, and is an excellent microphone in all respects. The development and production of a hand-holder for the microphone button should be expedited in order to make the MT-1 a universal microphone which could replace all types now in use.

(i) An SCR-399 was drawn by the Division Signal Company in place of the SCR-499 authorized. The SCR-399 is greatly to be preferred, as it includes an HO-17 Shelter. The set is operable on the ground, where it presents a very low silhouette, or on a 2½-ton truck as a vehicular set.

(j) The Division Signal Company had no occasion to use the two MM equipments authorized by the T/A, and these sets remained at the base camp. The same was true of the two SCR-624 radios belonging to the Signal Company. Both types of equipment are unnecessary.

(k) No use was made of the VHF portion of the AN/VRC-1's with which all regimental and battalion Air Liaison Parties were equipped. If these Air Liaison Parties are to continue to be denied the control of air strikes in future operations, as they have been in the past, much would be gained by replacing the AN/VRC-1's with MZ's. The lower silhouette of the MZ offers considerable tactical advantage, while the problem of resupply would be much simplified, as large numbers of MZ equipment are in use throughout the Division, while the AN/VRC-1 is used only in Air Liaison Parties. On the

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other hand, if there is a continuing need for VHF equipment in Air Liaison Parties, a pack VHF set, such as the Army's new AN/TRC-7, should be supplied for use when the vehicular AN/VRC-1 cannot be employed.

(1) A large percentage of failures in the SCR-510 and 610 equipments was occasioned by salt water corrosion of the cable connections.

9. EQUIPMENT - WIRE

(a) The complete absence of trees and vegetation in the area traversed by the majority of Division and Regimental trunk lines necessitated an extensive use of lance poles and 2x4 substitutes for lance poles. Approximately 750 of the latter were used in the operation. As far as materials were available the 2x4's were painted with camouflage paint prior to the operation. This measure, besides reducing their visibility, tended to discourage theft. The 2x4's were cut to lengths of from 18 to 20 feet and proved much superior to the shorter and frailer Lance Pole PO-2.

(b) Two M-29 Cargo Carriers were employed on an experimental basis for wire laying. Each was equipped with two RL-31 reels cut down in height and welded to the rear deck of the carrier. The success of these vehicles exceeded all expectations. Their ability to negotiate any type of terrain, plus their ability to carry a substantial load of wire make them ideal wire laying vehicles.

(c) An experimental quantity of High-Speed Coils of W-130 wire were used on the operation with mixed success. Reports indicate that this method of packaging W-130 is promising, but that several modifications are necessary and should be followed by further tests. The one-mile coil used at present appears too heavy for convenient carrying by assault units. A half or three-quarter mile coil is suggested. A somewhat heavier gauge metal sheath around the coil is also suggested. The present case frequently will not withstand the rough treatment the coil receives in transportation and handling.

(d) Dampness caused the hand generators on several EE-8B telephones to "freeze", necessitating the replacement of the phones.

(e) The issue of only a quarter-mile of W-130 wire on DR-8 drums necessitated breaking open shipping crates and hand winding another quarter-mile to fill the reel. This procedure wasted time, effort, and crating material, both prior to and during the operation.

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10. EQUIPMENT - MESSAGE CENTER

(a) Almost all of the equipment used by Division Message Center was of local construction. This included blackout tents, portable tables and desks, equipment chests, and peg boards showing the operational status of communication facilities.

(b) The standard Command Post Tent was available, but has not been found as satisfactory for Division Message Center use as a specially modified pyramidal tent used by this Division. In fast moving situations on large land masses, suitably equipped HO-17 shelters operable on the ground or in 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks should prove preferable to either.

(c) The MCS-3 Message Center Case is of no use to a Division Message Center. In a message center of this size, portable tables and field desks are indispensable.

(d) The present field message book is entirely inadequate in format size for Division Headquarters use, and the two copies it provides are insufficient for Division Headquarters distribution. At present there are two methods for handling Division Headquarters distribution with the present message book. One method is to prepare the necessary additional copies by hand, three at a time. The alternative is to have a local messenger show a single information copy to all interested parties, standing by while each party reads the message. Both alternatives, by virtue of the time consumed, are entirely unsatisfactory.

(e) The Division Message Center partially solved the problems of message format size and an adequate number of copies by using standard Western Union size message blanks made up into books of four sheets with interleaved carbons. A fully satisfactory solution can be achieved, however, only by the use of a fluid process duplicator capable of rapidly turning out at least fifteen copies of each message.

11. EQUIPMENT - RADAR

(a) The AN/TPS-1 radar employed by the 726th SAW Det proved much superior to its predecessor, the SCR-602. Bogies were picked up without difficulty at 90 miles. Locally modified PE-75 power supplies were used in place of the power unit supplied with the radar, as the small gasoline capacity and high speed of the latter power supply proved very annoying.

(b) The obtaining of meteorological information by

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observation of meteorological balloons was greatly handicapped by frequent low cloud ceilings. An electronic balloon tracking device, such as the SCR-658, would insure the collection of vital data under all weather conditions, and should be issued as standard equipment for the Artillery Regiment.

12. EQUIPMENT - MOTOR TRANSPORT

(a) Repairs on the 51 vehicles of the Signal Company were seriously hampered by lack of sufficient automotive tools. Almost complete reliance had to be placed on tools which were the personal property of the mechanics.

(b) The operation again demonstrated the need for a greasing trailer in the Signal Company. In operations on a large land mass the lack of such a trailer would prove a serious handicap to Signal Company operations.

(c) Experimental use of the M-29 Cargo Carrier as a radio vehicle and a wire laying vehicle has already been touched upon. In general, the mechanical performance of these carriers was excellent. The tracks seem to be somewhat fragile, and considerable track repair and replacement appear likely in an operation at extended distances. Two mechanical failures were reported by the Signal Company during the operation. In one instance a track was thrown when the carrier crossed the remnants of a narrow gauge railroad. Signal Company mechanics, by dint of much hard work, were able to replace and adjust this track without special tools or equipment. In another instance a clutch burned out and was replaced by Signal Company mechanics with a slightly modified clutch from a $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck.

(d) No shortage of motor transport was experienced on this operation because of the short distances involved. In an extended operation on a large land mass, additional vehicles for laying wire and moving supplies would be indispensable.

13. EQUIPMENT - LIGHTING

(a) An ER engine generator was used by the Signal Company to supply essential lighting service to the Division Command Post, but proved inadequate in power output. While command post lighting is not the accepted responsibility of the Signal Company, it generally happens that the Signal Company is more favorably located to perform this service than any other unit with the necessary technical knowledge. It is therefore believed that the Signal Company should be equipped with the necessary generators, wiring, and electrical supplies to take over this task. As the Signal Company is

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already equipped with several PE-95's (for powering radio sets), the logical power equipment is the PE-95. This generator has ample power for the job and should be trailer-mounted for convenience in handling.

14. SUPPLY AND REPAIR

(a) The sole threat to communications during the operation arose on D day and was not completely erased until late on D plus 1. A great deal of the signal equipment landed by assault units was destroyed or damaged during this period. As conditions on the beach prevented the establishment of repair facilities, damaged equipment had to be replaced outright by new equipment, pending eventual repair. Surf conditions and shortage of landing craft prevented the immediate landing of these replacements, and the first two LVT loads, one for each assault regiment, could not be landed until D plus 1. Fortunately these loads reached the assault regiments before a critical shortage occurred. On D plus 2 a substantial quantity of replacement equipment was landed, although two LCM loads of signal equipment were lost through sinking. The supply situation was never threatened after D plus 2, as a steady flow of supplies was maintained thereafter. The Division Signal Repair Section was set up ashore on D plus 2 and returned a large proportion of the damaged equipment to service.

(b) The inability to commence signal repair during the early stages of an amphibious operation necessitates a much larger emergency pool of critical signal equipment than now exists. Such a Division pool, augmented at times by a Corps pool, provides the only effective means of tiding the assault units over the difficult period immediately following a landing. A portion of this pool should be pre-loaded in LVT's and held available for dispatching to the beach when the need arises. Normally one such LVT should be dispatched to each assault Regiment on D day or D plus 1. At least one additional LVT should contain the nucleus of the Division Signal Dump, and should be sent to the beach under the personal control of the Division Signal Quartermaster. The remainder of the pool should be loaded on the ships carrying the Signal Officer and the Assistant Signal Officer where it could be loaded into landing craft under the immediate supervision of one of these officers.

(c) Repair operations conducted by the Division Signal Repair Shop are summarized in Appendix 3.

15. PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT

(a) Replacements for communication personnel casualties in the assault units were drawn from several sources. Initially

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replacements groups were assembled from the VAC Sig Det and from the 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts. Later, as Shore Party consolidation progressed, Shore Party communication personnel were used as replacements for casualties in assault units.

(b) The landing of replacement personnel presented some difficulties during the first two days of the operation. Communication personnel of the two replacement drafts were dispersed among many ships, where they were employed in ship's platoons. Assembling groups of these personnel to send ashore to assault units was generally difficult, as communication with the various ships was slow, and boats were scarce. To remedy this condition in future operations it is believed that communication personnel of replacement drafts should be attached to the Signal Company and embarked in the ships carrying the Signal Officer and the Assistant Signal Officer.

PART V - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. TABLES OF ORGANIZATION. - The following changes in Tables of Organization are recommended. The changes are based not only on the experience in the IWO JIMA Operation, but on the experience gained from the preceding operations of this Division. The possibility of extended operations on large land masses has been considered in formulating these recommendations:

(a) Division Signal Company (F-91)

	<u>PRESENT ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE</u>
Warrant Officer		
Motor Transport (MT)	0	1
Technical Sergeant		
Inspector and mechanic (QM)(413)	0	1
Staff Sergeant		
Message Center Chief (CP)(674)	3	4
Field wire chief (CP)(595)	1	3
Sergeant		
Motor mechanic (QM)(014)	1	2
Assistant message center chief (CP)(674)	2	4
Corporal		
Motor mechanic (QM)(014)	1	2
Message center clerk (CP)(667)	1	4
Telegraph printer operator (CP) (237)	1	2

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ANNEX E-ASW TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

	<u>PRESENT ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE</u>
Private First Class/Private		
Truck driver (345)	23	42
Mechanic (014)	0	4
Messenger (CP)(675)	21	33
Telegraph printer operator (CP)(237)	4	8
Telephone lineman (CP)(641)	47	45

(b) Joint Assault Signal Company (F-518)

Company Headquarters

Staff Sergeant		
Clerical (501)	0	1

Shore Fire Control Section

Lieutenant (jg)(USN)		
Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer	0	1
Sergeant		
Radio operator (CP)(776)	13	0
Radio operator - mechanic (CP)(174)	0	22
Corporal		
Field telephone man (CP)(641)	13	0
Radio operator (CP)(776)	13	35
Radar beacon operator (CP)	0	8
Private First Class/Private		
Field telephone man (CP)(641)	13	0
Radio operator (CP)(776)	0	88

Air Liaison Section

Captain		
Air Liaison Officer (ACI)	0	1
Lieutenant		
Air Liaison Officer	13	14
Corporal		
Radio operator (Avn)(755)	13	27
Private First Class/Private		
Truck driver (Avn)(245)	13	0
Radio operator (Avn)(755)	0	67

(1) The above changes in the JASCO Tables of Organization will provide for the following functional radio teams, with radio operators performing all incidental tasks, such as driving and wire laying, when necessary:

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- a. Battalion and Regimental Air Liaison Party:
Air Liaison Officer and radio mechanic.
SAR/SAD Nets Team (4 radio operators).
SAO Net Team (3 radio operators).
- b. Division Air Liaison Party:
Air Liaison Officer, two officer assistants,
and radio mechanic.
SAR/SAD Nets Team (4 radio operators).
SAD Secondary Net Team (3 radio operators).
SAO Net Team (3 radio operators).
- c. Battalion SFC Spotter Party:
Officer Spotter, liaison sergeant, and radio
mechanic.
SFC Net Team (4 radio operators).
- d. Battalion NGF Liaison Party:
NGF Liaison Officer and radio mechanic.
SFC Net Team (4 radio operators).
Division NGF Common Net Team (3 radio
operators).
- e. Regimental NGF Liaison Party:
Officer Spotter and liaison sergeant (for
replacements and special missions).
NGF Liaison Officer and radio mechanic.
NGF Control Net Team (3 radio operators).
Division NGF Common Net Team (3 radio
operators).
Radar Beacon Team (2 radar beacon operators).
- f. Division NGF Liaison Party:
Officer Spotter and liaison sergeant (for
replacements and special missions).
NGF Liaison Officer, one officer assistant,
and radio mechanic.
NGF Control Net Team (3 radio operators).
Division NGF Common Net Team (3 radio
operators).
Radar Beacon Team (2 radar beacon operators).

(2) Each of the above listed radio teams consists of 3 or 4 radio operators, the minimum capable of handling the portable equipment and operating for prolonged periods. Reduction in the number of specialist types will materially assist in keeping the teams up to strength during combat.

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(c) Communication Platoon, Headquarters Company, Infantry Battalion (F-4)

Private First Class/Private
Truck driver (345)

PRESENT ALLOWANCE RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE

2 4

(d) Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Service Company, Infantry Regiment (F-9)

Private First Class/Private
Truck driver (345)

3 6

(e) Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Service Battery, 105mm Howitzer Battalion (F-24)

Private First Class/Private
Truck driver (345)

3 4

(f) Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Service Battery, Artillery Regiment (F-29)

Corporal

Field telephone man (CP)(641)

7 9

Private First Class/Private

Truck driver (345)

4 12

Field telephone man (CP)(641)

22 28

(g) Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Battalion (F-34)

Warrant Officer
Communication

0 1

(h) Headquarters and Service Company, Motor Transport Battalion (F-59)

Sergeant

Radio operator-mechanic (CP)(174)

0 1

Corporal

Radio operator (CP)(776)

2 6

(i) Tank Company, Tank Battalion (F-76)

Corporal

Radio operator-mechanic (CP)(174)

0 1

Private First Class/Private

Radio operator (CP)(776)

0 2

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PRESENT RECOMMENDED
ALLOWANCE ALLOWANCE

(j) Headquarters and Service Company, Tank Battalion(F-79)

Corporal		
Radio operator-mechanic (CP)(174)	0	2
Private First Class/Private		
Radio operator (CP)(776)	2	4

(k) Marine Observation Squadron - VMO

Warrant Officer		
Communication	0	1
Staff Sergeant		
Communication Chief (CP)(542)	0	1
Sergeant		
Radio operator-mechanic (CP)(174)	0	1
Corporal		
Radio operator (CP)(776)	0	2
Private First Class/Private		
Radio operator (CP)(776)	0	4

(l) Amphibian Truck Company (E-705)

Corporal		
Radio operator-mechanic (CP)(174)	0	1

(m) Provisional Rocket Detachment

Sergeant		
Radio operator-mechanic (CP)(174)	1	1
Corporal		
Radio operator (CP)(776)	2	3
Private First Class/Private		
Radio operator (CP)(776)	3	8

2. TABLES OF ALLOWANCES. - The following changes in Tables of Allowances are recommended. These changes are based not only on the experience gained in the IWO JIMA Operation, but on the experience gained from the three preceding operations of this Division. The possibility of extended operations on large land masses has been considered in formulating these recommendations:

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PRESENT ALLOWANCE RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE

(a) Division Signal Company

SIG-62	Case MCS-3	8	0
SIG-64	Chest BC-5	40	50
SIG-87	Gas Driven Generator EF	3	6
SIG-97	Head & Chest Set MHS-9	6	10
SIG-100	Holder M-167	15	50
SIG-110	Kit, Crystal Group NN	50	0
SIG-111	Kit, Crystal Group OO	50	0
SIG-121	Lantern TL-303/U	55	100
SIG-141	Motor Generator EG	2	6
SIG-146	Panel Set AP-30-C	15*	4
SIG-147	Panel Set AP-30-D	15*	4
SIG-152/8	Plow LC-61	0	2
SIG-162	Power Unit PE-95	2	5
-----	Radio Set RBY	0	1
SIG-192	Radio Set SCR-300	30*	40*
-----	Radio Set SCR-399	1	2
SIG-196	Radio Set SCR-510	0	6*
SIG-204	Radio Set SCR-608		
	(in Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C)	0	1
	(in Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4)	3	10*
SIG-205	Radio Set SCR-610	6	30*
SIG-206	Radio Set SCR-624	2	0
SIG-207	Radio Set TCS		
	(in Carrier, Cargo M-29-C)	0	1
	(in Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4)	7	12*
SIG-208	Receiver Power Unit EL	2	6
-----	Shelter HO-17	0	3
SIG-220	Signal Lamp Equipment EE-84	15*	4
SIG-221	Signal Lamp Equipment SE-11	50*	10*
SIG-235	Stamp MC-181	1	3
SIG-237	Steel Helmet, Navy Type	18	0
SIG-248	Telegraph Printer EE-97	2	5
SIG-249	Telegraph Set TG-5	8	4
SIG-278	Tool Equipment TE-50	1	2
SIG-285	Typewriter, Standard, W.U. Type	5	8
SIG-301/2	Wire, W-143 on DR-5, Miles	0	100
-----	Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C	0	3

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ANNEX EAST TO DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

		<u>PRESENT ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE</u>
-----	Clock, 8-day	0	2
3208-33	Desk, field	3	6
-----	Duplicator, Fluid Process, Model SW	0	2
3091-29	Equipment, Drafting, Company, Set	0	1
3091-30	Expendable Supplies, Equip- ment, Drafting, Company, Set	0	1
2184-5	Fuse, Electric, Plug, 10- Amp, 125-Volt	0	100
2184-18	Insulator, Porcelain, Split Knob, 1-3/16" x 1-3/4" f/ No 12 to 14 Wire, w/Nail and Leather Washer	0	200
-----	Gun, Submachine, Cal. .45, Thompson, M1A1	0	7#
3154-69	Kit, Tool, Chassis and Motor Repair, Mechanic's, Complete	0	4
2184-7	Lamp, Electric, 60-Watt, 115-Volt, Medium Screw Base	0	100
-----	Lettering Set, Leroy	0	1
1097	Pistol, Automatic, Cal..45, M1911, w/1 Magazine	0	50#
2184-10	Socket, Weather-proof, Com- position, Medium Screw Base	0	50
2184-19	Switch, Entrance, Plug Fuse, 30-Amp, 125-Volt, Double Pole, 2-wire	0	12
3208-52	Table, Folding	1	7
-----	Trailer, 1/2-ton, 2-wheel, cargo (for Company Hq)	0	5
-----	Trailer, 1/2-ton, 2-wheel, greas- ing (for Company Hq)	0	1
-----	Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo (for Company Hq)	4	5
-----	Truck, 1/2-ton, 4x4, (for Company Hq)	13	16
-----	Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo (for Company Hq)	0	4

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		<u>PRESENT ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE</u>
-----	Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6 cargo (for Company Hq)	8	10
-----	Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, amphibian (for Company Hq)	0	2
-----	Typewriter, Portable	0	3
2184-29	Wire, Copper, Solid, No.14 B&S Gauge, Rubber Covered, Double Braided, Ft (On reel, 3000 Ft to reel)	0	3000

(* Includes Division Emergency Pool)

(# Company allowances of carbines to be reduced accordingly)

(b) Joint Assault Signal Company

(1) Shore and Beach Party Section

SIG-192	Radio Set SCR-300	0	7
SIG-205	Radio Set SCR-610	0	3
SIG-207/2	Radio Set TBX	20	10
SIG-218	Seat FN-1/GR	20	10
SIG-252	Telephone Central Office Set TC-4	0	1

(2) Shore Fire Control Section

SIG-87	Gas Driven Generator EF	0	4
SIG-100	Holder M-167	0	26
SIG-121	Lantern TL-303/U	0	26
SIG-188/8	Radio Set RBZ	0	5
SIG-192	Radio Set SCR-300	0	18
SIG-198	Radio Set SCR-536	26	18
SIG-207/2	Radio Set TBX	26	35
SIG-207/4	Radio Set TCS (in Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4)	0	13
SIG-218	Seat FN-1/GR	26	35
-----	Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4, Cargo	26	13
-----	Radar Beacon Mark II	0	4

(3) Air Liaison Section

SIG-85	Frequency Meter Set SCR-211	12	0
SIG-100	Holder M-167	0	26
SIG-121	Lantern, TL-303/U	12	27
-----	Radio Set AN/TRC-7	0	13

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

	<u>PRESENT ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE</u>
SIG-188/3 Radio Set MAQ	1	0
SIG-188/8 Radio Set RBZ	0	14
----- Radio Set SCR-299/542	0	1
SIG-207/2 Radio Set TBX	12	27
SIG-207/4 Radio Set TCS (in Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4)	0	5
SIG-218 Seat FN-1/GR	12	27

a. The recommended changes in the JASCO Tables of Allowances will provide the necessary equipment for the following functional radio teams:

1. Battalion Air Liaison Party:
SAR/SAD Net Team (AN/VRC-1, TBX,
AN/TRC-7)
SAO Net Team (TBX)
Monitoring (RBZ)
2. Regimental Air Liaison Party:
SAR/SAD Net Team (AN/VRC-1, TBX,
AN/TRC-7)
SAO Net Team (TCS, TBX)
Monitoring (RBZ)
3. Division Air Liaison Party:
SAR/SAD Net Team (SCR-299/542, TBX,
AN/TRC-7)
SAD Secondary Net Team (TCS, TBX)
SAO Net Team (TCS, TBX)
Monitoring (2 RBZ)
4. Battalion SFC Spotter Party:
SFC Net Team (TBX, SCR-300, SCR-536)
5. Battalion NGF Liaison Party:
SFC Net Team (TCS, TBX, SCR-300, SCR-536)
Division NGF Common Net Team (TBX)
6. Regimental NGF Liaison Party:
NGF Control Net Team (TCS, TBX)
Division NGF Common Net Team (TBX)
Beacon Team (Beacon)
Monitoring (RBZ)

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

7. Division NGF Liaison Party:
NGF Control Net Team (TCS, TBX)
Division NGF Common Net Team (TBX)
Beacon Team (Beacon)
Monitoring (2 RBZ)

(AN/TRC-7 is a newly developed portable radio set in the 100-156 MC band.)

Platoon (c) Headquarters Company, Infantry Battalion (Communication)

		<u>PRESENT ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE</u>
SIG-192	Radio Set SCR-300	9	12
SIG-204	Radio Set SCR-608		
	(in Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4x4)	0	1
SIG-237	Steel Helmet, Navy Type	5	0
SIG-249	Telegraph Set TG-5	2	0
-----	Carrier, Cargo M-29-C	0	1

Section (d) Weapons Company, Infantry Regiment (Communication)

SIG-97	Head and Chest Set MHS-9	2	0
SIG-237	Steel Helmet, Navy Type	8	0

(Communication Platoon) (e) Headquarters and Service Company, Infantry Regiment

SIG-207/4	Radio Set TCS		
	(in Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4x4)	2	3
SIG-249	Telegraph Set TG-5	4	0
-----	Carrier, Cargo M-29-C	0	2
-----	Trailer, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 2-wheel, cargo	0	2

Battalion (Communication Platoon) (f) Headquarters and Service Battery, 105mm Howitzer

-----	Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C	0	1
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Battalion (Communication Platoon) (g) Headquarters and Service Battery, 155mm Howitzer

-----	Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C	0	1
-------	------------------------	---	---

(Communication Platoon) (h) Headquarters and Service Battery, Artillery Regiment

-----	Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C	0	2
-------	------------------------	---	---

(i) Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Battalion

SIG-192	Radio Set SCR-300	8	12
SIG-196	Radio Set SCR-510	0	1%

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

		PRESENT ALLOWANCE	RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE
	SIG-207/2 Radio Set TBX	1	5
	SIG-218 Seat FN-1/GR	1	5
	(% Contingent on approval of issue of Engineer-Armored vehicles to Engineer Battalion)		
<u>Battalion</u>	(j) <u>Headquarters and Service Company, Motor Transport</u>		
	SIG-50/5 Book, Signal Failure Report PM-4	0	2
	SIG-207/4 Radio, Set TCS, (in Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4x4)	2	5
	(in Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C)	0	1
	SIG-274 Tool Equipment TE-36	0	1
	(k) <u>Amphibian Truck Company</u>		
	SIG-50/5 Book, Signal Failure Report PM-4	0	1
	SIG-205 Radio Set SCR-610	0	6
	SIG-274 Tool Equipment TE-36	0	1
	(l) <u>Provisional Rocket Detachment</u>		
	SIG-50/5 Book, Signal Failure Report PM-4	0	2
	SIG-64 Chest BC-5	0	1
	SIG-95/5 Head & Chest Set H-25/GT	0	4
	SIG-100 Holder M-167	0	3
	SIG-192 Radio Set SCR-300	0	5
	SIG-198 Radio Set SCR-536	0	6
	SIG-204 Radio Set SCR-608 (in Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4x4)	0	3
	SIG-209 Reel Equipment CE-11	0	4
	SIG-274 Tool Equipment TE-36	0	1
	SIG-301 Wire W-130	0	4
	(m) <u>Marine Observation Squadron - VMO</u>		
	SIG-50/5 Book, Failure Report PM-4	0	2
	SIG-64 Chest BC-5	0	1
	SIG-85 Frequency Meter Set SCR-211	0	1
	SIG-100 Holder M-167	0	2
	SIG-274 Tool Equipment TE-36	0	1

(1) Automatic items have not been included in the above recommendations. The allowances of all such items should be changed in conformity with the above recommendations and in conformity with the recommendations for changes in Tables of Organization.

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

(n) It is recommended that the present basis of issue of wrist watches, 15 to 17 jewel, with wristlet, be broadened so as to provide the following additional distribution:

1 per message center enlisted below staff grade.

3. NEW EQUIPMENT - The following recommendations for the expeditious development of issue of new types of signal equipment are based upon the extensive combat experience of this Division. They envisage future operations on large land masses as well as small highly fortified islands.

(a) The TCS remote should provide interphone facilities.

(b) An ultra-portable voice scrambler should be provided for all types of radio equipment from SCR-610 to SCR-399. It is believed that the Army has developed such a scrambler with sufficient security for tactical communications.

(c) Radio teletype equipment should be issued to the Division Signal Company for use with the next higher echelon of command.

(d) Issue of Radio Set SCR-619 to replace Radio Set SCR-610 should be expedited, with priority to artillery forward observer teams.

(e) Every effort should be made to expedite the development and issue of lightweight switchboards for Battalions and Regiments.

(f) An ultra-portable tape facsimile machine should be provided to replace the telegraph between Division and Regiments. It is believed that the Army has developed such a device.

(g) If Air Liaison Parties are to control air strikes in future operations, a portable VHF radio set, such as the Army's new AN/TRC-7, should be provided for each party to supplement the vehicular AN/VRC-1.

(h) There is an immediate and urgent need for the development of a radio set similar in design to the SCR-300 but operating on frequencies from 48 to at least 60 megacycles.

(i) Electronic balloon tracking equipment, such as SCR-658, should be furnished to the Artillery Regiment.

4. MODIFICATIONS TO PRESENT EQUIPMENT

(a) The cable connectors for the SCR-510/610 should be

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

thoroughly protected from saltwater corrosion.

(b) The hand generator of the EE-8B field telephone "freezes" after being subjected to dampness. More thorough moisture proofing is necessary.

(c) At present Drum DR-8 is issued with only one-quarter mile of W-130 wire. The DR-8 should be issued completely filled with W-130.

(d) The Sound Power Handset TS-10 and Reel RL-39 should be issued as separate Table of Allowance items rather than combined as Reel Equipment CE-11. The allowances of TS-10's should be double the present allowances of CE-11's, and the replenishment rate on the TS-10 should be at least 25%.

(e) Staggered clips should be provided on the TS-10 to reduce the possibility of shorting out the line, a frequent and annoying occurrence at present.

(f) The high-speed coils of W-130 wire should be lighter and less bulky than the present one-mile coil. A one-half or three-quarter mile coil is recommended. The metal housing for the coil should be of stronger material.

(g) Headset MHS-11 should replace all types of radio headsets now in use and should become the standard Marine Corps headset.

(h) Microphone MT-1 should be provided with a hand-holder for the microphone button, and should be standardized as the universal microphone for the Marine Corps, replacing all types now in use.

5. PLANNING

(a) The effective shackle numeral cipher for each operation should be printed on water-resistant paper and distributed in ready-to-use form by Landing Force or higher echelon. A distribution of 1200 copies of each day's shackle grid is recommended for each Division.

(b) In assigning SCR-300 channels, adjacent channels should not be allocated to a Division. Channels should be separated as widely as possible within each Division to minimize interference.

(c) Divisions should be given more definite instructions as to which cryptographic channels are to be carried on an operation.

(d) While the present method of station authentication is

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

very good, a more secure system can be provided with slight modification. It is recommended that the challenging station send four random letters, instead of three, and that the challenged station reply by transmitting four letters which "touch" the challenge letters in the effective shackle grid, but transmitting them in reverse order.

(e) A Radio Intelligence Platoon should be attached to each Division Signal Company.

6. TRAINING

(a) Navajo Indian talkers should be thoroughly trained in voice radio procedure and should be trained in a standard Navajo military vocabulary. Voice radio nets for training Navajos should be established between Divisions in rear areas.

(b) The radio countermeasures instruction conducted by FMF Pacific should be continued.

(c) FMF Pacific should continue and extend the training courses in the operation and maintenance of new types of equipment.

(d) FMF Pacific schools should be established for basic re-training of Air Liaison and Shore Fire Control Sections of the Joint Assault Signal Companies between operations.

7. REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL - TRAINING

(a) All replacement communication personnel should have a working knowledge of signal equipment used by Fleet Marine Force units prior to joining a combat organization. Repair personnel, especially, should be schooled in the maintenance of signal equipment used in the Division. If this training cannot be accomplished in the United States, it should be undertaken at FMF Pacific.

(b) Non-commissioned officers in replacement drafts should be able to assume duties commensurate with their rank when transferred to communication organizations in combat.

(c) Replacement personnel should be received in sufficient time prior to an operation to permit proper orientation and training.

8. REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL - ASSIGNMENT

(a) It is recommended that all Replacement Draft communication personnel be released for assignment to the Signal Company for training prior to an operation, and for cooperation with the

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ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

Signal Company.


9. REHEARSAL

(a) Rehearsal plans should provide for the exercise of signal supply and communication personnel replacement functions by assessing casualties to both equipment and personnel.

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SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF 4th MAR DIV TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATION ABOARD USS BAYFIELD (APA 33)




APPENDIX I TO ANNEX EASY
TO 4th MAR DIV OPN REPORT
ON IWO JIMA OPN

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
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF 4th MAR DIV (ADC-GP) TACTICAL COMMUNICATION INSTALLATION ABOARD USS MELLETTE (APA 156)



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SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF 4th MAR DIV (ADC-GP) TACTICAL COMMUNICATION INSTALLATION ABOARD USS MELLETTE (APA 156)



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APPENDIX C TO ANNEX EASY TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION

OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA

REPAIR OPERATIONS BY DIVISION SIGNAL REPAIR SHOP

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TURNUED IN FOR REPAIR</u>	<u>RETURNED TO SERVICE</u>
Handset TS-15-A	129	118
Head & Chest Set HS-19	22	20
Head & Chest Set H-25/GT	25	21
Public Address System MPA-1	1	1
Radio Set AN/VRC-1	6	6
Radio Set SCR-284	5	5
Radio Set SCR-300	204	187
Radio Set SCR-536	250	217
Radio Set SCR-610	103	91
Radio Set TBX	56	52
Radio Set TCS	33	28
Switchboard BD-71	19	18
Switchboard BD-72	4	4
Telephone EE-8	238	195

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